Linux-2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..462d78d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1725 @@
+/*
+ * linux/kernel/sys.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
+ */
+
+#include <linux/config.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/utsname.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
+#include <linux/reboot.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/highuid.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/times.h>
+#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/dcookies.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+
+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/io.h>
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+
+#ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
+# define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
+#endif
+#ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL
+# define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
+#endif
+#ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL
+# define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
+#endif
+#ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL
+# define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
+#endif
+#ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL
+# define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
+#endif
+#ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL
+# define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for
+ * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past
+ */
+
+int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID;
+int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_UID16
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit
+ * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures
+ */
+
+int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
+int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid);
+
+/*
+ * this indicates whether you can reboot with ctrl-alt-del: the default is yes
+ */
+
+int C_A_D = 1;
+int cad_pid = 1;
+
+/*
+ * Notifier list for kernel code which wants to be called
+ * at shutdown. This is used to stop any idling DMA operations
+ * and the like.
+ */
+
+static struct notifier_block *reboot_notifier_list;
+static DEFINE_RWLOCK(notifier_lock);
+
+/**
+ * notifier_chain_register - Add notifier to a notifier chain
+ * @list: Pointer to root list pointer
+ * @n: New entry in notifier chain
+ *
+ * Adds a notifier to a notifier chain.
+ *
+ * Currently always returns zero.
+ */
+
+int notifier_chain_register(struct notifier_block **list, struct notifier_block *n)
+{
+ write_lock(¬ifier_lock);
+ while(*list)
+ {
+ if(n->priority > (*list)->priority)
+ break;
+ list= &((*list)->next);
+ }
+ n->next = *list;
+ *list=n;
+ write_unlock(¬ifier_lock);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(notifier_chain_register);
+
+/**
+ * notifier_chain_unregister - Remove notifier from a notifier chain
+ * @nl: Pointer to root list pointer
+ * @n: New entry in notifier chain
+ *
+ * Removes a notifier from a notifier chain.
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success, or %-ENOENT on failure.
+ */
+
+int notifier_chain_unregister(struct notifier_block **nl, struct notifier_block *n)
+{
+ write_lock(¬ifier_lock);
+ while((*nl)!=NULL)
+ {
+ if((*nl)==n)
+ {
+ *nl=n->next;
+ write_unlock(¬ifier_lock);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ nl=&((*nl)->next);
+ }
+ write_unlock(¬ifier_lock);
+ return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(notifier_chain_unregister);
+
+/**
+ * notifier_call_chain - Call functions in a notifier chain
+ * @n: Pointer to root pointer of notifier chain
+ * @val: Value passed unmodified to notifier function
+ * @v: Pointer passed unmodified to notifier function
+ *
+ * Calls each function in a notifier chain in turn.
+ *
+ * If the return value of the notifier can be and'd
+ * with %NOTIFY_STOP_MASK, then notifier_call_chain
+ * will return immediately, with the return value of
+ * the notifier function which halted execution.
+ * Otherwise, the return value is the return value
+ * of the last notifier function called.
+ */
+
+int notifier_call_chain(struct notifier_block **n, unsigned long val, void *v)
+{
+ int ret=NOTIFY_DONE;
+ struct notifier_block *nb = *n;
+
+ while(nb)
+ {
+ ret=nb->notifier_call(nb,val,v);
+ if(ret&NOTIFY_STOP_MASK)
+ {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ nb=nb->next;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(notifier_call_chain);
+
+/**
+ * register_reboot_notifier - Register function to be called at reboot time
+ * @nb: Info about notifier function to be called
+ *
+ * Registers a function with the list of functions
+ * to be called at reboot time.
+ *
+ * Currently always returns zero, as notifier_chain_register
+ * always returns zero.
+ */
+
+int register_reboot_notifier(struct notifier_block * nb)
+{
+ return notifier_chain_register(&reboot_notifier_list, nb);
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_reboot_notifier);
+
+/**
+ * unregister_reboot_notifier - Unregister previously registered reboot notifier
+ * @nb: Hook to be unregistered
+ *
+ * Unregisters a previously registered reboot
+ * notifier function.
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success, or %-ENOENT on failure.
