linker: Allow an app to update it's own LD_LIBRARY_PATH
When the kernel executes a program which is setuid, setgid, has
file capabilities, or causes an SELinux domain transition, the
AT_SECURE flag is set. This flag instructs the dynamic linker to
prune any dangerous environment variables passed across security
boundaries.
For SELinux in particular, whether this flag is set depends on the
the "noatsecure" process permission. If that permission does not
exist, then AT_SECURE=1 whenever a domain transition occurs.
In https://android-review.googlesource.com/129971 , Android stopped
using noatsecure when executing init services. In
https://android-review.googlesource.com/130610 , init was flipped
back into SELinux enforcing mode, making ag/129971 active. The
combination of those two changes ensured that AT_SECURE=1 was
set when executing init spawned services.
In particular, AT_SECURE=1 is set when init executes zygote. Due to
the forking nature of zygote, AT_SECURE remains untouched when
executing zygote's children.
This causes problems for the code added in
https://android-review.googlesource.com/48409 . Specifically, if
AT_SECURE=1, an attempt to call android_update_LD_LIBRARY_PATH()
is silently ignored. This causes problems when art tries to adjust
the LD_LIBRARY_PATH for Android apps. Ultimately, apps are unable
to find shared libraries they depend on.
As discussed in bug 7896159, there's no security reason for
preventing an application from updating it's own LD_LIBRARY_PATH.
We only need to prune LD_LIBRARY_PATH when transitioning across
security boundaries, but not when we're entirely within a security
boundary.
Remove the AT_SECURE check within do_android_update_LD_LIBRARY_PATH().
It's unneeded and prevents an application from modifying it's own
LD_LIBRARY_PATH. This allows an application to specify a location
where it's dlopen()ed shared libraries should be loaded from.
There is no change to AT_SECURE handling in
__sanitize_environment_variables(). We continue to honor it there
to prevent using security sensitive environment variables across
an exec boundary.
Bug: 19559835
Change-Id: If4af2ee8e84265aaa0c93de8b281208b20d7942a
diff --git a/linker/linker.cpp b/linker/linker.cpp
index 87fce95..9ba83ec 100644
--- a/linker/linker.cpp
+++ b/linker/linker.cpp
@@ -1241,9 +1241,7 @@
}
void do_android_update_LD_LIBRARY_PATH(const char* ld_library_path) {
- if (!get_AT_SECURE()) {
- parse_LD_LIBRARY_PATH(ld_library_path);
- }
+ parse_LD_LIBRARY_PATH(ld_library_path);
}
soinfo* do_dlopen(const char* name, int flags, const android_dlextinfo* extinfo) {