ipv6: protect skb->sk accesses from recursive dereference inside the stack
We should not consult skb->sk for output decisions in xmit recursion
levels > 0 in the stack. Otherwise local socket settings could influence
the result of e.g. tunnel encapsulation process.
ipv6 does not conform with this in three places:
1) ip6_fragment: we do consult ipv6_npinfo for frag_size
2) sk_mc_loop in ipv6 uses skb->sk and checks if we should
loop the packet back to the local socket
3) ip6_skb_dst_mtu could query the settings from the user socket and
force a wrong MTU
Furthermore:
In sk_mc_loop we could potentially land in WARN_ON(1) if we use a
PF_PACKET socket ontop of an IPv6-backed vxlan device.
Reuse xmit_recursion as we are currently only interested in protecting
tunnel devices.
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
diff --git a/include/net/ip6_route.h b/include/net/ip6_route.h
index 1d09b46..eda131d 100644
--- a/include/net/ip6_route.h
+++ b/include/net/ip6_route.h
@@ -174,7 +174,8 @@
static inline int ip6_skb_dst_mtu(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct ipv6_pinfo *np = skb->sk ? inet6_sk(skb->sk) : NULL;
+ struct ipv6_pinfo *np = skb->sk && !dev_recursion_level() ?
+ inet6_sk(skb->sk) : NULL;
return (np && np->pmtudisc >= IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE) ?
skb_dst(skb)->dev->mtu : dst_mtu(skb_dst(skb));