diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b59582b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+config SECURITY_SELINUX
+	bool "NSA SELinux Support"
+	depends on SECURITY && NET && INET
+	default n
+	help
+	  This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).
+	  You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem.
+	  You can obtain the policy compiler (checkpolicy), the utility for
+	  labeling filesystems (setfiles), and an example policy configuration
+	  from <http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/>.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
+	bool "NSA SELinux boot parameter"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default n
+	help
+	  This option adds a kernel parameter 'selinux', which allows SELinux
+	  to be disabled at boot.  If this option is selected, SELinux
+	  functionality can be disabled with selinux=0 on the kernel
+	  command line.  The purpose of this option is to allow a single
+	  kernel image to be distributed with SELinux built in, but not
+	  necessarily enabled.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
+	int "NSA SELinux boot parameter default value"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
+	range 0 1
+	default 1
+	help
+	  This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter
+	  'selinux', which allows SELinux to be disabled at boot.  If this
+	  option is set to 0 (zero), the SELinux kernel parameter will
+	  default to 0, disabling SELinux at bootup.  If this option is
+	  set to 1 (one), the SELinux kernel parameter will default to 1,
+	  enabling SELinux at bootup.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+	bool "NSA SELinux runtime disable"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default n
+	help
+	  This option enables writing to a selinuxfs node 'disable', which
+	  allows SELinux to be disabled at runtime prior to the policy load.
+	  SELinux will then remain disabled until the next boot.
+	  This option is similar to the selinux=0 boot parameter, but is to
+	  support runtime disabling of SELinux, e.g. from /sbin/init, for
+	  portability across platforms where boot parameters are difficult
+	  to employ.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+	bool "NSA SELinux Development Support"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default y
+	help
+	  This enables the development support option of NSA SELinux,
+	  which is useful for experimenting with SELinux and developing
+	  policies.  If unsure, say Y.  With this option enabled, the
+	  kernel will start in permissive mode (log everything, deny nothing)
+	  unless you specify enforcing=1 on the kernel command line.  You
+	  can interactively toggle the kernel between enforcing mode and
+	  permissive mode (if permitted by the policy) via /selinux/enforce.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+	bool "NSA SELinux AVC Statistics"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option collects access vector cache statistics to
+	  /selinux/avc/cache_stats, which may be monitored via
+	  tools such as avcstat.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
+	int "NSA SELinux checkreqprot default value"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	range 0 1
+	default 1
+	help
+	  This option sets the default value for the 'checkreqprot' flag
+	  that determines whether SELinux checks the protection requested
+	  by the application or the protection that will be applied by the
+	  kernel (including any implied execute for read-implies-exec) for
+	  mmap and mprotect calls.  If this option is set to 0 (zero),
+	  SELinux will default to checking the protection that will be applied
+	  by the kernel.  If this option is set to 1 (one), SELinux will
+	  default to checking the protection requested by the application.
+	  The checkreqprot flag may be changed from the default via the
+	  'checkreqprot=' boot parameter.  It may also be changed at runtime
+	  via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b038cd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#
+# Makefile for building the SELinux module as part of the kernel tree.
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o ss/
+
+selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o
+
+selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) += netif.o
+
+EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe6285e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,949 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the kernel access vector cache (AVC).
+ *
+ * Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ *           James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Update:   KaiGai, Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *     Replaced the avc_lock spinlock by RCU.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/un.h>
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+
+static const struct av_perm_to_string
+{
+  u16 tclass;
+  u32 value;
+  const char *name;
+} av_perm_to_string[] = {
+#define S_(c, v, s) { c, v, s },
+#include "av_perm_to_string.h"
+#undef S_
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+static const char *class_to_string[] = {
+#define S_(s) s,
+#include "class_to_string.h"
+#undef S_
+};
+#endif
+
+#define TB_(s) static const char * s [] = {
+#define TE_(s) };
+#define S_(s) s,
+#include "common_perm_to_string.h"
+#undef TB_
+#undef TE_
+#undef S_
+
+static const struct av_inherit
+{
+    u16 tclass;
+    const char **common_pts;
+    u32 common_base;
+} av_inherit[] = {
+#define S_(c, i, b) { c, common_##i##_perm_to_string, b },
+#include "av_inherit.h"
+#undef S_
+};
+
+#define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS			512
+#define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD		512
+#define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM		16
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) 				\
+do {								\
+	per_cpu(avc_cache_stats, get_cpu()).field++;		\
+	put_cpu();						\
+} while (0)
+#else
+#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field)	do {} while (0)
+#endif
+
+struct avc_entry {
+	u32			ssid;
+	u32			tsid;
+	u16			tclass;
+	struct av_decision	avd;
+	atomic_t		used;	/* used recently */
+};
+
+struct avc_node {
+	struct avc_entry	ae;
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct rcu_head         rhead;
+};
+
+struct avc_cache {
+	struct list_head	slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS];
+	spinlock_t		slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
+	atomic_t		lru_hint;	/* LRU hint for reclaim scan */
+	atomic_t		active_nodes;
+	u32			latest_notif;	/* latest revocation notification */
+};
+
+struct avc_callback_node {
+	int (*callback) (u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+	                 u16 tclass, u32 perms,
+	                 u32 *out_retained);
+	u32 events;
+	u32 ssid;
+	u32 tsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	u32 perms;
+	struct avc_callback_node *next;
+};
+
+/* Exported via selinufs */
+unsigned int avc_cache_threshold = AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats) = { 0 };
+#endif
+
+static struct avc_cache avc_cache;
+static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
+static kmem_cache_t *avc_node_cachep;
+
+static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+{
+	return (ssid ^ (tsid<<2) ^ (tclass<<4)) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_dump_av - Display an access vector in human-readable form.
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @av: access vector
+ */
+static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
+{
+	const char **common_pts = NULL;
+	u32 common_base = 0;
+	int i, i2, perm;
+
+	if (av == 0) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " null");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit); i++) {
+		if (av_inherit[i].tclass == tclass) {
+			common_pts = av_inherit[i].common_pts;
+			common_base = av_inherit[i].common_base;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " {");
+	i = 0;
+	perm = 1;
+	while (perm < common_base) {
+		if (perm & av) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " %s", common_pts[i]);
+			av &= ~perm;
+		}
+		i++;
+		perm <<= 1;
+	}
+
+	while (i < sizeof(av) * 8) {
+		if (perm & av) {
+			for (i2 = 0; i2 < ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string); i2++) {
+				if ((av_perm_to_string[i2].tclass == tclass) &&
+				    (av_perm_to_string[i2].value == perm))
+					break;
+			}
+			if (i2 < ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string)) {
+				audit_log_format(ab, " %s",
+						 av_perm_to_string[i2].name);
+				av &= ~perm;
+			}
+		}
+		i++;
+		perm <<= 1;
+	}
+
+	if (av)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " 0x%x", av);
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " }");
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_dump_query - Display a SID pair and a class in human-readable form.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ */
+static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char *scontext;
+	u32 scontext_len;
+
+ 	rc = security_sid_to_context(ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	if (rc)
+		audit_log_format(ab, "ssid=%d", ssid);
+	else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, "scontext=%s", scontext);
+		kfree(scontext);
+	}
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(tsid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	if (rc)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", tsid);
+	else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", scontext);
+		kfree(scontext);
+	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", class_to_string[tclass]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_init - Initialize the AVC.
+ *
+ * Initialize the access vector cache.
+ */
+void __init avc_init(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&avc_cache.slots[i]);
+		spin_lock_init(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
+	}
+	atomic_set(&avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
+	atomic_set(&avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
+
+	avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
+					     0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
+
+	audit_log(current->audit_context, "AVC INITIALIZED\n");
+}
+
+int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
+{
+	int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used;
+	struct avc_node *node;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	slots_used = 0;
+	max_chain_len = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
+		if (!list_empty(&avc_cache.slots[i])) {
+			slots_used++;
+			chain_len = 0;
+			list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &avc_cache.slots[i], list)
+				chain_len++;
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "entries: %d\nbuckets used: %d/%d\n"
+			 "longest chain: %d\n",
+			 atomic_read(&avc_cache.active_nodes),
+			 slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node = container_of(rhead, struct avc_node, rhead);
+	kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+	avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
+{
+	list_del_rcu(&node->list);
+	call_rcu(&node->rhead, avc_node_free);
+	atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
+{
+	kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+	avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
+	atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
+}
+
+static void avc_node_replace(struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old)
+{
+	list_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
+	call_rcu(&old->rhead, avc_node_free);
+	atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
+}
+
+static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node;
+	int hvalue, try, ecx;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++ ) {
+		hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.lru_hint) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
+
+		if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags))
+			continue;
+
+		list_for_each_entry(node, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
+			if (atomic_dec_and_test(&node->ae.used)) {
+				/* Recently Unused */
+				avc_node_delete(node);
+				avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
+				ecx++;
+				if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) {
+					spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags);
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags);
+	}
+out:
+	return ecx;
+}
+
+static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node;
+
+	node = kmem_cache_alloc(avc_node_cachep, SLAB_ATOMIC);
+	if (!node)
+		goto out;
+
+	memset(node, 0, sizeof(*node));
+	INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rhead);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&node->list);
+	atomic_set(&node->ae.used, 1);
+	avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations);
+
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.active_nodes) > avc_cache_threshold)
+		avc_reclaim_node();
+
+out:
+	return node;
+}
+
+static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct avc_entry *ae)
+{
+	node->ae.ssid = ssid;
+	node->ae.tsid = tsid;
+	node->ae.tclass = tclass;
+	memcpy(&node->ae.avd, &ae->avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
+}
+
+static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL;
+	int hvalue;
+
+	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
+		if (ssid == node->ae.ssid &&
+		    tclass == node->ae.tclass &&
+		    tsid == node->ae.tsid) {
+			ret = node;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ret == NULL) {
+		/* cache miss */
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* cache hit */
+	if (atomic_read(&ret->ae.used) != 1)
+		atomic_set(&ret->ae.used, 1);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_lookup - Look up an AVC entry.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
+ *
+ * Look up an AVC entry that is valid for the
+ * @requested permissions between the SID pair
+ * (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
+ * based on @tclass.  If a valid AVC entry exists,
+ * then this function return the avc_node.
+ * Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
+ */
+static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node;
+
+	avc_cache_stats_incr(lookups);
+	node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+
+	if (node && ((node->ae.avd.decided & requested) == requested)) {
+		avc_cache_stats_incr(hits);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	node = NULL;
+	avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
+out:
+	return node;
+}
+
+static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(notif_lock);
+	unsigned long flag;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&notif_lock, flag);
+	if (is_insert) {
+		if (seqno < avc_cache.latest_notif) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "avc:  seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n",
+			       seqno, avc_cache.latest_notif);
+			ret = -EAGAIN;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (seqno > avc_cache.latest_notif)
+			avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno;
+	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&notif_lock, flag);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_insert - Insert an AVC entry.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @ae: AVC entry
+ *
+ * Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
+ * (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
+ * The access vectors and the sequence number are
+ * normally provided by the security server in
+ * response to a security_compute_av() call.  If the
+ * sequence number @ae->avd.seqno is not less than the latest
+ * revocation notification, then the function copies
+ * the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
+ * avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
+ */
+static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct avc_entry *ae)
+{
+	struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
+	int hvalue;
+	unsigned long flag;
+
+	if (avc_latest_notif_update(ae->avd.seqno, 1))
+		goto out;
+
+	node = avc_alloc_node();
+	if (node) {
+		hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+		avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, ae);
+
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
+		list_for_each_entry(pos, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
+			if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
+			    pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
+			    pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
+			    	avc_node_replace(node, pos);
+				goto found;
+			}
+		}
+		list_add_rcu(&node->list, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue]);
+found:
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
+	}
+out:
+	return node;
+}
+
+static inline void avc_print_ipv6_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+				       struct in6_addr *addr, u16 port,
+				       char *name1, char *name2)
+{
+	if (!ipv6_addr_any(addr))
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x:"
+				 "%04x:%04x:%04x", name1, NIP6(*addr));
+	if (port)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+}
+
+static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 addr,
+				       u16 port, char *name1, char *name2)
+{
+	if (addr)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d.%d.%d.%d", name1, NIPQUAD(addr));
+	if (port)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
+ * @a:  auxiliary audit data
+ *
+ * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
+ * with the policy.  This function is typically called by
+ * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be
+ * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit()
+ * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing.
+ * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must
+ * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
+ * before calling the auditing code.
+ */
+void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+               u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+               struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *a)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+	struct inode *inode = NULL;
+	u32 denied, audited;
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+	denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
+	if (denied) {
+		audited = denied;
+		if (!(audited & avd->auditdeny))
+			return;
+	} else if (result) {
+		audited = denied = requested;
+        } else {
+		audited = requested;
+		if (!(audited & avd->auditallow))
+			return;
+	}
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context);
+	if (!ab)
+		return;		/* audit_panic has been called */
+	audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ", denied ? "denied" : "granted");
+	avc_dump_av(ab, tclass,audited);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
+	if (a && a->tsk)
+		tsk = a->tsk;
+	if (tsk && tsk->pid) {
+		struct mm_struct *mm;
+		struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+		audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d", tsk->pid);
+		if (tsk == current)
+			mm = current->mm;
+		else
+			mm = get_task_mm(tsk);
+		if (mm) {
+			if (down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
+				vma = mm->mmap;
+				while (vma) {
+					if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
+					    vma->vm_file) {
+						audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
+							vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
+							vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
+						break;
+					}
+					vma = vma->vm_next;
+				}
+				up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+			} else {
+				audit_log_format(ab, " comm=%s", tsk->comm);
+			}
+			if (tsk != current)
+				mmput(mm);
+		} else {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " comm=%s", tsk->comm);
+		}
+	}
+	if (a) {
+		switch (a->type) {
+		case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_IPC:
+			audit_log_format(ab, " key=%d", a->u.ipc_id);
+			break;
+		case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_CAP:
+			audit_log_format(ab, " capability=%d", a->u.cap);
+			break;
+		case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS:
+			if (a->u.fs.dentry) {
+				struct dentry *dentry = a->u.fs.dentry;
+				if (a->u.fs.mnt) {
+					audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", dentry,
+							a->u.fs.mnt);
+				} else {
+					audit_log_format(ab, " name=%s",
+							 dentry->d_name.name);
+				}
+				inode = dentry->d_inode;
+			} else if (a->u.fs.inode) {
+				struct dentry *dentry;
+				inode = a->u.fs.inode;
+				dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+				if (dentry) {
+					audit_log_format(ab, " name=%s",
+							 dentry->d_name.name);
+					dput(dentry);
+				}
+			}
+			if (inode)
+				audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%ld",
+						 inode->i_sb->s_id,
+						 inode->i_ino);
+			break;
+		case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET:
+			if (a->u.net.sk) {
+				struct sock *sk = a->u.net.sk;
+				struct unix_sock *u;
+				int len = 0;
+				char *p = NULL;
+
+				switch (sk->sk_family) {
+				case AF_INET: {
+					struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+
+					avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->rcv_saddr,
+							    inet->sport,
+							    "laddr", "lport");
+					avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->daddr,
+							    inet->dport,
+							    "faddr", "fport");
+					break;
+				}
+				case AF_INET6: {
+					struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+					struct ipv6_pinfo *inet6 = inet6_sk(sk);
+
+					avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->rcv_saddr,
+							    inet->sport,
+							    "laddr", "lport");
+					avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->daddr,
+							    inet->dport,
+							    "faddr", "fport");
+					break;
+				}
+				case AF_UNIX:
+					u = unix_sk(sk);
+					if (u->dentry) {
+						audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=",
+							u->dentry, u->mnt);
+						break;
+					}
+					if (!u->addr)
+						break;
+					len = u->addr->len-sizeof(short);
+					p = &u->addr->name->sun_path[0];
+					if (*p)
+						audit_log_format(ab,
+							"path=%*.*s", len,
+							len, p);
+					else
+						audit_log_format(ab,
+							"path=@%*.*s", len-1,
+							len-1, p+1);
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			
+			switch (a->u.net.family) {
+			case AF_INET:
+				avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.saddr,
+						    a->u.net.sport,
+						    "saddr", "src");
+				avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.daddr,
+						    a->u.net.dport,
+						    "daddr", "dest");
+				break;
+			case AF_INET6:
+				avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.saddr,
+						    a->u.net.sport,
+						    "saddr", "src");
+				avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.daddr,
+						    a->u.net.dport,
+						    "daddr", "dest");
+				break;
+			}
+			if (a->u.net.netif)
+				audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s",
+					a->u.net.netif);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, " ");
+	avc_dump_query(ab, ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events.
