external/openssh: update to 6.8p1.
In preparation for some updates to external/openssh to make it work with
BoringSSL, this change updates the code to a recent version. The current
version (5.9p1) is coming up on four years old now.
* Confirmed that f5c67b478bef9992de9e9ec91ce10af4f6205e0d matches
OpenSSH 5.9p1 exactly (save for the removal of the scard
subdirectory).
* Downloaded openssh-6.8p1.tar.gz (SHA256:
3ff64ce73ee124480b5bf767b9830d7d3c03bbcb6abe716b78f0192c37ce160e)
and verified with PGP signature. (I've verified Damien's key in
person previously.)
* Applied changes between f5c67b478bef9992de9e9ec91ce10af4f6205e0d and
OpenSSH 5.9p1 to 6.8p1 and updated the build as best I can. The
ugliest change is probably the duplication of umac.c to umac128.c
because Android conditionally compiles that file twice. See the
comment in those files.
Change-Id: I63cb07a8118afb5a377f116087a0882914cea486
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index a9577a0..2947eb0 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.115 2011/06/23 23:35:42 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.145 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
#include <sys/wait.h>
@@ -40,9 +39,13 @@
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
@@ -56,7 +59,9 @@
#include <skey.h>
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
@@ -84,6 +89,7 @@
#include "sshlogin.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#include "monitor_mm.h"
@@ -92,11 +98,12 @@
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
-#include "misc.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "jpake.h"
#include "roaming.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
@@ -105,38 +112,13 @@
/* Imports */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern u_int utmp_len;
-extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
-extern z_stream incoming_stream;
-extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
extern u_char session_id[];
extern Buffer auth_debug;
extern int auth_debug_init;
extern Buffer loginmsg;
/* State exported from the child */
-
-struct {
- z_stream incoming;
- z_stream outgoing;
- u_char *keyin;
- u_int keyinlen;
- u_char *keyout;
- u_int keyoutlen;
- u_char *ivin;
- u_int ivinlen;
- u_char *ivout;
- u_int ivoutlen;
- u_char *ssh1key;
- u_int ssh1keylen;
- int ssh1cipher;
- int ssh1protoflags;
- u_char *input;
- u_int ilen;
- u_char *output;
- u_int olen;
- u_int64_t sent_bytes;
- u_int64_t recv_bytes;
-} child_state;
+static struct sshbuf *child_state;
/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
@@ -160,11 +142,6 @@
int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_jpake_step1(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_jpake_step2(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int, Buffer *);
#ifdef USE_PAM
int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *);
@@ -190,7 +167,10 @@
static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
static Authctxt *authctxt;
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
+#endif
/* local state for key verify */
static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
@@ -199,6 +179,7 @@
static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
static char *auth_method = "unknown";
+static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
@@ -219,7 +200,9 @@
#define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
+#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
@@ -252,18 +235,13 @@
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
#endif
-#ifdef JPAKE
- {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
- {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_jpake_step1},
- {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_step2},
- {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm},
- {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm},
-#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
@@ -276,6 +254,7 @@
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
{MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
{MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
{MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
@@ -303,10 +282,12 @@
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
#endif
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
{MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
{MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
@@ -314,6 +295,7 @@
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
#endif
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -352,7 +334,7 @@
monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct mon_table *ent;
- int authenticated = 0;
+ int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
debug3("preauth child monitor started");
@@ -379,8 +361,26 @@
/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
while (!authenticated) {
+ partial = 0;
auth_method = "unknown";
+ auth_submethod = NULL;
authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
+
+ /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
+ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+ if (!compat20)
+ fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
+ "with SSH protocol 1");
+ if (authenticated &&
+ !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
+ auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
+ debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
+ auth_method);
+ authenticated = 0;
+ partial = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
if (authenticated) {
if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
@@ -401,28 +401,14 @@
}
#endif
}
-
if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
- auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
- compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
+ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
+ auth_method, auth_submethod);
if (!authenticated)
authctxt->failures++;
}
-#ifdef JPAKE
- /* Cleanup JPAKE context after authentication */
- if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
- if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
- jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
- authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
- }
- }
-#endif
}
- /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
- while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
- ;
-
if (!authctxt->valid)
fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
@@ -433,6 +419,10 @@
mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
+ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ ;
+
close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
@@ -460,6 +450,9 @@
signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
+#ifdef SIGXFSZ
+ signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
+#endif
if (compat20) {
mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
@@ -479,9 +472,6 @@
for (;;)
monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
-
- close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
- pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
}
void
@@ -493,6 +483,27 @@
}
}
+/* Allocation functions for zlib */
+static void *
+mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
+{
+ size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
+ void *address;
+
+ if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size)
+ fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
+
+ address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
+
+ return (address);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
+{
+ mm_free(mm, address);
+}
+
static int
monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
@@ -507,6 +518,7 @@
if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
if (errno == EPIPE) {
+ buffer_free(&logmsg);
debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
@@ -534,7 +546,7 @@
do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
buffer_free(&logmsg);
- xfree(msg);
+ free(msg);
return 0;
}
@@ -549,7 +561,7 @@
struct pollfd pfd[2];
for (;;) {
- bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd));
+ memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
@@ -625,12 +637,9 @@
monitor_reset_key_state(void)
{
/* reset state */
- if (key_blob != NULL)
- xfree(key_blob);
- if (hostbased_cuser != NULL)
- xfree(hostbased_cuser);
- if (hostbased_chost != NULL)
- xfree(hostbased_chost);
+ free(key_blob);
+ free(hostbased_cuser);
+ free(hostbased_chost);
key_blob = NULL;
key_bloblen = 0;
key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
@@ -638,6 +647,7 @@
hostbased_chost = NULL;
}
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int
mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
@@ -672,27 +682,62 @@
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
return (0);
}
+#endif
int
mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
- Key *key;
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ struct sshbuf *sigbuf;
u_char *p;
u_char *signature;
- u_int siglen, datlen;
- int keyid;
+ size_t datlen, siglen;
+ int r, keyid, is_proof = 0;
+ const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
debug3("%s", __func__);
- keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
- p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/*
* Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
* SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
+ *
+ * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
+ * proof.
+ *
+ * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
+ * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
+ * than the full kex structure...
*/
- if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64)
- fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
+ if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
+ /*
+ * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
+ * the client sent us.
+ */
+ if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
+ fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
+ if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
+ if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
+ session_id2_len) != 0) ||
+ (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
+ "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
+ memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
+ __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
+ sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ is_proof = 1;
+ }
/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
if (session_id2_len == 0) {
@@ -701,18 +746,30 @@
memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
}
- if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL)
+ if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen,
+ datafellows)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
+ auth_sock > 0) {
+ if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
+ p, datlen, datafellows)) != 0) {
+ fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ } else
fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
- if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
- fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
- debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen);
+ debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
+ is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen);
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- xfree(p);
- xfree(signature);
+ free(p);
+ free(signature);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
@@ -743,7 +800,7 @@
authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
- xfree(username);
+ free(username);
buffer_clear(m);
@@ -761,10 +818,10 @@
buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
-#ifdef HAVE_PW_GECOS_IN_PASSWD
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
#endif
buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
@@ -785,7 +842,17 @@
COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
#undef M_CP_STROPT
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
-
+
+ /* Create valid auth method lists */
+ if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
+ * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
+ * authentication to succeed.
