| /* |
| * Copyright 2015 The Android Open Source Project |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| * You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| * |
| * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| * |
| * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| * limitations under the License. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <keymaster/soft_keymaster_context.h> |
| |
| #include <memory> |
| #include <time.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/aes.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include <openssl/sha.h> |
| |
| #include <keymaster/android_keymaster_utils.h> |
| #include <keymaster/logger.h> |
| |
| #include "aes_key.h" |
| #include "auth_encrypted_key_blob.h" |
| #include "ec_keymaster0_key.h" |
| #include "ec_keymaster1_key.h" |
| #include "hmac_key.h" |
| #include "integrity_assured_key_blob.h" |
| #include "keymaster0_engine.h" |
| #include "ocb_utils.h" |
| #include "openssl_err.h" |
| #include "rsa_keymaster0_key.h" |
| #include "rsa_keymaster1_key.h" |
| |
| using std::unique_ptr; |
| |
| namespace keymaster { |
| |
| namespace { |
| static uint8_t master_key_bytes[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; |
| const int NONCE_LENGTH = 12; |
| const int TAG_LENGTH = 16; |
| const KeymasterKeyBlob MASTER_KEY(master_key_bytes, array_length(master_key_bytes)); |
| } // anonymous namespace |
| |
| SoftKeymasterContext::SoftKeymasterContext(const std::string& root_of_trust) |
| : rsa_factory_(new RsaKeyFactory(this)), ec_factory_(new EcKeyFactory(this)), |
| aes_factory_(new AesKeyFactory(this)), hmac_factory_(new HmacKeyFactory(this)), |
| km1_dev_(nullptr), root_of_trust_(root_of_trust) {} |
| |
| SoftKeymasterContext::~SoftKeymasterContext() {} |
| |
| keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::SetHardwareDevice(keymaster0_device_t* keymaster0_device) { |
| if (!keymaster0_device) |
| return KM_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER; |
| |
| if ((keymaster0_device->flags & KEYMASTER_SOFTWARE_ONLY) != 0) { |
| LOG_E("SoftKeymasterContext only wraps hardware keymaster0 devices", 0); |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| } |
| |
| km0_engine_.reset(new Keymaster0Engine(keymaster0_device)); |
| rsa_factory_.reset(new RsaKeymaster0KeyFactory(this, km0_engine_.get())); |
| ec_factory_.reset(new EcdsaKeymaster0KeyFactory(this, km0_engine_.get())); |
| // Keep AES and HMAC factories. |
| |
| return KM_ERROR_OK; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::SetHardwareDevice(keymaster1_device_t* keymaster1_device) { |
| if (!keymaster1_device) |
| return KM_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER; |
| |
| km1_dev_ = keymaster1_device; |
| |
| km1_engine_.reset(new Keymaster1Engine(keymaster1_device)); |
| rsa_factory_.reset(new RsaKeymaster1KeyFactory(this, km1_engine_.get())); |
| ec_factory_.reset(new EcdsaKeymaster1KeyFactory(this, km1_engine_.get())); |
| |
| // All AES and HMAC operations should be passed directly to the keymaster1 device. Explicitly |
| // do not handle them, to provoke errors in case the higher layers fail to send them to the |
| // device. |
| aes_factory_.reset(nullptr); |
| hmac_factory_.reset(nullptr); |
| |
| return KM_ERROR_OK; |
| } |
| |
| KeyFactory* SoftKeymasterContext::GetKeyFactory(keymaster_algorithm_t algorithm) const { |
| switch (algorithm) { |
| case KM_ALGORITHM_RSA: |
| return rsa_factory_.get(); |
| case KM_ALGORITHM_EC: |
| return ec_factory_.get(); |
| case KM_ALGORITHM_AES: |
| return aes_factory_.get(); |
| case KM_ALGORITHM_HMAC: |
| return hmac_factory_.get(); |
| default: |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static keymaster_algorithm_t supported_algorithms[] = {KM_ALGORITHM_RSA, KM_ALGORITHM_EC, |
| KM_ALGORITHM_AES, KM_ALGORITHM_HMAC}; |
| |
| keymaster_algorithm_t* |
| SoftKeymasterContext::GetSupportedAlgorithms(size_t* algorithms_count) const { |
| *algorithms_count = array_length(supported_algorithms); |
| return supported_algorithms; |
| } |
| |
| OperationFactory* SoftKeymasterContext::GetOperationFactory(keymaster_algorithm_t algorithm, |
| keymaster_purpose_t purpose) const { |
| KeyFactory* key_factory = GetKeyFactory(algorithm); |
| if (!key_factory) |
| return nullptr; |
| return key_factory->GetOperationFactory(purpose); |