+ * @callback: callback function
+ * @events: security events
+ * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD
+ * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @perms: permissions
+ *
+ * Register a callback function for events in the set @events
+ * related to the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) and
+ * and the permissions @perms, interpreting
+ * @perms based on @tclass.  Returns %0 on success or
+ * -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory exists to add the callback.
+ */
+int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+                                     u16 tclass, u32 perms,
+                                     u32 *out_retained),
+                     u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+                     u16 tclass, u32 perms)
+{
+	struct avc_callback_node *c;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!c) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	c->callback = callback;
+	c->events = events;
+	c->ssid = ssid;
+	c->tsid = tsid;
+	c->perms = perms;
+	c->next = avc_callbacks;
+	avc_callbacks = c;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int avc_sidcmp(u32 x, u32 y)
+{
+	return (x == y || x == SECSID_WILD || y == SECSID_WILD);
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_update_node Update an AVC entry
+ * @event : Updating event
+ * @perms : Permission mask bits
+ * @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
+ *
+ * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
+ * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
+ * otherwise, this function update the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
+ * will release later by RCU.
+ */
+static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+{
+	int hvalue, rc = 0;
+	unsigned long flag;
+	struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL;
+
+	node = avc_alloc_node();
+	if (!node) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Lock the target slot */
+	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
+
+	list_for_each_entry(pos, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list){
+		if ( ssid==pos->ae.ssid &&
+		     tsid==pos->ae.tsid &&
+		     tclass==pos->ae.tclass ){
+			orig = pos;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!orig) {
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		avc_node_kill(node);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy and replace original node.
+	 */
+
+	avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae);
+
+	switch (event) {
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
+		node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms;
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE:
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE:
+		node->ae.avd.allowed &= ~perms;
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE:
+		node->ae.avd.auditallow |= perms;
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE:
+		node->ae.avd.auditallow &= ~perms;
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE:
+		node->ae.avd.auditdeny |= perms;
+		break;
+	case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE:
+		node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms;
+		break;
+	}
+	avc_node_replace(node, orig);
+out_unlock:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
+ * @seqno: policy sequence number
+ */
+int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
+{
+	struct avc_callback_node *c;
+	int i, rc = 0;
+	unsigned long flag;
+	struct avc_node *node;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i], flag);
+		list_for_each_entry(node, &avc_cache.slots[i], list)
+			avc_node_delete(node);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i], flag);
+	}
+
+	for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
+		if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+			rc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
+					 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	avc_latest_notif_update(seqno, 0);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ *
+ * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
+ * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
+ * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain
+ * a new decision and add it to the cache.  Return a copy of the decisions
+ * in @avd.  Return %0 if all @requested permissions are granted,
+ * -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or another -errno upon
+ * other errors.  This function is typically called by avc_has_perm(),
+ * but may also be called directly to separate permission checking from
+ * auditing, e.g. in cases where a lock must be held for the check but
+ * should be released for the auditing.
+ */
+int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+                         u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+                         struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct avc_node *node;
+	struct avc_entry entry, *p_ae;
+	int rc = 0;
+	u32 denied;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested);
+	if (!node) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		rc = security_compute_av(ssid,tsid,tclass,requested,&entry.avd);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		node = avc_insert(ssid,tsid,tclass,&entry);
+	}
+
+	p_ae = node ? &node->ae : &entry;
+
+	if (avd)
+		memcpy(avd, &p_ae->avd, sizeof(*avd));
+
+	denied = requested & ~(p_ae->avd.allowed);
+
+	if (!requested || denied) {
+		if (selinux_enforcing)
+			rc = -EACCES;
+		else
+			if (node)
+				avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT,requested,
+						ssid,tsid,tclass);
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_has_perm - Check permissions and perform any appropriate auditing.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
+ * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data
+ *
+ * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
+ * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
+ * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain
+ * a new decision and add it to the cache.  Audit the granting or denial of
+ * permissions in accordance with the policy.  Return %0 if all @requested
+ * permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
+ * another -errno upon other errors.
+ */
+int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+                 u32 requested, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata)
+{
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd);
+	avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a2cc75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4565 @@
+/*
+ *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *
+ *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
+ *
+ *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ *            Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
+ *            Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
+ *            James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ *                          <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/config.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/kd.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <net/icmp.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>		/* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
+#include <net/tcp.h>		/* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>	/* for network interface checks */
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/quota.h>
+#include <linux/un.h>		/* for Unix socket types */
+#include <net/af_unix.h>	/* for Unix socket types */
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netif.h"
+
+#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
+#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
+
+extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
+extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+int selinux_enforcing = 0;
+
+static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
+{
+	selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
+int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
+
+static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
+{
+	selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
+#endif
+
+/* Original (dummy) security module. */
+static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
+
+/* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
+   just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
+   The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
+   module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
+static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
+
+/* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
+   before the policy was loaded. */
+static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
+
+/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
+
+static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	tsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memset(tsec, 0, sizeof(struct task_security_struct));
+	tsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+	tsec->task = task;
+	tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	task->security = tsec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
+
+	if (!tsec || tsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
+		return;
+
+	task->security = NULL;
+	kfree(tsec);
+}
+
+static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+	isec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!isec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memset(isec, 0, sizeof(struct inode_security_struct));
+	init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
+	isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+	isec->inode = inode;
+	isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
+	if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC)
+		isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
+	else
+		isec->task_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	inode->i_security = isec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+
+	if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
+		return;
+
+	spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+	if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
+		list_del_init(&isec->list);
+	spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+
+	inode->i_security = NULL;
+	kfree(isec);
+}
+
+static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+
+	fsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!fsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memset(fsec, 0, sizeof(struct file_security_struct));
+	fsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+	fsec->file = file;
+	if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC) {
+		fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
+		fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
+	} else {
+		fsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+		fsec->fown_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	}
+	file->f_security = fsec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+
+	if (!fsec || fsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
+		return;
+
+	file->f_security = NULL;
+	kfree(fsec);
+}
+
+static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+
+	sbsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sbsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memset(sbsec, 0, sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct));
+	init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
+	spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+	sbsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+	sbsec->sb = sb;
+	sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
+	sb->s_security = sbsec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+
+	if (!sbsec || sbsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
+		return;
+
+	spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
+	if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
+		list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
+	spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
+
+	sb->s_security = NULL;
+	kfree(sbsec);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, int priority)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
+
+	if (family != PF_UNIX)
+		return 0;
+
+	ssec = kmalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
+	if (!ssec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memset(ssec, 0, sizeof(*ssec));
+	ssec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+	ssec->sk = sk;
+	ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sk->sk_security = ssec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX || ssec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
+		return;
+
+	sk->sk_security = NULL;
+	kfree(ssec);
+}
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+
+/* The security server must be initialized before
+   any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
+extern int ss_initialized;
+
+/* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
+
+static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
+	"uses xattr",
+	"uses transition SIDs",
+	"uses task SIDs",
+	"uses genfs_contexts",
+	"not configured for labeling",
+	"uses mountpoint labeling",
+};
+
+static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
+
+static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
+}
+
+enum {
+	Opt_context = 1,
+	Opt_fscontext = 2,
+	Opt_defcontext = 4,
+};
+
+static match_table_t tokens = {
+	{Opt_context, "context=%s"},
+	{Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
+	{Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
+};
+
+#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
+
+static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
+	const char *name;
+	u32 sid;
+	int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+
+	if (!data)
+		goto out;
+
+	name = sb->s_type->name;
+
+	if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
+
+		/* NFS we understand. */
+		if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
+			struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
+
+			if (d->version <  NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
+				goto out;
+
+			if (d->context[0]) {
+				context = d->context;
+				seen |= Opt_context;
+			}
+		} else
+			goto out;
+
+	} else {
+		/* Standard string-based options. */
+		char *p, *options = data;
+
+		while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
+			int token;
+			substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+
+			if (!*p)
+				continue;
+
+			token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
+
+			switch (token) {
+			case Opt_context:
+				if (seen) {
+					rc = -EINVAL;
+					printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+					goto out_free;
+				}
+				context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+				if (!context) {
+					rc = -ENOMEM;
+					goto out_free;
+				}
+				if (!alloc)
+					alloc = 1;
+				seen |= Opt_context;
+				break;
+
+			case Opt_fscontext:
+				if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) {
+					rc = -EINVAL;
+					printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+					goto out_free;
+				}
+				context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+				if (!context) {
+					rc = -ENOMEM;
+					goto out_free;
+				}
+				if (!alloc)
+					alloc = 1;
+				seen |= Opt_fscontext;
+				break;
+
+			case Opt_defcontext:
+				if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
+					rc = -EINVAL;
+					printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  "
+					       "defcontext option is invalid "
+					       "for this filesystem type\n");
+					goto out_free;
+				}
+				if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
+					rc = -EINVAL;
+					printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+					goto out_free;
+				}
+				defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+				if (!defcontext) {
+					rc = -ENOMEM;
+					goto out_free;
+				}
+				if (!alloc)
+					alloc = 1;
+				seen |= Opt_defcontext;
+				break;
+
+			default:
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount "
+				       "option\n");
+				goto out_free;
+
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!seen)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (context) {
+		rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
+			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+			       context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
+			goto out_free;
+		}
+
+		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+		                  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free;
+
+		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+		                  FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free;
+
+		sbsec->sid = sid;
+
+		if (seen & Opt_context)
+			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
+	}
+
+	if (defcontext) {
+		rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
+			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+			       defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
+			goto out_free;
+		}
+
+		if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
+			goto out_free;
+
+		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+				  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free;
+
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+				  FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free;
+
+		sbsec->def_sid = sid;
+	}
+
+out_free:
+	if (alloc) {
+		kfree(context);
+		kfree(defcontext);
+	}
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+	struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	down(&sbsec->sem);
+	if (sbsec->initialized)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
+		   after the initial policy is loaded and the security
+		   server is ready to handle calls. */
+		spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
+		if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
+			list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
+		spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
+	rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
+	if (rc) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
+		       __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
+		/* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
+		   error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
+		   the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
+		   the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
+		   assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
+		if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
+			       "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+			rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+		if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
+			if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
+				       "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
+				       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+			else
+				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
+				       "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
+				       sb->s_type->name, -rc);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
+		sbsec->proc = 1;
+
+	sbsec->initialized = 1;
+
+	if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
+		       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+	}
+	else {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
+		       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
+		       labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
+	}
+
+	/* Initialize the root inode. */
+	rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
+
+	/* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
+	   inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
+	   during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
+	   populates itself. */
+	spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+next_inode:
+	if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec =
+				list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
+				           struct inode_security_struct, list);
+		struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
+		spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		inode = igrab(inode);
+		if (inode) {
+			if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
+				inode_doinit(inode);
+			iput(inode);
+		}
+		spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		list_del_init(&isec->list);
+		goto next_inode;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+out:
+	up(&sbsec->sem);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
+{
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+	case S_IFSOCK:
+		return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
+	case S_IFLNK:
+		return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
+	case S_IFREG:
+		return SECCLASS_FILE;
+	case S_IFBLK:
+		return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
+	case S_IFDIR:
+		return SECCLASS_DIR;
+	case S_IFCHR:
+		return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
+	case S_IFIFO:
+		return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
+
+	}
+
+	return SECCLASS_FILE;
+}
+
+static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
+{
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_UNIX:
+		switch (type) {
+		case SOCK_STREAM:
+		case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
+			return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
+		case SOCK_DGRAM:
+			return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
+		}
+		break;
+	case PF_INET:
+	case PF_INET6:
+		switch (type) {
+		case SOCK_STREAM:
+			return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
+		case SOCK_DGRAM:
+			return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
+		case SOCK_RAW:
+			return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+		}
+		break;
+	case PF_NETLINK:
+		switch (protocol) {
+		case NETLINK_ROUTE:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_TCPDIAG:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_NFLOG:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_XFRM:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_SELINUX:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_AUDIT:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
+		default:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+		}
+	case PF_PACKET:
+		return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
+	case PF_KEY:
+		return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
+	}
+
+	return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
+				u16 tclass,
+				u32 *sid)
+{
+	int buflen, rc;
+	char *buffer, *path, *end;
+
+	buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
+	end = buffer+buflen;
+	*--end = '\0';
+	buflen--;
+	path = end-1;
+	*path = '/';
+	while (de && de != de->parent) {
+		buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
+		if (buflen < 0)
+			break;
+		end -= de->namelen;
+		memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
+		*--end = '/';
+		path = end;
+		de = de->parent;
+	}
+	rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
+	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
+	return rc;
+}
+#else
+static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
+				u16 tclass,
+				u32 *sid)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
+static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
+{
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	u32 sid;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
+	char *context = NULL;
+	unsigned len = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+	int hold_sem = 0;
+
+	if (isec->initialized)
+		goto out;
+
+	down(&isec->sem);
+	hold_sem = 1;
+	if (isec->initialized)
+		goto out;
+
+	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+	if (!sbsec->initialized) {
+		/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
+		   after the initial policy is loaded and the security
+		   server is ready to handle calls. */
+		spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		if (list_empty(&isec->list))
+			list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
+		spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	switch (sbsec->behavior) {
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
+		if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
+			isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
+		   Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
+		if (opt_dentry) {
+			/* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
+			dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+		} else {
+			/* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
+			dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+		}
+		if (!dentry) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  no dentry for dev=%s "
+			       "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
+			       inode->i_ino);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
+		context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!context) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			dput(dentry);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+					   context, len);
+		if (rc == -ERANGE) {
+			/* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
+			rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+						   NULL, 0);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				dput(dentry);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			kfree(context);
+			len = rc;
+			context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!context) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				dput(dentry);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
+						   XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+						   context, len);
+		}
+		dput(dentry);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			if (rc != -ENODATA) {
+				printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  getxattr returned "
+				       "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
+				       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+				kfree(context);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
+			sid = sbsec->def_sid;
+			rc = 0;
+		} else {
+			rc = security_context_to_sid(context, rc, &sid);
+			if (rc) {
+				printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
+				       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+				       __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
+				       inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+				kfree(context);
+				/* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
+				rc = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		kfree(context);
+		isec->sid = sid;
+		break;
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
+		isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
+		break;
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
+		/* Default to the fs SID. */
+		isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
+
+		/* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
+		isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+		rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
+					     sbsec->sid,
+					     isec->sclass,
+					     &sid);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		isec->sid = sid;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Default to the fs SID. */
+		isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
+
+		if (sbsec->proc) {
+			struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
+			if (proci->pde) {
+				isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+				rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
+							  isec->sclass,
+							  &sid);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				isec->sid = sid;
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	isec->initialized = 1;
+
+out:
+	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
+		isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+
+	if (hold_sem)
+		up(&isec->sem);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
+{
+	u32 perm = 0;
+
+	switch (sig) {
+	case SIGCHLD:
+		/* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
+		break;
+	case SIGKILL:
+		/* Cannot be caught or ignored */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
+		break;
+	case SIGSTOP:
+		/* Cannot be caught or ignored */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* All other signals. */
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return perm;
+}
+
+/* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
+   fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
+static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
+			 struct task_struct *tsk2,
+			 u32 perms)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
+
+	tsec1 = tsk1->security;
+	tsec2 = tsk2->security;
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
+			    SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
+static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
+			       int cap)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+	tsec = tsk->security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
+	ad.tsk = tsk;
+	ad.u.cap = cap;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+			    SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
+static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
+			   u32 perms)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	tsec = tsk->security;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+			    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
+   The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
+   data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
+static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
+			  struct inode *inode,
+			  u32 perms,
+			  struct avc_audit_data *adp)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+	tsec = tsk->security;
+	isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	if (!adp) {
+		adp = &ad;
+		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+		ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
+	}
+
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
+}
+
+/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
+   the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
+   pathname if needed. */
+static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				  struct vfsmount *mnt,
+				  struct dentry *dentry,
+				  u32 av)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
+	ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
+	ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
+	return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
+   access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
+   descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
+   check a particular permission to the file.