+ */
+ debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
+ }
+
debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
@@ -813,9 +880,7 @@
banner = auth2_read_banner();
buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
-
- if (banner != NULL)
- xfree(banner);
+ free(banner);
return (0);
}
@@ -831,7 +896,7 @@
__func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
- xfree(authctxt->style);
+ free(authctxt->style);
authctxt->style = NULL;
}
@@ -847,16 +912,16 @@
u_int plen;
passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
+#if !defined(ANDROID)
/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
-#ifndef ANDROID
- /* no password authentication in android */
authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
#else
+ /* no password authentication in Android. */
authenticated = 0;
#endif
- memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
- xfree(passwd);
+ explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
+ free(passwd);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
@@ -896,10 +961,10 @@
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
if (success) {
- xfree(name);
- xfree(infotxt);
- xfree(prompts);
- xfree(echo_on);
+ free(name);
+ free(infotxt);
+ free(prompts);
+ free(echo_on);
}
return (0);
@@ -919,7 +984,7 @@
auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
authctxt->as = NULL;
debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
- xfree(response);
+ free(response);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, authok);
@@ -927,7 +992,11 @@
debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
- auth_method = "bsdauth";
+ if (compat20) {
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
+ } else
+ auth_method = "bsdauth";
return (authok != 0);
}
@@ -968,7 +1037,7 @@
skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
- xfree(response);
+ free(response);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, authok);
@@ -1053,20 +1122,19 @@
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, ret);
buffer_put_cstring(m, name);
- xfree(name);
+ free(name);
buffer_put_cstring(m, info);
- xfree(info);
+ free(info);
buffer_put_int(m, num);
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[i]);
- xfree(prompts[i]);
+ free(prompts[i]);
buffer_put_int(m, echo_on[i]);
}
- if (prompts != NULL)
- xfree(prompts);
- if (echo_on != NULL)
- xfree(echo_on);
- auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
+ free(prompts);
+ free(echo_on);
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod = "pam";
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
return (0);
}
@@ -1087,15 +1155,16 @@
resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
- xfree(resp[i]);
- xfree(resp);
+ free(resp[i]);
+ free(resp);
} else {
ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
}
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, ret);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
- auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod = "pam";
if (ret == 0)
sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
return (0);
@@ -1109,7 +1178,8 @@
(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
buffer_clear(m);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
- auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod = "pam";
return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
}
#endif
@@ -1140,20 +1210,37 @@
debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
+ /* These should not make it past the privsep child */
+ if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
+ (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
+
switch (type) {
case MM_USERKEY:
allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
+ !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
+ match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+ options.pubkey_key_types,
+ strlen(options.pubkey_key_types), 0) == 1 &&
user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
+ pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
auth_method = "publickey";
if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
auth_clear_options();
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
+ match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+ options.hostbased_key_types,
+ strlen(options.hostbased_key_types), 0) == 1 &&
hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
cuser, chost, key);
+ pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
+ "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
+ cuser, chost);
auth_method = "hostbased";
break;
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
@@ -1163,6 +1250,7 @@
auth_clear_options();
auth_method = "rsa";
break;
+#endif
default:
fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
break;
@@ -1183,10 +1271,10 @@
hostbased_chost = chost;
} else {
/* Log failed attempt */
- auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
- xfree(blob);
- xfree(cuser);
- xfree(chost);
+ auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
+ free(blob);
+ free(cuser);
+ free(chost);
}
debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
@@ -1208,7 +1296,7 @@
monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
Buffer b;
- char *p;
+ char *p, *userstyle;
u_int len;
int fail = 0;
@@ -1229,26 +1317,30 @@
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
- xfree(p);
+ free(p);
}
if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
+ p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
+ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+ if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
- authctxt->user, p);
+ userstyle, p);
fail++;
}
- xfree(p);
+ free(userstyle);
+ free(p);
buffer_skip_string(&b);
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
fail++;
} else {
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
fail++;
- xfree(p);
+ free(p);
if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
fail++;
buffer_skip_string(&b);
@@ -1265,7 +1357,7 @@
char *chost)
{
Buffer b;
- char *p;
+ char *p, *userstyle;
u_int len;
int fail = 0;
@@ -1277,22 +1369,26 @@
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
- xfree(p);
+ free(p);
if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
+ p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
+ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+ if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
- authctxt->user, p);
+ userstyle, p);
fail++;
}
- xfree(p);
+ free(userstyle);
+ free(p);
buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
fail++;
- xfree(p);
+ free(p);
buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
@@ -1302,13 +1398,13 @@
p[len - 1] = '\0';
if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
fail++;
- xfree(p);
+ free(p);
/* verify client user */
p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
fail++;
- xfree(p);
+ free(p);
if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
fail++;
@@ -1356,10 +1452,15 @@
debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
__func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
- key_free(key);
- xfree(blob);
- xfree(signature);
- xfree(data);
+ /* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
+ if (verified == 1)
+ auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
+ else
+ key_free(key);
+
+ free(blob);
+ free(signature);
+ free(data);
auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
@@ -1487,10 +1588,11 @@
if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
mm_session_close(s);
buffer_clear(m);
- xfree(tty);
+ free(tty);
return (0);
}
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
int
mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
@@ -1619,7 +1721,7 @@
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
- xfree(blob);
+ free(blob);
key_free(key);
return (0);
}
@@ -1651,9 +1753,9 @@
fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
- xfree(blob);