| } |
| |
| static keymaster_error_t TranslateAuthorizationSetError(AuthorizationSet::Error err) { |
| switch (err) { |
| case AuthorizationSet::OK: |
| return KM_ERROR_OK; |
| case AuthorizationSet::ALLOCATION_FAILURE: |
| return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED; |
| case AuthorizationSet::MALFORMED_DATA: |
| return KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR; |
| } |
| return KM_ERROR_OK; |
| } |
| |
| static keymaster_error_t SetAuthorizations(const AuthorizationSet& key_description, |
| keymaster_key_origin_t origin, |
| AuthorizationSet* hw_enforced, |
| AuthorizationSet* sw_enforced) { |
| sw_enforced->Clear(); |
| |
| for (auto& entry : key_description) { |
| switch (entry.tag) { |
| // These cannot be specified by the client. |
| case KM_TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST: |
| case KM_TAG_ORIGIN: |
| LOG_E("Root of trust and origin tags may not be specified", 0); |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG; |
| |
| // These don't work. |
| case KM_TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANT: |
| LOG_E("KM_TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANT not supported", 0); |
| return KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_TAG; |
| |
| // These are hidden. |
| case KM_TAG_APPLICATION_ID: |
| case KM_TAG_APPLICATION_DATA: |
| break; |
| |
| // Everything else we just copy into sw_enforced, unless the KeyFactory has placed it in |
| // hw_enforced, in which case we defer to its decision. |
| default: |
| if (hw_enforced->GetTagCount(entry.tag) == 0) |
| sw_enforced->push_back(entry); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| sw_enforced->push_back(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, java_time(time(NULL))); |
| sw_enforced->push_back(TAG_ORIGIN, origin); |
| return TranslateAuthorizationSetError(sw_enforced->is_valid()); |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::CreateKeyBlob(const AuthorizationSet& key_description, |
| const keymaster_key_origin_t origin, |
| const KeymasterKeyBlob& key_material, |
| KeymasterKeyBlob* blob, |
| AuthorizationSet* hw_enforced, |
| AuthorizationSet* sw_enforced) const { |
| keymaster_error_t error = SetAuthorizations(key_description, origin, hw_enforced, sw_enforced); |
| if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) |
| return error; |
| |
| AuthorizationSet hidden; |
| error = BuildHiddenAuthorizations(key_description, &hidden); |
| if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) |
| return error; |
| |
| return SerializeIntegrityAssuredBlob(key_material, hidden, *hw_enforced, *sw_enforced, blob); |
| } |
| |
| static keymaster_error_t ParseOcbAuthEncryptedBlob(const KeymasterKeyBlob& blob, |
| const AuthorizationSet& hidden, |
| KeymasterKeyBlob* key_material, |
| AuthorizationSet* hw_enforced, |
| AuthorizationSet* sw_enforced) { |
| Buffer nonce, tag; |
| KeymasterKeyBlob encrypted_key_material; |
| keymaster_error_t error = DeserializeAuthEncryptedBlob(blob, &encrypted_key_material, |
| hw_enforced, sw_enforced, &nonce, &tag); |
| if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) |
| return error; |
| |
| if (nonce.available_read() != OCB_NONCE_LENGTH || tag.available_read() != OCB_TAG_LENGTH) |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB; |
| |
| return OcbDecryptKey(*hw_enforced, *sw_enforced, hidden, MASTER_KEY, encrypted_key_material, |
| nonce, tag, key_material); |
| } |
| |
| // Note: This parsing code in below is from system/security/softkeymaster/keymaster_openssl.cpp's |
| // unwrap_key function, modified for the preferred function signature and formatting. It does some |
| // odd things, but they have been left unchanged to avoid breaking compatibility. |
| static const uint8_t SOFT_KEY_MAGIC[] = {'P', 'K', '#', '8'}; |
| const uint64_t HUNDRED_YEARS = 1000LL * 60 * 60 * 24 * 365 * 100; |
| keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::ParseOldSoftkeymasterBlob( |
| const KeymasterKeyBlob& blob, KeymasterKeyBlob* key_material, AuthorizationSet* hw_enforced, |
| AuthorizationSet* sw_enforced) const { |
| long publicLen = 0; |
| long privateLen = 0; |
| const uint8_t* p = blob.key_material; |
| const uint8_t* end = blob.key_material + blob.key_material_size; |
| |
| int type = 0; |
| ptrdiff_t min_size = |