+ */
+
+int unregister_reboot_notifier(struct notifier_block * nb)
+{
+ return notifier_chain_unregister(&reboot_notifier_list, nb);
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_reboot_notifier);
+
+static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
+{
+ int no_nice;
+
+ if (p->uid != current->euid &&
+ p->euid != current->euid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
+ error = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
+ error = -EACCES;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
+ if (no_nice) {
+ error = no_nice;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (error == -ESRCH)
+ error = 0;
+ set_user_nice(p, niceval);
+out:
+ return error;
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_setpriority(int which, int who, int niceval)
+{
+ struct task_struct *g, *p;
+ struct user_struct *user;
+ int error = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (which > 2 || which < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */
+ error = -ESRCH;
+ if (niceval < -20)
+ niceval = -20;
+ if (niceval > 19)
+ niceval = 19;
+
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ switch (which) {
+ case PRIO_PROCESS:
+ if (!who)
+ who = current->pid;
+ p = find_task_by_pid(who);
+ if (p)
+ error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
+ break;
+ case PRIO_PGRP:
+ if (!who)
+ who = process_group(current);
+ do_each_task_pid(who, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
+ error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
+ } while_each_task_pid(who, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
+ break;
+ case PRIO_USER:
+ user = current->user;
+ if (!who)
+ who = current->uid;
+ else
+ if ((who != current->uid) && !(user = find_user(who)))
+ goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */
+
+ do_each_thread(g, p)
+ if (p->uid == who)
+ error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
+ while_each_thread(g, p);
+ if (who != current->uid)
+ free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */
+ break;
+ }
+out_unlock:
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+out:
+ return error;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will
+ * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that
+ * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19)
+ * to stay compatible.
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_getpriority(int which, int who)
+{
+ struct task_struct *g, *p;
+ struct user_struct *user;
+ long niceval, retval = -ESRCH;
+
+ if (which > 2 || which < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ switch (which) {
+ case PRIO_PROCESS:
+ if (!who)
+ who = current->pid;
+ p = find_task_by_pid(who);
+ if (p) {
+ niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
+ if (niceval > retval)
+ retval = niceval;
+ }
+ break;
+ case PRIO_PGRP:
+ if (!who)
+ who = process_group(current);
+ do_each_task_pid(who, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
+ niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
+ if (niceval > retval)
+ retval = niceval;
+ } while_each_task_pid(who, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
+ break;
+ case PRIO_USER:
+ user = current->user;
+ if (!who)
+ who = current->uid;
+ else
+ if ((who != current->uid) && !(user = find_user(who)))
+ goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */
+
+ do_each_thread(g, p)
+ if (p->uid == who) {
+ niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
+ if (niceval > retval)
+ retval = niceval;
+ }
+ while_each_thread(g, p);
+ if (who != current->uid)
+ free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */
+ break;
+ }
+out_unlock:
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Reboot system call: for obvious reasons only root may call it,
+ * and even root needs to set up some magic numbers in the registers
+ * so that some mistake won't make this reboot the whole machine.
+ * You can also set the meaning of the ctrl-alt-del-key here.
+ *
+ * reboot doesn't sync: do that yourself before calling this.
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_reboot(int magic1, int magic2, unsigned int cmd, void __user * arg)
+{
+ char buffer[256];
+
+ /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /* For safety, we require "magic" arguments. */
+ if (magic1 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC1 ||
+ (magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2 &&
+ magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2A &&
+ magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2B &&
+ magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2C))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ lock_kernel();
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART:
+ notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, NULL);
+ system_state = SYSTEM_RESTART;
+ device_shutdown();
+ printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system.\n");
+ machine_restart(NULL);
+ break;
+
+ case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_ON:
+ C_A_D = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_OFF:
+ C_A_D = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT:
+ notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_HALT, NULL);
+ system_state = SYSTEM_HALT;
+ device_shutdown();
+ printk(KERN_EMERG "System halted.\n");
+ machine_halt();
+ unlock_kernel();
+ do_exit(0);
+ break;
+
+ case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF:
+ notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_POWER_OFF, NULL);
+ system_state = SYSTEM_POWER_OFF;
+ device_shutdown();
+ printk(KERN_EMERG "Power down.\n");
+ machine_power_off();
+ unlock_kernel();
+ do_exit(0);
+ break;
+
+ case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART2:
+ if (strncpy_from_user(&buffer[0], arg, sizeof(buffer) - 1) < 0) {
+ unlock_kernel();
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = '\0';
+
+ notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, buffer);
+ system_state = SYSTEM_RESTART;
+ device_shutdown();
+ printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system with command '%s'.\n", buffer);
+ machine_restart(buffer);
+ break;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SOFTWARE_SUSPEND
+ case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_SW_SUSPEND:
+ {
+ int ret = software_suspend();
+ unlock_kernel();
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ default:
+ unlock_kernel();
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ unlock_kernel();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void deferred_cad(void *dummy)
+{
+ notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, NULL);
+ machine_restart(NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function gets called by ctrl-alt-del - ie the keyboard interrupt.
