security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook
In order to validate the contents of firmware being loaded, there must be
a hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel
itself. Without this, there is a risk that a root user could load malicious
firmware designed to mount an attack against kernel memory (e.g. via DMA).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 59820f8..0ae4b14 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -702,6 +702,15 @@
* @inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
* The current task must be the one that nominated @inode.
* Return 0 if successful.
+ * @kernel_fw_from_file:
+ * Load firmware from userspace (not called for built-in firmware).
+ * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
+ * the firmware to load. This argument will be NULL if the firmware
+ * was loaded via the uevent-triggered blob-based interface exposed
+ * by CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER.
+ * @buf pointer to buffer containing firmware contents.
+ * @size length of the firmware contents.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @kernel_module_request:
* Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
* userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
@@ -1568,6 +1577,7 @@
void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
+ int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1840,6 +1850,7 @@
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
+int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file);
int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -2366,6 +2377,12 @@
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file,
+ char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index e76373d..a74fde6 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -401,6 +401,11 @@
return 0;
}
+static int cap_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
return 0;
@@ -1015,6 +1020,7 @@
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_fw_from_file);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_from_file);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 31614e9..35d37d0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -845,6 +845,12 @@
return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
}
+int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ return security_ops->kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_fw_from_file);
+
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name);