| sizeof(SOFT_KEY_MAGIC) + sizeof(type) + sizeof(publicLen) + 1 + sizeof(privateLen) + 1; |
| if (end - p < min_size) { |
| LOG_W("key blob appears to be truncated (if an old SW key)", 0); |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB; |
| } |
| |
| if (memcmp(p, SOFT_KEY_MAGIC, sizeof(SOFT_KEY_MAGIC)) != 0) |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB; |
| p += sizeof(SOFT_KEY_MAGIC); |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(type); i++) |
| type = (type << 8) | *p++; |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(type); i++) |
| publicLen = (publicLen << 8) | *p++; |
| |
| if (p + publicLen > end) { |
| LOG_W("public key length encoding error: size=%ld, end=%td", publicLen, end - p); |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB; |
| } |
| p += publicLen; |
| |
| if (end - p < 2) { |
| LOG_W("key blob appears to be truncated (if an old SW key)", 0); |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB; |
| } |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(type); i++) |
| privateLen = (privateLen << 8) | *p++; |
| |
| if (p + privateLen > end) { |
| LOG_W("private key length encoding error: size=%ld, end=%td", privateLen, end - p); |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB; |
| } |
| |
| // Just to be sure, make sure that the ASN.1 structure parses correctly. We don't actually use |
| // the EVP_PKEY here. |
| unique_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_Delete> pkey(EVP_PKEY_new()); |
| if (pkey.get() == nullptr) |
| return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED; |
| |
| EVP_PKEY* tmp = pkey.get(); |
| const uint8_t* key_start = p; |
| if (d2i_PrivateKey(type, &tmp, &p, privateLen) == NULL) { |
| LOG_W("Failed to parse PKCS#8 key material (if old SW key)", 0); |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB; |
| } |
| |
| // All auths go into sw_enforced, including those that would be HW-enforced if we were faking |
| // auths for a HW-backed key. |
| hw_enforced->Clear(); |
| keymaster_error_t error = FakeKeyAuthorizations(pkey.get(), sw_enforced, sw_enforced); |
| if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) |
| return error; |
| |
| if (!key_material->Reset(privateLen)) |
| return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED; |
| memcpy(key_material->writable_data(), key_start, privateLen); |
| |
| return KM_ERROR_OK; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::ParseKeyBlob(const KeymasterKeyBlob& blob, |
| const AuthorizationSet& additional_params, |
| KeymasterKeyBlob* key_material, |
| AuthorizationSet* hw_enforced, |
| AuthorizationSet* sw_enforced) const { |
| // This is a little bit complicated. |
| // |
| // The SoftKeymasterContext has to handle a lot of different kinds of key blobs. |
| // |
| // 1. New keymaster1 software key blobs. These are integrity-assured but not encrypted. The |
| // raw key material and auth sets should be extracted and returned. This is the kind |
| // produced by this context when the KeyFactory doesn't use keymaster0 to back the keys. |
| // |
| // 2. Old keymaster1 software key blobs. These are OCB-encrypted with an all-zero master key. |
| // They should be decrypted and the key material and auth sets extracted and returned. |
| // |
| // 3. Old keymaster0 software key blobs. These are raw key material with a small header tacked |
| // on the front. They don't have auth sets, so reasonable defaults are generated and |
| // returned along with the raw key material. |
| // |
| // 4. New keymaster0 hardware key blobs. These are integrity-assured but not encrypted (though |
| // they're protected by the keymaster0 hardware implementation). The keymaster0 key blob |
| // and auth sets should be extracted and returned. |
| // |
| // 5. Keymaster1 hardware key blobs. These are raw hardware key blobs. They contain auth |
| // sets, which we retrieve from the hardware module. |
| // |
| // 6. Old keymaster0 hardware key blobs. These are raw hardware key blobs. They don't have |
| // auth sets so reasonable defaults are generated and returned along with the key blob. |
| // |
| // Determining what kind of blob has arrived is somewhat tricky. What helps is that |
| // integrity-assured and OCB-encrypted blobs are self-consistent and effectively impossible to |