+ * As it's called within an interrupt, it may NOT sync: the only choice
+ * is whether to reboot at once, or just ignore the ctrl-alt-del.
+ */
+void ctrl_alt_del(void)
+{
+ static DECLARE_WORK(cad_work, deferred_cad, NULL);
+
+ if (C_A_D)
+ schedule_work(&cad_work);
+ else
+ kill_proc(cad_pid, SIGINT, 1);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid
+ * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
+ *
+ * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not
+ * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid.
+ *
+ * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its
+ * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
+ * a security audit over a program.
+ *
+ * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be
+ * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be
+ * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
+ *
+ * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem
+ * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned).
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
+{
+ int old_rgid = current->gid;
+ int old_egid = current->egid;
+ int new_rgid = old_rgid;
+ int new_egid = old_egid;
+ int retval;
+
+ retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
+ if ((old_rgid == rgid) ||
+ (current->egid==rgid) ||
+ capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ new_rgid = rgid;
+ else
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
+ if ((old_rgid == egid) ||
+ (current->egid == egid) ||
+ (current->sgid == egid) ||
+ capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ new_egid = egid;
+ else {
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+ if (new_egid != old_egid)
+ {
+ current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ wmb();
+ }
+ if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
+ (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid))
+ current->sgid = new_egid;
+ current->fsgid = new_egid;
+ current->egid = new_egid;
+ current->gid = new_rgid;
+ key_fsgid_changed(current);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS
+ *
+ * SMP: Same implicit races as above.
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
+{
+ int old_egid = current->egid;
+ int retval;
+
+ retval = security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ {
+ if(old_egid != gid)
+ {
+ current->mm->dumpable=0;
+ wmb();
+ }
+ current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid;
+ }
+ else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid))
+ {
+ if(old_egid != gid)
+ {
+ current->mm->dumpable=0;
+ wmb();
+ }
+ current->egid = current->fsgid = gid;
+ }
+ else
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ key_fsgid_changed(current);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int dumpclear)
+{
+ struct user_struct *new_user;
+
+ new_user = alloc_uid(new_ruid);
+ if (!new_user)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+
+ if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >=
+ current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur &&
+ new_user != &root_user) {
+ free_uid(new_user);
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+
+ switch_uid(new_user);
+
+ if(dumpclear)
+ {
+ current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ wmb();
+ }
+ current->uid = new_ruid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid
+ * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
+ *
+ * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not
+ * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid.
+ *
+ * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its
+ * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
+ * a security audit over a program.
+ *
+ * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be
+ * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be
+ * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
+{
+ int old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, new_ruid, new_euid;
+ int retval;
+
+ retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ new_ruid = old_ruid = current->uid;
+ new_euid = old_euid = current->euid;
+ old_suid = current->suid;
+
+ if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
+ new_ruid = ruid;
+ if ((old_ruid != ruid) &&
+ (current->euid != ruid) &&
+ !capable(CAP_SETUID))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
+ new_euid = euid;
+ if ((old_ruid != euid) &&
+ (current->euid != euid) &&
+ (current->suid != euid) &&
+ !capable(CAP_SETUID))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ if (new_ruid != old_ruid && set_user(new_ruid, new_euid != old_euid) < 0)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+
+ if (new_euid != old_euid)
+ {
+ current->mm->dumpable=0;
+ wmb();
+ }
+ current->fsuid = current->euid = new_euid;
+ if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 ||
+ (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old_ruid))
+ current->suid = current->euid;
+ current->fsuid = current->euid;
+
+ key_fsuid_changed(current);
+
+ return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RE);
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS
+ *
+ * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program
+ * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal
+ * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets
+ * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people
+ * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid()
+ * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to
+ * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid.
