#####################################
# domain_trans(olddomain, type, newdomain)
# Allow a transition from olddomain to newdomain
# upon executing a file labeled with type.
# This only allows the transition; it does not
# cause it to occur automatically - use domain_auto_trans
# if that is what you want.
#
define(`domain_trans', `
# Old domain may exec the file and transition to the new domain.
allow $1 $2:file { getattr open read execute };
allow $1 $3:process transition;
# New domain is entered by executing the file.
allow $3 $2:file { entrypoint read execute };
# New domain can send SIGCHLD to its caller.
allow $3 $1:process sigchld;
# Enable AT_SECURE, i.e. libc secure mode.
dontaudit $1 $3:process noatsecure;
# XXX dontaudit candidate but requires further study.
allow $1 $3:process { siginh rlimitinh };
')

#####################################
# domain_auto_trans(olddomain, type, newdomain)
# Automatically transition from olddomain to newdomain
# upon executing a file labeled with type.
#
define(`domain_auto_trans', `
# Allow the necessary permissions.
domain_trans($1,$2,$3)
# Make the transition occur by default.
type_transition $1 $2:process $3;
')

#####################################
# file_type_trans(domain, dir_type, file_type)
# Allow domain to create a file labeled file_type in a
# directory labeled dir_type.
# This only allows the transition; it does not
# cause it to occur automatically - use file_type_auto_trans
# if that is what you want.
#
define(`file_type_trans', `
# Allow the domain to add entries to the directory.
allow $1 $2:dir ra_dir_perms;
# Allow the domain to create the file.
allow $1 $3:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
allow $1 $3:dir create_dir_perms;
')

#####################################
# file_type_auto_trans(domain, dir_type, file_type)
# Automatically label new files with file_type when
# they are created by domain in directories labeled dir_type.
#
define(`file_type_auto_trans', `
# Allow the necessary permissions.
file_type_trans($1, $2, $3)
# Make the transition occur by default.
type_transition $1 $2:dir $3;
type_transition $1 $2:notdevfile_class_set $3;
')

#####################################
# r_dir_file(domain, type)
# Allow the specified domain to read directories, files
# and symbolic links of the specified type.
define(`r_dir_file', `
allow $1 $2:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 $2:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
')

#####################################
# unconfined_domain(domain)
# Allow the specified domain to perform more privileged operations
# than would be typically allowed. Please see the comments at the
# top of unconfined.te.
#
define(`unconfined_domain', `
typeattribute $1 mlstrustedsubject;
typeattribute $1 unconfineddomain;
')

#####################################
# tmpfs_domain(domain)
# Define and allow access to a unique type for
# this domain when creating tmpfs / shmem / ashmem files.
define(`tmpfs_domain', `
type $1_tmpfs, file_type;
type_transition $1 tmpfs:file $1_tmpfs;
allow $1 $1_tmpfs:file { read write };
')

#####################################
# init_daemon_domain(domain)
# Set up a transition from init to the daemon domain
# upon executing its binary.
define(`init_daemon_domain', `
domain_auto_trans(init, $1_exec, $1)
tmpfs_domain($1)
')

#####################################
# app_domain(domain)
# Allow a base set of permissions required for all apps.
define(`app_domain', `
typeattribute $1 appdomain;
# Label ashmem objects with our own unique type.
tmpfs_domain($1)
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow $1 $1_tmpfs:file execute;
')

#####################################
# relabelto_domain(domain)
# Allows this domain to use the relabelto permission
define(`relabelto_domain', `
typeattribute $1 relabeltodomain;
')

#####################################
# platform_app_domain(domain)
# Allow permissions specific to platform apps.
define(`platform_app_domain', `
typeattribute $1 platformappdomain;
typeattribute $1 mlstrustedsubject;
')

#####################################
# net_domain(domain)
# Allow a base set of permissions required for network access.
define(`net_domain', `
typeattribute $1 netdomain;
')

#####################################
# bluetooth_domain(domain)
# Allow a base set of permissions required for bluetooth access.
define(`bluetooth_domain', `
typeattribute $1 bluetoothdomain;
')

#####################################
# unix_socket_connect(clientdomain, socket, serverdomain)
# Allow a local socket connection from clientdomain via
# socket to serverdomain.
define(`unix_socket_connect', `
allow $1 $2_socket:sock_file write;
allow $1 $3:unix_stream_socket connectto;
')

#####################################
# unix_socket_send(clientdomain, socket, serverdomain)
# Allow a local socket send from clientdomain via
# socket to serverdomain.
define(`unix_socket_send', `
allow $1 $2_socket:sock_file write;
allow $1 $3:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
')

#####################################
# binder_use(domain)
# Allow domain to use Binder IPC.
define(`binder_use', `
# Call the servicemanager and transfer references to it.
allow $1 servicemanager:binder { call transfer };
# rw access to /dev/binder and /dev/ashmem is presently granted to
# all domains in domain.te.
')

#####################################
# binder_call(clientdomain, serverdomain)
# Allow clientdomain to perform binder IPC to serverdomain.
define(`binder_call', `
# Call the server domain and optionally transfer references to it.
allow $1 $2:binder { call transfer };
# Allow the serverdomain to transfer references to the client on the reply.
allow $2 $1:binder transfer;
# Receive and use open files from the server.
allow $1 $2:fd use;
')

