Merge branch 'smack-for-4.3' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next into next
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 4ad4a98..17fa24d 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@
# Leavings from module signing
#
extra_certificates
+signing_key.pem
signing_key.priv
signing_key.x509
x509.genkey
diff --git a/Documentation/kbuild/kbuild.txt b/Documentation/kbuild/kbuild.txt
index 6466704..0ff6a46 100644
--- a/Documentation/kbuild/kbuild.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kbuild/kbuild.txt
@@ -174,6 +174,11 @@
The value can be overridden in which case the default value is ignored.
+KBUILD_SIGN_PIN
+--------------------------------------------------
+This variable allows a passphrase or PIN to be passed to the sign-file
+utility when signing kernel modules, if the private key requires such.
+
KBUILD_MODPOST_WARN
--------------------------------------------------
KBUILD_MODPOST_WARN can be set to avoid errors in case of undefined
diff --git a/Documentation/module-signing.txt b/Documentation/module-signing.txt
index c72702e..02a9baf 100644
--- a/Documentation/module-signing.txt
+++ b/Documentation/module-signing.txt
@@ -89,6 +89,32 @@
their signatures checked without causing a dependency loop.
+ (4) "File name or PKCS#11 URI of module signing key" (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY)
+
+ Setting this option to something other than its default of
+ "signing_key.pem" will disable the autogeneration of signing keys and
+ allow the kernel modules to be signed with a key of your choosing.
+ The string provided should identify a file containing both a private
+ key and its corresponding X.509 certificate in PEM form, or — on
+ systems where the OpenSSL ENGINE_pkcs11 is functional — a PKCS#11 URI
+ as defined by RFC7512. In the latter case, the PKCS#11 URI should
+ reference both a certificate and a private key.
+
+ If the PEM file containing the private key is encrypted, or if the
+ PKCS#11 token requries a PIN, this can be provided at build time by
+ means of the KBUILD_SIGN_PIN variable.
+
+
+ (5) "Additional X.509 keys for default system keyring" (CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS)
+
+ This option can be set to the filename of a PEM-encoded file containing
+ additional certificates which will be included in the system keyring by
+ default.
+
+Note that enabling module signing adds a dependency on the OpenSSL devel
+packages to the kernel build processes for the tool that does the signing.
+
+
=======================
GENERATING SIGNING KEYS
=======================
@@ -100,11 +126,11 @@
kernel so that it can be used to check the signatures as the modules are
loaded.
-Under normal conditions, the kernel build will automatically generate a new
-keypair using openssl if one does not exist in the files:
+Under normal conditions, when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY is unchanged from its
+default, the kernel build will automatically generate a new keypair using
+openssl if one does not exist in the file:
- signing_key.priv
- signing_key.x509
+ signing_key.pem
during the building of vmlinux (the public part of the key needs to be built
into vmlinux) using parameters in the:
@@ -135,8 +161,12 @@
generate the public/private key files:
openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha256 -days 36500 -batch -x509 \
- -config x509.genkey -outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \
- -keyout signing_key.priv
+ -config x509.genkey -outform PEM -out kernel_key.pem \
+ -keyout kernel_key.pem
+
+The full pathname for the resulting kernel_key.pem file can then be specified
+in the CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY option, and the certificate and key therein will
+be used instead of an autogenerated keypair.
=========================
@@ -152,10 +182,9 @@
302d2d52 I------ 1 perm 1f010000 0 0 asymmetri Fedora kernel signing key: d69a84e6bce3d216b979e9505b3e3ef9a7118079: X509.RSA a7118079 []
...
-Beyond the public key generated specifically for module signing, any file
-placed in the kernel source root directory or the kernel build root directory
-whose name is suffixed with ".x509" will be assumed to be an X.509 public key
-and will be added to the keyring.
+Beyond the public key generated specifically for module signing, additional
+trusted certificates can be provided in a PEM-encoded file referenced by the
+CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS configuration option.
Further, the architecture code may take public keys from a hardware store and
add those in also (e.g. from the UEFI key database).
@@ -181,7 +210,7 @@
the Linux kernel source tree. The script requires 4 arguments:
1. The hash algorithm (e.g., sha256)
- 2. The private key filename
+ 2. The private key filename or PKCS#11 URI
3. The public key filename
4. The kernel module to be signed
@@ -194,6 +223,9 @@
doesn't, you should make sure that hash algorithm is either built into the
kernel or can be loaded without requiring itself.
+If the private key requires a passphrase or PIN, it can be provided in the
+$KBUILD_SIGN_PIN environment variable.
+
============================
SIGNED MODULES AND STRIPPING
diff --git a/Documentation/security/Yama.txt b/Documentation/security/Yama.txt
index 227a63f..d9ee7d7 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/Yama.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/Yama.txt
@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
-Yama is a Linux Security Module that collects a number of system-wide DAC
-security protections that are not handled by the core kernel itself. To
-select it at boot time, specify "security=yama" (though this will disable
-any other LSM).
-
-Yama is controlled through sysctl in /proc/sys/kernel/yama:
+Yama is a Linux Security Module that collects system-wide DAC security
+protections that are not handled by the core kernel itself. This is
+selectable at build-time with CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA, and can be controlled
+at run-time through sysctls in /proc/sys/kernel/yama:
- ptrace_scope
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index a226416..bde2e3f 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -5935,7 +5935,7 @@
KEYS/KEYRINGS:
M: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
-L: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
+L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
F: Documentation/security/keys.txt
F: include/linux/key.h
@@ -5947,7 +5947,7 @@
M: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
-L: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
+L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
F: include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -5958,7 +5958,7 @@
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
M: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
-L: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
+L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
F: include/keys/encrypted-type.h
@@ -9102,6 +9102,12 @@
S: Supported
F: security/apparmor/
+YAMA SECURITY MODULE
+M: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git yama/tip
+S: Supported
+F: security/yama/
+
SENSABLE PHANTOM
M: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
S: Maintained
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index a9ad490..6ab99d8 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -870,10 +870,10 @@
# export INITRD_COMPRESS := $(INITRD_COMPRESS-y)
ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL
-MODSECKEY = ./signing_key.priv
+MODSECKEY = $(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY)
MODPUBKEY = ./signing_key.x509
export MODPUBKEY
-mod_sign_cmd = perl $(srctree)/scripts/sign-file $(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY)
+mod_sign_cmd = scripts/sign-file $(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY)
else
mod_sign_cmd = true
endif
@@ -1173,8 +1173,8 @@
arch/*/include/generated .tmp_objdiff
MRPROPER_FILES += .config .config.old .version .old_version \
Module.symvers tags TAGS cscope* GPATH GTAGS GRTAGS GSYMS \
- signing_key.priv signing_key.x509 x509.genkey \
- extra_certificates signing_key.x509.keyid \
+ signing_key.pem signing_key.priv signing_key.x509 \
+ x509.genkey extra_certificates signing_key.x509.keyid \
signing_key.x509.signer vmlinux-gdb.py
# clean - Delete most, but leave enough to build external modules
diff --git a/arch/mips/configs/pistachio_defconfig b/arch/mips/configs/pistachio_defconfig
index 1646cce..642b509 100644
--- a/arch/mips/configs/pistachio_defconfig
+++ b/arch/mips/configs/pistachio_defconfig
@@ -320,7 +320,6 @@
CONFIG_SECURITY=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y
-CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED=y
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_AUTHENC=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC=y
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index ca83f7ac..fab22e7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -536,7 +536,9 @@
int ret;
ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
- system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
+ system_trusted_keyring,
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
+ &trusted);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (!trusted)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index e47fcd9..cd1406f 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -15,15 +15,21 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER) += x509_key_parser.o
x509_key_parser-y := \
x509-asn1.o \
+ x509_akid-asn1.o \
x509_rsakey-asn1.o \
x509_cert_parser.o \
x509_public_key.o
-$(obj)/x509_cert_parser.o: $(obj)/x509-asn1.h $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h
+$(obj)/x509_cert_parser.o: \
+ $(obj)/x509-asn1.h \
+ $(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.h \
+ $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h
$(obj)/x509-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509-asn1.c $(obj)/x509-asn1.h
+$(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.h
$(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h
clean-files += x509-asn1.c x509-asn1.h
+clean-files += x509_akid-asn1.c x509_akid-asn1.h
clean-files += x509_rsakey-asn1.c x509_rsakey-asn1.h
#
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index b0e4ed2..1916680 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
*/
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -20,6 +21,16 @@
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = {
+ [VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "mod sig",
+ [VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE] = "firmware sig",
+ [VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE] = "kexec PE sig",
+ [VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE] = "key sig",
+ [VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE] = "key self sig",
+ [VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE] = "unspec sig",
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for);
+
static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers);
static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
index a5a14ef..1eca740 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
PKCS7ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- contentType ContentType,
+ contentType ContentType ({ pkcs7_check_content_type }),
content [0] EXPLICIT SignedData OPTIONAL
}
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID })
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
- version INTEGER,
+ version INTEGER ({ pkcs7_note_signeddata_version }),
digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
- contentInfo ContentInfo,
+ contentInfo ContentInfo ({ pkcs7_note_content }),
certificates CHOICE {
certSet [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates,
certSequence [2] IMPLICIT Certificates
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
}
ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- contentType ContentType,
+ contentType ContentType ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
content [0] EXPLICIT Data OPTIONAL
}
@@ -68,8 +68,8 @@
}
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- version INTEGER,
- issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
+ version INTEGER ({ pkcs7_note_signerinfo_version }),
+ sid SignerIdentifier, -- CMS variant, not PKCS#7
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo }),
authenticatedAttributes CHOICE {
aaSet [0] IMPLICIT SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute
@@ -88,6 +88,12 @@
} OPTIONAL
} ({ pkcs7_note_signed_info })
+SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
+ -- RFC5652 sec 5.3
+ issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
+ subjectKeyIdentifier [0] IMPLICIT SubjectKeyIdentifier
+}
+
IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer Name ({ pkcs7_sig_note_issuer }),
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber ({ pkcs7_sig_note_serial })
@@ -95,6 +101,8 @@
CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
+SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING ({ pkcs7_sig_note_skid })
+
SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute ::= SET OF AuthenticatedAttribute
AuthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
@@ -103,7 +111,7 @@
}
UnauthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
- type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+ type OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
values SET OF ANY
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
index 3d13b04..e2d0edb 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
@@ -14,16 +14,26 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PKCS#7 testing key type");
+
+static unsigned pkcs7_usage;
+module_param_named(usage, pkcs7_usage, uint, S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(pkcs7_usage,
+ "Usage to specify when verifying the PKCS#7 message");
+
/*
* Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob.
*/
static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
+ enum key_being_used_for usage = pkcs7_usage;
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
const void *data, *saved_prep_data;
size_t datalen, saved_prep_datalen;
@@ -32,6 +42,11 @@
kenter("");
+ if (usage >= NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR) {
+ pr_err("Invalid usage type %d\n", usage);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
saved_prep_data = prep->data;
saved_prep_datalen = prep->datalen;
pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(saved_prep_data, saved_prep_datalen);
@@ -40,7 +55,7 @@
goto error;
}
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
index 3bd5a1e..e6298b7 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@
unsigned raw_serial_size;
unsigned raw_issuer_size;
const void *raw_issuer;
+ const void *raw_skid;
+ unsigned raw_skid_size;
+ bool expect_skid;
};
/*
@@ -78,6 +81,30 @@
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_free_message);
+/*
+ * Check authenticatedAttributes are provided or not provided consistently.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_check_authattrs(struct pkcs7_message *msg)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+ bool want;
+
+ sinfo = msg->signed_infos;
+ if (sinfo->authattrs) {
+ want = true;
+ msg->have_authattrs = true;
+ }
+
+ for (sinfo = sinfo->next; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next)
+ if (!!sinfo->authattrs != want)
+ goto inconsistent;
+ return 0;
+
+inconsistent:
+ pr_warn("Inconsistently supplied authAttrs\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
/**
* pkcs7_parse_message - Parse a PKCS#7 message
* @data: The raw binary ASN.1 encoded message to be parsed
@@ -110,6 +137,10 @@
goto out;
}
+ ret = pkcs7_check_authattrs(ctx->msg);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
msg = ctx->msg;
ctx->msg = NULL;
@@ -226,6 +257,100 @@
}
/*
+ * We only support signed data [RFC2315 sec 9].
