crypto: qat - Ensure ipad and opad are zeroed
The patch ad511e260a27b8e35d273cc0ecfe5a8ff9543181 (crypto: qat -
Fix incorrect uses of memzero_explicit) broke hashing because the
code was in fact overwriting the qat_auth_state variable.
In fact there is no reason for the variable to exist anyway since
all we are using it for is to store ipad and opad. So we could
simply create ipad and opad directly and avoid this whole mess.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c
index a0d95f3..e2c4b25 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c
@@ -160,33 +160,30 @@
const uint8_t *auth_key,
unsigned int auth_keylen)
{
- struct qat_auth_state auth_state;
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, ctx->hash_tfm);
struct sha1_state sha1;
struct sha256_state sha256;
struct sha512_state sha512;
int block_size = crypto_shash_blocksize(ctx->hash_tfm);
int digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(ctx->hash_tfm);
- uint8_t *ipad = auth_state.data;
- uint8_t *opad = ipad + block_size;
+ char ipad[block_size];
+ char opad[block_size];
__be32 *hash_state_out;
__be64 *hash512_state_out;
int i, offset;
- memset(auth_state.data, 0, sizeof(auth_state.data));
+ memset(ipad, 0, block_size);
+ memset(opad, 0, block_size);
shash->tfm = ctx->hash_tfm;
shash->flags = 0x0;
if (auth_keylen > block_size) {
- char buff[SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE];
int ret = crypto_shash_digest(shash, auth_key,
- auth_keylen, buff);
+ auth_keylen, ipad);
if (ret)
return ret;
- memcpy(ipad, buff, digest_size);
- memcpy(opad, buff, digest_size);
- memzero_explicit(buff, sizeof(buff));
+ memcpy(opad, ipad, digest_size);
} else {
memcpy(ipad, auth_key, auth_keylen);
memcpy(opad, auth_key, auth_keylen);