tree 91aba384f043e95978663e92ceddea39b1a52871
parent 78f87ce2a17f0aa625451835ffaceb6b607b4a9a
author Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> 1496910127 -0700
committer Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 1497445555 +0200

KVM: cpuid: Fix read/write out-of-bounds vulnerability in cpuid emulation

commit a3641631d14571242eec0d30c9faa786cbf52d44 upstream.

If "i" is the last element in the vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[] array, it
potentially can be exploited the vulnerability. this will out-of-bounds
read and write.  Luckily, the effect is small:

	/* when no next entry is found, the current entry[i] is reselected */
	for (j = i + 1; ; j = (j + 1) % nent) {
		struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *ej = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[j];
		if (ej->function == e->function) {

It reads ej->maxphyaddr, which is user controlled.  However...

			ej->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATE_READ_NEXT;

After cpuid_entries there is

	int maxphyaddr;
	struct x86_emulate_ctxt emulate_ctxt;  /* 16-byte aligned */

So we have:

- cpuid_entries at offset 1B50 (6992)
- maxphyaddr at offset 27D0 (6992 + 3200 = 10192)
- padding at 27D4...27DF
- emulate_ctxt at 27E0

And it writes in the padding.  Pfew, writing the ops field of emulate_ctxt
would have been much worse.

This patch fixes it by modding the index to avoid the out-of-bounds
access. Worst case, i == j and ej->function == e->function,
the loop can bail out.

Reported-by: Moguofang <moguofang@huawei.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Guofang Mo <moguofang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>