| // parse as anything else. Old keymaster0 software key blobs have a header. It's reasonably |
| // unlikely that hardware keys would have the same header. So anything that is neither |
| // integrity-assured nor OCB-encrypted and lacks the old software key header is assumed to be |
| // keymaster0 hardware. |
| |
| AuthorizationSet hidden; |
| keymaster_error_t error = BuildHiddenAuthorizations(additional_params, &hidden); |
| if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) |
| return error; |
| |
| // Assume it's an integrity-assured blob (new software-only blob, or new keymaster0-backed |
| // blob). |
| error = DeserializeIntegrityAssuredBlob(blob, hidden, key_material, hw_enforced, sw_enforced); |
| if (error != KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB) |
| return error; |
| |
| // Wasn't an integrity-assured blob. Maybe it's an OCB-encrypted blob. |
| error = ParseOcbAuthEncryptedBlob(blob, hidden, key_material, hw_enforced, sw_enforced); |
| if (error == KM_ERROR_OK) |
| LOG_D("Parsed an old keymaster1 software key", 0); |
| if (error != KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB) |
| return error; |
| |
| // Wasn't an OCB-encrypted blob. Maybe it's an old softkeymaster blob. |
| error = ParseOldSoftkeymasterBlob(blob, key_material, hw_enforced, sw_enforced); |
| if (error == KM_ERROR_OK) |
| LOG_D("Parsed an old sofkeymaster key", 0); |
| if (error != KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB) |
| return error; |
| |
| if (km1_dev_) |
| return ParseKeymaster1HwBlob(blob, additional_params, key_material, hw_enforced, |
| sw_enforced); |
| else if (km0_engine_) |
| return ParseKeymaster0HwBlob(blob, key_material, hw_enforced, sw_enforced); |
| |
| LOG_E("Failed to parse key; not a valid software blob, no hardware module configured", 0); |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::AddRngEntropy(const uint8_t* buf, size_t length) const { |
| RAND_add(buf, length, 0 /* Don't assume any entropy is added to the pool. */); |
| return KM_ERROR_OK; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::GenerateRandom(uint8_t* buf, size_t length) const { |
| if (RAND_bytes(buf, length) != 1) |
| return KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR; |
| return KM_ERROR_OK; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::ParseKeymaster1HwBlob( |
| const KeymasterKeyBlob& blob, const AuthorizationSet& additional_params, |
| KeymasterKeyBlob* key_material, AuthorizationSet* hw_enforced, |
| AuthorizationSet* sw_enforced) const { |
| assert(km1_dev_); |
| |
| keymaster_blob_t client_id = {nullptr, 0}; |
| keymaster_blob_t app_data = {nullptr, 0}; |
| keymaster_blob_t* client_id_ptr = nullptr; |
| keymaster_blob_t* app_data_ptr = nullptr; |
| if (additional_params.GetTagValue(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, &client_id)) |
| client_id_ptr = &client_id; |
| if (additional_params.GetTagValue(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, &app_data)) |
| app_data_ptr = &app_data; |
| |
| // Get key characteristics, which incidentally verifies that the HW recognizes the key. |
| keymaster_key_characteristics_t* characteristics; |
| keymaster_error_t error = km1_dev_->get_key_characteristics(km1_dev_, &blob, client_id_ptr, |
| app_data_ptr, &characteristics); |
| if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) |
| return error; |
| unique_ptr<keymaster_key_characteristics_t, Characteristics_Delete> characteristics_deleter( |
| characteristics); |
| |
| LOG_D("Module \"%s\" accepted key", km1_dev_->common.module->name); |
| |
| hw_enforced->Reinitialize(characteristics->hw_enforced); |
| sw_enforced->Reinitialize(characteristics->sw_enforced); |
| *key_material = blob; |
| return KM_ERROR_OK; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::ParseKeymaster0HwBlob(const KeymasterKeyBlob& blob, |
| KeymasterKeyBlob* key_material, |
| AuthorizationSet* hw_enforced, |
| AuthorizationSet* sw_enforced) const { |
| assert(km0_engine_); |
| |
| unique_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_Delete> tmp_key(km0_engine_->GetKeymaster0PublicKey(blob)); |
| |
| if (!tmp_key) |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB; |
| |
| LOG_D("Module \"%s\" accepted key", km0_engine_->device()->common.module->name); |
| keymaster_error_t error = FakeKeyAuthorizations(tmp_key.get(), hw_enforced, sw_enforced); |