#####################################
# binder_service(domain)
# Mark a domain as being a Binder service domain.
# Used to allow binder IPC to the various system services.
define(`binder_service', `
typeattribute $1 binderservicedomain;
')

#####################################
# selinux_check_access(domain)
# Allow domain to check SELinux permissions via selinuxfs.
define(`selinux_check_access', `
allow $1 selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 selinuxfs:file rw_file_perms;
allow $1 kernel:security compute_av;
allow $1 self:netlink_selinux_socket *;
')

#####################################
# selinux_check_context(domain)
# Allow domain to check SELinux contexts via selinuxfs.
define(`selinux_check_context', `
allow $1 selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 selinuxfs:file rw_file_perms;
allow $1 kernel:security check_context;
')

#####################################
# selinux_getenforce(domain)
# Allow domain to check whether SELinux is enforcing.
define(`selinux_getenforce', `
allow $1 selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
')

#####################################
# selinux_setenforce(domain)
# Allow domain to set SELinux to enforcing.
define(`selinux_setenforce', `
allow $1 selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 selinuxfs:file rw_file_perms;
allow $1 kernel:security setenforce;
')

#####################################
# selinux_setbool(domain)
# Allow domain to set SELinux booleans.
define(`selinux_setbool', `
allow $1 selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 selinuxfs:file rw_file_perms;
allow $1 kernel:security setbool;
')

#####################################
# security_access_policy(domain)
# Read only access to all policy files and
# selinuxfs
define(`security_access_policy', `
allow $1 security_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 security_file:file r_file_perms;
allow $1 security_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow $1 selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
allow $1 rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 rootfs:file r_file_perms;
')

#####################################
# selinux_manage_policy(domain)
# Ability to manage policy files and
# trigger runtime reload.
define(`selinux_manage_policy', `
security_access_policy($1)
unix_socket_connect($1, property, init)
allow $1 security_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1 security_file:file create_file_perms;
allow $1 security_file:lnk_file { create rename unlink };
allow $1 security_prop:property_service set;
')

#####################################
# mmac_manage_policy(domain)
# Ability to manage mmac policy files,
# trigger runtime reload, change
# mmac enforcing mode and access logcat.
define(`mmac_manage_policy', `
unix_socket_connect($1, property, init)
allow $1 security_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1 security_file:file create_file_perms;
allow $1 security_file:lnk_file { create rename unlink };
allow $1 security_prop:property_service set;
')

#####################################
# access_kmsg(domain)
# Ability to read from kernel logs
# and execute the klogctl syscall
# in a non destructive manner. See
# man 2 klogctl
define(`access_kmsg', `
allow $1 kernel:system syslog_read;
')

#####################################
# write_klog(domain)
# Ability to write to kernel log via
# klog_write()
# See system/core/libcutil/klog.c
define(`write_klog', `
type_transition $1 device:chr_file klog_device "__kmsg__";
allow $1 klog_device:chr_file { create open write unlink };
allow $1 device:dir { write add_name remove_name };
')

#####################################
# create_pty(domain)
# Allow domain to create and use a pty, isolated from any other domain ptys.
define(`create_pty', `
# Each domain gets a unique devpts type.
type $1_devpts, fs_type;
# Label the pty with the unique type when created.
type_transition $1 devpts:chr_file $1_devpts;
# Allow use of the pty after creation.
allow $1 $1_devpts:chr_file { open getattr read write ioctl };
# Note: devpts:dir search and ptmx_device:chr_file rw_file_perms
# allowed to everyone via domain.te.
')

#####################################
# Non system_app application set
#
define(`non_system_app_set', `{ appdomain -system_app }')

#####################################
# Userdebug or eng builds
# SELinux rules which apply only to userdebug or eng builds
#
define(`userdebug_or_eng', ifelse(target_build_variant, `eng', $1, ifelse(target_build_variant, `userdebug', $1)))

#####################################
# permissive_or_unconfined
# Returns "permissive $1" if FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED is false,
# and "unconfined($1)" otherwise.
#
# This is used for experimental domains, where we want to ensure
# the domain is unconfined+enforcing once new SELinux policy development
# has ceased.
#
define(`permissive_or_unconfined', ifelse(force_permissive_to_unconfined, `false', permissive $1;, unconfined_domain($1)))

#####################################
# write_logd(domain)
# Ability to write to android log
# daemon via sockets
define(`write_logd', `
userdebug_or_eng(`
  # Debug output
  type_transition $1 device:file logd_debug;
  allow $1 device:dir rw_dir_perms;
  allow $1 logd_debug:file create_file_perms;
')
unix_socket_send($1, logdw, logd)
')

#####################################
# read_logd(domain)
# Ability to read from android
# log daemon via sockets
define(`read_logd', `
unix_socket_connect($1, logdr, logd)
')

#####################################
# control_logd(domain)
# Ability to control
# android log daemon via sockets
define(`control_logd', `
# Group AID_LOG checked by filesystem & logd
# to permit control commands
unix_socket_connect($1, logd, logd)
')