+   Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
+   has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
+   access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
+   where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
+static inline int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				struct file *file,
+				u32 av)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+	struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
+	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
+	ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
+
+	if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_FD,
+				  FD__USE,
+				  &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
+	if (av)
+		return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
+static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
+		      struct dentry *dentry,
+		      u16 tclass)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	u32 newsid;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	dsec = dir->i_security;
+	sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+			  DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
+			  &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+		newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+	} else {
+		rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
+					     &newsid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
+			    SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			    FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+#define MAY_LINK   0
+#define MAY_UNLINK 1
+#define MAY_RMDIR  2
+
+/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
+static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
+		    struct dentry *dentry,
+		    int kind)
+
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	u32 av;
+	int rc;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	dsec = dir->i_security;
+	isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
+
+	av = DIR__SEARCH;
+	av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	switch (kind) {
+	case MAY_LINK:
+		av = FILE__LINK;
+		break;
+	case MAY_UNLINK:
+		av = FILE__UNLINK;
+		break;
+	case MAY_RMDIR:
+		av = DIR__RMDIR;
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link:  unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
+			     struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			     struct inode *new_dir,
+			     struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	u32 av;
+	int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
+	int rc;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
+	old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+	old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
+	new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+
+	ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+			  DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
+			  old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
+				  old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
+	av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
+	if (new_dentry->d_inode)
+		av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
+		new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+		new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
+		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
+				  new_isec->sclass,
+				  (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
+static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
+			       struct super_block *sb,
+			       u32 perms,
+			       struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+
+	tsec = tsk->security;
+	sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			    perms, ad);
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
+		if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
+			av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
+		if (mask & MAY_READ)
+			av |= FILE__READ;
+
+		if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
+			av |= FILE__APPEND;
+		else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+			av |= FILE__WRITE;
+
+	} else {
+		if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
+			av |= DIR__SEARCH;
+		if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+			av |= DIR__WRITE;
+		if (mask & MAY_READ)
+			av |= DIR__READ;
+	}
+
+	return av;
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
+{
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+		av |= FILE__READ;
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+		if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
+			av |= FILE__APPEND;
+		else
+			av |= FILE__WRITE;
+	}
+
+	return av;
+}
+
+/* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */
+static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+
+	if (!sbsec->initialized) {
+		/* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	down(&isec->sem);
+	isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+	isec->sid = sid;
+	isec->initialized = 1;
+	up(&isec->sem);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Set the security attributes on a newly created file. */
+static int post_create(struct inode *dir,
+		       struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	u32 newsid;
+	char *context;
+	unsigned int len;
+	int rc;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	dsec = dir->i_security;
+	sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+
+	inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	if (!inode) {
+		/* Some file system types (e.g. NFS) may not instantiate
+		   a dentry for all create operations (e.g. symlink),
+		   so we have to check to see if the inode is non-NULL. */
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create:  no inode, dir (dev=%s, "
+		       "ino=%ld)\n", dir->i_sb->s_id, dir->i_ino);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+		newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+	} else {
+		rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
+					     inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
+					     &newsid);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create:  "
+			       "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
+			       "ino=%ld)\n",
+			       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
+	if (rc) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create:  inode_security_set_sid "
+		       "failed, rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
+		       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
+	    inode->i_op->setxattr) {
+		/* Use extended attributes. */
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &len);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create:  sid_to_context "
+			       "failed, rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
+			       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+			return rc;
+		}
+		down(&inode->i_sem);
+		rc = inode->i_op->setxattr(dentry,
+					   XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+					   context, len, 0);
+		up(&inode->i_sem);
+		kfree(context);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create:  setxattr failed, "
+			       "rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
+			       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Hook functions begin here. */
+
+static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
+	struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
+	/* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
+	if (!rc)
+		csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+                          kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+}
+
+static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+                                kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
+}
+
+static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+                               kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+}
+
+static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
+{
+	int error = 0;
+	u32 av;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	u32 tsid;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+
+	rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
+	                          SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
+	if (rc) {
+		/* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
+		tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
+	}
+
+	/* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
+	 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
+	if(op == 001) {
+		error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
+				     SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
+	} else {
+		av = 0;
+		if (op & 004)
+			av |= FILE__READ;
+		if (op & 002)
+			av |= FILE__WRITE;
+		if (av)
+			error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
+					     SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
+        }
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!sb)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (cmds) {
+		case Q_SYNC:
+		case Q_QUOTAON:
+		case Q_QUOTAOFF:
+	        case Q_SETINFO:
+		case Q_SETQUOTA:
+			rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
+						 sb,
+						 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
+			break;
+	        case Q_GETFMT:
+	        case Q_GETINFO:
+		case Q_GETQUOTA:
+			rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
+						 sb,
+						 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
+			break;
+		default:
+			rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
+			break;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
+}
+
+static int selinux_syslog(int type)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	switch (type) {
+		case 3:         /* Read last kernel messages */
+		case 10:        /* Return size of the log buffer */
+			rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
+			break;
+		case 6:         /* Disable logging to console */
+		case 7:         /* Enable logging to console */
+		case 8:		/* Set level of messages printed to console */
+			rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
+			break;
+		case 0:         /* Close log */
+		case 1:         /* Open log */
+		case 2:         /* Read from log */
+		case 4:         /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
+		case 5:         /* Clear ring buffer */
+		default:
+			rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
+			break;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
+ * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
+ * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
+ *
+ * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
+ * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
+ * the capability is granted.
+ *
+ * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
+ * processes that allocate mappings.
+ */
+static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
+{
+	int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+					SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
+					CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
+					NULL);
+
+	if (rc == 0)
+		cap_sys_admin = 1;
+
+	return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
+}
+
+/* binprm security operations */
+
+static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
+
+	bsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!bsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memset(bsec, 0, sizeof *bsec);
+	bsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+	bsec->bprm = bprm;
+	bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	bsec->set = 0;
+
+	bprm->security = bsec;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
+	u32 newsid;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	bsec = bprm->security;
+
+	if (bsec->set)
+		return 0;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	/* Default to the current task SID. */
+	bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
+
+	/* Reset create SID on execve. */
+	tsec->create_sid = 0;
+
+	if (tsec->exec_sid) {
+		newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
+		/* Reset exec SID on execve. */
+		tsec->exec_sid = 0;
+	} else {
+		/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
+		rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+		                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
+	ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
+
+	if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+		newsid = tsec->sid;
+
+        if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	} else {
+		/* Check permissions for the transition. */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
+				  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		/* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
+		current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+		/* Set the security field to the new SID. */
+		bsec->sid = newsid;
+	}
+
+	bsec->set = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
+}
+
+
+static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+	int atsecure = 0;
+
+	if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
+		/* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
+		   the noatsecure permission is granted between
+		   the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
+		atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
+					 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+					 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
+	}
+
+	return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+}
+
+static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct bprm_security_struct *bsec = bprm->security;
+	bprm->security = NULL;
+	kfree(bsec);
+}
+
+extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
+extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
+
+/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
+static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
+{
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
+	struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
+	long j = -1;
+
+	if (tty) {
+		file_list_lock();
+		file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_list);
+		if (file) {
+			/* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
+			   Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
+			   than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
+			   file may belong to another process and we are only
+			   interested in the inode-based check here. */
+			struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+			if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
+					   FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
+				/* Reset controlling tty. */
+				current->signal->tty = NULL;
+				current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
+			}
+		}
+		file_list_unlock();
+	}
+
+	/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
+
+	spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
+	for (;;) {
+		unsigned long set, i;
+		int fd;
+
+		j++;
+		i = j * __NFDBITS;
+		if (i >= files->max_fds || i >= files->max_fdset)
+			break;
+		set = files->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
+		if (!set)
+			continue;
+		spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
+		for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
+			if (set & 1) {
+				file = fget(i);
+				if (!file)
+					continue;
+				if (file_has_perm(current,
+						  file,
+						  file_to_av(file))) {
+					sys_close(i);
+					fd = get_unused_fd();
+					if (fd != i) {
+						if (fd >= 0)
+							put_unused_fd(fd);
+						fput(file);
+						continue;
+					}
+					if (devnull) {
+						atomic_inc(&devnull->f_count);
+					} else {
+						devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
+						if (!devnull) {
+							put_unused_fd(fd);
+							fput(file);
+							continue;
+						}
+					}
+					fd_install(fd, devnull);
+				}
+				fput(file);
+			}
+		}
+		spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
+
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
+}
+
+static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
+	u32 sid;
+	int rc;
+
+	secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+
+	bsec = bprm->security;
+	sid = bsec->sid;
+
+	tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
+	bsec->unsafe = 0;
+	if (tsec->sid != sid) {
+		/* Check for shared state.  If not ok, leave SID
+		   unchanged and kill. */
+		if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
+			rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+					PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
+			if (rc) {
+				bsec->unsafe = 1;
+				return;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
+		   Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
+		if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
+			rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
+					  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
+					  NULL);
+			if (rc) {
+				bsec->unsafe = 1;
+				return;
+			}
+		}
+		tsec->sid = sid;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
+ */
+static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
+	struct itimerval itimer;
+	struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
+	int rc, i;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	bsec = bprm->security;
+
+	if (bsec->unsafe) {
+		force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
+		return;
+
+	/* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
+	flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
+
+	/* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
+	   from the old SID.  If not, clear itimers to avoid
+	   subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
+	   signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
+	  been updated so that any kill done after the flush
+	  will be checked against the new SID. */
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			  PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
+	if (rc) {
+		memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
+		for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+			do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
+		flush_signals(current);
+		spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+		flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
+		sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
+		recalc_sigpending();
+		spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+	}
+
+	/* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
+	   from the old SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to
+	   the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
+	   task's soft limit.  Note that the setting of hard limits
+	   (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
+	   check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
+	   the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
+	   than the default soft limit for cases where the default
+	   is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
+	   RLIMIT_STACK.*/
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			  PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
+	if (rc) {
+		for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
+			rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
+			initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
+			rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
+		}
+		if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
+			/*
+			 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
+			 * to be refigured.
+			 */
+			current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
+	   recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
+	wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
+}
+
+/* superblock security operations */
+
+static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
+}
+
+static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	superblock_free_security(sb);
+}
+
+static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
+{
+	if (plen > olen)
+		return 0;
+
+	return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
+{
+	return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
+	        match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
+	        match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len));
+}
+
+static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
+{
+	if (!*first) {
+		**to = ',';
+		*to += 1;
+	}
+	else
+		*first = 0;
+	memcpy(*to, from, len);
+	*to += len;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
+{
+	int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
+	char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
+	char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
+
+	in_curr = orig;
+	sec_curr = copy;
+
+	/* Binary mount data: just copy */
+	if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
+		copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!nosec) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	nosec_save = nosec;
+	fnosec = fsec = 1;
+	in_save = in_end = orig;
+
+	do {
+		if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') {
+			int len = in_end - in_curr;
+
+			if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
+				take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
+			else
+				take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
+
+			in_curr = in_end + 1;
+		}
+	} while (*in_end++);
+
+	copy_page(in_save, nosec_save);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
+	ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
+	return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
+	ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
+	return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
+                         struct nameidata *nd,
+                         char * type,
+                         unsigned long flags,
+                         void * data)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+		return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
+		                           FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
+	else
+		return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
+		                       FILE__MOUNTON);
+}
+
+static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
+	                           FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
+}
+
+/* inode security operations */
+
+static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return inode_alloc_security(inode);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	inode_free_security(inode);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
+{
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
+{
+	post_create(dir, dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	post_create(dir, dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
+{
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
+{
+	post_create(dir, dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+	post_create(dir, dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+                                struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+                                      struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+				    struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (!mask) {
+		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
+			       file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
+			       ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
+		return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	u32 newsid;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
+		if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+			     sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
+		    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+			/* A different attribute in the security namespace.
+			   Restrict to administrator. */
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
+
+		/* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
+		   ordinary setattr permission. */
+		return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+	}
+
+	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
+	ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+			  FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
+			  FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
+	                                  isec->sclass);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(newsid,
+			    sbsec->sid,
+			    SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			    FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
+			    &ad);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
+                                        void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	u32 newsid;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
+		/* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
+		return;
+	}
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
+	if (rc) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  unable to obtain SID for context "
+		       "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	isec->sid = newsid;
+	return;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+
+	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+{
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
+		if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+			     sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
+		    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+			/* A different attribute in the security namespace.
