Comment out ->buf_filled_len in pattern fill
It's buggy, needs to be debugged. Disable for now. It can cause
verify failures.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com>
diff --git a/verify.c b/verify.c
index eb8da58..a7344e3 100644
--- a/verify.c
+++ b/verify.c
@@ -39,23 +39,38 @@
io_u->rand_seed = fill_random_buf(p, len);
break;
case 1:
+ /*
+ * See below write barrier comment
+ */
+#if 0
+ read_barrier();
if (io_u->buf_filled_len >= len) {
dprint(FD_VERIFY, "using already filled verify pattern b=0 len=%u\n", len);
return;
}
+#endif
dprint(FD_VERIFY, "fill verify pattern b=0 len=%u\n", len);
memset(p, td->o.verify_pattern[0], len);
+ /*
+ * We need to ensure that the pattern stores are seen before
+ * the fill length store, or we could observe headers that
+ * aren't valid to the extent notified by the fill length
+ */
+ write_barrier();
io_u->buf_filled_len = len;
break;
default: {
unsigned int i = 0, size = 0;
unsigned char *b = p;
+#if 0
+ read_barrier();
if (io_u->buf_filled_len >= len) {
dprint(FD_VERIFY, "using already filled verify pattern b=%d len=%u\n",
td->o.verify_pattern_bytes, len);
return;
}
+#endif
dprint(FD_VERIFY, "fill verify pattern b=%d len=%u\n",
td->o.verify_pattern_bytes, len);
@@ -66,6 +81,7 @@
memcpy(b+i, td->o.verify_pattern, size);
i += size;
}
+ write_barrier();
io_u->buf_filled_len = len;
break;
}