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
+{
+ int old_euid = current->euid;
+ int old_ruid, old_suid, new_ruid, new_suid;
+ int retval;
+
+ retval = security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ old_ruid = new_ruid = current->uid;
+ old_suid = current->suid;
+ new_suid = old_suid;
+
+ if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+ if (uid != old_ruid && set_user(uid, old_euid != uid) < 0)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ new_suid = uid;
+ } else if ((uid != current->uid) && (uid != new_suid))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (old_euid != uid)
+ {
+ current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ wmb();
+ }
+ current->fsuid = current->euid = uid;
+ current->suid = new_suid;
+
+ key_fsuid_changed(current);
+
+ return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_ID);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid,
+ * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid().
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
+{
+ int old_ruid = current->uid;
+ int old_euid = current->euid;
+ int old_suid = current->suid;
+ int retval;
+
+ retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+ if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && (ruid != current->uid) &&
+ (ruid != current->euid) && (ruid != current->suid))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && (euid != current->uid) &&
+ (euid != current->euid) && (euid != current->suid))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && (suid != current->uid) &&
+ (suid != current->euid) && (suid != current->suid))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
+ if (ruid != current->uid && set_user(ruid, euid != current->euid) < 0)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+ if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
+ if (euid != current->euid)
+ {
+ current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ wmb();
+ }
+ current->euid = euid;
+ }
+ current->fsuid = current->euid;
+ if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
+ current->suid = suid;
+
+ key_fsuid_changed(current);
+
+ return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_getresuid(uid_t __user *ruid, uid_t __user *euid, uid_t __user *suid)
+{
+ int retval;
+
+ if (!(retval = put_user(current->uid, ruid)) &&
+ !(retval = put_user(current->euid, euid)))
+ retval = put_user(current->suid, suid);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid.
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
+{
+ int retval;
+
+ retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, sgid, LSM_SETID_RES);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
+ if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && (rgid != current->gid) &&
+ (rgid != current->egid) && (rgid != current->sgid))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && (egid != current->gid) &&
+ (egid != current->egid) && (egid != current->sgid))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && (sgid != current->gid) &&
+ (sgid != current->egid) && (sgid != current->sgid))
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
+ if (egid != current->egid)
+ {
+ current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ wmb();
+ }
+ current->egid = egid;
+ }
+ current->fsgid = current->egid;
+ if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
+ current->gid = rgid;
+ if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
+ current->sgid = sgid;
+
+ key_fsgid_changed(current);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_getresgid(gid_t __user *rgid, gid_t __user *egid, gid_t __user *sgid)
+{
+ int retval;
+
+ if (!(retval = put_user(current->gid, rgid)) &&
+ !(retval = put_user(current->egid, egid)))
+ retval = put_user(current->sgid, sgid);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This
+ * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at
+ * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when
+ * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access..
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
+{
+ int old_fsuid;
+
+ old_fsuid = current->fsuid;
+ if (security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS))
+ return old_fsuid;
+
+ if (uid == current->uid || uid == current->euid ||
+ uid == current->suid || uid == current->fsuid ||
+ capable(CAP_SETUID))
+ {
+ if (uid != old_fsuid)
+ {
+ current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ wmb();
+ }
+ current->fsuid = uid;
+ }
+
+ key_fsuid_changed(current);
+
+ security_task_post_setuid(old_fsuid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS);
+
+ return old_fsuid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Samma på svenska..
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid)
+{
+ int old_fsgid;
+
+ old_fsgid = current->fsgid;
+ if (security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS))
+ return old_fsgid;
+
+ if (gid == current->gid || gid == current->egid ||
+ gid == current->sgid || gid == current->fsgid ||
+ capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ {
+ if (gid != old_fsgid)
+ {
+ current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ wmb();
+ }
+ current->fsgid = gid;
+ key_fsgid_changed(current);
+ }
+ return old_fsgid;
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_times(struct tms __user * tbuf)
+{
+ /*
+ * In the SMP world we might just be unlucky and have one of
+ * the times increment as we use it. Since the value is an
+ * atomically safe type this is just fine. Conceptually its
+ * as if the syscall took an instant longer to occur.
