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Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001#
2# Security configuration
3#
4
5menu "Security options"
6
David Howellsf0894942012-05-11 10:56:56 +01007source security/keys/Kconfig
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07008
Dan Rosenbergeaf06b22010-11-11 14:05:18 -08009config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
10 bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
11 default n
12 help
13 This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
14 syslog via dmesg(8).
15
16 If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
17 unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
18
19 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
20
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070021config SECURITY
22 bool "Enable different security models"
Adrian Bunk2c405792005-08-22 18:20:50 +020023 depends on SYSFS
Iulia Manda28138932015-04-15 16:16:41 -070024 depends on MULTIUSER
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070025 help
26 This allows you to choose different security modules to be
27 configured into your kernel.
28
29 If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
30 model will be used.
31
32 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
33
James Morrisdd0859d2017-02-15 00:17:24 +110034config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
35 depends on SECURITY
36 bool
37 default n
38
Eric Parisda318942008-08-22 11:35:57 -040039config SECURITYFS
40 bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
41 help
42 This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
Mimi Zohar3323eec2009-02-04 09:06:58 -050043 the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is
44 not used by SELinux or SMACK.
Eric Parisda318942008-08-22 11:35:57 -040045
46 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
47
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070048config SECURITY_NETWORK
49 bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
50 depends on SECURITY
51 help
52 This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
53 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
54 implement socket and networking access controls.
55 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
56
Dave Hansen385ce0e2017-12-04 15:08:03 +010057config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
58 bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
Thomas Gleixner87faa0d2018-01-03 15:18:44 +010059 default y
Joerg Roedel61a6bd82018-09-14 12:59:14 +020060 depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE) && !UML
Dave Hansen385ce0e2017-12-04 15:08:03 +010061 help
62 This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
63 ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
64 into userspace.
65
W. Trevor Kinga237f762018-01-12 15:24:59 -080066 See Documentation/x86/pti.txt for more details.
Dave Hansen385ce0e2017-12-04 15:08:03 +010067
Daniel Jurgensd291f1a2017-05-19 15:48:52 +030068config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
69 bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
70 depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
71 help
72 This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
73 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
74 implement Infiniband access controls.
75 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
76
Trent Jaegerdf718372005-12-13 23:12:27 -080077config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
78 bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
79 depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
80 help
81 This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
82 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
83 implement per-packet access controls based on labels
84 derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
85 designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
86 to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
87 IPSec.
88 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
89
Kentaro Takedabe6d3e52008-12-17 13:24:15 +090090config SECURITY_PATH
91 bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
92 depends on SECURITY
93 help
94 This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
95 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
96 implement pathname based access controls.
97 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
98
Joseph Cihula31625342009-06-30 19:30:59 -070099config INTEL_TXT
100 bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
Shane Wang69575d32009-09-01 18:25:07 -0700101 depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
Joseph Cihula31625342009-06-30 19:30:59 -0700102 help
103 This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
104 Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
105 Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
106 of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
107 will have no effect.
108
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo3c556e42009-08-12 12:00:40 -0300109 Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
Joseph Cihula31625342009-06-30 19:30:59 -0700110 initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
111 create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
112 helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
113 correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
114 of the kernel itself.
115
116 Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
117 confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo3c556e42009-08-12 12:00:40 -0300118 it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
Joseph Cihula31625342009-06-30 19:30:59 -0700119 providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
120
121 See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
122 about Intel(R) TXT.
123 See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
124 See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
125 Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
126
127 If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
128
Eric Paris788084a2009-07-31 12:54:11 -0400129config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
Andreas Schwab024e6cb2009-08-18 22:14:29 +0200130 int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
Eric Paris788084a2009-07-31 12:54:11 -0400131 depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
Colin Cross530b0992014-02-04 02:15:32 +0000132 default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
Dave Jonesa58578e2009-08-18 13:47:37 -0400133 default 65536
Eric Paris788084a2009-07-31 12:54:11 -0400134 help
135 This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
136 from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
137 can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
138
139 For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
140 a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
141 On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
142 Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
143 this low address space will need the permission specific to the
144 systems running LSM.
