Bluetooth: Fix ignoring unknown SMP authentication requirement bits
The SMP specification states that we should ignore any unknown bits from
the authentication requirement. We already have a define for masking out
unknown bits but we haven't used it in all places so far. This patch
adds usage of the AUTH_REQ_MASK to all places that need it and ensures
that we don't pass unknown bits onward to other functions.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index dbd17a0..ef8f96d 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -949,8 +949,11 @@
if (!smp)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
+ auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+
if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
- (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+ (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
@@ -959,9 +962,6 @@
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
- /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
- auth = req->auth_req;
-
sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
@@ -1024,6 +1024,8 @@
if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+ auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+
/* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */
if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
u8 method;
@@ -1044,7 +1046,7 @@
*/
smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
- auth = (req->auth_req | rsp->auth_req);
+ auth |= req->auth_req;
ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
if (ret)
@@ -1160,7 +1162,7 @@
struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
struct smp_chan *smp;
- u8 sec_level;
+ u8 sec_level, auth;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
@@ -1170,7 +1172,9 @@
if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
- sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);
+ auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+
+ sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level))
return 0;
@@ -1185,13 +1189,13 @@
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags) &&
- (rp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+ (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
- build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, rp->auth_req);
+ build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));