+ free(blob);
key_free(key);
- xfree(response);
+ free(response);
auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
@@ -1668,6 +1770,7 @@
return (success);
}
+#endif
int
mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
@@ -1732,7 +1835,7 @@
cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
/* sanity check command, if so how? */
audit_run_command(cmd);
- xfree(cmd);
+ free(cmd);
return (0);
}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
@@ -1740,95 +1843,40 @@
void
monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
- if (compat20) {
- set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
- set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
- } else {
- packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
- packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key,
- child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher);
- xfree(child_state.ssh1key);
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ struct kex *kex;
+ int r;
+
+ debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshbuf_free(child_state);
+ child_state = NULL;
+
+ if ((kex = ssh->kex) != 0) {
+ /* XXX set callbacks */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+# endif
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
+ kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+ kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+ kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+ kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
}
- /* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */
- packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
- xfree(child_state.keyout);
- packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
- xfree(child_state.keyin);
-
- if (!compat20) {
- packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
- xfree(child_state.ivout);
- packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
- xfree(child_state.ivin);
- }
-
- memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
- sizeof(incoming_stream));
- memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
- sizeof(outgoing_stream));
-
/* Update with new address */
- if (options.compression)
- mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
-
- /* Network I/O buffers */
- /* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
- buffer_clear(packet_get_input());
- buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
- memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
- xfree(child_state.input);
-
- buffer_clear(packet_get_output());
- buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output,
- child_state.olen);
- memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
- xfree(child_state.output);
-
- /* Roaming */
- if (compat20)
- roam_set_bytes(child_state.sent_bytes, child_state.recv_bytes);
-}
-
-static Kex *
-mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
-{
- Kex *kex;
- void *blob;
- u_int bloblen;
-
- kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
- kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
- if (session_id2 == NULL ||
- kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len ||
- timingsafe_bcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)
- fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
- kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
- kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
- buffer_init(&kex->my);
- buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
- xfree(blob);
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
- buffer_init(&kex->peer);
- buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
- xfree(blob);
- kex->done = 1;
- kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
- kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
- kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
- kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
-
- return (kex);
+ if (options.compression) {
+ ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib,
+ (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
+ (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
+ }
}
/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
@@ -1836,118 +1884,16 @@
void
mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
- Buffer m;
- u_char *blob, *p;
- u_int bloblen, plen;
- u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
- u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
-
debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
- buffer_init(&m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
- if (!compat20) {
- child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
- child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
- child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m,
- &child_state.ssh1keylen);
- child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
- &child_state.ivoutlen);
- child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
- goto skip;
- } else {
- /* Get the Kex for rekeying */
- *pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
- }
-
- blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
- current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
- xfree(blob);
-
- debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
- blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
- current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
- xfree(blob);
-
- /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
- seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
- blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
- bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
- seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
- blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
- bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- packet_set_state(MODE_IN, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
-
- skip:
- /* Get the key context */
- child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
- child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
-
- debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__);
- /* Get compression state */
- p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
- if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
- fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
- memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
- xfree(p);
-
- p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
- if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
- fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
- memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
- xfree(p);
-
- /* Network I/O buffers */
- debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__);
- child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
- child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
-
- /* Roaming */
- if (compat20) {
- child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
- }
-
- buffer_free(&m);
+ if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
+ child_state);
+ debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
}
-/* Allocation functions for zlib */
-void *
-mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
-{
- size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
- void *address;
-
- if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size)
- fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
-
- address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
-
- return (address);
-}
-
-void
-mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
-{
- mm_free(mm, address);
-}
-
-void
-mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
-{
- outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
- outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
- outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
-
- incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
- incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
- incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
-}
-
/* XXX */
#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
@@ -1983,6 +1929,7 @@
struct monitor *
monitor_init(void)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct monitor *mon;
mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
@@ -1995,7 +1942,9 @@
mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
/* Compression needs to share state across borders */
- mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
+ ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib,
+ (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
+ (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
}
return mon;
@@ -2020,7 +1969,7 @@
major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
- xfree(goid.elements);
+ free(goid.elements);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, major);
@@ -2045,7 +1994,7 @@
in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
in.length = len;
major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
- xfree(in.value);
+ free(in.value);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, major);
@@ -2077,8 +2026,8 @@
ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
- xfree(gssbuf.value);
- xfree(mic.value);
+ free(gssbuf.value);
+ free(mic.value);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, ret);
@@ -2111,205 +2060,3 @@
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
-#ifdef JPAKE
-int
-mm_answer_jpake_step1(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
- u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
- u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
-
- if (!options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
- fatal("zero_knowledge_password_authentication disabled");
-
- if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL)
- fatal("%s: authctxt->jpake_ctx already set (%p)",
- __func__, authctxt->jpake_ctx);
- authctxt->jpake_ctx = pctx = jpake_new();
-
- jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
- &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
- &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
- &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
- &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len);
-
- JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step1 done in %s", __func__));
-
- buffer_clear(m);
-
- buffer_put_string(m, pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x3);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x4);
- buffer_put_string(m, x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
- buffer_put_string(m, x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
-
- debug3("%s: sending step1", __func__);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, m);
-
- bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
- bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
- xfree(x3_proof);
- xfree(x4_proof);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 0);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
- char *hash_scheme, *salt;
-
- if (pctx == NULL)
- fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
-
- auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s, &hash_scheme, &salt);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- /* pctx->s is sensitive, not returned to slave */
- buffer_put_cstring(m, hash_scheme);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, salt);
-
- debug3("%s: sending pwdata", __func__);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, m);
-
- bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
- bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
- xfree(hash_scheme);
- xfree(salt);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, 1);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_jpake_step2(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
- u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
- u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
-
- if (pctx == NULL)
- fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
-
- if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
- buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x1);
- buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x2);
- pctx->client_id = buffer_get_string(m, &pctx->client_id_len);
- x1_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x1_proof_len);
- x2_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_proof_len);
-
- jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
- pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
- pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
- pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
- x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
- x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
- &pctx->b,
- &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len);
-
- JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step2 done in %s", __func__));
-
- bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
- bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
- xfree(x1_proof);
- xfree(x2_proof);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
-
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->b);
- buffer_put_string(m, x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
-
- debug3("%s: sending step2", __func__);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, m);
-
- bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
- xfree(x4_s_proof);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, 1);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
- u_char *x2_s_proof;
- u_int x2_s_proof_len;
-
- if (pctx == NULL)
- fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
-
- if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
- buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->a);
- x2_s_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_s_proof_len);
-
- jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
- pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
- pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
- pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
- session_id2, session_id2_len,
- x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
- &pctx->k,
- &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
-
- JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "key_confirm done in %s", __func__));
-
- bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
- buffer_clear(m);
-
- /* pctx->k is sensitive, not sent */
- buffer_put_string(m, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
-
- debug3("%s: sending confirmation hash", __func__);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, m);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, 1);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- int authenticated = 0;
- u_char *peer_confirm_hash;
- u_int peer_confirm_hash_len;
- struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
-
- if (pctx == NULL)
- fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
-
- peer_confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(m, &peer_confirm_hash_len);
-
- authenticated = jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
- pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
- session_id2, session_id2_len,
- peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len) && authctxt->valid;
-
- JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "check_confirm done in %s", __func__));
-
- bzero(peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
- xfree(peer_confirm_hash);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
-
- debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, m);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 1);
-
- auth_method = "jpake-01@openssh.com";
- return authenticated;
-}
-
-#endif /* JPAKE */