x86: Clean up the range of stack overflow checking
The overflow checking of kernel stack checks if the stack
pointer points to the available kernel stack range, which is
derived from the original overflow checking.
It is clear that curbase address is always less than low
boundary of available kernel stack. So, this patch removes the
first condition that checks if the pointer is higher than
curbase.
Signed-off-by: Mitsuo Hayasaka <mitsuo.hayasaka.hu@hitachi.com>
Cc: yrl.pp-manager.tt@hitachi.com
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20111129060845.11076.40916.stgit@ltc219.sdl.hitachi.co.jp
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c
index 42552b0..54e2b2b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c
@@ -46,10 +46,9 @@
if (user_mode_vm(regs))
return;
- if (regs->sp >= curbase &&
- regs->sp <= curbase + THREAD_SIZE &&
- regs->sp >= curbase + sizeof(struct thread_info) +
- sizeof(struct pt_regs) + 128)
+ if (regs->sp >= curbase + sizeof(struct thread_info) +
+ sizeof(struct pt_regs) + 128 &&
+ regs->sp <= curbase + THREAD_SIZE)
return;
irq_stack_top = (u64)__get_cpu_var(irq_stack_union.irq_stack);