| if (error == KM_ERROR_OK) |
| *key_material = blob; |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::FakeKeyAuthorizations(EVP_PKEY* pubkey, |
| AuthorizationSet* hw_enforced, |
| AuthorizationSet* sw_enforced) const { |
| hw_enforced->Clear(); |
| sw_enforced->Clear(); |
| |
| switch (EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type)) { |
| case EVP_PKEY_RSA: { |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_ALGORITHM, KM_ALGORITHM_RSA); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_NONE); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_MD5); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA1); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_224); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_256); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_384); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_512); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_NONE); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_RSA_PSS); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_RSA_OAEP); |
| |
| sw_enforced->push_back(TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_SIGN); |
| sw_enforced->push_back(TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_VERIFY); |
| sw_enforced->push_back(TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_ENCRYPT); |
| sw_enforced->push_back(TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_DECRYPT); |
| |
| unique_ptr<RSA, RSA_Delete> rsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey)); |
| if (!rsa) |
| return TranslateLastOpenSslError(); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_KEY_SIZE, RSA_size(rsa.get()) * 8); |
| uint64_t public_exponent = BN_get_word(rsa->e); |
| if (public_exponent == 0xffffffffL) |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB; |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, public_exponent); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| case EVP_PKEY_EC: { |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_ALGORITHM, KM_ALGORITHM_RSA); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_NONE); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_MD5); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA1); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_224); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_256); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_384); |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_512); |
| |
| sw_enforced->push_back(TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_SIGN); |
| sw_enforced->push_back(TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_VERIFY); |
| |
| UniquePtr<EC_KEY, EC_Delete> ec_key(EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey)); |
| if (!ec_key.get()) |
| return TranslateLastOpenSslError(); |
| size_t key_size_bits; |
| keymaster_error_t error = |
| EcKeyFactory::get_group_size(*EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key.get()), &key_size_bits); |
| if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) |
| return error; |
| hw_enforced->push_back(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size_bits); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| default: |
| return KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; |
| } |
| |
| sw_enforced->push_back(TAG_ALL_USERS); |
| sw_enforced->push_back(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED); |
| |
| return KM_ERROR_OK; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::BuildHiddenAuthorizations(const AuthorizationSet& input_set, |
| AuthorizationSet* hidden) const { |
| keymaster_blob_t entry; |
| if (input_set.GetTagValue(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, &entry)) |
| hidden->push_back(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, entry.data, entry.data_length); |
| if (input_set.GetTagValue(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, &entry)) |
| hidden->push_back(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, entry.data, entry.data_length); |
| |
| hidden->push_back(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(root_of_trust_.data()), |
| root_of_trust_.size()); |
| |
| return TranslateAuthorizationSetError(hidden->is_valid()); |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace keymaster |