+			   Restrict to administrator. */
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
+
+		/* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
+		   ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
+		   permission for removexattr. */
+		return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+	}
+
+	/* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
+	   You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	char *context;
+	unsigned len;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* Permission check handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.*/
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (!buffer || !size) {
+		kfree(context);
+		return len;
+	}
+	if (size < len) {
+		kfree(context);
+		return -ERANGE;
+	}
+	memcpy(buffer, context, len);
+	kfree(context);
+	return len;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+                                     const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	u32 newsid;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!value || !size)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	isec->sid = newsid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
+{
+	const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
+	if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
+		memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
+	return len;
+}
+
+/* file security operations */
+
+static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+
+	if (!mask) {
+		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
+	if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
+		mask |= MAY_APPEND;
+
+	return file_has_perm(current, file,
+			     file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	return file_alloc_security(file);
+}
+
+static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	file_free_security(file);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			      unsigned long arg)
+{
+	int error = 0;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+		case FIONREAD:
+		/* fall through */
+		case FIBMAP:
+		/* fall through */
+		case FIGETBSZ:
+		/* fall through */
+		case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
+		/* fall through */
+		case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
+			error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
+			break;
+
+		case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
+		/* fall through */
+		case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
+			error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
+			break;
+
+		/* sys_ioctl() checks */
+		case FIONBIO:
+		/* fall through */
+		case FIOASYNC:
+			error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
+			break;
+
+	        case KDSKBENT:
+	        case KDSKBSENT:
+			error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
+			break;
+
+		/* default case assumes that the command will go
+		 * to the file's ioctl() function.
+		 */
+		default:
+			error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
+
+	}
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
+{
+#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
+	if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
+		/*
+		 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
+		 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
+		 * This has an additional check.
+		 */
+		int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (file) {
+		/* read access is always possible with a mapping */
+		u32 av = FILE__READ;
+
+		/* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
+		if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
+			av |= FILE__WRITE;
+
+		if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+			av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
+
+		return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			     unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
+		prot = reqprot;
+
+	return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
+				   (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				 unsigned long reqprot,
+				 unsigned long prot)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
+		prot = reqprot;
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
+	if (vma->vm_file != NULL && vma->anon_vma != NULL && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
+		/*
+		 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
+		 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been written,
+		 * check ability to execute the possibly modified content.
+		 * This typically should only occur for text relocations.
+		 */
+		int rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			      unsigned long arg)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	        case F_SETFL:
+			if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
+				err = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
+				err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
+				break;
+			}
+			/* fall through */
+	        case F_SETOWN:
+	        case F_SETSIG:
+	        case F_GETFL:
+	        case F_GETOWN:
+	        case F_GETSIG:
+			/* Just check FD__USE permission */
+			err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
+			break;
+		case F_GETLK:
+		case F_SETLK:
+	        case F_SETLKW:
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+	        case F_GETLK64:
+		case F_SETLK64:
+	        case F_SETLKW64:
+#endif
+			if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
+				err = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+			err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	fsec = file->f_security;
+	fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				       struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
+{
+        struct file *file;
+	u32 perm;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+
+	/* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
+        file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
+
+	tsec = tsk->security;
+	fsec = file->f_security;
+
+	if (!signum)
+		perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
+	else
+		perm = signal_to_av(signum);
+
+	return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
+			    SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+	return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
+}
+
+/* task security operations */
+
+static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
+	int rc;
+
+	tsec1 = current->security;
+
+	rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	tsec2 = tsk->security;
+
+	tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
+	tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
+
+	/* Retain the exec and create SIDs across fork */
+	tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
+	tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
+
+	/* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
+	   This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
+	   subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
+	tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	task_free_security(tsk);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
+{
+	/* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
+	   since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
+	   identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
+	   this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use
+	   of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
+	   capable hook. */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
+{
+	return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
+{
+	/* See the comment for setuid above. */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+	return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
+{
+	/* See the comment for setuid above. */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+	struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
+	   lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
+	   later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
+	   upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
+	if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
+		return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
+{
+	return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
+{
+	u32 perm;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (info && ((unsigned long)info == 1 ||
+	             (unsigned long)info == 2 || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!sig)
+		perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
+	else
+		perm = signal_to_av(sig);
+
+	return task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
+			      unsigned long arg2,
+			      unsigned long arg3,
+			      unsigned long arg4,
+			      unsigned long arg5)
+{
+	/* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
+	   any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
+	   the state of the current process. */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	u32 perm;
+
+	perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
+
+	return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
+}
+
+static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+  	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
+
+	tsec = p->security;
+	tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
+	tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+	return;
+}
+
+static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
+				  struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	isec->sid = tsec->sid;
+	isec->initialized = 1;
+	return;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+
+/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
+	struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
+
+	offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
+	ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
+	if (ih == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
+	if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
+		goto out;
+
+	ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
+	ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
+	ret = 0;
+
+	switch (ih->protocol) {
+        case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+        	struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+
+        	if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+        		break;
+
+		offset += ihlen;
+		th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+		if (th == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
+		ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
+		break;
+        }
+        
+        case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+        	struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+        	
+        	if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+        		break;
+        		
+		offset += ihlen;
+        	uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+		if (uh == NULL)
+			break;	
+
+        	ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
+        	ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
+        	break;
+        }
+
+        default:
+        	break;
+        }
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+
+/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	u8 nexthdr;
+	int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
+	struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
+
+	offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
+	ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
+	if (ip6 == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
+	ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
+	ret = 0;
+
+	nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
+	offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
+	offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr,
+				  skb->tail - skb->head - offset);
+	if (offset < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	switch (nexthdr) {
+	case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+        	struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+
+		th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+		if (th == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
+		ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+		struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+		uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+		if (uh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
+		ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* includes fragments */
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+
+static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+			     char **addrp, int *len, int src)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	switch (ad->u.net.family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
+		if (ret || !addrp)
+			break;
+		*len = 4;
+		*addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
+					&ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
+		break;
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+	case PF_INET6:
+		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
+		if (ret || !addrp)
+			break;
+		*len = 16;
+		*addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
+					&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
+		break;
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* socket security operations */
+static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
+			   u32 perms)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	tsec = task->security;
+	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+
+	if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
+		goto out;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+	ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
+	err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
+
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
+				 int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	if (kern)
+		goto out;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+			   socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
+			   protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
+
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+				       int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+	isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid;
+	isec->initialized = 1;
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
+   Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
+   permission check between the socket and the port number. */
+#define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
+#define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
+
+static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	u16 family;
+	int err;
+
+	err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
+	 */
+	family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+	if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
+		char *addrp;
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+		struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+		struct avc_audit_data ad;
+		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
+		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+		unsigned short snum;
+		struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+		u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
+
+		tsec = current->security;
+		isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+
+		if (family == PF_INET) {
+			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
+			addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
+			addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+		} else {
+			addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+			addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
+			addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
+		}
+
+		if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
+			   snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
+			err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+						sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
+			if (err)
+				goto out;
+			AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+			ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
+			ad.u.net.family = family;
+			err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
+					   isec->sclass,
+					   SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
+			if (err)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		
+		switch(sk->sk_protocol) {
+		case IPPROTO_TCP:
+			node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+			
+		case IPPROTO_UDP:
+			node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+			
+		default:
+			node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+		}
+		
+		err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+		
+		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+		ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
+		ad.u.net.family = family;
+
+		if (family == PF_INET)
+			ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+		else
+			ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
+
+		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
+		                   isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	int err;
+
+	err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/*
+	 * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
+	 */
+	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
+		struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+		struct avc_audit_data ad;
+		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
+		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+		unsigned short snum;
+		u32 sid;
+
+		if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
+			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+			if (addrlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
+		} else {
+			addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+			if (addrlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+		}
+
+		err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+					sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+
+		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+		ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
+		ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
+		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
+				   TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
+
+	err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
+
+	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+	newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
+	newisec->sid = isec->sid;
+	newisec->initialized = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ 				  int size)
+{
+	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				  int size, int flags)
+{
+	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
+{
+	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+				     int optname)
+{
+	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
+					      struct socket *other,
+					      struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	int err;
+
+	err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+	other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+	ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
+			   isec->sclass,
+			   UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* connecting socket */
+	ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
+	
+	/* server child socket */
+	ssec = newsk->sk_security;
+	ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
+	
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
+					struct socket *other)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	int err;
+
+	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+	other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+	ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
+			   isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	u16 family;
+	char *addrp;
+	int len, err = 0;
+	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
+	u32 sock_sid = 0;
+	u16 sock_class = 0;
+	struct socket *sock;
+	struct net_device *dev;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+	family = sk->sk_family;
+	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+
+ 	read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ 	sock = sk->sk_socket;
+ 	if (sock) {
+ 		struct inode *inode;
+ 		inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
+ 		if (inode) {
+ 			struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ 			isec = inode->i_security;
+ 			sock_sid = isec->sid;
+ 			sock_class = isec->sclass;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ 	if (!sock_sid)
+  		goto out;
+
+	dev = skb->dev;
+	if (!dev)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	switch (sock_class) {
+	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
+		netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
+		node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
+		recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
+		break;
+	
+	case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+		netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
+		node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
+		recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
+		break;
+	
+	default:
+		netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
+		node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
+	ad.u.net.family = family;
+
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, &ad);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+	
+	/* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
+	err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+	
+	err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, &ad);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (recv_perm) {
+		u32 port_sid;
+
+		/* Fixme: make this more efficient */
+		err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+		                        sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad.u.net.sport),
+		                        &port_sid);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+
+		err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
+				   sock_class, recv_perm, &ad);
+	}
+out:	
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+				     int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	char *scontext;
+	u32 scontext_len;
+	struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+	if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
+		err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	
+	err = security_sid_to_context(ssec->peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (scontext_len > len) {
+		err = -ERANGE;
+		goto out_len;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
+		err = -EFAULT;
+
+out_len:
+	if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
+		err = -EFAULT;
+
+	kfree(scontext);
+out:	
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, int priority)
+{
+	return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
+}
+
+static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	sk_free_security(sk);
+}
+
+static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	u32 perm;
+	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
+	struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+	
+	if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
+	
+	err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
+	if (err) {
+		if (err == -EINVAL) {
+			audit_log(current->audit_context,
+				  "SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message"
+				  " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
+				  nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
+			if (!selinux_enforcing)
+				err = 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Ignore */
+		if (err == -ENOENT)
+			err = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
+                                              struct sk_buff **pskb,
+                                              const struct net_device *in,
+                                              const struct net_device *out,
+                                              int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
+                                              u16 family)
+{
+	char *addrp;
+	int len, err = NF_ACCEPT;
+	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
+	struct sock *sk;
+	struct socket *sock;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
+	
+	sk = skb->sk;
+	if (!sk)
+		goto out;
+		
+	sock = sk->sk_socket;
+	if (!sock)
+		goto out;
+		
+	inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
+	if (!inode)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	isec = inode->i_security;
+	
+	switch (isec->sclass) {
+	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
+		netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
+		node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
+		send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
+		break;
+	
+	case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+		netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
+		node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
+		send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
+		break;
+	
+	default:
+		netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
+		node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
+		break;
+	}
+
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
+	ad.u.net.family = family;
+
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp,
+				&len, 0) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+	if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF,
+	                   netif_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+	if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+		goto out;
+		
+	/* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
+	err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len,
+				&node_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+	if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+		goto out;
+	
+	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE,
+	                   node_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+	if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (send_perm) {
+		u32 port_sid;
+		
+		/* Fixme: make this more efficient */
+		err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
+		                        sk->sk_type,
+		                        sk->sk_protocol,
+		                        ntohs(ad.u.net.dport),
+		                        &port_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+		if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+			goto out;
+
+		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
+		                   send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+	}
+
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
+						struct sk_buff **pskb,
+						const struct net_device *in,
+						const struct net_device *out,
+						int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
+{
+	return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
+						struct sk_buff **pskb,
+						const struct net_device *in,
+						const struct net_device *out,
+						int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
+{
+	return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
+}
+
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+
+#endif	/* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+
+#else
+
+static inline int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+
+static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int err;
+
+	err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+
+	avd.allowed = 0;
+	avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+				SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd);
+	cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed);
+
+	if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
+		err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
+			      struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
+			      u16 sclass)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+
+	isec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!isec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memset(isec, 0, sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct));
+	isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+	isec->sclass = sclass;
+	isec->ipc_perm = perm;
+	if (tsec) {
+		isec->sid = tsec->sid;
+	} else {
+		isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	}
+	perm->security = isec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
+	if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
+		return;
+
+	perm->security = NULL;
+	kfree(isec);
+}
+
+static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+
+	msec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!msec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memset(msec, 0, sizeof(struct msg_security_struct));
+	msec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+	msec->msg = msg;
+	msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	msg->security = msec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
+	if (!msec || msec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
+		return;
+
+	msg->security = NULL;
+	kfree(msec);
+}
+
+static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
+			u16 sclass, u32 perms)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	isec = ipc_perms->security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, sclass, perms, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
+}
+
+static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	msg_msg_free_security(msg);
+}
+
+/* message queue security operations */
+static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+			  MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
+	if (rc) {
+		ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+	ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+			    MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
+{
+	int err;
+	int perms;
+
+	switch(cmd) {
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case MSG_INFO:
+		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+		return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT:
+		perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+		perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
+		break;
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ, perms);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
+	msec = msg->security;
+
+	/*
+	 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
+	 */
+	if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
+		/*
+		 * Compute new sid based on current process and
+		 * message queue this message will be stored in
+		 */
+		rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
+					     isec->sid,
+					     SECCLASS_MSG,
+					     &msec->sid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
+
+	/* Can this process write to the queue? */
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+			  MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
+	if (!rc)
+		/* Can this process send the message */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
+	if (!rc)
+		/* Can the message be put in the queue? */
+		rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+				    struct task_struct *target,
+				    long type, int mode)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	tsec = target->security;
+	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
+	msec = msg->security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+			  SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Shared Memory security operations */
+static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ 	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+			  SHM__CREATE, &ad);
+	if (rc) {
+		ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+	ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
+}
+
+static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+			    SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
+static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
+{
+	int perms;
+	int err;
+
+	switch(cmd) {
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SHM_INFO:
+		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+		return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT:
+		perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+		perms = SHM__SETATTR;
+		break;
+	case SHM_LOCK:
+	case SHM_UNLOCK:
+		perms = SHM__LOCK;
+		break;
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		perms = SHM__DESTROY;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM, perms);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
+			     char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
+{
+	u32 perms;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
+		perms = SHM__READ;
+	else
+		perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
+
+	return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM, perms);
+}
+
+/* Semaphore security operations */
+static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ 	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+			  SEM__CREATE, &ad);
+	if (rc) {
+		ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+	ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+			    SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
+static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
+{
+	int err;
+	u32 perms;
+
+	switch(cmd) {
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SEM_INFO:
+		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+		return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
+	case GETPID:
+	case GETNCNT:
+	case GETZCNT:
+		perms = SEM__GETATTR;
+		break;
+	case GETVAL:
+	case GETALL:
+		perms = SEM__READ;
+		break;
+	case SETVAL:
+	case SETALL:
+		perms = SEM__WRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		perms = SEM__DESTROY;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+		perms = SEM__SETATTR;
+		break;
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT:
+		perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM, perms);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
+			     struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
+{
+	u32 perms;
+
+	if (alter)
+		perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
+	else
+		perms = SEM__READ;
+
+	return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM, perms);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+	u16 sclass = SECCLASS_IPC;
+	u32 av = 0;
+
+	if (isec && isec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC)
+		sclass = isec->sclass;
+
+	av = 0;
+	if (flag & S_IRUGO)
+		av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
+	if (flag & S_IWUGO)
+		av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
+
+	if (av == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, sclass, av);
+}
+
+/* module stacking operations */
+static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
+{
+	if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  There is already a secondary security "
+		       "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+
+	secondary_ops = ops;
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  Registering secondary module %s\n",
+	       __FUNCTION__,
+	       name);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
+{
+	if (ops != secondary_ops) {
+		printk (KERN_INFO "%s:  trying to unregister a security module "
+		        "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	secondary_ops = original_ops;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (inode)
+		inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
+			       char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	u32 sid, len;
+	char *context;
+	int error;
+
+	if (current != p) {
+		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
+		if (error)
+			return error;
+	}
+
+	if (!size)
+		return -ERANGE;
+
+	tsec = p->security;
+
+	if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+		sid = tsec->sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
+		sid = tsec->osid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+		sid = tsec->exec_sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+		sid = tsec->create_sid;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!sid)
+		return 0;
+
+	error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+	if (len > size) {
+		kfree(context);
+		return -ERANGE;
+	}
+	memcpy(value, context, len);
+	kfree(context);
+	return len;
+}
+
+static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
+			       char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	u32 sid = 0;
+	int error;
+	char *str = value;
+
+	if (current != p) {
+		/* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
+		   security attributes. */
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
+	 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
+	 * above restriction is ever removed.
