x86: fix stackprotector canary updates during context switches
fix a bug noticed and fixed by pageexec@freemail.hu.
if built with -fstack-protector-all then we'll have canary checks built
into the __switch_to() function. That does not work well with the
canary-switching code there: while we already use the %rsp of the
new task, we still call __switch_to() whith the previous task's canary
value in the PDA, hence the __switch_to() ssp prologue instructions
will store the previous canary. Then we update the PDA and upon return
from __switch_to() the canary check triggers and we panic.
so update the canary after we have called __switch_to(), where we are
at the same stackframe level as the last stackframe of the next
(and now freshly current) task.
Note: this means that we call __switch_to() [and its sub-functions]
still with the old canary, but that is not a problem, both the previous
and the next task has a high-quality canary. The only (mostly academic)
disadvantage is that the canary of one task may leak onto the stack of
another task, increasing the risk of information leaks, were an attacker
able to read the stack of specific tasks (but not that of others).
To solve this we'll have to reorganize the way we switch tasks, and move
the PDA setting into the switch_to() assembly code. That will happen in
another patch.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 5395a61..d6a5151 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1096,10 +1096,9 @@
pid_t pid;
pid_t tgid;
-#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
/* Canary value for the -fstack-protector gcc feature */
unsigned long stack_canary;
-#endif
+
/*
* pointers to (original) parent process, youngest child, younger sibling,
* older sibling, respectively. (p->father can be replaced with