+ */
+ if (tbuf) {
+ struct tms tmp;
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+ struct task_struct *t;
+ cputime_t utime, stime, cutime, cstime;
+
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ utime = tsk->signal->utime;
+ stime = tsk->signal->stime;
+ t = tsk;
+ do {
+ utime = cputime_add(utime, t->utime);
+ stime = cputime_add(stime, t->stime);
+ t = next_thread(t);
+ } while (t != tsk);
+
+ /*
+ * While we have tasklist_lock read-locked, no dying thread
+ * can be updating current->signal->[us]time. Instead,
+ * we got their counts included in the live thread loop.
+ * However, another thread can come in right now and
+ * do a wait call that updates current->signal->c[us]time.
+ * To make sure we always see that pair updated atomically,
+ * we take the siglock around fetching them.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+ cutime = tsk->signal->cutime;
+ cstime = tsk->signal->cstime;
+ spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+
+ tmp.tms_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(utime);
+ tmp.tms_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(stime);
+ tmp.tms_cutime = cputime_to_clock_t(cutime);
+ tmp.tms_cstime = cputime_to_clock_t(cstime);
+ if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64());
+}
+
+/*
+ * This needs some heavy checking ...
+ * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully
+ * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it.
+ *
+ * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really
+ * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user
+ * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91
+ *
+ * Auch. Had to add the 'did_exec' flag to conform completely to POSIX.
+ * LBT 04.03.94
+ */
+
+asmlinkage long sys_setpgid(pid_t pid, pid_t pgid)
+{
+ struct task_struct *p;
+ int err = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!pid)
+ pid = current->pid;
+ if (!pgid)
+ pgid = pid;
+ if (pgid < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock
+ * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM
+ */
+ write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+ err = -ESRCH;
+ p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
+ if (!p)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ if (!thread_group_leader(p))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (p->parent == current || p->real_parent == current) {
+ err = -EPERM;
+ if (p->signal->session != current->signal->session)
+ goto out;
+ err = -EACCES;
+ if (p->did_exec)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ err = -ESRCH;
+ if (p != current)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ err = -EPERM;
+ if (p->signal->leader)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (pgid != pid) {
+ struct task_struct *p;
+
+ do_each_task_pid(pgid, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
+ if (p->signal->session == current->signal->session)
+ goto ok_pgid;
+ } while_each_task_pid(pgid, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ok_pgid:
+ err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (process_group(p) != pgid) {
+ detach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID);
+ p->signal->pgrp = pgid;
+ attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgid);
+ }
+
+ err = 0;
+out:
+ /* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */
+ write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+ return err;
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_getpgid(pid_t pid)
+{
+ if (!pid) {
+ return process_group(current);
+ } else {
+ int retval;
+ struct task_struct *p;
+
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
+
+ retval = -ESRCH;
+ if (p) {
+ retval = security_task_getpgid(p);
+ if (!retval)
+ retval = process_group(p);
+ }
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ return retval;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP
+
+asmlinkage long sys_getpgrp(void)
+{
+ /* SMP - assuming writes are word atomic this is fine */
+ return process_group(current);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+asmlinkage long sys_getsid(pid_t pid)
+{
+ if (!pid) {
+ return current->signal->session;
+ } else {
+ int retval;
+ struct task_struct *p;
+
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
+
+ retval = -ESRCH;
+ if(p) {
+ retval = security_task_getsid(p);
+ if (!retval)
+ retval = p->signal->session;
+ }
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ return retval;
+ }
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_setsid(void)
+{
+ struct pid *pid;
+ int err = -EPERM;
+
+ if (!thread_group_leader(current))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ down(&tty_sem);
+ write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+ pid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PGID, current->pid);
+ if (pid)
+ goto out;
+
+ current->signal->leader = 1;
+ __set_special_pids(current->pid, current->pid);
+ current->signal->tty = NULL;
+ current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
+ err = process_group(current);
+out:
+ write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+ up(&tty_sem);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supplementary group IDs
+ */
+
+/* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */
+struct group_info init_groups = { .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2) };
+
+struct group_info *groups_alloc(int gidsetsize)
+{
+ struct group_info *group_info;
+ int nblocks;
+ int i;
+
+ nblocks = (gidsetsize + NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK - 1) / NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK;
+ /* Make sure we always allocate at least one indirect block pointer */
+ nblocks = nblocks ? : 1;
+ group_info = kmalloc(sizeof(*group_info) + nblocks*sizeof(gid_t *), GFP_USER);
+ if (!group_info)
+ return NULL;
+ group_info->ngroups = gidsetsize;
+ group_info->nblocks = nblocks;
+ atomic_set(&group_info->usage, 1);
+
+ if (gidsetsize <= NGROUPS_SMALL) {
+ group_info->blocks[0] = group_info->small_block;
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < nblocks; i++) {
+ gid_t *b;
+ b = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_USER);
+ if (!b)
+ goto out_undo_partial_alloc;
+ group_info->blocks[i] = b;
+ }
+ }
+ return group_info;
+
+out_undo_partial_alloc:
+ while (--i >= 0) {
+ free_page((unsigned long)group_info->blocks[i]);
+ }
+ kfree(group_info);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(groups_alloc);
+
+void groups_free(struct group_info *group_info)
+{
+ if (group_info->blocks[0] != group_info->small_block) {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++)
+ free_page((unsigned long)group_info->blocks[i]);
+ }
+ kfree(group_info);
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(groups_free);
+
+/* export the group_info to a user-space array */
+static int groups_to_user(gid_t __user *grouplist,
+ struct group_info *group_info)
+{
+ int i;
+ int count = group_info->ngroups;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++) {
+ int cp_count = min(NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK, count);
+ int off = i * NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK;
+ int len = cp_count * sizeof(*grouplist);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(grouplist+off, group_info->blocks[i], len))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ count -= cp_count;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* fill a group_info from a user-space array - it must be allocated already */
+static int groups_from_user(struct group_info *group_info,
+ gid_t __user *grouplist)
+ {
+ int i;
+ int count = group_info->ngroups;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++) {
+ int cp_count = min(NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK, count);
+ int off = i * NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK;
+ int len = cp_count * sizeof(*grouplist);
+
+ if (copy_from_user(group_info->blocks[i], grouplist+off, len))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ count -= cp_count;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* a simple shell-metzner sort */
+static void groups_sort(struct group_info *group_info)
+{
+ int base, max, stride;
+ int gidsetsize = group_info->ngroups;
+
+ for (stride = 1; stride < gidsetsize; stride = 3 * stride + 1)
+ ; /* nothing */
+ stride /= 3;
+
+ while (stride) {
+ max = gidsetsize - stride;
+ for (base = 0; base < max; base++) {
+ int left = base;
+ int right = left + stride;
+ gid_t tmp = GROUP_AT(group_info, right);
+
+ while (left >= 0 && GROUP_AT(group_info, left) > tmp) {
+ GROUP_AT(group_info, right) =
+ GROUP_AT(group_info, left);
+ right = left;
+ left -= stride;
+ }
+ GROUP_AT(group_info, right) = tmp;
+ }
+ stride /= 3;
+ }
+}
+
+/* a simple bsearch */
+static int groups_search(struct group_info *group_info, gid_t grp)
+{
+ int left, right;
+
+ if (!group_info)
+ return 0;
+
+ left = 0;
+ right = group_info->ngroups;
+ while (left < right) {
+ int mid = (left+right)/2;
+ int cmp = grp - GROUP_AT(group_info, mid);
+ if (cmp > 0)
+ left = mid + 1;
+ else if (cmp < 0)
+ right = mid;
+ else
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* validate and set current->group_info */
+int set_current_groups(struct group_info *group_info)
+{
+ int retval;
+ struct group_info *old_info;
+
+ retval = security_task_setgroups(group_info);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ groups_sort(group_info);
+ get_group_info(group_info);
+
+ task_lock(current);
+ old_info = current->group_info;
+ current->group_info = group_info;
+ task_unlock(current);
+
+ put_group_info(old_info);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_current_groups);
+
+asmlinkage long sys_getgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t __user *grouplist)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * SMP: Nobody else can change our grouplist. Thus we are
+ * safe.
+ */
+
+ if (gidsetsize < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* no need to grab task_lock here; it cannot change */
+ get_group_info(current->group_info);
+ i = current->group_info->ngroups;
+ if (gidsetsize) {
+ if (i > gidsetsize) {
+ i = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (groups_to_user(grouplist, current->group_info)) {
+ i = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ put_group_info(current->group_info);
+ return i;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SMP: Our groups are copy-on-write. We can set them safely
+ * without another task interfering.