+	 */
+	if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
+	else
+		error = -EINVAL;
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	/* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
+	if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
+		if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
+			str[size-1] = 0;
+			size--;
+		}
+		error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
+		if (error)
+			return error;
+	}
+
+	/* Permission checking based on the specified context is
+	   performed during the actual operation (execve,
+	   open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
+	   operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
+	   checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
+	   operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
+	tsec = p->security;
+	if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+		tsec->exec_sid = sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+		tsec->create_sid = sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
+		struct av_decision avd;
+
+		if (sid == 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
+		if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
+			struct task_struct *g, *t;
+			struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
+			read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+			do_each_thread(g, t)
+				if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
+					read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+					return -EPERM;
+				}
+			while_each_thread(g, t);
+			read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+                }
+
+		/* Check permissions for the transition. */
+		error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+		                     PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
+		if (error)
+			return error;
+
+		/* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
+		   Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
+		task_lock(p);
+		if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
+			error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
+						     SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+						     PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
+			if (!error)
+				tsec->sid = sid;
+			task_unlock(p);
+			avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+				  PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
+			if (error)
+				return error;
+		} else {
+			tsec->sid = sid;
+			task_unlock(p);
+		}
+	}
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return size;
+}
+
+static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
+	.ptrace =			selinux_ptrace,
+	.capget =			selinux_capget,
+	.capset_check =			selinux_capset_check,
+	.capset_set =			selinux_capset_set,
+	.sysctl =			selinux_sysctl,
+	.capable =			selinux_capable,
+	.quotactl =			selinux_quotactl,
+	.quota_on =			selinux_quota_on,
+	.syslog =			selinux_syslog,
+	.vm_enough_memory =		selinux_vm_enough_memory,
+
+	.netlink_send =			selinux_netlink_send,
+        .netlink_recv =			selinux_netlink_recv,
+
+	.bprm_alloc_security =		selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
+	.bprm_free_security =		selinux_bprm_free_security,
+	.bprm_apply_creds =		selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
+	.bprm_post_apply_creds =	selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
+	.bprm_set_security =		selinux_bprm_set_security,
+	.bprm_check_security =		selinux_bprm_check_security,
+	.bprm_secureexec =		selinux_bprm_secureexec,
+
+	.sb_alloc_security =		selinux_sb_alloc_security,
+	.sb_free_security =		selinux_sb_free_security,
+	.sb_copy_data =			selinux_sb_copy_data,
+	.sb_kern_mount =	        selinux_sb_kern_mount,
+	.sb_statfs =			selinux_sb_statfs,
+	.sb_mount =			selinux_mount,
+	.sb_umount =			selinux_umount,
+
+	.inode_alloc_security =		selinux_inode_alloc_security,
+	.inode_free_security =		selinux_inode_free_security,
+	.inode_create =			selinux_inode_create,
+	.inode_post_create =		selinux_inode_post_create,
+	.inode_link =			selinux_inode_link,
+	.inode_post_link =		selinux_inode_post_link,
+	.inode_unlink =			selinux_inode_unlink,
+	.inode_symlink =		selinux_inode_symlink,
+	.inode_post_symlink =		selinux_inode_post_symlink,
+	.inode_mkdir =			selinux_inode_mkdir,
+	.inode_post_mkdir =		selinux_inode_post_mkdir,
+	.inode_rmdir =			selinux_inode_rmdir,
+	.inode_mknod =			selinux_inode_mknod,
+	.inode_post_mknod =		selinux_inode_post_mknod,
+	.inode_rename =			selinux_inode_rename,
+	.inode_post_rename =		selinux_inode_post_rename,
+	.inode_readlink =		selinux_inode_readlink,
+	.inode_follow_link =		selinux_inode_follow_link,
+	.inode_permission =		selinux_inode_permission,
+	.inode_setattr =		selinux_inode_setattr,
+	.inode_getattr =		selinux_inode_getattr,
+	.inode_setxattr =		selinux_inode_setxattr,
+	.inode_post_setxattr =		selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
+	.inode_getxattr =		selinux_inode_getxattr,
+	.inode_listxattr =		selinux_inode_listxattr,
+	.inode_removexattr =		selinux_inode_removexattr,
+	.inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
+	.inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
+	.inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
+
+	.file_permission =		selinux_file_permission,
+	.file_alloc_security =		selinux_file_alloc_security,
+	.file_free_security =		selinux_file_free_security,
+	.file_ioctl =			selinux_file_ioctl,
+	.file_mmap =			selinux_file_mmap,
+	.file_mprotect =		selinux_file_mprotect,
+	.file_lock =			selinux_file_lock,
+	.file_fcntl =			selinux_file_fcntl,
+	.file_set_fowner =		selinux_file_set_fowner,
+	.file_send_sigiotask =		selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
+	.file_receive =			selinux_file_receive,
+
+	.task_create =			selinux_task_create,
+	.task_alloc_security =		selinux_task_alloc_security,
+	.task_free_security =		selinux_task_free_security,
+	.task_setuid =			selinux_task_setuid,
+	.task_post_setuid =		selinux_task_post_setuid,
+	.task_setgid =			selinux_task_setgid,
+	.task_setpgid =			selinux_task_setpgid,
+	.task_getpgid =			selinux_task_getpgid,
+	.task_getsid =		        selinux_task_getsid,
+	.task_setgroups =		selinux_task_setgroups,
+	.task_setnice =			selinux_task_setnice,
+	.task_setrlimit =		selinux_task_setrlimit,
+	.task_setscheduler =		selinux_task_setscheduler,
+	.task_getscheduler =		selinux_task_getscheduler,
+	.task_kill =			selinux_task_kill,
+	.task_wait =			selinux_task_wait,
+	.task_prctl =			selinux_task_prctl,
+	.task_reparent_to_init =	selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
+	.task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
+
+	.ipc_permission =		selinux_ipc_permission,
+
+	.msg_msg_alloc_security =	selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
+	.msg_msg_free_security =	selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
+
+	.msg_queue_alloc_security =	selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
+	.msg_queue_free_security =	selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
+	.msg_queue_associate =		selinux_msg_queue_associate,
+	.msg_queue_msgctl =		selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
+	.msg_queue_msgsnd =		selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
+	.msg_queue_msgrcv =		selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
+
+	.shm_alloc_security =		selinux_shm_alloc_security,
+	.shm_free_security =		selinux_shm_free_security,
+	.shm_associate =		selinux_shm_associate,
+	.shm_shmctl =			selinux_shm_shmctl,
+	.shm_shmat =			selinux_shm_shmat,
+
+	.sem_alloc_security = 		selinux_sem_alloc_security,
+	.sem_free_security =  		selinux_sem_free_security,
+	.sem_associate =		selinux_sem_associate,
+	.sem_semctl =			selinux_sem_semctl,
+	.sem_semop =			selinux_sem_semop,
+
+	.register_security =		selinux_register_security,
+	.unregister_security =		selinux_unregister_security,
+
+	.d_instantiate =                selinux_d_instantiate,
+
+	.getprocattr =                  selinux_getprocattr,
+	.setprocattr =                  selinux_setprocattr,
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+        .unix_stream_connect =		selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
+	.unix_may_send =		selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
+
+	.socket_create =		selinux_socket_create,
+	.socket_post_create =		selinux_socket_post_create,
+	.socket_bind =			selinux_socket_bind,
+	.socket_connect =		selinux_socket_connect,
+	.socket_listen =		selinux_socket_listen,
+	.socket_accept =		selinux_socket_accept,
+	.socket_sendmsg =		selinux_socket_sendmsg,
+	.socket_recvmsg =		selinux_socket_recvmsg,
+	.socket_getsockname =		selinux_socket_getsockname,
+	.socket_getpeername =		selinux_socket_getpeername,
+	.socket_getsockopt =		selinux_socket_getsockopt,
+	.socket_setsockopt =		selinux_socket_setsockopt,
+	.socket_shutdown =		selinux_socket_shutdown,
+	.socket_sock_rcv_skb =		selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
+	.socket_getpeersec =		selinux_socket_getpeersec,
+	.sk_alloc_security =		selinux_sk_alloc_security,
+	.sk_free_security =		selinux_sk_free_security,
+#endif
+};
+
+static __init int selinux_init(void)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at boot.\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
+
+	/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
+	if (task_alloc_security(current))
+		panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
+	tsec = current->security;
+	tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+
+	avc_init();
+
+	original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
+	if (!secondary_ops)
+		panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
+	if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
+		panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
+
+	if (selinux_enforcing) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
+	} else {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void selinux_complete_init(void)
+{
+	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
+
+	/* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
+	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
+	spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
+next_sb:
+	if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
+		struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
+				list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
+				           struct superblock_security_struct,
+				           list);
+		struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
+		spin_lock(&sb_lock);
+		sb->s_count++;
+		spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+		spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
+		down_read(&sb->s_umount);
+		if (sb->s_root)
+			superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
+		drop_super(sb);
+		spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
+		list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
+		goto next_sb;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
+}
+
+/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
+   all processes and objects when they are created. */
+security_initcall(selinux_init);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
+
+static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
+	.hook =		selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
+	.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
+	.pf =		PF_INET,
+	.hooknum =	NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
+	.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+};
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+
+static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
+	.hook =		selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
+	.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
+	.pf =		PF_INET6,
+	.hooknum =	NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
+	.priority =	NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+};
+
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+
+static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled)
+		goto out;
+		
+	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
+	
+	err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
+	if (err)
+		panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+
+	err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
+	if (err)
+		panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
+
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
+{
+	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
+
+	nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+	nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
+#endif	/* IPV6 */
+}
+#endif
+
+#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
+#endif
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+int selinux_disable(void)
+{
+	extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
+	static int selinux_disabled = 0;
+
+	if (ss_initialized) {
+		/* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (selinux_disabled) {
+		/* Only do this once. */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
+
+	selinux_disabled = 1;
+
+	/* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
+	security_ops = secondary_ops;
+
+	/* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
+	selinux_nf_ip_exit();
+
+	/* Unregister selinuxfs. */
+	exit_sel_fs();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9facb27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
+   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, file, 0x00020000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_LNK_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_BLK_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_IPC, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_SEM, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_SHM, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..903e8b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, "mount")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, "remount")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, "unmount")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, "getattr")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, "relabelfrom")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, "relabelto")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__TRANSITION, "transition")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, "associate")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, "quotamod")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, "quotaget")
+   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__ADD_NAME, "add_name")
+   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REMOVE_NAME, "remove_name")
+   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REPARENT, "reparent")
+   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, "search")
+   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__RMDIR, "rmdir")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, "use")
+   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto")
+   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__NEWCONN, "newconn")
+   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM, "acceptfrom")
+   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind")
+   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, "name_connect")
+   S_(SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET, UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind")
+   S_(SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET, RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__TCP_RECV, "tcp_recv")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__TCP_SEND, "tcp_send")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__UDP_RECV, "udp_recv")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__UDP_SEND, "udp_send")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RAWIP_RECV, "rawip_recv")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RAWIP_SEND, "rawip_send")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__ENFORCE_DEST, "enforce_dest")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__TCP_RECV, "tcp_recv")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__TCP_SEND, "tcp_send")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__UDP_RECV, "udp_recv")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__UDP_SEND, "udp_send")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__RAWIP_RECV, "rawip_recv")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__RAWIP_SEND, "rawip_send")
+   S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto")
+   S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__NEWCONN, "newconn")
+   S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM, "acceptfrom")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, "fork")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, "transition")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGCHLD, "sigchld")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGKILL, "sigkill")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGSTOP, "sigstop")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGNULL, "signull")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGNAL, "signal")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, "ptrace")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSCHED, "getsched")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, "setsched")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSESSION, "getsession")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETPGID, "getpgid")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETPGID, "setpgid")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETCAP, "getcap")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCAP, "setcap")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, "share")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, "getattr")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETEXEC, "setexec")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, "setfscreate")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE, "noatsecure")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, "siginh")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, "setrlimit")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__RLIMITINH, "rlimitinh")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, "dyntransition")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCURRENT, "setcurrent")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM, "execmem")
+   S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, "enqueue")
+   S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, "send")
+   S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, "receive")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SHM, SHM__LOCK, "lock")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV, "compute_av")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE, "compute_create")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER, "compute_member")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT, "check_context")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY, "load_policy")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL, "compute_relabel")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER, "compute_user")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETENFORCE, "setenforce")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL, "setbool")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM, "setsecparam")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT, "setcheckreqprot")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, "ipc_info")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, "syslog_read")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, "syslog_mod")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE, "syslog_console")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__CHOWN, "chown")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE, "dac_override")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH, "dac_read_search")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__FOWNER, "fowner")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__FSETID, "fsetid")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__KILL, "kill")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SETGID, "setgid")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SETUID, "setuid")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SETPCAP, "setpcap")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__LINUX_IMMUTABLE, "linux_immutable")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__NET_BIND_SERVICE, "net_bind_service")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__NET_BROADCAST, "net_broadcast")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__NET_ADMIN, "net_admin")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__NET_RAW, "net_raw")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__IPC_LOCK, "ipc_lock")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__IPC_OWNER, "ipc_owner")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_MODULE, "sys_module")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_RAWIO, "sys_rawio")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_CHROOT, "sys_chroot")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_PTRACE, "sys_ptrace")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_PACCT, "sys_pacct")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_ADMIN, "sys_admin")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_BOOT, "sys_boot")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_NICE, "sys_nice")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_RESOURCE, "sys_resource")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_TIME, "sys_time")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_TTY_CONFIG, "sys_tty_config")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__MKNOD, "mknod")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__LEASE, "lease")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PASSWD, PASSWD__PASSWD, "passwd")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PASSWD, PASSWD__CHFN, "chfn")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PASSWD, PASSWD__CHSH, "chsh")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PASSWD, PASSWD__ROOTOK, "rootok")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PASSWD, PASSWD__CRONTAB, "crontab")
+   S_(SECCLASS_DRAWABLE, DRAWABLE__CREATE, "create")
+   S_(SECCLASS_DRAWABLE, DRAWABLE__DESTROY, "destroy")
+   S_(SECCLASS_DRAWABLE, DRAWABLE__DRAW, "draw")
+   S_(SECCLASS_DRAWABLE, DRAWABLE__COPY, "copy")
+   S_(SECCLASS_DRAWABLE, DRAWABLE__GETATTR, "getattr")
+   S_(SECCLASS_GC, GC__CREATE, "create")
+   S_(SECCLASS_GC, GC__FREE, "free")
+   S_(SECCLASS_GC, GC__GETATTR, "getattr")
+   S_(SECCLASS_GC, GC__SETATTR, "setattr")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__ADDCHILD, "addchild")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__CREATE, "create")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__DESTROY, "destroy")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__MAP, "map")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__UNMAP, "unmap")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__CHSTACK, "chstack")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__CHPROPLIST, "chproplist")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__CHPROP, "chprop")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__LISTPROP, "listprop")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__GETATTR, "getattr")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__SETATTR, "setattr")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__SETFOCUS, "setfocus")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__MOVE, "move")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__CHSELECTION, "chselection")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__CHPARENT, "chparent")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__CTRLLIFE, "ctrllife")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__ENUMERATE, "enumerate")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__TRANSPARENT, "transparent")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__MOUSEMOTION, "mousemotion")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__CLIENTCOMEVENT, "clientcomevent")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__INPUTEVENT, "inputevent")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__DRAWEVENT, "drawevent")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__WINDOWCHANGEEVENT, "windowchangeevent")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__WINDOWCHANGEREQUEST, "windowchangerequest")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__SERVERCHANGEEVENT, "serverchangeevent")
