Merge "Remove MAC capabilities from unconfined domains."
diff --git a/domain.te b/domain.te
index b13ad75..6d755a7 100644
--- a/domain.te
+++ b/domain.te
@@ -147,6 +147,9 @@
### neverallow rules
###
+neverallow domain self:capability2 mac_override;
+neverallow { domain -recovery } self:capability2 mac_admin;
+
# Only init should be able to load SELinux policies.
# The first load technically occurs while still in the kernel domain,
# but this does not trigger a denial since there is no policy yet.
diff --git a/recovery.te b/recovery.te
index eb2a2b0..abcf0cf 100644
--- a/recovery.te
+++ b/recovery.te
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
unconfined_domain(recovery)
relabelto_domain(recovery)
+allow recovery self:capability2 mac_admin;
+
allow recovery {fs_type dev_type -kmem_device file_type}:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
allow recovery unlabeled:filesystem mount;
diff --git a/unconfined.te b/unconfined.te
index 9facc2e..8d424f3 100644
--- a/unconfined.te
+++ b/unconfined.te
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
# The use of this template is discouraged.
######################################################
-allow unconfineddomain self:capability_class_set *;
+allow unconfineddomain self:capability *;
+allow unconfineddomain self:capability2 ~{ mac_override mac_admin };
allow unconfineddomain kernel:security ~{ load_policy setenforce setcheckreqprot };
allow unconfineddomain kernel:system *;
allow unconfineddomain domain:process ~{ execmem execstack execheap ptrace transition dyntransition };