+ */
+
+asmlinkage long sys_setgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t __user *grouplist)
+{
+ struct group_info *group_info;
+ int retval;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ group_info = groups_alloc(gidsetsize);
+ if (!group_info)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ retval = groups_from_user(group_info, grouplist);
+ if (retval) {
+ put_group_info(group_info);
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ retval = set_current_groups(group_info);
+ put_group_info(group_info);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether we're fsgid/egid or in the supplemental group..
+ */
+int in_group_p(gid_t grp)
+{
+ int retval = 1;
+ if (grp != current->fsgid) {
+ get_group_info(current->group_info);
+ retval = groups_search(current->group_info, grp);
+ put_group_info(current->group_info);
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(in_group_p);
+
+int in_egroup_p(gid_t grp)
+{
+ int retval = 1;
+ if (grp != current->egid) {
+ get_group_info(current->group_info);
+ retval = groups_search(current->group_info, grp);
+ put_group_info(current->group_info);
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(in_egroup_p);
+
+DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem);
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(uts_sem);
+
+asmlinkage long sys_newuname(struct new_utsname __user * name)
+{
+ int errno = 0;
+
+ down_read(&uts_sem);
+ if (copy_to_user(name,&system_utsname,sizeof *name))
+ errno = -EFAULT;
+ up_read(&uts_sem);
+ return errno;
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_sethostname(char __user *name, int len)
+{
+ int errno;
+ char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ down_write(&uts_sem);
+ errno = -EFAULT;
+ if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
+ memcpy(system_utsname.nodename, tmp, len);
+ system_utsname.nodename[len] = 0;
+ errno = 0;
+ }
+ up_write(&uts_sem);
+ return errno;
+}
+
+#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME
+
+asmlinkage long sys_gethostname(char __user *name, int len)
+{
+ int i, errno;
+
+ if (len < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ down_read(&uts_sem);
+ i = 1 + strlen(system_utsname.nodename);
+ if (i > len)
+ i = len;
+ errno = 0;
+ if (copy_to_user(name, system_utsname.nodename, i))
+ errno = -EFAULT;
+ up_read(&uts_sem);
+ return errno;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling
+ * uname()
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setdomainname(char __user *name, int len)
+{
+ int errno;
+ char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ down_write(&uts_sem);
+ errno = -EFAULT;
+ if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
+ memcpy(system_utsname.domainname, tmp, len);
+ system_utsname.domainname[len] = 0;
+ errno = 0;
+ }
+ up_write(&uts_sem);
+ return errno;
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_getrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit __user *rlim)
+{
+ if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ else {
+ struct rlimit value;
+ task_lock(current->group_leader);
+ value = current->signal->rlim[resource];
+ task_unlock(current->group_leader);
+ return copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT
+
+/*
+ * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps.
+ */
+
+asmlinkage long sys_old_getrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit __user *rlim)
+{
+ struct rlimit x;
+ if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ task_lock(current->group_leader);
+ x = current->signal->rlim[resource];
+ task_unlock(current->group_leader);
+ if(x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF)
+ x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ if(x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF)
+ x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x))?-EFAULT:0;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+asmlinkage long sys_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit __user *rlim)
+{
+ struct rlimit new_rlim, *old_rlim;
+ int retval;
+
+ if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if(copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (new_rlim.rlim_cur > new_rlim.rlim_max)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
+ if ((new_rlim.rlim_max > old_rlim->rlim_max) &&
+ !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && new_rlim.rlim_max > NR_OPEN)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ retval = security_task_setrlimit(resource, &new_rlim);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ task_lock(current->group_leader);
+ *old_rlim = new_rlim;
+ task_unlock(current->group_leader);
+
+ if (resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim.rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY &&
+ (cputime_eq(current->signal->it_prof_expires, cputime_zero) ||
+ new_rlim.rlim_cur <= cputime_to_secs(
+ current->signal->it_prof_expires))) {
+ cputime_t cputime = secs_to_cputime(new_rlim.rlim_cur);
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
+ set_process_cpu_timer(current, CPUCLOCK_PROF,
+ &cputime, NULL);
+ spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct,
+ * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After
+ * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would
+ * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information
+ * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not
+ * measuring them yet).