+   S_(SECCLASS_WINDOW, WINDOW__EXTENSIONEVENT, "extensionevent")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FONT, FONT__LOAD, "load")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FONT, FONT__FREE, "free")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FONT, FONT__GETATTR, "getattr")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FONT, FONT__USE, "use")
+   S_(SECCLASS_COLORMAP, COLORMAP__CREATE, "create")
+   S_(SECCLASS_COLORMAP, COLORMAP__FREE, "free")
+   S_(SECCLASS_COLORMAP, COLORMAP__INSTALL, "install")
+   S_(SECCLASS_COLORMAP, COLORMAP__UNINSTALL, "uninstall")
+   S_(SECCLASS_COLORMAP, COLORMAP__LIST, "list")
+   S_(SECCLASS_COLORMAP, COLORMAP__READ, "read")
+   S_(SECCLASS_COLORMAP, COLORMAP__STORE, "store")
+   S_(SECCLASS_COLORMAP, COLORMAP__GETATTR, "getattr")
+   S_(SECCLASS_COLORMAP, COLORMAP__SETATTR, "setattr")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROPERTY, PROPERTY__CREATE, "create")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROPERTY, PROPERTY__FREE, "free")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROPERTY, PROPERTY__READ, "read")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROPERTY, PROPERTY__WRITE, "write")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CURSOR, CURSOR__CREATE, "create")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CURSOR, CURSOR__CREATEGLYPH, "createglyph")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CURSOR, CURSOR__FREE, "free")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CURSOR, CURSOR__ASSIGN, "assign")
+   S_(SECCLASS_CURSOR, CURSOR__SETATTR, "setattr")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XCLIENT, XCLIENT__KILL, "kill")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XINPUT, XINPUT__LOOKUP, "lookup")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XINPUT, XINPUT__GETATTR, "getattr")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XINPUT, XINPUT__SETATTR, "setattr")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XINPUT, XINPUT__SETFOCUS, "setfocus")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XINPUT, XINPUT__WARPPOINTER, "warppointer")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XINPUT, XINPUT__ACTIVEGRAB, "activegrab")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XINPUT, XINPUT__PASSIVEGRAB, "passivegrab")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XINPUT, XINPUT__UNGRAB, "ungrab")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XINPUT, XINPUT__BELL, "bell")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XINPUT, XINPUT__MOUSEMOTION, "mousemotion")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XINPUT, XINPUT__RELABELINPUT, "relabelinput")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XSERVER, XSERVER__SCREENSAVER, "screensaver")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XSERVER, XSERVER__GETHOSTLIST, "gethostlist")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XSERVER, XSERVER__SETHOSTLIST, "sethostlist")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XSERVER, XSERVER__GETFONTPATH, "getfontpath")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XSERVER, XSERVER__SETFONTPATH, "setfontpath")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XSERVER, XSERVER__GETATTR, "getattr")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XSERVER, XSERVER__GRAB, "grab")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XSERVER, XSERVER__UNGRAB, "ungrab")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XEXTENSION, XEXTENSION__QUERY, "query")
+   S_(SECCLASS_XEXTENSION, XEXTENSION__USE, "use")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__PAGEEXEC, "pageexec")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__EMUTRAMP, "emutramp")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__MPROTECT, "mprotect")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__RANDMMAP, "randmmap")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__RANDEXEC, "randexec")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PAX, PAX__SEGMEXEC, "segmexec")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET, NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET, NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
+   S_(SECCLASS_DBUS, DBUS__ACQUIRE_SVC, "acquire_svc")
+   S_(SECCLASS_DBUS, DBUS__SEND_MSG, "send_msg")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NSCD, NSCD__GETPWD, "getpwd")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NSCD, NSCD__GETGRP, "getgrp")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NSCD, NSCD__GETHOST, "gethost")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NSCD, NSCD__GETSTAT, "getstat")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NSCD, NSCD__ADMIN, "admin")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NSCD, NSCD__SHMEMPWD, "shmempwd")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NSCD, NSCD__SHMEMGRP, "shmemgrp")
+   S_(SECCLASS_NSCD, NSCD__SHMEMHOST, "shmemhost")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0a12ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -0,0 +1,902 @@
+/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
+#define COMMON_FILE__IOCTL                               0x00000001UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__READ                                0x00000002UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__WRITE                               0x00000004UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__CREATE                              0x00000008UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__GETATTR                             0x00000010UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__SETATTR                             0x00000020UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__LOCK                                0x00000040UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__RELABELFROM                         0x00000080UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__RELABELTO                           0x00000100UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__APPEND                              0x00000200UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__UNLINK                              0x00000400UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__LINK                                0x00000800UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__RENAME                              0x00001000UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__EXECUTE                             0x00002000UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__SWAPON                              0x00004000UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__QUOTAON                             0x00008000UL
+#define COMMON_FILE__MOUNTON                             0x00010000UL
+
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__IOCTL                             0x00000001UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__READ                              0x00000002UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__WRITE                             0x00000004UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__CREATE                            0x00000008UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__GETATTR                           0x00000010UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__SETATTR                           0x00000020UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__LOCK                              0x00000040UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                       0x00000080UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__RELABELTO                         0x00000100UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__APPEND                            0x00000200UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__BIND                              0x00000400UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__CONNECT                           0x00000800UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__LISTEN                            0x00001000UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__ACCEPT                            0x00002000UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__GETOPT                            0x00004000UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__SETOPT                            0x00008000UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                          0x00010000UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__RECVFROM                          0x00020000UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__SENDTO                            0x00040000UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                          0x00080000UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                          0x00100000UL
+#define COMMON_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                         0x00200000UL
+
+#define COMMON_IPC__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
+#define COMMON_IPC__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
+#define COMMON_IPC__GETATTR                              0x00000004UL
+#define COMMON_IPC__SETATTR                              0x00000008UL
+#define COMMON_IPC__READ                                 0x00000010UL
+#define COMMON_IPC__WRITE                                0x00000020UL
+#define COMMON_IPC__ASSOCIATE                            0x00000040UL
+#define COMMON_IPC__UNIX_READ                            0x00000080UL
+#define COMMON_IPC__UNIX_WRITE                           0x00000100UL
+
+#define FILESYSTEM__MOUNT                         0x00000001UL
+#define FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT                       0x00000002UL
+#define FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT                       0x00000004UL
+#define FILESYSTEM__GETATTR                       0x00000008UL
+#define FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM                   0x00000010UL
+#define FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO                     0x00000020UL
+#define FILESYSTEM__TRANSITION                    0x00000040UL
+#define FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE                     0x00000080UL
+#define FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD                      0x00000100UL
+#define FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET                      0x00000200UL
+
+#define DIR__IOCTL                                0x00000001UL
+#define DIR__READ                                 0x00000002UL
+#define DIR__WRITE                                0x00000004UL
+#define DIR__CREATE                               0x00000008UL
+#define DIR__GETATTR                              0x00000010UL
+#define DIR__SETATTR                              0x00000020UL
+#define DIR__LOCK                                 0x00000040UL
+#define DIR__RELABELFROM                          0x00000080UL
+#define DIR__RELABELTO                            0x00000100UL
+#define DIR__APPEND                               0x00000200UL
+#define DIR__UNLINK                               0x00000400UL
+#define DIR__LINK                                 0x00000800UL
+#define DIR__RENAME                               0x00001000UL
+#define DIR__EXECUTE                              0x00002000UL
+#define DIR__SWAPON                               0x00004000UL
+#define DIR__QUOTAON                              0x00008000UL
+#define DIR__MOUNTON                              0x00010000UL
+
+#define DIR__ADD_NAME                             0x00020000UL
+#define DIR__REMOVE_NAME                          0x00040000UL
+#define DIR__REPARENT                             0x00080000UL
+#define DIR__SEARCH                               0x00100000UL
+#define DIR__RMDIR                                0x00200000UL
+
+#define FILE__IOCTL                               0x00000001UL
+#define FILE__READ                                0x00000002UL
+#define FILE__WRITE                               0x00000004UL
+#define FILE__CREATE                              0x00000008UL
+#define FILE__GETATTR                             0x00000010UL
+#define FILE__SETATTR                             0x00000020UL
+#define FILE__LOCK                                0x00000040UL
+#define FILE__RELABELFROM                         0x00000080UL
+#define FILE__RELABELTO                           0x00000100UL
+#define FILE__APPEND                              0x00000200UL
+#define FILE__UNLINK                              0x00000400UL
+#define FILE__LINK                                0x00000800UL
+#define FILE__RENAME                              0x00001000UL
+#define FILE__EXECUTE                             0x00002000UL
+#define FILE__SWAPON                              0x00004000UL
+#define FILE__QUOTAON                             0x00008000UL
+#define FILE__MOUNTON                             0x00010000UL
+
+#define FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS                    0x00020000UL
+#define FILE__ENTRYPOINT                          0x00040000UL
+#define FILE__EXECMOD                             0x00080000UL
+
+#define LNK_FILE__IOCTL                           0x00000001UL
+#define LNK_FILE__READ                            0x00000002UL
+#define LNK_FILE__WRITE                           0x00000004UL
+#define LNK_FILE__CREATE                          0x00000008UL
+#define LNK_FILE__GETATTR                         0x00000010UL
+#define LNK_FILE__SETATTR                         0x00000020UL
+#define LNK_FILE__LOCK                            0x00000040UL
+#define LNK_FILE__RELABELFROM                     0x00000080UL
+#define LNK_FILE__RELABELTO                       0x00000100UL
+#define LNK_FILE__APPEND                          0x00000200UL
+#define LNK_FILE__UNLINK                          0x00000400UL
+#define LNK_FILE__LINK                            0x00000800UL
+#define LNK_FILE__RENAME                          0x00001000UL
+#define LNK_FILE__EXECUTE                         0x00002000UL
+#define LNK_FILE__SWAPON                          0x00004000UL
+#define LNK_FILE__QUOTAON                         0x00008000UL
+#define LNK_FILE__MOUNTON                         0x00010000UL
+
+#define CHR_FILE__IOCTL                           0x00000001UL
+#define CHR_FILE__READ                            0x00000002UL
+#define CHR_FILE__WRITE                           0x00000004UL
+#define CHR_FILE__CREATE                          0x00000008UL
+#define CHR_FILE__GETATTR                         0x00000010UL
+#define CHR_FILE__SETATTR                         0x00000020UL
+#define CHR_FILE__LOCK                            0x00000040UL
+#define CHR_FILE__RELABELFROM                     0x00000080UL
+#define CHR_FILE__RELABELTO                       0x00000100UL
+#define CHR_FILE__APPEND                          0x00000200UL
+#define CHR_FILE__UNLINK                          0x00000400UL
+#define CHR_FILE__LINK                            0x00000800UL
+#define CHR_FILE__RENAME                          0x00001000UL
+#define CHR_FILE__EXECUTE                         0x00002000UL
+#define CHR_FILE__SWAPON                          0x00004000UL
+#define CHR_FILE__QUOTAON                         0x00008000UL
+#define CHR_FILE__MOUNTON                         0x00010000UL
+
+#define CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS                0x00020000UL
+#define CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT                      0x00040000UL
+#define CHR_FILE__EXECMOD                         0x00080000UL
+
+#define BLK_FILE__IOCTL                           0x00000001UL
+#define BLK_FILE__READ                            0x00000002UL
+#define BLK_FILE__WRITE                           0x00000004UL
+#define BLK_FILE__CREATE                          0x00000008UL
+#define BLK_FILE__GETATTR                         0x00000010UL
+#define BLK_FILE__SETATTR                         0x00000020UL
+#define BLK_FILE__LOCK                            0x00000040UL
+#define BLK_FILE__RELABELFROM                     0x00000080UL
+#define BLK_FILE__RELABELTO                       0x00000100UL
+#define BLK_FILE__APPEND                          0x00000200UL
+#define BLK_FILE__UNLINK                          0x00000400UL
+#define BLK_FILE__LINK                            0x00000800UL
+#define BLK_FILE__RENAME                          0x00001000UL
+#define BLK_FILE__EXECUTE                         0x00002000UL
+#define BLK_FILE__SWAPON                          0x00004000UL
+#define BLK_FILE__QUOTAON                         0x00008000UL
+#define BLK_FILE__MOUNTON                         0x00010000UL
+
+#define SOCK_FILE__IOCTL                          0x00000001UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__READ                           0x00000002UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__WRITE                          0x00000004UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__CREATE                         0x00000008UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__GETATTR                        0x00000010UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__SETATTR                        0x00000020UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__LOCK                           0x00000040UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__RELABELFROM                    0x00000080UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__RELABELTO                      0x00000100UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__APPEND                         0x00000200UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__UNLINK                         0x00000400UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__LINK                           0x00000800UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__RENAME                         0x00001000UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__EXECUTE                        0x00002000UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__SWAPON                         0x00004000UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__QUOTAON                        0x00008000UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__MOUNTON                        0x00010000UL
+
+#define FIFO_FILE__IOCTL                          0x00000001UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__READ                           0x00000002UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__WRITE                          0x00000004UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__CREATE                         0x00000008UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__GETATTR                        0x00000010UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__SETATTR                        0x00000020UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__LOCK                           0x00000040UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__RELABELFROM                    0x00000080UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__RELABELTO                      0x00000100UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__APPEND                         0x00000200UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__UNLINK                         0x00000400UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__LINK                           0x00000800UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__RENAME                         0x00001000UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__EXECUTE                        0x00002000UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__SWAPON                         0x00004000UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__QUOTAON                        0x00008000UL
+#define FIFO_FILE__MOUNTON                        0x00010000UL
+
+#define FD__USE                                   0x00000001UL
+
+#define SOCKET__IOCTL                             0x00000001UL
+#define SOCKET__READ                              0x00000002UL
+#define SOCKET__WRITE                             0x00000004UL
+#define SOCKET__CREATE                            0x00000008UL
+#define SOCKET__GETATTR                           0x00000010UL
+#define SOCKET__SETATTR                           0x00000020UL
+#define SOCKET__LOCK                              0x00000040UL
+#define SOCKET__RELABELFROM                       0x00000080UL
+#define SOCKET__RELABELTO                         0x00000100UL
+#define SOCKET__APPEND                            0x00000200UL
+#define SOCKET__BIND                              0x00000400UL
+#define SOCKET__CONNECT                           0x00000800UL
+#define SOCKET__LISTEN                            0x00001000UL
+#define SOCKET__ACCEPT                            0x00002000UL
+#define SOCKET__GETOPT                            0x00004000UL
+#define SOCKET__SETOPT                            0x00008000UL
+#define SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                          0x00010000UL
+#define SOCKET__RECVFROM                          0x00020000UL
+#define SOCKET__SENDTO                            0x00040000UL
+#define SOCKET__RECV_MSG                          0x00080000UL
+#define SOCKET__SEND_MSG                          0x00100000UL
+#define SOCKET__NAME_BIND                         0x00200000UL
+
+#define TCP_SOCKET__IOCTL                         0x00000001UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__READ                          0x00000002UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__WRITE                         0x00000004UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__CREATE                        0x00000008UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__GETATTR                       0x00000010UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__SETATTR                       0x00000020UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__LOCK                          0x00000040UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                   0x00000080UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__RELABELTO                     0x00000100UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__APPEND                        0x00000200UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__BIND                          0x00000400UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__CONNECT                       0x00000800UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__LISTEN                        0x00001000UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__ACCEPT                        0x00002000UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__GETOPT                        0x00004000UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__SETOPT                        0x00008000UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                      0x00010000UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM                      0x00020000UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__SENDTO                        0x00040000UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                      0x00080000UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                      0x00100000UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                     0x00200000UL
+
+#define TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO                     0x00400000UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__NEWCONN                       0x00800000UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM                    0x01000000UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND                     0x02000000UL
+#define TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT                  0x04000000UL
+
+#define UDP_SOCKET__IOCTL                         0x00000001UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__READ                          0x00000002UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__WRITE                         0x00000004UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__CREATE                        0x00000008UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__GETATTR                       0x00000010UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__SETATTR                       0x00000020UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__LOCK                          0x00000040UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                   0x00000080UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__RELABELTO                     0x00000100UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__APPEND                        0x00000200UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__BIND                          0x00000400UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__CONNECT                       0x00000800UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__LISTEN                        0x00001000UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__ACCEPT                        0x00002000UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__GETOPT                        0x00004000UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__SETOPT                        0x00008000UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                      0x00010000UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM                      0x00020000UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__SENDTO                        0x00040000UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                      0x00080000UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                      0x00100000UL
+#define UDP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                     0x00200000UL
+
+#define UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND                     0x00400000UL
+
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__IOCTL                       0x00000001UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__READ                        0x00000002UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__WRITE                       0x00000004UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__CREATE                      0x00000008UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__GETATTR                     0x00000010UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__SETATTR                     0x00000020UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__LOCK                        0x00000040UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                 0x00000080UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__RELABELTO                   0x00000100UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__APPEND                      0x00000200UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__BIND                        0x00000400UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__CONNECT                     0x00000800UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__LISTEN                      0x00001000UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__ACCEPT                      0x00002000UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__GETOPT                      0x00004000UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__SETOPT                      0x00008000UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                    0x00010000UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM                    0x00020000UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__SENDTO                      0x00040000UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                    0x00080000UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                    0x00100000UL
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                   0x00200000UL
+
+#define RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND                   0x00400000UL
+
+#define NODE__TCP_RECV                            0x00000001UL
+#define NODE__TCP_SEND                            0x00000002UL
+#define NODE__UDP_RECV                            0x00000004UL
+#define NODE__UDP_SEND                            0x00000008UL
+#define NODE__RAWIP_RECV                          0x00000010UL
+#define NODE__RAWIP_SEND                          0x00000020UL
+#define NODE__ENFORCE_DEST                        0x00000040UL
+
+#define NETIF__TCP_RECV                           0x00000001UL
+#define NETIF__TCP_SEND                           0x00000002UL
+#define NETIF__UDP_RECV                           0x00000004UL
+#define NETIF__UDP_SEND                           0x00000008UL
+#define NETIF__RAWIP_RECV                         0x00000010UL
+#define NETIF__RAWIP_SEND                         0x00000020UL
+
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__IOCTL                     0x00000001UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__READ                      0x00000002UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__WRITE                     0x00000004UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__CREATE                    0x00000008UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__GETATTR                   0x00000010UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__SETATTR                   0x00000020UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__LOCK                      0x00000040UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__RELABELFROM               0x00000080UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__RELABELTO                 0x00000100UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__APPEND                    0x00000200UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__BIND                      0x00000400UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__CONNECT                   0x00000800UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__LISTEN                    0x00001000UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__ACCEPT                    0x00002000UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__GETOPT                    0x00004000UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__SETOPT                    0x00008000UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                  0x00010000UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__RECVFROM                  0x00020000UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__SENDTO                    0x00040000UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                  0x00080000UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                  0x00100000UL
+#define NETLINK_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                 0x00200000UL
+
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__IOCTL                      0x00000001UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__READ                       0x00000002UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__WRITE                      0x00000004UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__CREATE                     0x00000008UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__GETATTR                    0x00000010UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__SETATTR                    0x00000020UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__LOCK                       0x00000040UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                0x00000080UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__RELABELTO                  0x00000100UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__APPEND                     0x00000200UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__BIND                       0x00000400UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__CONNECT                    0x00000800UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__LISTEN                     0x00001000UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__ACCEPT                     0x00002000UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__GETOPT                     0x00004000UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__SETOPT                     0x00008000UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                   0x00010000UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__RECVFROM                   0x00020000UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__SENDTO                     0x00040000UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                   0x00080000UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                   0x00100000UL
+#define PACKET_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                  0x00200000UL
+
+#define KEY_SOCKET__IOCTL                         0x00000001UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__READ                          0x00000002UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__WRITE                         0x00000004UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__CREATE                        0x00000008UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__GETATTR                       0x00000010UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__SETATTR                       0x00000020UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__LOCK                          0x00000040UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                   0x00000080UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__RELABELTO                     0x00000100UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__APPEND                        0x00000200UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__BIND                          0x00000400UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__CONNECT                       0x00000800UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__LISTEN                        0x00001000UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__ACCEPT                        0x00002000UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__GETOPT                        0x00004000UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__SETOPT                        0x00008000UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                      0x00010000UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__RECVFROM                      0x00020000UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__SENDTO                        0x00040000UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                      0x00080000UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                      0x00100000UL
+#define KEY_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                     0x00200000UL
+
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__IOCTL                 0x00000001UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__READ                  0x00000002UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__WRITE                 0x00000004UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CREATE                0x00000008UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__GETATTR               0x00000010UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SETATTR               0x00000020UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__LOCK                  0x00000040UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RELABELFROM           0x00000080UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RELABELTO             0x00000100UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__APPEND                0x00000200UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__BIND                  0x00000400UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECT               0x00000800UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__LISTEN                0x00001000UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__ACCEPT                0x00002000UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__GETOPT                0x00004000UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SETOPT                0x00008000UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN              0x00010000UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RECVFROM              0x00020000UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SENDTO                0x00040000UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG              0x00080000UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG              0x00100000UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND             0x00200000UL
+
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO             0x00400000UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__NEWCONN               0x00800000UL
+#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM            0x01000000UL
+
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__IOCTL                  0x00000001UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__READ                   0x00000002UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__WRITE                  0x00000004UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__CREATE                 0x00000008UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__GETATTR                0x00000010UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SETATTR                0x00000020UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__LOCK                   0x00000040UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RELABELFROM            0x00000080UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RELABELTO              0x00000100UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__APPEND                 0x00000200UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__BIND                   0x00000400UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__CONNECT                0x00000800UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__LISTEN                 0x00001000UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__ACCEPT                 0x00002000UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__GETOPT                 0x00004000UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SETOPT                 0x00008000UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN               0x00010000UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECVFROM               0x00020000UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SENDTO                 0x00040000UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG               0x00080000UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG               0x00100000UL
+#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND              0x00200000UL
+
+#define PROCESS__FORK                             0x00000001UL
+#define PROCESS__TRANSITION                       0x00000002UL
+#define PROCESS__SIGCHLD                          0x00000004UL
+#define PROCESS__SIGKILL                          0x00000008UL
+#define PROCESS__SIGSTOP                          0x00000010UL
+#define PROCESS__SIGNULL                          0x00000020UL
+#define PROCESS__SIGNAL                           0x00000040UL
+#define PROCESS__PTRACE                           0x00000080UL
+#define PROCESS__GETSCHED                         0x00000100UL
+#define PROCESS__SETSCHED                         0x00000200UL
+#define PROCESS__GETSESSION                       0x00000400UL
+#define PROCESS__GETPGID                          0x00000800UL
+#define PROCESS__SETPGID                          0x00001000UL
+#define PROCESS__GETCAP                           0x00002000UL
+#define PROCESS__SETCAP                           0x00004000UL
+#define PROCESS__SHARE                            0x00008000UL
+#define PROCESS__GETATTR                          0x00010000UL
+#define PROCESS__SETEXEC                          0x00020000UL
+#define PROCESS__SETFSCREATE                      0x00040000UL
+#define PROCESS__NOATSECURE                       0x00080000UL
+#define PROCESS__SIGINH                           0x00100000UL
+#define PROCESS__SETRLIMIT                        0x00200000UL
+#define PROCESS__RLIMITINH                        0x00400000UL
+#define PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION                    0x00800000UL
+#define PROCESS__SETCURRENT                       0x01000000UL
+#define PROCESS__EXECMEM                          0x02000000UL
+
+#define IPC__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
+#define IPC__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
+#define IPC__GETATTR                              0x00000004UL
+#define IPC__SETATTR                              0x00000008UL
+#define IPC__READ                                 0x00000010UL
+#define IPC__WRITE                                0x00000020UL
+#define IPC__ASSOCIATE                            0x00000040UL
+#define IPC__UNIX_READ                            0x00000080UL
+#define IPC__UNIX_WRITE                           0x00000100UL
+
+#define SEM__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
+#define SEM__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
+#define SEM__GETATTR                              0x00000004UL
+#define SEM__SETATTR                              0x00000008UL
+#define SEM__READ                                 0x00000010UL
+#define SEM__WRITE                                0x00000020UL
+#define SEM__ASSOCIATE                            0x00000040UL
+#define SEM__UNIX_READ                            0x00000080UL
+#define SEM__UNIX_WRITE                           0x00000100UL
+
+#define MSGQ__CREATE                              0x00000001UL
+#define MSGQ__DESTROY                             0x00000002UL
+#define MSGQ__GETATTR                             0x00000004UL
+#define MSGQ__SETATTR                             0x00000008UL
+#define MSGQ__READ                                0x00000010UL
+#define MSGQ__WRITE                               0x00000020UL
+#define MSGQ__ASSOCIATE                           0x00000040UL
+#define MSGQ__UNIX_READ                           0x00000080UL
+#define MSGQ__UNIX_WRITE                          0x00000100UL
+
+#define MSGQ__ENQUEUE                             0x00000200UL
+
+#define MSG__SEND                                 0x00000001UL
+#define MSG__RECEIVE                              0x00000002UL
+
+#define SHM__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
+#define SHM__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
+#define SHM__GETATTR                              0x00000004UL
+#define SHM__SETATTR                              0x00000008UL
+#define SHM__READ                                 0x00000010UL
+#define SHM__WRITE                                0x00000020UL
+#define SHM__ASSOCIATE                            0x00000040UL
+#define SHM__UNIX_READ                            0x00000080UL
+#define SHM__UNIX_WRITE                           0x00000100UL
+
+#define SHM__LOCK                                 0x00000200UL
+
+#define SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV                      0x00000001UL
+#define SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE                  0x00000002UL
+#define SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER                  0x00000004UL
+#define SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT                   0x00000008UL
+#define SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY                     0x00000010UL
+#define SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL                 0x00000020UL
+#define SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER                    0x00000040UL
+#define SECURITY__SETENFORCE                      0x00000080UL
+#define SECURITY__SETBOOL                         0x00000100UL
+#define SECURITY__SETSECPARAM                     0x00000200UL
+#define SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT                 0x00000400UL
+
+#define SYSTEM__IPC_INFO                          0x00000001UL
+#define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ                       0x00000002UL
+#define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD                        0x00000004UL
+#define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE                    0x00000008UL
+
+#define CAPABILITY__CHOWN                         0x00000001UL
+#define CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE                  0x00000002UL
+#define CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH               0x00000004UL
+#define CAPABILITY__FOWNER                        0x00000008UL
+#define CAPABILITY__FSETID                        0x00000010UL
+#define CAPABILITY__KILL                          0x00000020UL
+#define CAPABILITY__SETGID                        0x00000040UL
+#define CAPABILITY__SETUID                        0x00000080UL
+#define CAPABILITY__SETPCAP                       0x00000100UL
+#define CAPABILITY__LINUX_IMMUTABLE               0x00000200UL
+#define CAPABILITY__NET_BIND_SERVICE              0x00000400UL
+#define CAPABILITY__NET_BROADCAST                 0x00000800UL
+#define CAPABILITY__NET_ADMIN                     0x00001000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__NET_RAW                       0x00002000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__IPC_LOCK                      0x00004000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__IPC_OWNER                     0x00008000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__SYS_MODULE                    0x00010000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__SYS_RAWIO                     0x00020000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__SYS_CHROOT                    0x00040000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__SYS_PTRACE                    0x00080000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__SYS_PACCT                     0x00100000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__SYS_ADMIN                     0x00200000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__SYS_BOOT                      0x00400000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__SYS_NICE                      0x00800000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__SYS_RESOURCE                  0x01000000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__SYS_TIME                      0x02000000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__SYS_TTY_CONFIG                0x04000000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__MKNOD                         0x08000000UL
+#define CAPABILITY__LEASE                         0x10000000UL
+
+#define PASSWD__PASSWD                            0x00000001UL
+#define PASSWD__CHFN                              0x00000002UL
+#define PASSWD__CHSH                              0x00000004UL
+#define PASSWD__ROOTOK                            0x00000008UL
+#define PASSWD__CRONTAB                           0x00000010UL
+
+#define DRAWABLE__CREATE                          0x00000001UL
+#define DRAWABLE__DESTROY                         0x00000002UL
+#define DRAWABLE__DRAW                            0x00000004UL
+#define DRAWABLE__COPY                            0x00000008UL
+#define DRAWABLE__GETATTR                         0x00000010UL
+
+#define GC__CREATE                                0x00000001UL
+#define GC__FREE                                  0x00000002UL
+#define GC__GETATTR                               0x00000004UL
+#define GC__SETATTR                               0x00000008UL
+
+#define WINDOW__ADDCHILD                          0x00000001UL
+#define WINDOW__CREATE                            0x00000002UL
+#define WINDOW__DESTROY                           0x00000004UL
+#define WINDOW__MAP                               0x00000008UL
+#define WINDOW__UNMAP                             0x00000010UL
+#define WINDOW__CHSTACK                           0x00000020UL
+#define WINDOW__CHPROPLIST                        0x00000040UL
+#define WINDOW__CHPROP                            0x00000080UL
+#define WINDOW__LISTPROP                          0x00000100UL
+#define WINDOW__GETATTR                           0x00000200UL
+#define WINDOW__SETATTR                           0x00000400UL
+#define WINDOW__SETFOCUS                          0x00000800UL
+#define WINDOW__MOVE                              0x00001000UL
+#define WINDOW__CHSELECTION                       0x00002000UL
+#define WINDOW__CHPARENT                          0x00004000UL
+#define WINDOW__CTRLLIFE                          0x00008000UL
+#define WINDOW__ENUMERATE                         0x00010000UL
+#define WINDOW__TRANSPARENT                       0x00020000UL
+#define WINDOW__MOUSEMOTION                       0x00040000UL
+#define WINDOW__CLIENTCOMEVENT                    0x00080000UL
+#define WINDOW__INPUTEVENT                        0x00100000UL
+#define WINDOW__DRAWEVENT                         0x00200000UL
+#define WINDOW__WINDOWCHANGEEVENT                 0x00400000UL
+#define WINDOW__WINDOWCHANGEREQUEST               0x00800000UL
+#define WINDOW__SERVERCHANGEEVENT                 0x01000000UL
+#define WINDOW__EXTENSIONEVENT                    0x02000000UL
+
+#define FONT__LOAD                                0x00000001UL
+#define FONT__FREE                                0x00000002UL
+#define FONT__GETATTR                             0x00000004UL
+#define FONT__USE                                 0x00000008UL
+
+#define COLORMAP__CREATE                          0x00000001UL
+#define COLORMAP__FREE                            0x00000002UL
+#define COLORMAP__INSTALL                         0x00000004UL
+#define COLORMAP__UNINSTALL                       0x00000008UL
+#define COLORMAP__LIST                            0x00000010UL
+#define COLORMAP__READ                            0x00000020UL