145
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700146config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
147 bool
148 help
149 The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
150 validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
151 support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
152
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700153config HARDENED_USERCOPY
154 bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
Linus Torvalds6040e572016-08-19 12:47:01 -0700155 depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
Kees Cook22ec1a22017-12-01 13:19:39 -0800156 imply STRICT_DEVMEM
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700157 help
158 This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
159 copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
160 copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
161 are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
Geert Uytterhoeven99c55fb2017-05-02 20:27:41 +0200162 separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
Kees Cookf5509cc2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700163 or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
164 of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
165
Kees Cook2d891fb2017-11-30 13:04:32 -0800166config HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK
167 bool "Allow usercopy whitelist violations to fallback to object size"
168 depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
169 default y
170 help
171 This is a temporary option that allows missing usercopy whitelists
172 to be discovered via a WARN() to the kernel log, instead of
173 rejecting the copy, falling back to non-whitelisted hardened
174 usercopy that checks the slab allocation size instead of the
175 whitelist size. This option will be removed once it seems like
176 all missing usercopy whitelists have been identified and fixed.
177 Booting with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=Y/N" can change
178 this setting.
179
Kees Cook8e1f74e2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700180config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
181 bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages"
182 depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
Linus Torvalds80a77042016-09-07 14:03:49 -0700183 depends on EXPERT
Kees Cook8e1f74e2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700184 help
185 When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP,
186 hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are,
187 however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all
188 been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
189 trying to find such users.
190
Daniel Micay6974f0c2017-07-12 14:36:10 -0700191config FORTIFY_SOURCE
192 bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
193 depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
194 help
195 Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
196 where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
197
Greg Kroah-Hartman64e90a8a2017-01-16 16:22:39 +0100198config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
199 bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
200 help
201 By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
202 binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
203 interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined
204 either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
205 option. However, some of these are dynamically created at
206 runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
207 To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
208 calls through a single executable that can not have its name
209 changed.
210
211 Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
212 "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
213 passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick
214 and choose what real programs are called.
215
216 If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
217 disabled, choose this option and then set
218 STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
219
220config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
221 string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
222 depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
223 default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
224 help
225 The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
226 program is wish to be run. The "real" application's name will
227 be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
228 line.
229
230 If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
231 specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
232
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700233source security/selinux/Kconfig
Casey Schauflere114e472008-02-04 22:29:50 -0800234source security/smack/Kconfig
Kentaro Takeda00d7d6f2009-02-05 17:18:17 +0900235source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
John Johansenf9ad1af2010-07-29 14:48:08 -0700236source security/apparmor/Kconfig
Kees Cook9b091552016-04-20 15:46:28 -0700237source security/loadpin/Kconfig
Kees Cook2d514482011-12-21 12:17:04 -0800238source security/yama/Kconfig
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700239
Mimi Zoharf381c272011-03-09 14:13:22 -0500240source security/integrity/Kconfig
Mimi Zohar3323eec2009-02-04 09:06:58 -0500241
John Johansen6e65f922009-11-05 17:03:20 -0800242choice
243 prompt "Default security module"
244 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
245 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
246 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
John Johansenf9ad1af2010-07-29 14:48:08 -0700247 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
John Johansen6e65f922009-11-05 17:03:20 -0800248 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
249
250 help
251 Select the security module that will be used by default if the
252 kernel parameter security= is not specified.
253
254 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
255 bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
256
257 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
258 bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
259
260 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
261 bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
262
John Johansenf9ad1af2010-07-29 14:48:08 -0700263 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
264 bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
265
John Johansen6e65f922009-11-05 17:03:20 -0800266 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
267 bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
268
269endchoice
270
271config DEFAULT_SECURITY
272 string
273 default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
274 default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
275 default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
John Johansenf9ad1af2010-07-29 14:48:08 -0700276 default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
John Johansen6e65f922009-11-05 17:03:20 -0800277 default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
278
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700279endmenu
280