Bluetooth: Fix exposing full value of shortened LTKs
When we notify user space of a new LTK or distribute an LTK to the
remote peer the value passed should be the shortened version so that
it's easy to compare values in various traces. The core spec also sets
the requirements for the shortening/masking as:
"The masking shall be done after generation and before being
distributed, used or stored."
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 3921cba..4bfaa3d 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -1271,7 +1271,14 @@
__le16 ediv;
__le64 rand;
- get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));
+ /* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of
+ * bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest
+ * of the value to zeroes.
+ */
+ get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size);
+ memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
+ sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size);
+
get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));