+ */
+int pkcs7_check_content_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ if (ctx->last_oid != OID_signed_data) {
+ pr_warn("Only support pkcs7_signedData type\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the SignedData version
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_signeddata_version(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ unsigned version;
+
+ if (vlen != 1)
+ goto unsupported;
+
+ ctx->msg->version = version = *(const u8 *)value;
+ switch (version) {
+ case 1:
+ /* PKCS#7 SignedData [RFC2315 sec 9.1]
+ * CMS ver 1 SignedData [RFC5652 sec 5.1]
+ */
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ /* CMS ver 3 SignedData [RFC2315 sec 5.1] */
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto unsupported;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+unsupported:
+ pr_warn("Unsupported SignedData version\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the SignerInfo version
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_signerinfo_version(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ unsigned version;
+
+ if (vlen != 1)
+ goto unsupported;
+
+ version = *(const u8 *)value;
+ switch (version) {
+ case 1:
+ /* PKCS#7 SignerInfo [RFC2315 sec 9.2]
+ * CMS ver 1 SignerInfo [RFC5652 sec 5.3]
+ */
+ if (ctx->msg->version != 1)
+ goto version_mismatch;
+ ctx->expect_skid = false;
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ /* CMS ver 3 SignerInfo [RFC2315 sec 5.3] */
+ if (ctx->msg->version == 1)
+ goto version_mismatch;
+ ctx->expect_skid = true;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto unsupported;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+unsupported:
+ pr_warn("Unsupported SignerInfo version\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+version_mismatch:
+ pr_warn("SignedData-SignerInfo version mismatch\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+}
+
+/*
* Extract a certificate and store it in the context.
*/
int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
@@ -284,6 +409,25 @@
}
/*
+ * Note the content type.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_content(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ if (ctx->last_oid != OID_data &&
+ ctx->last_oid != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("Unsupported data type %d\n", ctx->last_oid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ctx->msg->data_type = ctx->last_oid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* Extract the data from the message and store that and its content type OID in
* the context.
*/
@@ -298,45 +442,119 @@
ctx->msg->data = value;
ctx->msg->data_len = vlen;
ctx->msg->data_hdrlen = hdrlen;
- ctx->msg->data_type = ctx->last_oid;
return 0;
}
/*
- * Parse authenticated attributes
+ * Parse authenticated attributes.
*/
int pkcs7_sig_note_authenticated_attr(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
+ enum OID content_type;
pr_devel("AuthAttr: %02x %zu [%*ph]\n", tag, vlen, (unsigned)vlen, value);
switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+ case OID_contentType:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ content_type = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+ if (content_type != ctx->msg->data_type) {
+ pr_warn("Mismatch between global data type (%d) and sinfo %u (%d)\n",
+ ctx->msg->data_type, sinfo->index,
+ content_type);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ case OID_signingTime:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_signing_time, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ /* Should we check that the signing time is consistent
+ * with the signer's X.509 cert?
+ */
+ return x509_decode_time(&sinfo->signing_time,
+ hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
+
case OID_messageDigest:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
if (tag != ASN1_OTS)
return -EBADMSG;
- ctx->sinfo->msgdigest = value;
- ctx->sinfo->msgdigest_len = vlen;
+ sinfo->msgdigest = value;
+ sinfo->msgdigest_len = vlen;
+ return 0;
+
+ case OID_smimeCapabilites:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_smime_caps, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("S/MIME Caps only allowed with Authenticode\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Microsoft SpOpusInfo seems to be contain cont[0] 16-bit BE
+ * char URLs and cont[1] 8-bit char URLs.
+ *
+ * Microsoft StatementType seems to contain a list of OIDs that
+ * are also used as extendedKeyUsage types in X.509 certs.
+ */
+ case OID_msSpOpusInfo:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ goto authenticode_check;
+ case OID_msStatementType:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_ms_statement_type, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ authenticode_check:
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("Authenticode AuthAttrs only allowed with Authenticode\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ /* I'm not sure how to validate these */
return 0;
default:
return 0;
}
+
+repeated:
+ /* We permit max one item per AuthenticatedAttribute and no repeats */
+ pr_warn("Repeated/multivalue AuthAttrs not permitted\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
/*
- * Note the set of auth attributes for digestion purposes [RFC2315 9.3]
+ * Note the set of auth attributes for digestion purposes [RFC2315 sec 9.3]
*/
int pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
+
+ if (!test_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set) ||
+ !test_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set) ||
+ (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData &&
+ !test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))) {
+ pr_warn("Missing required AuthAttr\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData &&
+ test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
+ pr_warn("Unexpected Authenticode AuthAttr\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
/* We need to switch the 'CONT 0' to a 'SET OF' when we digest */
- ctx->sinfo->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1);
- ctx->sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1);
+ sinfo->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1);
+ sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1);
return 0;
}
@@ -367,6 +585,22 @@
}
/*
+ * Note the issuing cert's subjectKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_skid(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ pr_devel("SKID: %02x %zu [%*ph]\n", tag, vlen, (unsigned)vlen, value);
+
+ ctx->raw_skid = value;
+ ctx->raw_skid_size = vlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* Note the signature data
*/
int pkcs7_sig_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
@@ -398,14 +632,27 @@
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData && !sinfo->authattrs) {
+ pr_warn("Authenticode requires AuthAttrs\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
/* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
- kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
- ctx->raw_serial_size,
- ctx->raw_issuer,
- ctx->raw_issuer_size);
+ if (!ctx->expect_skid) {
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
+ ctx->raw_serial_size,
+ ctx->raw_issuer,
+ ctx->raw_issuer_size);
+ } else {
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_skid,
+ ctx->raw_skid_size,
+ "", 0);
+ }
if (IS_ERR(kid))
return PTR_ERR(kid);
+ pr_devel("SINFO KID: %u [%*phN]\n", kid->len, kid->len, kid->data);
+
sinfo->signing_cert_id = kid;
sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
*ctx->ppsinfo = sinfo;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
index efc7dc9..a66b19e 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@
struct pkcs7_signed_info {
struct pkcs7_signed_info *next;
struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */
- unsigned index;
- bool trusted;
- bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if not usable due to missing crypto */
+ unsigned index;
+ bool trusted;
+ bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if not usable due to missing crypto */
/* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */
const void *msgdigest;
@@ -32,8 +32,18 @@
/* Authenticated Attribute data (or NULL) */
unsigned authattrs_len;
const void *authattrs;
+ unsigned long aa_set;
+#define sinfo_has_content_type 0
+#define sinfo_has_signing_time 1
+#define sinfo_has_message_digest 2
+#define sinfo_has_smime_caps 3
+#define sinfo_has_ms_opus_info 4
+#define sinfo_has_ms_statement_type 5
+ time64_t signing_time;
- /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */
+ /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name [PKCS#7 or CMS ver 1]
+ * or issuing cert's SKID [CMS ver 3].
+ */
struct asymmetric_key_id *signing_cert_id;
/* Message signature.
@@ -50,6 +60,8 @@
struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificate list */
struct x509_certificate *crl; /* Revocation list */
struct pkcs7_signed_info *signed_infos;
+ u8 version; /* Version of cert (1 -> PKCS#7 or CMS; 3 -> CMS) */
+ bool have_authattrs; /* T if have authattrs */
/* Content Data (or NULL) */
enum OID data_type; /* Type of Data */
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
index 1d29376..90d6d47 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@
/* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
* keys.
*/
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->id,
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ x509->id, x509->skid,
false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
/* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
@@ -85,8 +86,10 @@
/* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the
* trusted keys.
*/
- if (last && last->authority) {
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->authority,
+ if (last && (last->akid_id || last->akid_skid)) {
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ last->akid_id,
+ last->akid_skid,
false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
x509 = last;
@@ -103,6 +106,7 @@
*/
key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
sinfo->signing_cert_id,
+ NULL,
false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
pr_devel("sinfo %u: Direct signer is key %x\n",
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index cd45545..d20c0b4 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -70,9 +70,15 @@
* message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
* digest we just calculated.
*/
- if (sinfo->msgdigest) {
+ if (sinfo->authattrs) {
u8 tag;
+ if (!sinfo->msgdigest) {
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: No messageDigest\n", sinfo->index);
+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sinfo->sig.digest_size) {
pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
@@ -170,6 +176,7 @@
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
{
struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *auth;
int ret;
kenter("");
@@ -187,11 +194,14 @@
goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509;
pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
- if (x509->authority)
- pr_debug("- authkeyid %*phN\n",
- x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
+ if (x509->akid_id)
+ pr_debug("- authkeyid.id %*phN\n",
+ x509->akid_id->len, x509->akid_id->data);
+ if (x509->akid_skid)
+ pr_debug("- authkeyid.skid %*phN\n",
+ x509->akid_skid->len, x509->akid_skid->data);
- if (!x509->authority ||
+ if ((!x509->akid_id && !x509->akid_skid) ||
strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
/* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
* the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
@@ -215,21 +225,42 @@
/* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
* list to see if the next one is there.
*/
- pr_debug("- want %*phN\n",
- x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
- for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
- if (!p->skid)
- continue;
- pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
- p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
- if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->authority))
- goto found_issuer;
+ auth = x509->akid_id;
+ if (auth) {
+ pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
+ for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+ pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
+ p->index, p->id->len, p->id->data);
+ if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->id, auth))
+ goto found_issuer_check_skid;
+ }
+ } else {
+ auth = x509->akid_skid;
+ pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
+ for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+ if (!p->skid)
+ continue;
+ pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
+ p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
+ if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, auth))
+ goto found_issuer;
+ }
}
/* We didn't find the root of this chain */
pr_debug("- top\n");
return 0;
+ found_issuer_check_skid:
+ /* We matched issuer + serialNumber, but if there's an
+ * authKeyId.keyId, that must match the CA subjKeyId also.
+ */
+ if (x509->akid_skid &&
+ !asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->akid_skid)) {
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains auth-skid nonmatch (%u->%u)\n",
+ sinfo->index, x509->index, p->index);
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
found_issuer:
pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject);
if (p->seen) {
@@ -289,6 +320,18 @@
pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n",
sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index);
+ /* Check that the PKCS#7 signing time is valid according to the X.509
+ * certificate. We can't, however, check against the system clock
+ * since that may not have been set yet and may be wrong.
+ */
+ if (test_bit(sinfo_has_signing_time, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
+ if (sinfo->signing_time < sinfo->signer->valid_from ||
+ sinfo->signing_time > sinfo->signer->valid_to) {
+ pr_warn("Message signed outside of X.509 validity window\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */
ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, &sinfo->sig);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -303,6 +346,7 @@
/**
* pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put
*
* Verify a PKCS#7 message is internally consistent - that is, the data digest
* matches the digest in the AuthAttrs and any signature in the message or one
@@ -314,6 +358,9 @@
*
* Returns, in order of descending priority:
*
+ * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a key was selected that had a usage restriction at
+ * odds with the specified usage, or:
+ *
* (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we found an
* appropriate X.509 certificate, or:
*
@@ -325,7 +372,8 @@
* (*) 0 if all the signature chains that don't incur -ENOPKG can be verified
* (note that a signature chain may be of zero length), or:
*/
-int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage)
{
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
struct x509_certificate *x509;
@@ -334,12 +382,48 @@
kenter("");
+ switch (usage) {
+ case VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid module sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ if (pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid module sig (has authattrs)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ break;
+ case VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ if (!pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (missing authattrs)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ break;
+ case VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid kexec sig (not Authenticode)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ /* Authattr presence checked in parser */
+ break;
+ case VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid unspecified sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
for (n = 0, x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, n++) {
ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- pr_debug("X.509[%u] %*phN\n",
- n, x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
}
for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
@@ -359,3 +443,28 @@
return enopkg;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_supply_detached_data - Supply the data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message
+ * @data: The data to be verified
+ * @datalen: The amount of data
+ *
+ * Supply the detached data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message. Note that no
+ * attempt to retain/pin the data is made. That is left to the caller. The
+ * data will not be modified by pkcs7_verify() and will not be freed when the
+ * PKCS#7 message is freed.
+ *
+ * Returns -EINVAL if data is already supplied in the message, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ if (pkcs7->data) {
+ pr_debug("Data already supplied\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ pkcs7->data = data;
+ pkcs7->data_len = datalen;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 2f6e4fb..81efccb 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = {
[PKEY_ID_PGP] = "PGP",
[PKEY_ID_X509] = "X509",
+ [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] = "PKCS#7",
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type_name);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index 2421f46..897b734 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -393,6 +393,7 @@
* @pebuf: Buffer containing the PE binary image
* @pelen: Length of the binary image
* @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
* @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
*
* Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message inside the PE
@@ -417,7 +418,9 @@
* May also return -ENOMEM.
*/
int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
- struct key *trusted_keyring, bool *_trusted)
+ struct key *trusted_keyring,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ bool *_trusted)
{
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
struct pefile_context ctx;
@@ -462,7 +465,7 @@
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a33231
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+-- X.509 AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+-- rfc5280 section 4.2.1.1
+
+AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+ keyIdentifier [0] IMPLICIT KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+ authorityCertIssuer [1] IMPLICIT GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
+ authorityCertSerialNumber [2] IMPLICIT CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL
+ }
+
+KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING ({ x509_akid_note_kid })
+
+CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER ({ x509_akid_note_serial })
+
+GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE OF GeneralName
+
+GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
+ otherName [0] ANY,
+ rfc822Name [1] IA5String,
+ dNSName [2] IA5String,
+ x400Address [3] ANY,
+ directoryName [4] Name ({ x509_akid_note_name }),
+ ediPartyName [5] ANY,
+ uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
+ iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,
+ registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ }
+
+Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
+
+RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeValueAssertion
+
+AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
+ attributeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ x509_note_OID }),
+ attributeValue ANY ({ x509_extract_name_segment })
+ }
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index a668d90..af71878 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include "public_key.h"
#include "x509_parser.h"
#include "x509-asn1.h"
+#include "x509_akid-asn1.h"
#include "x509_rsakey-asn1.h"
struct x509_parse_context {
@@ -35,6 +36,10 @@
u16 o_offset; /* Offset of organizationName (O) */
u16 cn_offset; /* Offset of commonName (CN) */
u16 email_offset; /* Offset of emailAddress */
+ unsigned raw_akid_size;
+ const void *raw_akid; /* Raw authorityKeyId in ASN.1 */
+ const void *akid_raw_issuer; /* Raw directoryName in authorityKeyId */
+ unsigned akid_raw_issuer_size;
};
/*
@@ -48,7 +53,8 @@
kfree(cert->subject);
kfree(cert->id);
kfree(cert->skid);
- kfree(cert->authority);
+ kfree(cert->akid_id);
+ kfree(cert->akid_skid);
kfree(cert->sig.digest);
mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s);
kfree(cert);
@@ -85,6 +91,18 @@
if (ret < 0)
goto error_decode;
+ /* Decode the AuthorityKeyIdentifier */
+ if (ctx->raw_akid) {
+ pr_devel("AKID: %u %*phN\n",
+ ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid);
+ ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_akid_decoder, ctx,
+ ctx->raw_akid, ctx->raw_akid_size);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_warn("Couldn't decode AuthKeyIdentifier\n");
+ goto error_decode;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Decode the public key */
ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_rsakey_decoder, ctx,
ctx->key, ctx->key_size);
@@ -422,7 +440,6 @@
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
const unsigned char *v = value;
- int i;
pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
@@ -437,9 +454,7 @@
ctx->cert->raw_skid_size = vlen;
ctx->cert->raw_skid = v;
- kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->cert->raw_subject,
- ctx->cert->raw_subject_size,
- v, vlen);
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen, "", 0);
if (IS_ERR(kid))
return PTR_ERR(kid);
ctx->cert->skid = kid;
@@ -449,117 +464,113 @@
if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
/* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
- if (ctx->cert->authority || vlen < 5)
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- /* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */
- if (v[0] != (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS << 5)))
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- /* Authority Key Identifier is not indefinite length */
- if (unlikely(vlen == ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH))
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- if (vlen < ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH) {
- /* Short Form length */
- if (v[1] != vlen - 2 ||
- v[2] != SEQ_TAG_KEYID ||
- v[3] > vlen - 4)
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- vlen = v[3];
- v += 4;
- } else {
- /* Long Form length */
- size_t seq_len = 0;
- size_t sub = v[1] - ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH;
-
- if (sub > 2)
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- /* calculate the length from subsequent octets */
- v += 2;
- for (i = 0; i < sub; i++) {
- seq_len <<= 8;
- seq_len |= v[i];
- }
-
- if (seq_len != vlen - 2 - sub ||
- v[sub] != SEQ_TAG_KEYID ||
- v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub)
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- vlen = v[sub + 1];
- v += (sub + 2);
- }
-
- kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->cert->raw_issuer,
- ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size,
- v, vlen);
- if (IS_ERR(kid))
- return PTR_ERR(kid);
- pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
- ctx->cert->authority = kid;
+ ctx->raw_akid = v;
+ ctx->raw_akid_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
-/*
- * Record a certificate time.
+/**
+ * x509_decode_time - Decode an X.509 time ASN.1 object
+ * @_t: The time to fill in
+ * @hdrlen: The length of the object header
+ * @tag: The object tag
+ * @value: The object value
+ * @vlen: The size of the object value
+ *
+ * Decode an ASN.1 universal time or generalised time field into a struct the
+ * kernel can handle and check it for validity. The time is decoded thus:
+ *
+ * [RFC5280 §4.1.2.5]
+ * CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate validity
+ * dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity dates in
+ * 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. Conforming
+ * applications MUST be able to process validity dates that are encoded in
+ * either UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.
*/
-static int x509_note_time(struct tm *tm, size_t hdrlen,
- unsigned char tag,
- const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen)
+int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen)
{
+ static const unsigned char month_lengths[] = { 31, 29, 31, 30, 31, 30,
+ 31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31 };
const unsigned char *p = value;
+ unsigned year, mon, day, hour, min, sec, mon_len;
-#define dec2bin(X) ((X) - '0')
+#define dec2bin(X) ({ unsigned char x = (X) - '0'; if (x > 9) goto invalid_time; x; })
#define DD2bin(P) ({ unsigned x = dec2bin(P[0]) * 10 + dec2bin(P[1]); P += 2; x; })
if (tag == ASN1_UNITIM) {
/* UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
if (vlen != 13)
goto unsupported_time;
- tm->tm_year = DD2bin(p);
- if (tm->tm_year >= 50)
- tm->tm_year += 1900;
+ year = DD2bin(p);
+ if (year >= 50)
+ year += 1900;
else
- tm->tm_year += 2000;
+ year += 2000;
} else if (tag == ASN1_GENTIM) {
/* GenTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
if (vlen != 15)
goto unsupported_time;
- tm->tm_year = DD2bin(p) * 100 + DD2bin(p);
+ year = DD2bin(p) * 100 + DD2bin(p);
+ if (year >= 1950 && year <= 2049)
+ goto invalid_time;
} else {
goto unsupported_time;
}
- tm->tm_year -= 1900;
- tm->tm_mon = DD2bin(p) - 1;
- tm->tm_mday = DD2bin(p);
- tm->tm_hour = DD2bin(p);
- tm->tm_min = DD2bin(p);
- tm->tm_sec = DD2bin(p);
+ mon = DD2bin(p);
+ day = DD2bin(p);
+ hour = DD2bin(p);
+ min = DD2bin(p);
+ sec = DD2bin(p);
if (*p != 'Z')
goto unsupported_time;
+ mon_len = month_lengths[mon];
+ if (mon == 2) {
+ if (year % 4 == 0) {
+ mon_len = 29;
+ if (year % 100 == 0) {
+ year /= 100;
+ if (year % 4 != 0)
+ mon_len = 28;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (year < 1970 ||
+ mon < 1 || mon > 12 ||
+ day < 1 || day > mon_len ||
+ hour < 0 || hour > 23 ||
+ min < 0 || min > 59 ||
+ sec < 0 || sec > 59)
+ goto invalid_time;
+
+ *_t = mktime64(year, mon, day, hour, min, sec);
return 0;
unsupported_time:
- pr_debug("Got unsupported time [tag %02x]: '%*.*s'\n",
- tag, (int)vlen, (int)vlen, value);
+ pr_debug("Got unsupported time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",
+ tag, (int)vlen, value);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+invalid_time:
+ pr_debug("Got invalid time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",
+ tag, (int)vlen, value);
return -EBADMSG;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_decode_time);
int x509_note_not_before(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
- return x509_note_time(&ctx->cert->valid_from, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
+ return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_from, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
}
int x509_note_not_after(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
@@ -567,5 +578,71 @@
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
- return x509_note_time(&ctx->cert->valid_to, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
+ return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_to, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note a key identifier-based AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int x509_akid_note_kid(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+
+ pr_debug("AKID: keyid: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
+
+ if (ctx->cert->akid_skid)
+ return 0;
+
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(kid))
+ return PTR_ERR(kid);
+ pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
+ ctx->cert->akid_skid = kid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note a directoryName in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int x509_akid_note_name(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ pr_debug("AKID: name: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
+
+ ctx->akid_raw_issuer = value;
+ ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size = vlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note a serial number in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int x509_akid_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+
+ pr_debug("AKID: serial: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
+
+ if (!ctx->akid_raw_issuer || ctx->cert->akid_id)
+ return 0;
+
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value,
+ vlen,
+ ctx->akid_raw_issuer,
+ ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size);
+ if (IS_ERR(kid))
+ return PTR_ERR(kid);
+
+ pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
+ ctx->cert->akid_id = kid;
+ return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 3dfe6b5..1de01ea 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -19,11 +19,12 @@
struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */
char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */
char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */
- struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Serial number + issuer */
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Issuer + Serial number */
struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject + subjectKeyId (optional) */
- struct asymmetric_key_id *authority; /* Authority key identifier (optional) */
- struct tm valid_from;
- struct tm valid_to;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_id; /* CA AuthKeyId matching ->id (optional) */
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_skid; /* CA AuthKeyId matching ->skid (optional) */
+ time64_t valid_from;
+ time64_t valid_to;
const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */
unsigned raw_sig_size; /* Size of sigature */
@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@
*/
extern void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert);
extern struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen);
+extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen);
/*
* x509_public_key.c
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 24f17e6..6d88dd1 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -65,23 +65,37 @@
/**
* x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
* @keyring: The keys to search.
- * @kid: The key ID.
+ * @id: The issuer & serialNumber to look for or NULL.
+ * @skid: The subjectKeyIdentifier to look for or NULL.
* @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false.
*
- * Find a key in the given keyring by subject name and key ID. These might,
- * for instance, be the issuer name and the authority key ID of an X.509
- * certificate that needs to be verified.
+ * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier. The preferred identifier is
+ * the issuer + serialNumber and the fallback identifier is the
+ * subjectKeyIdentifier. If both are given, the lookup is by the former, but
+ * the latter must also match.
*/
struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
- const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *id,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid,
bool partial)
{
- key_ref_t key;
- char *id, *p;
+ struct key *key;
+ key_ref_t ref;
+ const char *lookup;
+ char *req, *p;
+ int len;
+ if (id) {
+ lookup = id->data;
+ len = id->len;
+ } else {
+ lookup = skid->data;
+ len = skid->len;
+ }
+
/* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
- p = id = kmalloc(2 + 1 + kid->len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!id)
+ p = req = kmalloc(2 + 1 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (partial) {
@@ -92,32 +106,48 @@
*p++ = 'x';
}
*p++ = ':';
- p = bin2hex(p, kid->data, kid->len);
+ p = bin2hex(p, lookup, len);
*p = 0;
- pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
+ pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req);
- key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
- &key_type_asymmetric, id);
- if (IS_ERR(key))
- pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", id, PTR_ERR(key));
- kfree(id);
+ ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+ &key_type_asymmetric, req);
+ if (IS_ERR(ref))
+ pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref));
+ kfree(req);
- if (IS_ERR(key)) {
- switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+ if (IS_ERR(ref)) {
+ switch (PTR_ERR(ref)) {
/* Hide some search errors */
case -EACCES:
case -ENOTDIR:
case -EAGAIN:
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
default:
- return ERR_CAST(key);
+ return ERR_CAST(ref);
}
}
- pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__,
- key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
- return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref);
+ if (id && skid) {
+ const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+ if (!kids->id[1]) {
+ pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but expected SKID missing\n");
+ goto reject;
+ }
+ if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(skid, kids->id[1])) {
+ pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but SKID does not\n");
+ goto reject;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key));
+ return key;
+
+reject:
+ key_put(key);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_request_asymmetric_key);
@@ -227,10 +257,11 @@
if (!trust_keyring)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
+ if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(cert->akid_skid, ca_keyid))
return -EPERM;
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, cert->authority,
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ cert->akid_id, cert->akid_skid,
false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
if (!use_builtin_keys
@@ -271,14 +302,7 @@
}
pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pub->pkey_algo]);
- pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
- cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1,
- cert->valid_from.tm_mday, cert->valid_from.tm_hour,
- cert->valid_from.tm_min, cert->valid_from.tm_sec);
- pr_devel("Cert Valid To: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
- cert->valid_to.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_to.tm_mon + 1,
- cert->valid_to.tm_mday, cert->valid_to.tm_hour,
- cert->valid_to.tm_min, cert->valid_to.tm_sec);
+ pr_devel("Cert Valid period: %lld-%lld\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to);
pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
@@ -287,8 +311,9 @@
cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
- if (!cert->authority ||
- asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->authority)) {
+ if ((!cert->akid_skid && !cert->akid_id) ||
+ asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->akid_skid) ||
+ asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->id, cert->akid_id)) {
ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free_cert;
diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
index 691c791..441aff9 100644
--- a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
+++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
+#define _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
+
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+
struct key;
struct pkcs7_message;
@@ -33,4 +38,10 @@
/*
* pkcs7_verify.c
*/
-extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
+extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage);
+
+extern int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ const void *data, size_t datalen);
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H */
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 54add20..067c242 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -33,12 +33,27 @@
enum pkey_id_type {
PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */
PKEY_ID_X509, /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */
+ PKEY_ID_PKCS7, /* Signature in PKCS#7 message */
PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST
};
extern const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST];
/*
+ * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put.
+ */
+enum key_being_used_for {
+ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
+ NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR
+};
+extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR];
+
+/*
* Cryptographic data for the public-key subtype of the asymmetric key type.
*
* Note that this may include private part of the key as well as the public
@@ -101,7 +116,8 @@
struct asymmetric_key_id;
extern struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
- const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *id,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid,
bool partial);
#endif /* _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H */
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 72665eb..b20cd88 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
@@ -28,4 +29,10 @@
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+extern int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage);
+#endif
+
#endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/asn1_ber_bytecode.h b/include/linux/asn1_ber_bytecode.h
index 945d44a..ab3a6c0 100644
--- a/include/linux/asn1_ber_bytecode.h
+++ b/include/linux/asn1_ber_bytecode.h
@@ -45,23 +45,27 @@
ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP = 0x04,
ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP = 0x05,
ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY = 0x08,
+ ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP = 0x09,
ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT = 0x0a,
+ ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP = 0x0b,
/* Everything before here matches unconditionally */
ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_OR_SKIP = 0x11,
ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP = 0x13,
ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP = 0x15,
ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY = 0x18,
+ ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP = 0x19,
ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT = 0x1a,
+ ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP = 0x1b,
/* Everything before here will want a tag from the data */
-#define ASN1_OP__MATCHES_TAG ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT
+#define ASN1_OP__MATCHES_TAG ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP
/* These are here to help fill up space */
- ASN1_OP_COND_FAIL = 0x1b,
- ASN1_OP_COMPLETE = 0x1c,
- ASN1_OP_ACT = 0x1d,
- ASN1_OP_RETURN = 0x1e,
+ ASN1_OP_COND_FAIL = 0x1c,
+ ASN1_OP_COMPLETE = 0x1d,
+ ASN1_OP_ACT = 0x1e,
+ ASN1_OP_MAYBE_ACT = 0x1f,
/* The following eight have bit 0 -> SET, 1 -> OF, 2 -> ACT */
ASN1_OP_END_SEQ = 0x20,
@@ -76,6 +80,8 @@
#define ASN1_OP_END__OF 0x02
#define ASN1_OP_END__ACT 0x04
+ ASN1_OP_RETURN = 0x28,
+
ASN1_OP__NR
};
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 9429f05..ec3a6ba 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1881,8 +1881,10 @@
extern int __init security_module_enable(const char *module);
extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
-void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
+extern void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
+#else
+static inline void __init yama_add_hooks(void) { }
#endif
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
index c2bbf67..93e0ff9 100644
--- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h
+++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
OID_signed_data, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2 */
/* PKCS#9 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)} */
OID_email_address, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1 */
- OID_content_type, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3 */
+ OID_contentType, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3 */
OID_messageDigest, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4 */
OID_signingTime, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5 */
OID_smimeCapabilites, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.15 */
@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@
/* Microsoft Authenticode & Software Publishing */
OID_msIndirectData, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.4 */
+ OID_msStatementType, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.11 */
+ OID_msSpOpusInfo, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.12 */
OID_msPeImageDataObjId, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.15 */
OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.21 */
OID_msOutlookExpress, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.16.4 */
diff --git a/include/linux/verify_pefile.h b/include/linux/verify_pefile.h
index ac34819..da2049b 100644
--- a/include/linux/verify_pefile.h
+++ b/include/linux/verify_pefile.h
@@ -12,7 +12,11 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H
#define _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+
extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
- struct key *trusted_keyring, bool *_trusted);
+ struct key *trusted_keyring,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ bool *_trusted);
#endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index af09b4f..5d1a703 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1752,6 +1752,37 @@
Keys in this keyring are used by module signature checking.
+config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
+ string "Additional X.509 keys for default system keyring"
+ depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ help
+ If set, this option should be the filename of a PEM-formatted file
+ containing trusted X.509 certificates to be included in the default
+ system keyring. Any certificate used for module signing is implicitly
+ also trusted.
+
+ NOTE: If you previously provided keys for the system keyring in the
+ form of DER-encoded *.x509 files in the top-level build directory,
+ those are no longer used. You will need to set this option instead.
+
+config SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+ def_bool n
+ select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ select KEYS
+ select CRYPTO
+ select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+ select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+ select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
+ select ASN1
+ select OID_REGISTRY
+ select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+ select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+ help
+ Provide PKCS#7 message verification using the contents of the system
+ trusted keyring to provide public keys. This then can be used for
+ module verification, kexec image verification and firmware blob
+ verification.
+
config PROFILING
bool "Profiling support"
help
@@ -1860,20 +1891,16 @@
config MODULE_SIG
bool "Module signature verification"
depends on MODULES
- select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
- select KEYS
- select CRYPTO
- select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
- select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
- select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
- select ASN1
- select OID_REGISTRY
- select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+ select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
help
Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature
is simply appended to the module. For more information see
Documentation/module-signing.txt.
+ Note that this option adds the OpenSSL development packages as a
+ kernel build dependency so that the signing tool can use its crypto
+ library.
+
!!!WARNING!!! If you enable this option, you MUST make sure that the
module DOES NOT get stripped after being signed. This includes the
debuginfo strip done by some packagers (such as rpmbuild) and
@@ -1938,6 +1965,20 @@
default "sha384" if MODULE_SIG_SHA384
default "sha512" if MODULE_SIG_SHA512
+config MODULE_SIG_KEY
+ string "File name or PKCS#11 URI of module signing key"
+ default "signing_key.pem"
+ depends on MODULE_SIG
+ help
+ Provide the file name of a private key/certificate in PEM format,
+ or a PKCS#11 URI according to RFC7512. The file should contain, or
+ the URI should identify, both the certificate and its corresponding
+ private key.
+
+ If this option is unchanged from its default "signing_key.pem",
+ then the kernel will automatically generate the private key and
+ certificate as described in Documentation/module-signing.txt
+
config MODULE_COMPRESS
bool "Compress modules on installation"
depends on MODULES
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 43c4c92..65ef384 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -114,46 +114,74 @@
###############################################################################
#
-# Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull them into
-# the kernel so that they get loaded into the system trusted keyring during
-# boot.
+# When a Kconfig string contains a filename, it is suitable for
+# passing to shell commands. It is surrounded by double-quotes, and
+# any double-quotes or backslashes within it are escaped by
+# backslashes.
#
-# We look in the source root and the build root for all files whose name ends
-# in ".x509". Unfortunately, this will generate duplicate filenames, so we
-# have make canonicalise the pathnames and then sort them to discard the
-# duplicates.
+# This is no use for dependencies or $(wildcard). We need to strip the
+# surrounding quotes and the escaping from quotes and backslashes, and
+# we *do* need to escape any spaces in the string. So, for example:
+#
+# Usage: $(eval $(call config_filename,FOO))
+#
+# Defines FOO_FILENAME based on the contents of the CONFIG_FOO option,
+# transformed as described above to be suitable for use within the
+# makefile.
+#
+# Also, if the filename is a relative filename and exists in the source
+# tree but not the build tree, define FOO_SRCPREFIX as $(srctree)/ to
+# be prefixed to *both* command invocation and dependencies.
+#
+# Note: We also print the filenames in the quiet_cmd_foo text, and
+# perhaps ought to have a version specially escaped for that purpose.
+# But it's only cosmetic, and $(patsubst "%",%,$(CONFIG_FOO)) is good
+# enough. It'll strip the quotes in the common case where there's no
+# space and it's a simple filename, and it'll retain the quotes when
+# there's a space. There are some esoteric cases in which it'll print
+# the wrong thing, but we don't really care. The actual dependencies
+# and commands *do* get it right, with various combinations of single
+# and double quotes, backslashes and spaces in the filenames.
#
###############################################################################
+#
+quote := $(firstword " ")
+space :=
+space +=
+space_escape := %%%SPACE%%%
+#
+define config_filename
+ifneq ($$(CONFIG_$(1)),"")
+$(1)_FILENAME := $$(subst \\,\,$$(subst \$$(quote),$$(quote),$$(subst $$(space_escape),\$$(space),$$(patsubst "%",%,$$(subst $$(space),$$(space_escape),$$(CONFIG_$(1)))))))
+ifneq ($$(patsubst /%,%,$$(firstword $$($(1)_FILENAME))),$$(firstword $$($(1)_FILENAME)))
+else
+ifeq ($$(wildcard $$($(1)_FILENAME)),)
+ifneq ($$(wildcard $$(srctree)/$$($(1)_FILENAME)),)
+$(1)_SRCPREFIX := $(srctree)/
+endif
+endif
+endif
+endif
+endef
+#
+###############################################################################
+
ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
-X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509)
-X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += $(objtree)/signing_key.x509
-X509_CERTIFICATES-raw := $(sort $(foreach CERT,$(X509_CERTIFICATES-y), \
- $(or $(realpath $(CERT)),$(CERT))))
-X509_CERTIFICATES := $(subst $(realpath $(objtree))/,,$(X509_CERTIFICATES-raw))
-ifeq ($(X509_CERTIFICATES),)
-$(warning *** No X.509 certificates found ***)
-endif
+$(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
-ifneq ($(wildcard $(obj)/.x509.list),)
-ifneq ($(shell cat $(obj)/.x509.list),$(X509_CERTIFICATES))
-$(warning X.509 certificate list changed to "$(X509_CERTIFICATES)" from "$(shell cat $(obj)/.x509.list)")
-$(shell rm $(obj)/.x509.list)
-endif
-endif
+# GCC doesn't include .incbin files in -MD generated dependencies (PR#66871)
+$(obj)/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
-kernel/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
+# Cope with signing_key.x509 existing in $(srctree) not $(objtree)
+AFLAGS_system_certificates.o := -I$(srctree)
-quiet_cmd_x509certs = CERTS $@
- cmd_x509certs = cat $(X509_CERTIFICATES) /dev/null >$@ $(foreach X509,$(X509_CERTIFICATES),; $(kecho) " - Including cert $(X509)")
+quiet_cmd_extract_certs = EXTRACT_CERTS $(patsubst "%",%,$(2))
+ cmd_extract_certs = scripts/extract-cert $(2) $@ || ( rm $@; exit 1)
-targets += $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
-$(obj)/x509_certificate_list: $(X509_CERTIFICATES) $(obj)/.x509.list
- $(call if_changed,x509certs)
-
-targets += $(obj)/.x509.list
-$(obj)/.x509.list:
- @echo $(X509_CERTIFICATES) >$@
+targets += x509_certificate_list
+$(obj)/x509_certificate_list: scripts/extract-cert $(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_FILENAME) FORCE
+ $(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
endif
clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list
@@ -170,7 +198,11 @@
$(error Could not determine digest type to use from kernel config)
endif
-signing_key.priv signing_key.x509: x509.genkey
+# We do it this way rather than having a boolean option for enabling an
+# external private key, because 'make randconfig' might enable such a
+# boolean option and we unfortunately can't make it depend on !RANDCONFIG.
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY),"signing_key.pem")
+signing_key.pem: x509.genkey
@echo "###"
@echo "### Now generating an X.509 key pair to be used for signing modules."
@echo "###"
@@ -181,8 +213,8 @@
@echo "###"
openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) -days 36500 \
-batch -x509 -config x509.genkey \
- -outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \
- -keyout signing_key.priv 2>&1
+ -outform PEM -out signing_key.pem \
+ -keyout signing_key.pem 2>&1
@echo "###"
@echo "### Key pair generated."
@echo "###"
@@ -207,3 +239,17 @@
@echo >>x509.genkey "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
@echo >>x509.genkey "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"
endif
+
+$(eval $(call config_filename,MODULE_SIG_KEY))
+
+# If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY isn't a PKCS#11 URI, depend on it
+ifeq ($(patsubst pkcs11:%,%,$(firstword $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME))),$(firstword $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME)))
+X509_DEP := $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_SRCPREFIX)$(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME)
+endif
+
+# GCC PR#66871 again.
+$(obj)/system_certificates.o: signing_key.x509
+
+signing_key.x509: scripts/extract-cert include/config/module/sig/key.h $(X509_DEP)
+ $(call cmd,extract_certs,$(MODULE_SIG_KEY_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY))
+endif
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index be5b8fa..bd62f5c 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -10,11 +10,8 @@
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/err.h>
-#include <crypto/public_key.h>
-#include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
/*
@@ -28,170 +25,22 @@
* - Information block
*/
struct module_signature {
- u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [enum pkey_algo] */
- u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [enum hash_algo] */
- u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [enum pkey_id_type] */
- u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name */
- u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier */
+ u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
+ u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [0] */
+ u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
+ u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0] */
+ u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0] */
u8 __pad[3];
__be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */
};
/*
- * Digest the module contents.
- */
-static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum hash_algo hash,
- const void *mod,
- unsigned long modlen)
-{
- struct public_key_signature *pks;
- struct crypto_shash *tfm;
- struct shash_desc *desc;
- size_t digest_size, desc_size;
- int ret;
-
- pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
-
- /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
- * big the hash operational data will be.
- */
- tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[hash], 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm))
- return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm);
-
- desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
- digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
-
- /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our
- * context data and the digest output buffer on the end of that.
- */
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- pks = kzalloc(digest_size + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!pks)
- goto error_no_pks;
-
- pks->pkey_hash_algo = hash;
- pks->digest = (u8 *)pks + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size;
- pks->digest_size = digest_size;
-
- desc = (void *)pks + sizeof(*pks);
- desc->tfm = tfm;
- desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
-
- ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
-
- ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, mod, modlen, pks->digest);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
-
- crypto_free_shash(tfm);
- pr_devel("<==%s() = ok\n", __func__);
- return pks;
-
-error:
- kfree(pks);
-error_no_pks:
- crypto_free_shash(tfm);
- pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
- return ERR_PTR(ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * Extract an MPI array from the signature data. This represents the actual
- * signature. Each raw MPI is prefaced by a BE 2-byte value indicating the
- * size of the MPI in bytes.
- *
- * RSA signatures only have one MPI, so currently we only read one.
- */
-static int mod_extract_mpi_array(struct public_key_signature *pks,
- const void *data, size_t len)
-{
- size_t nbytes;
- MPI mpi;
-
- if (len < 3)
- return -EBADMSG;
- nbytes = ((const u8 *)data)[0] << 8 | ((const u8 *)data)[1];
- data += 2;
- len -= 2;
- if (len != nbytes)
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(data, nbytes);
- if (!mpi)
- return -ENOMEM;
- pks->mpi[0] = mpi;
- pks->nr_mpi = 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Request an asymmetric key.
- */
-static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
- const u8 *key_id, size_t key_id_len)
-{
- key_ref_t key;
- size_t i;
- char *id, *q;
-
- pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu,,%zu)\n", __func__, signer_len, key_id_len);
-
- /* Construct an identifier. */
- id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + key_id_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!id)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
-
- memcpy(id, signer, signer_len);
-
- q = id + signer_len;
- *q++ = ':';
- *q++ = ' ';
- for (i = 0; i < key_id_len; i++) {
- *q++ = hex_asc[*key_id >> 4];
- *q++ = hex_asc[*key_id++ & 0x0f];
- }
-
- *q = 0;
-
- pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
-
- key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
- &key_type_asymmetric, id);
- if (IS_ERR(key))
- pr_warn("Request for unknown module key '%s' err %ld\n",
- id, PTR_ERR(key));
- kfree(id);
-
- if (IS_ERR(key)) {
- switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
- /* Hide some search errors */
- case -EACCES:
- case -ENOTDIR:
- case -EAGAIN:
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
- default:
- return ERR_CAST(key);
- }
- }
-
- pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
- return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
-}
-
-/*
* Verify the signature on a module.
*/
int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
{
- struct public_key_signature *pks;
struct module_signature ms;
- struct key *key;
- const void *sig;
size_t modlen = *_modlen, sig_len;
- int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
@@ -205,46 +54,24 @@
if (sig_len >= modlen)
return -EBADMSG;
modlen -= sig_len;
- if ((size_t)ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len >= modlen)
- return -EBADMSG;
- modlen -= (size_t)ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len;
-
*_modlen = modlen;
- sig = mod + modlen;
- /* For the moment, only support RSA and X.509 identifiers */
- if (ms.algo != PKEY_ALGO_RSA ||
- ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_X509)
+ if (ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) {
+ pr_err("Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n");
return -ENOPKG;
-
- if (ms.hash >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
- !hash_algo_name[ms.hash])
- return -ENOPKG;
-
- key = request_asymmetric_key(sig, ms.signer_len,
- sig + ms.signer_len, ms.key_id_len);
- if (IS_ERR(key))
- return PTR_ERR(key);
-
- pks = mod_make_digest(ms.hash, mod, modlen);
- if (IS_ERR(pks)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(pks);
- goto error_put_key;
}
- ret = mod_extract_mpi_array(pks, sig + ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len,
- sig_len);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error_free_pks;
+ if (ms.algo != 0 ||
+ ms.hash != 0 ||
+ ms.signer_len != 0 ||
+ ms.key_id_len != 0 ||
+ ms.__pad[0] != 0 ||
+ ms.__pad[1] != 0 ||
+ ms.__pad[2] != 0) {
+ pr_err("PKCS#7 signature info has unexpected non-zero params\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
- ret = verify_signature(key, pks);
- pr_devel("verify_signature() = %d\n", ret);
-
-error_free_pks:
- mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
- kfree(pks);
-error_put_key:
- key_put(key);
- pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
- return ret;
+ return system_verify_data(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
+ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
}
diff --git a/kernel/system_certificates.S b/kernel/system_certificates.S
index 3e9868d47..6ba2f75 100644
--- a/kernel/system_certificates.S
+++ b/kernel/system_certificates.S
@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@
.globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list)
VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list):
__cert_list_start:
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+ .incbin "signing_key.x509"
+#endif
.incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list"
__cert_list_end:
diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
index 875f64e..2570598 100644
--- a/kernel/system_keyring.c
+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
-#include "module-internal.h"
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring);
@@ -104,3 +104,54 @@
return 0;
}
late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+
+/**
+ * Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
+ * @data: The data to be verified.
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
+ * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
+ */
+int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+ bool trusted;
+ int ret;
+
+ pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
+ return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+
+ /* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
+ if (pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) {
+ pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n");
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!trusted) {
+ pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
+ ret = -ENOKEY;
+ }
+
+error:
+ pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_verify_data);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
diff --git a/lib/asn1_decoder.c b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
index 1a000bb..2b3f46c 100644
--- a/lib/asn1_decoder.c
+++ b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
@@ -24,15 +24,20 @@
[ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP] = 1 + 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY] = 1,
+ [ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP] = 1,
[ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT] = 1 + 1,
+ [ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_JUMP_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY] = 1,
+ [ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP] = 1,
[ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT] = 1 + 1,
+ [ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP] = 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_COND_FAIL] = 1,
[ASN1_OP_COMPLETE] = 1,
[ASN1_OP_ACT] = 1 + 1,
+ [ASN1_OP_MAYBE_ACT] = 1 + 1,
[ASN1_OP_RETURN] = 1,
[ASN1_OP_END_SEQ] = 1,
[ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF] = 1 + 1,
@@ -177,6 +182,7 @@
unsigned char flags = 0;
#define FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH 0x01
#define FLAG_MATCHED 0x02
+#define FLAG_LAST_MATCHED 0x04 /* Last tag matched */
#define FLAG_CONS 0x20 /* Corresponds to CONS bit in the opcode tag
* - ie. whether or not we are going to parse
* a compound type.
@@ -208,9 +214,9 @@
unsigned char tmp;
/* Skip conditional matches if possible */
- if ((op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__COND &&
- flags & FLAG_MATCHED) ||
- dp == datalen) {
+ if ((op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__COND && flags & FLAG_MATCHED) ||
+ (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__SKIP && dp == datalen)) {
+ flags &= ~FLAG_LAST_MATCHED;
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
goto next_op;
}
@@ -302,7 +308,9 @@
/* Decide how to handle the operation */
switch (op) {
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
+ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
+ case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP:
ret = actions[machine[pc + 1]](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -319,8 +327,10 @@
case ASN1_OP_MATCH:
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY:
+ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY:
+ case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP:
skip_data:
if (!(flags & FLAG_CONS)) {
if (flags & FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH) {
@@ -422,8 +432,15 @@
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
goto next_op;
+ case ASN1_OP_MAYBE_ACT:
+ if (!(flags & FLAG_LAST_MATCHED)) {
+ pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
+ goto next_op;
+ }
case ASN1_OP_ACT:
ret = actions[machine[pc + 1]](context, hdr, tag, data + tdp, len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
goto next_op;
@@ -431,6 +448,7 @@
if (unlikely(jsp <= 0))
goto jump_stack_underflow;
pc = jump_stack[--jsp];
+ flags |= FLAG_MATCHED | FLAG_LAST_MATCHED;
goto next_op;
default:
@@ -438,7 +456,8 @@
}
/* Shouldn't reach here */
- pr_err("ASN.1 decoder error: Found reserved opcode (%u)\n", op);
+ pr_err("ASN.1 decoder error: Found reserved opcode (%u) pc=%zu\n",
+ op, pc);
return -EBADMSG;
data_overrun_error:
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile b/scripts/Makefile
index 2016a64..1b26617 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/Makefile
@@ -16,9 +16,13 @@
hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_compiler
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += sign-file
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += extract-cert
HOSTCFLAGS_sortextable.o = -I$(srctree)/tools/include
HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -I$(srctree)/include
+HOSTLOADLIBES_sign-file = -lcrypto
+HOSTLOADLIBES_extract-cert = -lcrypto
always := $(hostprogs-y) $(hostprogs-m)
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.modinst b/scripts/Makefile.modinst
index e48a4e9..07650ee 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.modinst
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.modinst
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
mkdir -p $(2) ; \
cp $@ $(2) ; \
$(mod_strip_cmd) $(2)/$(notdir $@) ; \
- $(mod_sign_cmd) $(2)/$(notdir $@) $(patsubst %,|| true,$(KBUILD_EXTMOD)) ; \
+ $(mod_sign_cmd) $(2)/$(notdir $@) $(patsubst %,|| true,$(KBUILD_EXTMOD)) && \
$(mod_compress_cmd) $(2)/$(notdir $@)
# Modules built outside the kernel source tree go into extra by default
diff --git a/scripts/asn1_compiler.c b/scripts/asn1_compiler.c
index 7750e9c..e000f44 100644
--- a/scripts/asn1_compiler.c
+++ b/scripts/asn1_compiler.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <unistd.h>
@@ -293,8 +294,8 @@
struct action {
struct action *next;
+ char *name;
unsigned char index;
- char name[];
};
static struct action *action_list;
@@ -305,15 +306,17 @@
enum token_type token_type : 8;
unsigned char size;
struct action *action;
- const char *value;
+ char *content;
struct type *type;
};
static struct token *token_list;
static unsigned nr_tokens;
-static _Bool verbose;
+static bool verbose_opt;
+static bool debug_opt;
-#define debug(fmt, ...) do { if (verbose) printf(fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
+#define verbose(fmt, ...) do { if (verbose_opt) printf(fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
+#define debug(fmt, ...) do { if (debug_opt) printf(fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
static int directive_compare(const void *_key, const void *_pdir)
{
@@ -325,11 +328,9 @@
dlen = strlen(dir);
clen = (dlen < token->size) ? dlen : token->size;
- //debug("cmp(%*.*s,%s) = ",
- // (int)token->size, (int)token->size, token->value,
- // dir);
+ //debug("cmp(%s,%s) = ", token->content, dir);
- val = memcmp(token->value, dir, clen);
+ val = memcmp(token->content, dir, clen);
if (val != 0) {
//debug("%d [cmp]\n", val);
return val;
@@ -349,7 +350,7 @@
static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
{
struct token *tokens;
- char *line, *nl, *p, *q;
+ char *line, *nl, *start, *p, *q;
unsigned tix, lineno;
/* Assume we're going to have half as many tokens as we have
@@ -408,11 +409,11 @@
break;
tokens[tix].line = lineno;
- tokens[tix].value = p;
+ start = p;
/* Handle string tokens */
if (isalpha(*p)) {
- const char **dir;
+ const char **dir, *start = p;
/* Can be a directive, type name or element
* name. Find the end of the name.
@@ -423,10 +424,18 @@
tokens[tix].size = q - p;
p = q;
+ tokens[tix].content = malloc(tokens[tix].size + 1);
+ if (!tokens[tix].content) {
+ perror(NULL);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ memcpy(tokens[tix].content, start, tokens[tix].size);
+ tokens[tix].content[tokens[tix].size] = 0;
+
/* If it begins with a lowercase letter then
* it's an element name
*/
- if (islower(tokens[tix].value[0])) {
+ if (islower(tokens[tix].content[0])) {
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_ELEMENT_NAME;
continue;
}
@@ -455,6 +464,13 @@
q++;
tokens[tix].size = q - p;
p = q;
+ tokens[tix].content = malloc(tokens[tix].size + 1);
+ if (!tokens[tix].content) {
+ perror(NULL);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ memcpy(tokens[tix].content, start, tokens[tix].size);
+ tokens[tix].content[tokens[tix].size] = 0;
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_NUMBER;
continue;
}
@@ -463,6 +479,7 @@
if (memcmp(p, "::=", 3) == 0) {
p += 3;
tokens[tix].size = 3;
+ tokens[tix].content = "::=";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_ASSIGNMENT;
continue;
}
@@ -472,12 +489,14 @@
if (memcmp(p, "({", 2) == 0) {
p += 2;
tokens[tix].size = 2;
+ tokens[tix].content = "({";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_OPEN_ACTION;
continue;
}
if (memcmp(p, "})", 2) == 0) {
p += 2;
tokens[tix].size = 2;
+ tokens[tix].content = "})";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_CLOSE_ACTION;
continue;
}
@@ -488,22 +507,27 @@
switch (*p) {
case '{':
p += 1;
+ tokens[tix].content = "{";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_OPEN_CURLY;
continue;
case '}':
p += 1;
+ tokens[tix].content = "}";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_CLOSE_CURLY;
continue;
case '[':
p += 1;
+ tokens[tix].content = "[";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_OPEN_SQUARE;
continue;
case ']':
p += 1;
+ tokens[tix].content = "]";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_CLOSE_SQUARE;
continue;
case ',':
p += 1;
+ tokens[tix].content = ",";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_COMMA;
continue;
default:
@@ -518,22 +542,20 @@
}
nr_tokens = tix;
- debug("Extracted %u tokens\n", nr_tokens);
+ verbose("Extracted %u tokens\n", nr_tokens);
#if 0
{
int n;
for (n = 0; n < nr_tokens; n++)
- debug("Token %3u: '%*.*s'\n",
- n,
- (int)token_list[n].size, (int)token_list[n].size,
- token_list[n].value);
+ debug("Token %3u: '%s'\n", n, token_list[n].content);
}
#endif
}
static void build_type_list(void);
static void parse(void);
+static void dump_elements(void);
static void render(FILE *out, FILE *hdr);
/*
@@ -548,16 +570,27 @@
char *kbuild_verbose;
int fd;
+ kbuild_verbose = getenv("KBUILD_VERBOSE");
+ if (kbuild_verbose)
+ verbose_opt = atoi(kbuild_verbose);
+
+ while (argc > 4) {
+ if (strcmp(argv[1], "-v") == 0)
+ verbose_opt = true;
+ else if (strcmp(argv[1], "-d") == 0)
+ debug_opt = true;
+ else
+ break;
+ memmove(&argv[1], &argv[2], (argc - 2) * sizeof(char *));
+ argc--;
+ }
+
if (argc != 4) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Format: %s <grammar-file> <c-file> <hdr-file>\n",
+ fprintf(stderr, "Format: %s [-v] [-d] <grammar-file> <c-file> <hdr-file>\n",
argv[0]);
exit(2);
}
- kbuild_verbose = getenv("KBUILD_VERBOSE");
- if (kbuild_verbose)
- verbose = atoi(kbuild_verbose);
-
filename = argv[1];
outputname = argv[2];
headername = argv[3];
@@ -608,6 +641,7 @@
tokenise(buffer, buffer + readlen);
build_type_list();
parse();
+ dump_elements();
out = fopen(outputname, "w");
if (!out) {
@@ -666,7 +700,7 @@
unsigned flags;
#define ELEMENT_IMPLICIT 0x0001
#define ELEMENT_EXPLICIT 0x0002
-#define ELEMENT_MARKED 0x0004
+#define ELEMENT_TAG_SPECIFIED 0x0004
#define ELEMENT_RENDERED 0x0008
#define ELEMENT_SKIPPABLE 0x0010
#define ELEMENT_CONDITIONAL 0x0020
@@ -693,7 +727,7 @@
if ((*a)->name->size != (*b)->name->size)
return (*a)->name->size - (*b)->name->size;
else
- return memcmp((*a)->name->value, (*b)->name->value,
+ return memcmp((*a)->name->content, (*b)->name->content,
(*a)->name->size);
}
@@ -706,7 +740,7 @@
if (token->size != type->name->size)
return token->size - type->name->size;
else
- return memcmp(token->value, type->name->value,
+ return memcmp(token->content, type->name->content,
token->size);
}
@@ -756,14 +790,11 @@
qsort(type_index, nr, sizeof(type_index[0]), type_index_compare);
- debug("Extracted %u types\n", nr_types);
+ verbose("Extracted %u types\n", nr_types);
#if 0
for (n = 0; n < nr_types; n++) {
struct type *type = type_index[n];
- debug("- %*.*s\n",
- (int)type->name->size,
- (int)type->name->size,
- type->name->value);
+ debug("- %*.*s\n", type->name->content);
}
#endif
}
@@ -793,15 +824,14 @@
type->element->type_def = type;
if (cursor != type[1].name) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Parse error at token '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Parse error at token '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
} while (type++, !(type->flags & TYPE_STOP_MARKER));
- debug("Extracted %u actions\n", nr_actions);
+ verbose("Extracted %u actions\n", nr_actions);
}
static struct element *element_list;
@@ -862,33 +892,31 @@
cursor++;
break;
default:
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unrecognised tag class token '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unrecognised tag class token '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
if (cursor >= end)
goto overrun_error;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_NUMBER) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing tag number '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing tag number '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
element->tag &= ~0x1f;
- element->tag |= strtoul(cursor->value, &p, 10);
- if (p - cursor->value != cursor->size)
+ element->tag |= strtoul(cursor->content, &p, 10);
+ element->flags |= ELEMENT_TAG_SPECIFIED;
+ if (p - cursor->content != cursor->size)
abort();
cursor++;
if (cursor >= end)
goto overrun_error;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_CLOSE_SQUARE) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing closing square bracket '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing closing square bracket '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
cursor++;
@@ -988,9 +1016,8 @@
ref = bsearch(cursor, type_index, nr_types, sizeof(type_index[0]),
type_finder);
if (!ref) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Type '%*.*s' undefined\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Type '%s' undefined\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
cursor->type = *ref;
@@ -1039,9 +1066,8 @@
break;
default:
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%*.*s' does not introduce a type\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%s' does not introduce a type\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
@@ -1058,20 +1084,18 @@
if (cursor >= end)
goto overrun_error;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_ELEMENT_NAME) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%*.*s' is not an action function name\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%s' is not an action function name\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
- action = malloc(sizeof(struct action) + cursor->size + 1);
+ action = malloc(sizeof(struct action));
if (!action) {
perror(NULL);
exit(1);
}
action->index = 0;
- memcpy(action->name, cursor->value, cursor->size);
- action->name[cursor->size] = 0;
+ action->name = cursor->content;
for (ppaction = &action_list;
*ppaction;
@@ -1101,9 +1125,8 @@
if (cursor >= end)
goto overrun_error;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_CLOSE_ACTION) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing close action, got '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing close action, got '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
cursor++;
@@ -1113,9 +1136,8 @@
return top;
parse_error:
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unexpected token '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unexpected token '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
overrun_error:
@@ -1133,9 +1155,8 @@
struct token *cursor = *_cursor, *name;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_OPEN_CURLY) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound to start with brace not '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound to start with brace not '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
cursor++;
@@ -1176,9 +1197,8 @@
children->flags &= ~ELEMENT_CONDITIONAL;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_CLOSE_CURLY) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound closure, got '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound closure, got '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
cursor++;
@@ -1191,6 +1211,52 @@
exit(1);
}
+static void dump_element(const struct element *e, int level)
+{
+ const struct element *c;
+ const struct type *t = e->type_def;
+ const char *name = e->name ? e->name->content : ".";
+ const char *tname = t && t->name ? t->name->content : ".";
+ char tag[32];
+
+ if (e->class == 0 && e->method == 0 && e->tag == 0)
+ strcpy(tag, "<...>");
+ else if (e->class == ASN1_UNIV)
+ sprintf(tag, "%s %s %s",
+ asn1_classes[e->class],
+ asn1_methods[e->method],
+ asn1_universal_tags[e->tag]);
+ else
+ sprintf(tag, "%s %s %u",
+ asn1_classes[e->class],
+ asn1_methods[e->method],
+ e->tag);
+
+ printf("%c%c%c%c%c %c %*s[*] \e[33m%s\e[m %s %s \e[35m%s\e[m\n",
+ e->flags & ELEMENT_IMPLICIT ? 'I' : '-',
+ e->flags & ELEMENT_EXPLICIT ? 'E' : '-',
+ e->flags & ELEMENT_TAG_SPECIFIED ? 'T' : '-',
+ e->flags & ELEMENT_SKIPPABLE ? 'S' : '-',
+ e->flags & ELEMENT_CONDITIONAL ? 'C' : '-',
+ "-tTqQcaro"[e->compound],
+ level, "",
+ tag,
+ tname,
+ name,
+ e->action ? e->action->name : "");
+ if (e->compound == TYPE_REF)
+ dump_element(e->type->type->element, level + 3);
+ else
+ for (c = e->children; c; c = c->next)
+ dump_element(c, level + 3);
+}
+
+static void dump_elements(void)
+{
+ if (debug_opt)
+ dump_element(type_list[0].element, 0);
+}
+
static void render_element(FILE *out, struct element *e, struct element *tag);
static void render_out_of_line_list(FILE *out);
@@ -1292,7 +1358,7 @@
}
/* We do two passes - the first one calculates all the offsets */
- debug("Pass 1\n");
+ verbose("Pass 1\n");
nr_entries = 0;
root = &type_list[0];
render_element(NULL, root->element, NULL);
@@ -1303,7 +1369,7 @@
e->flags &= ~ELEMENT_RENDERED;
/* And then we actually render */
- debug("Pass 2\n");
+ verbose("Pass 2\n");
fprintf(out, "\n");
fprintf(out, "static const unsigned char %s_machine[] = {\n",
grammar_name);
@@ -1376,7 +1442,7 @@
*/
static void render_element(FILE *out, struct element *e, struct element *tag)
{
- struct element *ec;
+ struct element *ec, *x;
const char *cond, *act;
int entry, skippable = 0, outofline = 0;
@@ -1389,9 +1455,7 @@
outofline = 1;
if (e->type_def && out) {
- render_more(out, "\t// %*.*s\n",
- (int)e->type_def->name->size, (int)e->type_def->name->size,
- e->type_def->name->value);
+ render_more(out, "\t// %s\n", e->type_def->name->content);
}
/* Render the operation */
@@ -1400,11 +1464,10 @@
act = e->action ? "_ACT" : "";
switch (e->compound) {
case ANY:
- render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_%sMATCH_ANY%s,", cond, act);
+ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_%sMATCH_ANY%s%s,",
+ cond, act, skippable ? "_OR_SKIP" : "");
if (e->name)
- render_more(out, "\t\t// %*.*s",
- (int)e->name->size, (int)e->name->size,
- e->name->value);
+ render_more(out, "\t\t// %s", e->name->content);
render_more(out, "\n");
goto dont_render_tag;
@@ -1435,15 +1498,15 @@
break;
}
- if (e->name)
- render_more(out, "\t\t// %*.*s",
- (int)e->name->size, (int)e->name->size,
- e->name->value);
+ x = tag ?: e;
+ if (x->name)
+ render_more(out, "\t\t// %s", x->name->content);
render_more(out, "\n");
/* Render the tag */
- if (!tag)
+ if (!tag || !(tag->flags & ELEMENT_TAG_SPECIFIED))
tag = e;
+
if (tag->class == ASN1_UNIV &&
tag->tag != 14 &&
tag->tag != 15 &&
@@ -1465,7 +1528,8 @@
case TYPE_REF:
render_element(out, e->type->type->element, tag);
if (e->action)
- render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_ACT,\n");
+ render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_%sACT,\n",
+ skippable ? "MAYBE_" : "");
break;
case SEQUENCE:
@@ -1474,10 +1538,8 @@
* skipability */
render_opcode(out, "_jump_target(%u),", e->entry_index);
if (e->type_def && e->type_def->name)
- render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %*.*s",
- (int)e->type_def->name->size,
- (int)e->type_def->name->size,
- e->type_def->name->value);
+ render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %s",
+ e->type_def->name->content);
render_more(out, "\n");
if (!(e->flags & ELEMENT_RENDERED)) {
e->flags |= ELEMENT_RENDERED;
@@ -1502,10 +1564,8 @@
* skipability */
render_opcode(out, "_jump_target(%u),", e->entry_index);
if (e->type_def && e->type_def->name)
- render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %*.*s",
- (int)e->type_def->name->size,
- (int)e->type_def->name->size,
- e->type_def->name->value);
+ render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %s",
+ e->type_def->name->content);
render_more(out, "\n");
if (!(e->flags & ELEMENT_RENDERED)) {
e->flags |= ELEMENT_RENDERED;
@@ -1539,7 +1599,7 @@
case CHOICE:
for (ec = e->children; ec; ec = ec->next)
- render_element(out, ec, NULL);
+ render_element(out, ec, ec);
if (!skippable)
render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_COND_FAIL,\n");
if (e->action)
diff --git a/scripts/extract-cert.c b/scripts/extract-cert.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd0db01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/extract-cert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/* Extract X.509 certificate in DER form from PKCS#11 or PEM.
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright © 2015 Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * Authors: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+ * David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
+#include <err.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+#define PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
+
+static __attribute__((noreturn))
+void format(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Usage: scripts/extract-cert <source> <dest>\n");
+ exit(2);
+}
+
+static void display_openssl_errors(int l)
+{
+ const char *file;
+ char buf[120];
+ int e, line;
+
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ return;
+ fprintf(stderr, "At main.c:%d:\n", l);
+
+ while ((e = ERR_get_error_line(&file, &line))) {
+ ERR_error_string(e, buf);
+ fprintf(stderr, "- SSL %s: %s:%d\n", buf, file, line);
+ }
+}
+
+static void drain_openssl_errors(void)
+{
+ const char *file;
+ int line;
+
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ return;
+ while (ERR_get_error_line(&file, &line)) {}
+}
+
+#define ERR(cond, fmt, ...) \
+ do { \
+ bool __cond = (cond); \
+ display_openssl_errors(__LINE__); \
+ if (__cond) { \
+ err(1, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); \
+ } \
+ } while(0)
+
+static const char *key_pass;
+static BIO *wb;
+static char *cert_dst;
+int kbuild_verbose;
+
+static void write_cert(X509 *x509)
+{
+ char buf[200];
+
+ if (!wb) {
+ wb = BIO_new_file(cert_dst, "wb");
+ ERR(!wb, "%s", cert_dst);
+ }
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x509), buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ERR(!i2d_X509_bio(wb, x509), cert_dst);
+ if (kbuild_verbose)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Extracted cert: %s\n", buf);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ char *cert_src;
+
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ kbuild_verbose = atoi(getenv("KBUILD_VERBOSE")?:"0");
+
+ key_pass = getenv("KBUILD_SIGN_PIN");
+
+ if (argc != 3)
+ format();
+
+ cert_src = argv[1];
+ cert_dst = argv[2];
+
+ if (!cert_src[0]) {
+ /* Invoked with no input; create empty file */
+ FILE *f = fopen(cert_dst, "wb");
+ ERR(!f, "%s", cert_dst);
+ fclose(f);
+ exit(0);
+ } else if (!strncmp(cert_src, "pkcs11:", 7)) {
+ ENGINE *e;
+ struct {
+ const char *cert_id;
+ X509 *cert;
+ } parms;
+
+ parms.cert_id = cert_src;
+ parms.cert = NULL;
+
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+ drain_openssl_errors();
+ e = ENGINE_by_id("pkcs11");
+ ERR(!e, "Load PKCS#11 ENGINE");
+ if (ENGINE_init(e))
+ drain_openssl_errors();
+ else
+ ERR(1, "ENGINE_init");
+ if (key_pass)
+ ERR(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "PIN", key_pass, 0), "Set PKCS#11 PIN");
+ ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(e, "LOAD_CERT_CTRL", 0, &parms, NULL, 1);
+ ERR(!parms.cert, "Get X.509 from PKCS#11");
+ write_cert(parms.cert);
+ } else {
+ BIO *b;
+ X509 *x509;
+
+ b = BIO_new_file(cert_src, "rb");
+ ERR(!b, "%s", cert_src);
+
+ while (1) {
+ x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (wb && !x509) {
+ unsigned long err = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM &&
+ ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ERR(!x509, "%s", cert_src);
+ write_cert(x509);
+ }
+ }
+
+ BIO_free(wb);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/scripts/sign-file b/scripts/sign-file
deleted file mode 100755
index 3906ee1..0000000
--- a/scripts/sign-file
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,421 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl -w
-#
-# Sign a module file using the given key.
-#
-
-my $USAGE =
-"Usage: scripts/sign-file [-v] <hash algo> <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n" .
-" scripts/sign-file [-v] -s <raw sig> <hash algo> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n";
-
-use strict;
-use FileHandle;
-use IPC::Open2;
-use Getopt::Std;
-
-my %opts;
-getopts('vs:', \%opts) or die $USAGE;
-my $verbose = $opts{'v'};
-my $signature_file = $opts{'s'};
-
-die $USAGE if ($#ARGV > 4);
-die $USAGE if (!$signature_file && $#ARGV < 3 || $signature_file && $#ARGV < 2);
-
-my $dgst = shift @ARGV;
-my $private_key;
-if (!$signature_file) {
- $private_key = shift @ARGV;
-}
-my $x509 = shift @ARGV;
-my $module = shift @ARGV;
-my ($dest, $keep_orig);
-if (@ARGV) {
- $dest = $ARGV[0];
- $keep_orig = 1;
-} else {
- $dest = $module . "~";
-}
-
-die "Can't read private key\n" if (!$signature_file && !-r $private_key);
-die "Can't read signature file\n" if ($signature_file && !-r $signature_file);
-die "Can't read X.509 certificate\n" unless (-r $x509);
-die "Can't read module\n" unless (-r $module);
-
-#
-# Function to read the contents of a file into a variable.
-#
-sub read_file($)
-{
- my ($file) = @_;
- my $contents;
- my $len;
-
- open(FD, "<$file") || die $file;
- binmode FD;
- my @st = stat(FD);
- die $file if (!@st);
- $len = read(FD, $contents, $st[7]) || die $file;
- close(FD) || die $file;
- die "$file: Wanted length ", $st[7], ", got ", $len, "\n"
- if ($len != $st[7]);
- return $contents;
-}
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# First of all, we have to parse the X.509 certificate to find certain details
-# about it.
-#
-# We read the DER-encoded X509 certificate and parse it to extract the Subject
-# name and Subject Key Identifier. Theis provides the data we need to build
-# the certificate identifier.
-#
-# The signer's name part of the identifier is fabricated from the commonName,
-# the organizationName or the emailAddress components of the X.509 subject
-# name.
-#
-# The subject key ID is used to select which of that signer's certificates
-# we're intending to use to sign the module.
-#
-###############################################################################
-my $x509_certificate = read_file($x509);
-
-my $UNIV = 0 << 6;
-my $APPL = 1 << 6;
-my $CONT = 2 << 6;
-my $PRIV = 3 << 6;
-
-my $CONS = 0x20;
-
-my $BOOLEAN = 0x01;
-my $INTEGER = 0x02;
-my $BIT_STRING = 0x03;
-my $OCTET_STRING = 0x04;
-my $NULL = 0x05;
-my $OBJ_ID = 0x06;
-my $UTF8String = 0x0c;
-my $SEQUENCE = 0x10;
-my $SET = 0x11;
-my $UTCTime = 0x17;
-my $GeneralizedTime = 0x18;
-
-my %OIDs = (
- pack("CCC", 85, 4, 3) => "commonName",
- pack("CCC", 85, 4, 6) => "countryName",
- pack("CCC", 85, 4, 10) => "organizationName",
- pack("CCC", 85, 4, 11) => "organizationUnitName",
- pack("CCCCCCCCC", 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 1) => "rsaEncryption",
- pack("CCCCCCCCC", 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 5) => "sha1WithRSAEncryption",
- pack("CCCCCCCCC", 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 9, 1) => "emailAddress",
- pack("CCC", 85, 29, 35) => "authorityKeyIdentifier",
- pack("CCC", 85, 29, 14) => "subjectKeyIdentifier",
- pack("CCC", 85, 29, 19) => "basicConstraints"
-);
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Extract an ASN.1 element from a string and return information about it.
-#
-###############################################################################
-sub asn1_extract($$@)
-{
- my ($cursor, $expected_tag, $optional) = @_;
-
- return [ -1 ]
- if ($cursor->[1] == 0 && $optional);
-
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 data underrun (elem ", $cursor->[1], ")\n"
- if ($cursor->[1] < 2);
-
- my ($tag, $len) = unpack("CC", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 2));
-
- if ($expected_tag != -1 && $tag != $expected_tag) {
- return [ -1 ]
- if ($optional);
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 unexpected tag (", $tag,
- " not ", $expected_tag, ")\n";
- }
-
- $cursor->[0] += 2;
- $cursor->[1] -= 2;
-
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 long tag\n"
- if (($tag & 0x1f) == 0x1f);
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 indefinite length\n"
- if ($len == 0x80);
-
- if ($len > 0x80) {
- my $l = $len - 0x80;
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 data underrun (len len $l)\n"
- if ($cursor->[1] < $l);
-
- if ($l == 0x1) {
- $len = unpack("C", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 1));
- } elsif ($l == 0x2) {
- $len = unpack("n", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 2));
- } elsif ($l == 0x3) {
- $len = unpack("C", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 1)) << 16;
- $len = unpack("n", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0] + 1, 2));
- } elsif ($l == 0x4) {
- $len = unpack("N", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 4));
- } else {
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 element too long (", $l, ")\n";
- }
-
- $cursor->[0] += $l;
- $cursor->[1] -= $l;
- }
-
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 data underrun (", $len, ")\n"
- if ($cursor->[1] < $len);
-
- my $ret = [ $tag, [ $cursor->[0], $len, $cursor->[2] ] ];
- $cursor->[0] += $len;
- $cursor->[1] -= $len;
-
- return $ret;
-}
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Retrieve the data referred to by a cursor
-#
-###############################################################################
-sub asn1_retrieve($)
-{
- my ($cursor) = @_;
- my ($offset, $len, $data) = @$cursor;
- return substr($$data, $offset, $len);
-}
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Roughly parse the X.509 certificate
-#
-###############################################################################
-my $cursor = [ 0, length($x509_certificate), \$x509_certificate ];
-
-my $cert = asn1_extract($cursor, $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $tbs = asn1_extract($cert->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $version = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 0, 1);
-my $serial_number = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $INTEGER);
-my $sig_type = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $issuer = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $validity = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $subject = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $key = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $issuer_uid = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 1, 1);
-my $subject_uid = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 2, 1);
-my $extension_list = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 3, 1);
-
-my $subject_key_id = ();
-my $authority_key_id = ();
-
-#
-# Parse the extension list
-#
-if ($extension_list->[0] != -1) {
- my $extensions = asn1_extract($extension_list->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-
- while ($extensions->[1]->[1] > 0) {
- my $ext = asn1_extract($extensions->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
- my $x_oid = asn1_extract($ext->[1], $UNIV | $OBJ_ID);
- my $x_crit = asn1_extract($ext->[1], $UNIV | $BOOLEAN, 1);
- my $x_val = asn1_extract($ext->[1], $UNIV | $OCTET_STRING);
-
- my $raw_oid = asn1_retrieve($x_oid->[1]);
- next if (!exists($OIDs{$raw_oid}));
- my $x_type = $OIDs{$raw_oid};
-
- my $raw_value = asn1_retrieve($x_val->[1]);
-
- if ($x_type eq "subjectKeyIdentifier") {
- my $vcursor = [ 0, length($raw_value), \$raw_value ];
-
- $subject_key_id = asn1_extract($vcursor, $UNIV | $OCTET_STRING);
- }
- }
-}
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Determine what we're going to use as the signer's name. In order of
-# preference, take one of: commonName, organizationName or emailAddress.
-#
-###############################################################################
-my $org = "";
-my $cn = "";
-my $email = "";
-
-while ($subject->[1]->[1] > 0) {
- my $rdn = asn1_extract($subject->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SET);
- my $attr = asn1_extract($rdn->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
- my $n_oid = asn1_extract($attr->[1], $UNIV | $OBJ_ID);
- my $n_val = asn1_extract($attr->[1], -1);
-
- my $raw_oid = asn1_retrieve($n_oid->[1]);
- next if (!exists($OIDs{$raw_oid}));
- my $n_type = $OIDs{$raw_oid};
-
- my $raw_value = asn1_retrieve($n_val->[1]);
-
- if ($n_type eq "organizationName") {
- $org = $raw_value;
- } elsif ($n_type eq "commonName") {
- $cn = $raw_value;
- } elsif ($n_type eq "emailAddress") {
- $email = $raw_value;
- }
-}
-
-my $signers_name = $email;
-
-if ($org && $cn) {
- # Don't use the organizationName if the commonName repeats it
- if (length($org) <= length($cn) &&
- substr($cn, 0, length($org)) eq $org) {
- $signers_name = $cn;
- goto got_id_name;
- }
-
- # Or a signifcant chunk of it
- if (length($org) >= 7 &&
- length($cn) >= 7 &&
- substr($cn, 0, 7) eq substr($org, 0, 7)) {
- $signers_name = $cn;
- goto got_id_name;
- }
-
- $signers_name = $org . ": " . $cn;
-} elsif ($org) {
- $signers_name = $org;
-} elsif ($cn) {
- $signers_name = $cn;
-}
-
-got_id_name:
-
-die $x509, ": ", "X.509: Couldn't find the Subject Key Identifier extension\n"
- if (!$subject_key_id);
-
-my $key_identifier = asn1_retrieve($subject_key_id->[1]);
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Create and attach the module signature
-#
-###############################################################################
-
-#
-# Signature parameters
-#
-my $algo = 1; # Public-key crypto algorithm: RSA
-my $hash = 0; # Digest algorithm
-my $id_type = 1; # Identifier type: X.509
-
-#
-# Digest the data
-#
-my $prologue;
-if ($dgst eq "sha1") {
- $prologue = pack("C*",
- 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
- 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A,
- 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14);
- $hash = 2;
-} elsif ($dgst eq "sha224") {
- $prologue = pack("C*",
- 0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,
- 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C);
- $hash = 7;
-} elsif ($dgst eq "sha256") {
- $prologue = pack("C*",
- 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
- 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20);
- $hash = 4;
-} elsif ($dgst eq "sha384") {
- $prologue = pack("C*",
- 0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,
- 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30);
- $hash = 5;
-} elsif ($dgst eq "sha512") {
- $prologue = pack("C*",
- 0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
- 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40);
- $hash = 6;
-} else {
- die "Unknown hash algorithm: $dgst\n";
-}
-
-my $signature;
-if ($signature_file) {
- $signature = read_file($signature_file);
-} else {
- #
- # Generate the digest and read from openssl's stdout
- #
- my $digest;
- $digest = readpipe("openssl dgst -$dgst -binary $module") || die "openssl dgst";
-
- #
- # Generate the binary signature, which will be just the integer that
- # comprises the signature with no metadata attached.
- #
- my $pid;
- $pid = open2(*read_from, *write_to,
- "openssl rsautl -sign -inkey $private_key -keyform PEM") ||
- die "openssl rsautl";
- binmode write_to;
- print write_to $prologue . $digest || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
- close(write_to) || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
-
- binmode read_from;
- read(read_from, $signature, 4096) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
- close(read_from) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
- waitpid($pid, 0) || die;
- die "openssl rsautl died: $?" if ($? >> 8);
-}
-$signature = pack("n", length($signature)) . $signature,
-
-#
-# Build the signed binary
-#
-my $unsigned_module = read_file($module);
-
-my $magic_number = "~Module signature appended~\n";
-
-my $info = pack("CCCCCxxxN",
- $algo, $hash, $id_type,
- length($signers_name),
- length($key_identifier),
- length($signature));
-
-if ($verbose) {
- print "Size of unsigned module: ", length($unsigned_module), "\n";
- print "Size of signer's name : ", length($signers_name), "\n";
- print "Size of key identifier : ", length($key_identifier), "\n";
- print "Size of signature : ", length($signature), "\n";
- print "Size of information : ", length($info), "\n";
- print "Size of magic number : ", length($magic_number), "\n";
- print "Signer's name : '", $signers_name, "'\n";
- print "Digest : $dgst\n";
-}
-
-open(FD, ">$dest") || die $dest;
-binmode FD;
-print FD
- $unsigned_module,
- $signers_name,
- $key_identifier,
- $signature,
- $info,
- $magic_number
- ;
-close FD || die $dest;
-
-if (!$keep_orig) {
- rename($dest, $module) || die $module;
-}
diff --git a/scripts/sign-file.c b/scripts/sign-file.c
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..058bba3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/sign-file.c
@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+/* Sign a module file using the given key.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
+#include <err.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+struct module_signature {
+ uint8_t algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
+ uint8_t hash; /* Digest algorithm [0] */
+ uint8_t id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
+ uint8_t signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0] */
+ uint8_t key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0] */
+ uint8_t __pad[3];
+ uint32_t sig_len; /* Length of signature data */
+};
+
+#define PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
+
+static char magic_number[] = "~Module signature appended~\n";
+
+static __attribute__((noreturn))
+void format(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Usage: scripts/sign-file [-dp] <hash algo> <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n");
+ exit(2);
+}
+
+static void display_openssl_errors(int l)
+{
+ const char *file;
+ char buf[120];
+ int e, line;
+
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ return;
+ fprintf(stderr, "At main.c:%d:\n", l);
+
+ while ((e = ERR_get_error_line(&file, &line))) {
+ ERR_error_string(e, buf);
+ fprintf(stderr, "- SSL %s: %s:%d\n", buf, file, line);
+ }
+}
+
+static void drain_openssl_errors(void)
+{
+ const char *file;
+ int line;
+
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ return;
+ while (ERR_get_error_line(&file, &line)) {}
+}
+
+#define ERR(cond, fmt, ...) \
+ do { \
+ bool __cond = (cond); \
+ display_openssl_errors(__LINE__); \
+ if (__cond) { \
+ err(1, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); \
+ } \
+ } while(0)
+
+static const char *key_pass;
+
+static int pem_pw_cb(char *buf, int len, int w, void *v)
+{
+ int pwlen;
+
+ if (!key_pass)
+ return -1;
+
+ pwlen = strlen(key_pass);
+ if (pwlen >= len)
+ return -1;
+
+ strcpy(buf, key_pass);
+
+ /* If it's wrong, don't keep trying it. */
+ key_pass = NULL;
+
+ return pwlen;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ struct module_signature sig_info = { .id_type = PKEY_ID_PKCS7 };
+ char *hash_algo = NULL;
+ char *private_key_name, *x509_name, *module_name, *dest_name;
+ bool save_cms = false, replace_orig;
+ bool sign_only = false;
+ unsigned char buf[4096];
+ unsigned long module_size, cms_size;
+ unsigned int use_keyid = 0, use_signed_attrs = CMS_NOATTR;
+ const EVP_MD *digest_algo;
+ EVP_PKEY *private_key;
+ CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+ X509 *x509;
+ BIO *b, *bd = NULL, *bm;
+ int opt, n;
+
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ key_pass = getenv("KBUILD_SIGN_PIN");
+
+ do {
+ opt = getopt(argc, argv, "dpk");
+ switch (opt) {
+ case 'p': save_cms = true; break;
+ case 'd': sign_only = true; save_cms = true; break;
+ case 'k': use_keyid = CMS_USE_KEYID; break;
+ case -1: break;
+ default: format();
+ }
+ } while (opt != -1);
+
+ argc -= optind;
+ argv += optind;
+ if (argc < 4 || argc > 5)
+ format();
+
+ hash_algo = argv[0];
+ private_key_name = argv[1];
+ x509_name = argv[2];
+ module_name = argv[3];
+ if (argc == 5) {
+ dest_name = argv[4];
+ replace_orig = false;
+ } else {
+ ERR(asprintf(&dest_name, "%s.~signed~", module_name) < 0,
+ "asprintf");
+ replace_orig = true;
+ }
+
+ /* Read the private key and the X.509 cert the PKCS#7 message
+ * will point to.
+ */
+ if (!strncmp(private_key_name, "pkcs11:", 7)) {
+ ENGINE *e;
+
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+ drain_openssl_errors();
+ e = ENGINE_by_id("pkcs11");
+ ERR(!e, "Load PKCS#11 ENGINE");
+ if (ENGINE_init(e))
+ drain_openssl_errors();
+ else
+ ERR(1, "ENGINE_init");
+ if (key_pass)
+ ERR(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "PIN", key_pass, 0), "Set PKCS#11 PIN");
+ private_key = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, private_key_name, NULL,
+ NULL);
+ ERR(!private_key, "%s", private_key_name);
+ } else {
+ b = BIO_new_file(private_key_name, "rb");
+ ERR(!b, "%s", private_key_name);
+ private_key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(b, NULL, pem_pw_cb, NULL);
+ ERR(!private_key, "%s", private_key_name);
+ BIO_free(b);
+ }
+
+ b = BIO_new_file(x509_name, "rb");
+ ERR(!b, "%s", x509_name);
+ x509 = d2i_X509_bio(b, NULL); /* Binary encoded X.509 */
+ if (!x509) {
+ ERR(BIO_reset(b) != 1, "%s", x509_name);
+ x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(b, NULL, NULL, NULL); /* PEM encoded X.509 */
+ if (x509)
+ drain_openssl_errors();
+ }
+ BIO_free(b);
+ ERR(!x509, "%s", x509_name);
+
+ /* Open the destination file now so that we can shovel the module data
+ * across as we read it.
+ */
+ if (!sign_only) {
+ bd = BIO_new_file(dest_name, "wb");
+ ERR(!bd, "%s", dest_name);
+ }
+
+ /* Digest the module data. */
+ OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+ display_openssl_errors(__LINE__);
+ digest_algo = EVP_get_digestbyname(hash_algo);
+ ERR(!digest_algo, "EVP_get_digestbyname");
+
+ bm = BIO_new_file(module_name, "rb");
+ ERR(!bm, "%s", module_name);
+
+ /* Load the CMS message from the digest buffer. */
+ cms = CMS_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_PARTIAL | CMS_BINARY | CMS_DETACHED | CMS_STREAM);
+ ERR(!cms, "CMS_sign");
+
+ ERR(!CMS_add1_signer(cms, x509, private_key, digest_algo,
+ CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_BINARY | CMS_NOSMIMECAP |
+ use_keyid | use_signed_attrs),
+ "CMS_sign_add_signer");
+ ERR(CMS_final(cms, bm, NULL, CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_BINARY) < 0,
+ "CMS_final");
+
+ if (save_cms) {
+ char *cms_name;
+
+ ERR(asprintf(&cms_name, "%s.p7s", module_name) < 0, "asprintf");
+ b = BIO_new_file(cms_name, "wb");
+ ERR(!b, "%s", cms_name);
+ ERR(i2d_CMS_bio_stream(b, cms, NULL, 0) < 0, "%s", cms_name);
+ BIO_free(b);
+ }
+
+ if (sign_only)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Append the marker and the PKCS#7 message to the destination file */
+ ERR(BIO_reset(bm) < 0, "%s", module_name);
+ while ((n = BIO_read(bm, buf, sizeof(buf))),
+ n > 0) {
+ ERR(BIO_write(bd, buf, n) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+ }
+ ERR(n < 0, "%s", module_name);
+ module_size = BIO_number_written(bd);
+
+ ERR(i2d_CMS_bio_stream(bd, cms, NULL, 0) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+ cms_size = BIO_number_written(bd) - module_size;
+ sig_info.sig_len = htonl(cms_size);
+ ERR(BIO_write(bd, &sig_info, sizeof(sig_info)) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+ ERR(BIO_write(bd, magic_number, sizeof(magic_number) - 1) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+
+ ERR(BIO_free(bd) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+
+ /* Finally, if we're signing in place, replace the original. */
+ if (replace_orig)
+ ERR(rename(dest_name, module_name) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index bf4ec4647..e4523789 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -132,7 +132,6 @@
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
- default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
help
@@ -151,9 +150,6 @@
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
- config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
- bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y
-
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
@@ -165,7 +161,6 @@
default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
- default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
endmenu
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 595fffa..e693ffc 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -56,18 +56,13 @@
pr_info("Security Framework initialized\n");
/*
- * Always load the capability module.
+ * Load minor LSMs, with the capability module always first.
*/
capability_add_hooks();
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
- /*
- * If Yama is configured for stacking load it next.
- */
yama_add_hooks();
-#endif
+
/*
- * Load the chosen module if there is one.
- * This will also find yama if it is stacking
+ * Load all the remaining security modules.
*/
do_security_initcalls();
diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
index 3123e1d..90c605e 100644
--- a/security/yama/Kconfig
+++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
@@ -6,14 +6,7 @@
This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary
access controls. Currently available is ptrace scope restriction.
+ Like capabilities, this security module stacks with other LSMs.
Further information can be found in Documentation/security/Yama.txt.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-
-config SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
- bool "Yama stacked with other LSMs"
- depends on SECURITY_YAMA
- default n
- help
- When Yama is built into the kernel, force it to stack with the
- selected primary LSM.
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 9ed3250..d3c19c9 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -353,11 +353,6 @@
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, yama_task_free),
};
-void __init yama_add_hooks(void)
-{
- security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks));
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static int yama_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -396,25 +391,18 @@
},
{ }
};
-#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
-
-static __init int yama_init(void)
+static void __init yama_init_sysctl(void)
{
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
- /*
- * If yama is being stacked this is already taken care of.
- */
- if (!security_module_enable("yama"))
- return 0;
-#endif
- pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
if (!register_sysctl_paths(yama_sysctl_path, yama_sysctl_table))
panic("Yama: sysctl registration failed.\n");
-#endif
-
- return 0;
}
+#else
+static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
-security_initcall(yama_init);
+void __init yama_add_hooks(void)
+{
+ pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
+ security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks));
+ yama_init_sysctl();
+}