+ *
+ * This expects to be called with tasklist_lock read-locked or better,
+ * and the siglock not locked. It may momentarily take the siglock.
+ *
+ * When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have
+ * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word
+ * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't
+ * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading
+ * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those
+ * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a
+ * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping.
+ */
+
+static void k_getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r)
+{
+ struct task_struct *t;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ cputime_t utime, stime;
+
+ memset((char *) r, 0, sizeof *r);
+
+ if (unlikely(!p->signal))
+ return;
+
+ switch (who) {
+ case RUSAGE_CHILDREN:
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&p->sighand->siglock, flags);
+ utime = p->signal->cutime;
+ stime = p->signal->cstime;
+ r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw;
+ r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw;
+ r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt;
+ r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&p->sighand->siglock, flags);
+ cputime_to_timeval(utime, &r->ru_utime);
+ cputime_to_timeval(stime, &r->ru_stime);
+ break;
+ case RUSAGE_SELF:
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&p->sighand->siglock, flags);
+ utime = stime = cputime_zero;
+ goto sum_group;
+ case RUSAGE_BOTH:
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&p->sighand->siglock, flags);
+ utime = p->signal->cutime;
+ stime = p->signal->cstime;
+ r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw;
+ r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw;
+ r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt;
+ r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt;
+ sum_group:
+ utime = cputime_add(utime, p->signal->utime);
+ stime = cputime_add(stime, p->signal->stime);
+ r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw;
+ r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw;
+ r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt;
+ r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt;
+ t = p;
+ do {
+ utime = cputime_add(utime, t->utime);
+ stime = cputime_add(stime, t->stime);
+ r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw;
+ r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw;
+ r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt;
+ r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt;
+ t = next_thread(t);
+ } while (t != p);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&p->sighand->siglock, flags);
+ cputime_to_timeval(utime, &r->ru_utime);
+ cputime_to_timeval(stime, &r->ru_stime);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+}
+
+int getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage __user *ru)
+{
+ struct rusage r;
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ k_getrusage(p, who, &r);
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_getrusage(int who, struct rusage __user *ru)
+{
+ if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return getrusage(current, who, ru);
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_umask(int mask)
+{
+ mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO);
+ return mask;
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
+ unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
+{
+ long error;
+ int sig;
+
+ error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ switch (option) {
+ case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG:
+ sig = arg2;
+ if (sig < 0 || sig > _NSIG) {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ current->pdeath_signal = sig;
+ break;
+ case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG:
+ error = put_user(current->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2);
+ break;
+ case PR_GET_DUMPABLE:
+ if (current->mm->dumpable)
+ error = 1;
+ break;
+ case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
+ if (arg2 != 0 && arg2 != 1) {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ current->mm->dumpable = arg2;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
+ error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(current, arg2);
+ break;
+ case PR_GET_UNALIGN:
+ error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(current, arg2);
+ break;
+ case PR_SET_FPEMU:
+ error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(current, arg2);
+ break;
+ case PR_GET_FPEMU:
+ error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(current, arg2);
+ break;
+ case PR_SET_FPEXC:
+ error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(current, arg2);
+ break;
+ case PR_GET_FPEXC:
+ error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(current, arg2);
+ break;
+ case PR_GET_TIMING:
+ error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL;
+ break;
+ case PR_SET_TIMING:
+ if (arg2 == PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL)
+ error = 0;
+ else
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+
+ case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
+ if (current->keep_capabilities)
+ error = 1;
+ break;
+ case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
+ if (arg2 != 0 && arg2 != 1) {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ current->keep_capabilities = arg2;
+ break;
+ case PR_SET_NAME: {
+ struct task_struct *me = current;
+ unsigned char ncomm[sizeof(me->comm)];
+
+ ncomm[sizeof(me->comm)-1] = 0;
+ if (strncpy_from_user(ncomm, (char __user *)arg2,
+ sizeof(me->comm)-1) < 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+ set_task_comm(me, ncomm);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ case PR_GET_NAME: {
+ struct task_struct *me = current;
+ unsigned char tcomm[sizeof(me->comm)];
+
+ get_task_comm(tcomm, me);
+ if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, tcomm, sizeof(tcomm)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ default:
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ return error;
+}