boot_verifier: Implement updated verified boot spec
Update the verified boot flow to send device state, boot state, unlocked
flag, hash of public key, system version, system security level to trust zone,
add support to pass eio mode for dm-verity and update the display messages for
all the states.
Change-Id: Idc29c1c2686c431158caf69d9669352df9d6b4cd
diff --git a/platform/msm_shared/boot_verifier.c b/platform/msm_shared/boot_verifier.c
index d3ce07a..7d22eb9 100644
--- a/platform/msm_shared/boot_verifier.c
+++ b/platform/msm_shared/boot_verifier.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include <qseecom_lk_api.h>
#include <secapp_loader.h>
#include <target.h>
+#include "bootimg.h"
#define ASN1_ENCODED_SHA256_SIZE 0x33
#define ASN1_ENCODED_SHA256_OFFSET 0x13
@@ -56,6 +57,9 @@
RSA *rsa_from_cert = NULL;
unsigned char fp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
uint32_t fp_size;
+#if OSVERSION_IN_BOOTIMAGE
+km_boot_state_t boot_state_info;
+#endif
ASN1_SEQUENCE(AUTH_ATTR) ={
ASN1_SIMPLE(AUTH_ATTR, target, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING),
@@ -397,6 +401,53 @@
return dev_boot_state;
}
+#if OSVERSION_IN_BOOTIMAGE
+static void boot_verify_send_boot_state(km_boot_state_t *boot_state)
+{
+ km_get_version_req_t version_req;
+ km_get_version_rsp_t version_rsp;
+ int ret;
+ int app_handle = get_secapp_handle();
+ km_set_boot_state_req_t *bs_req = NULL;
+ km_set_boot_state_rsp_t boot_state_rsp;
+ uint8_t *boot_state_ptr;
+
+ version_req.cmd_id = KEYMASTER_GET_VERSION;
+ ret = qseecom_send_command(app_handle, (void*) &version_req, sizeof(version_req), (void*) &version_rsp, sizeof(version_rsp));
+ if (ret < 0 || version_rsp.status < 0)
+ {
+ dprintf(CRITICAL, "QSEEcom command for getting keymaster version returned error: %d\n", version_rsp.status);
+ ASSERT(0);
+ }
+
+ if (version_rsp.major_version >= 0x2)
+ {
+ bs_req = malloc(sizeof(km_set_boot_state_req_t) + sizeof(km_boot_state_t));
+ ASSERT(bs_req);
+
+ boot_state_ptr = (uint8_t *) bs_req + sizeof(km_set_boot_state_req_t);
+ /* copy the boot state data */
+ memscpy(boot_state_ptr, sizeof(km_boot_state_t), &boot_state_info, sizeof(boot_state_info));
+
+ bs_req->cmd_id = KEYMASTER_SET_BOOT_STATE;
+ bs_req->version = 0x0;
+ bs_req->boot_state_offset = sizeof(km_set_boot_state_req_t);
+ bs_req->boot_state_size = sizeof(km_boot_state_t);
+
+ ret = qseecom_send_command(app_handle, (void *)bs_req, sizeof(*bs_req) + sizeof(km_boot_state_t), (void *) &boot_state_rsp, sizeof(boot_state_rsp));
+ if (ret < 0 || boot_state_rsp.status < 0)
+ {
+ dprintf(CRITICAL, "QSEEcom command for Sending boot state returned error: %d\n", boot_state_rsp.status);
+ free(bs_req);
+ ASSERT(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (bs_req)
+ free(bs_req);
+}
+#endif
+
bool send_rot_command(uint32_t is_unlocked)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -513,6 +564,13 @@
free(rot_input);
return false;
}
+
+#if OSVERSION_IN_BOOTIMAGE
+ boot_state_info.is_unlocked = is_unlocked;
+ boot_state_info.color = boot_verify_get_state();
+ memscpy(boot_state_info.public_key, sizeof(boot_state_info.public_key), digest, 32);
+ boot_verify_send_boot_state(&boot_state_info);
+#endif
dprintf(SPEW, "Sending Root of Trust to trustzone: end\n");
if(input)
free(input);
@@ -537,6 +595,9 @@
unsigned char* sig_addr = (unsigned char*)(img_addr + img_size);
uint32_t sig_len = 0;
unsigned char *signature = NULL;
+#if OSVERSION_IN_BOOTIMAGE
+ struct boot_img_hdr *img_hdr = NULL;
+#endif
if(dev_boot_state == ORANGE)
{
@@ -585,6 +646,13 @@
ret = verify_image_with_sig(img_addr, img_size, pname, sig, user_keystore);
+#if OSVERSION_IN_BOOTIMAGE
+ /* Extract the os version and patch level */
+ img_hdr = (struct boot_img_hdr *)img_addr;
+ boot_state_info.system_version = (img_hdr->os_version & 0xFFFFF8) >> 11;
+ boot_state_info.system_security_level = (img_hdr->os_version & 0x7FF);
+#endif
+
if(sig != NULL)
VERIFIED_BOOT_SIG_free(sig);
verify_image_error: