Restrict /data/security and setprop selinux.reload_policy access.
Remove /data/security and setprop selinux.reload_policy access
from unconfineddomain, and only add back what is needed to
init (system_server already gets the required allow rules via
the selinux_manage_policy macro).
init (via init.rc post-fs-data) originally creates /data/security
and may later restorecon it. init also sets the property (also from
init.rc post-fs-data) to trigger a reload once /data is mounted.
The system_server (SELinuxPolicyInstallReceiver in particular) creates
subdirectories under /data/security for updates, writes files to these
subdirectories, creates the /data/security/current symlink to the update
directory, and sets the property to trigger a reload when an update bundle
is received.
Add neverallow rules to ensure that we do not allow undesired access
to security_file or security_prop.
This is only truly meaningful if the support for /data/security policies
is restored, but is harmless otherwise.
Also drop the persist.mmac property_contexts entry; it was never used in
AOSP, only in our tree (for middleware MAC) and is obsolete.
Change-Id: I5ad5e3b6fc7abaafd314d31723f37b708d8fcf89
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
5 files changed