+#define COLORMAP__STORE                           0x00000040UL
+#define COLORMAP__GETATTR                         0x00000080UL
+#define COLORMAP__SETATTR                         0x00000100UL
+
+#define PROPERTY__CREATE                          0x00000001UL
+#define PROPERTY__FREE                            0x00000002UL
+#define PROPERTY__READ                            0x00000004UL
+#define PROPERTY__WRITE                           0x00000008UL
+
+#define CURSOR__CREATE                            0x00000001UL
+#define CURSOR__CREATEGLYPH                       0x00000002UL
+#define CURSOR__FREE                              0x00000004UL
+#define CURSOR__ASSIGN                            0x00000008UL
+#define CURSOR__SETATTR                           0x00000010UL
+
+#define XCLIENT__KILL                             0x00000001UL
+
+#define XINPUT__LOOKUP                            0x00000001UL
+#define XINPUT__GETATTR                           0x00000002UL
+#define XINPUT__SETATTR                           0x00000004UL
+#define XINPUT__SETFOCUS                          0x00000008UL
+#define XINPUT__WARPPOINTER                       0x00000010UL
+#define XINPUT__ACTIVEGRAB                        0x00000020UL
+#define XINPUT__PASSIVEGRAB                       0x00000040UL
+#define XINPUT__UNGRAB                            0x00000080UL
+#define XINPUT__BELL                              0x00000100UL
+#define XINPUT__MOUSEMOTION                       0x00000200UL
+#define XINPUT__RELABELINPUT                      0x00000400UL
+
+#define XSERVER__SCREENSAVER                      0x00000001UL
+#define XSERVER__GETHOSTLIST                      0x00000002UL
+#define XSERVER__SETHOSTLIST                      0x00000004UL
+#define XSERVER__GETFONTPATH                      0x00000008UL
+#define XSERVER__SETFONTPATH                      0x00000010UL
+#define XSERVER__GETATTR                          0x00000020UL
+#define XSERVER__GRAB                             0x00000040UL
+#define XSERVER__UNGRAB                           0x00000080UL
+
+#define XEXTENSION__QUERY                         0x00000001UL
+#define XEXTENSION__USE                           0x00000002UL
+
+#define PAX__PAGEEXEC                             0x00000001UL
+#define PAX__EMUTRAMP                             0x00000002UL
+#define PAX__MPROTECT                             0x00000004UL
+#define PAX__RANDMMAP                             0x00000008UL
+#define PAX__RANDEXEC                             0x00000010UL
+#define PAX__SEGMEXEC                             0x00000020UL
+
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__IOCTL               0x00000001UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__READ                0x00000002UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__WRITE               0x00000004UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__CREATE              0x00000008UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__GETATTR             0x00000010UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SETATTR             0x00000020UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__LOCK                0x00000040UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RELABELFROM         0x00000080UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RELABELTO           0x00000100UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__APPEND              0x00000200UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__BIND                0x00000400UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__CONNECT             0x00000800UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__LISTEN              0x00001000UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__ACCEPT              0x00002000UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__GETOPT              0x00004000UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SETOPT              0x00008000UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN            0x00010000UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RECVFROM            0x00020000UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SENDTO              0x00040000UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RECV_MSG            0x00080000UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SEND_MSG            0x00100000UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NAME_BIND           0x00200000UL
+
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ          0x00400000UL
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE         0x00800000UL
+
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__IOCTL            0x00000001UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__READ             0x00000002UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__WRITE            0x00000004UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__CREATE           0x00000008UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__GETATTR          0x00000010UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SETATTR          0x00000020UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__LOCK             0x00000040UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RELABELFROM      0x00000080UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RELABELTO        0x00000100UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__APPEND           0x00000200UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__BIND             0x00000400UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__CONNECT          0x00000800UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__LISTEN           0x00001000UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__ACCEPT           0x00002000UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__GETOPT           0x00004000UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SETOPT           0x00008000UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN         0x00010000UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RECVFROM         0x00020000UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SENDTO           0x00040000UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RECV_MSG         0x00080000UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SEND_MSG         0x00100000UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NAME_BIND        0x00200000UL
+
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ       0x00400000UL
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE      0x00800000UL
+
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__IOCTL             0x00000001UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__READ              0x00000002UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__WRITE             0x00000004UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__CREATE            0x00000008UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__GETATTR           0x00000010UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SETATTR           0x00000020UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__LOCK              0x00000040UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RELABELFROM       0x00000080UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RELABELTO         0x00000100UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__APPEND            0x00000200UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__BIND              0x00000400UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__CONNECT           0x00000800UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__LISTEN            0x00001000UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__ACCEPT            0x00002000UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__GETOPT            0x00004000UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SETOPT            0x00008000UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN          0x00010000UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RECVFROM          0x00020000UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SENDTO            0x00040000UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RECV_MSG          0x00080000UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SEND_MSG          0x00100000UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NAME_BIND         0x00200000UL
+
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ        0x00400000UL
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE       0x00800000UL
+
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__IOCTL               0x00000001UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__READ                0x00000002UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__WRITE               0x00000004UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__CREATE              0x00000008UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__GETATTR             0x00000010UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SETATTR             0x00000020UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__LOCK                0x00000040UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RELABELFROM         0x00000080UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RELABELTO           0x00000100UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__APPEND              0x00000200UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__BIND                0x00000400UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__CONNECT             0x00000800UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__LISTEN              0x00001000UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__ACCEPT              0x00002000UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__GETOPT              0x00004000UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SETOPT              0x00008000UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN            0x00010000UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RECVFROM            0x00020000UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SENDTO              0x00040000UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RECV_MSG            0x00080000UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SEND_MSG            0x00100000UL
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__NAME_BIND           0x00200000UL
+
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__IOCTL                0x00000001UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__READ                 0x00000002UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__WRITE                0x00000004UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__CREATE               0x00000008UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__GETATTR              0x00000010UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SETATTR              0x00000020UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__LOCK                 0x00000040UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RELABELFROM          0x00000080UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RELABELTO            0x00000100UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__APPEND               0x00000200UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__BIND                 0x00000400UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__CONNECT              0x00000800UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__LISTEN               0x00001000UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__ACCEPT               0x00002000UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__GETOPT               0x00004000UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SETOPT               0x00008000UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN             0x00010000UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RECVFROM             0x00020000UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SENDTO               0x00040000UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG             0x00080000UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG             0x00100000UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND            0x00200000UL
+
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ           0x00400000UL
+#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE          0x00800000UL
+
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__IOCTL             0x00000001UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__READ              0x00000002UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__WRITE             0x00000004UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__CREATE            0x00000008UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__GETATTR           0x00000010UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SETATTR           0x00000020UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__LOCK              0x00000040UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RELABELFROM       0x00000080UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RELABELTO         0x00000100UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__APPEND            0x00000200UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__BIND              0x00000400UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__CONNECT           0x00000800UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__LISTEN            0x00001000UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__ACCEPT            0x00002000UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__GETOPT            0x00004000UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SETOPT            0x00008000UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN          0x00010000UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RECVFROM          0x00020000UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SENDTO            0x00040000UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RECV_MSG          0x00080000UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SEND_MSG          0x00100000UL
+#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__NAME_BIND         0x00200000UL
+
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__IOCTL               0x00000001UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__READ                0x00000002UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__WRITE               0x00000004UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__CREATE              0x00000008UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__GETATTR             0x00000010UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SETATTR             0x00000020UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__LOCK                0x00000040UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RELABELFROM         0x00000080UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RELABELTO           0x00000100UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__APPEND              0x00000200UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__BIND                0x00000400UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__CONNECT             0x00000800UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__LISTEN              0x00001000UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__ACCEPT              0x00002000UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__GETOPT              0x00004000UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SETOPT              0x00008000UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN            0x00010000UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RECVFROM            0x00020000UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SENDTO              0x00040000UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RECV_MSG            0x00080000UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SEND_MSG            0x00100000UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NAME_BIND           0x00200000UL
+
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ          0x00400000UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE         0x00800000UL
+
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__IOCTL               0x00000001UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__READ                0x00000002UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__WRITE               0x00000004UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__CREATE              0x00000008UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__GETATTR             0x00000010UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SETATTR             0x00000020UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__LOCK                0x00000040UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RELABELFROM         0x00000080UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RELABELTO           0x00000100UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__APPEND              0x00000200UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__BIND                0x00000400UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__CONNECT             0x00000800UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__LISTEN              0x00001000UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__ACCEPT              0x00002000UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__GETOPT              0x00004000UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SETOPT              0x00008000UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN            0x00010000UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RECVFROM            0x00020000UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SENDTO              0x00040000UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RECV_MSG            0x00080000UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SEND_MSG            0x00100000UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NAME_BIND           0x00200000UL
+
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ          0x00400000UL
+#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE         0x00800000UL
+
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__IOCTL                0x00000001UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__READ                 0x00000002UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__WRITE                0x00000004UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__CREATE               0x00000008UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__GETATTR              0x00000010UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SETATTR              0x00000020UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__LOCK                 0x00000040UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RELABELFROM          0x00000080UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RELABELTO            0x00000100UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__APPEND               0x00000200UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__BIND                 0x00000400UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__CONNECT              0x00000800UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__LISTEN               0x00001000UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__ACCEPT               0x00002000UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__GETOPT               0x00004000UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SETOPT               0x00008000UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN             0x00010000UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RECVFROM             0x00020000UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SENDTO               0x00040000UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RECV_MSG             0x00080000UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SEND_MSG             0x00100000UL
+#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__NAME_BIND            0x00200000UL
+
+#define DBUS__ACQUIRE_SVC                         0x00000001UL
+#define DBUS__SEND_MSG                            0x00000002UL
+
+#define NSCD__GETPWD                              0x00000001UL
+#define NSCD__GETGRP                              0x00000002UL
+#define NSCD__GETHOST                             0x00000004UL
+#define NSCD__GETSTAT                             0x00000008UL
+#define NSCD__ADMIN                               0x00000010UL
+#define NSCD__SHMEMPWD                            0x00000020UL
+#define NSCD__SHMEMGRP                            0x00000040UL
+#define NSCD__SHMEMHOST                           0x00000080UL
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..960ef18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+/*
+ * Access vector cache interface for object managers.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_H_
+#define _SELINUX_AVC_H_
+
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <asm/system.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "av_permissions.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+extern int selinux_enforcing;
+#else
+#define selinux_enforcing 1
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * An entry in the AVC.
+ */
+struct avc_entry;
+
+struct task_struct;
+struct vfsmount;
+struct dentry;
+struct inode;
+struct sock;
+struct sk_buff;
+
+/* Auxiliary data to use in generating the audit record. */
+struct avc_audit_data {
+	char    type;
+#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS   1
+#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET  2
+#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_CAP  3
+#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_IPC  4
+	struct task_struct *tsk;
+	union 	{
+		struct {
+			struct vfsmount *mnt;
+			struct dentry *dentry;
+			struct inode *inode;
+		} fs;
+		struct {
+			char *netif;
+			struct sock *sk;
+			u16 family;
+			u16 dport;
+			u16 sport;
+			union {
+				struct {
+					u32 daddr;
+					u32 saddr;
+				} v4;
+				struct {
+					struct in6_addr daddr;
+					struct in6_addr saddr;
+				} v6;
+			} fam;
+		} net;
+		int cap;
+		int ipc_id;
+	} u;
+};
+
+#define v4info fam.v4
+#define v6info fam.v6
+
+/* Initialize an AVC audit data structure. */
+#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d,_t) \
+        { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; }
+
+/*
+ * AVC statistics
+ */
+struct avc_cache_stats
+{
+	unsigned int lookups;
+	unsigned int hits;
+	unsigned int misses;
+	unsigned int allocations;
+	unsigned int reclaims;
+	unsigned int frees;
+};
+
+/*
+ * AVC operations
+ */
+
+void __init avc_init(void);
+
+void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+               u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+               struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+
+int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+                         u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+                         struct av_decision *avd);
+
+int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+                 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+                 struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT		1
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE		2
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE		4
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_RESET		8
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE	16
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE	32
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE	64
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE	128
+
+int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+                                     u16 tclass, u32 perms,
+				     u32 *out_retained),
+		     u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+		     u16 tclass, u32 perms);
+
+/* Exported to selinuxfs */
+int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page);
+extern unsigned int avc_cache_threshold;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..450a283
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/*
+ * Access vector cache interface for the security server.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_
+#define _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_
+
+#include "flask.h"
+
+int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno);
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..519a77d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
+/*
+ * Security object class definitions
+ */
+    S_("null")
+    S_("security")
+    S_("process")
+    S_("system")
+    S_("capability")
+    S_("filesystem")
+    S_("file")
+    S_("dir")
+    S_("fd")
+    S_("lnk_file")
+    S_("chr_file")
+    S_("blk_file")
+    S_("sock_file")
+    S_("fifo_file")
+    S_("socket")
+    S_("tcp_socket")
+    S_("udp_socket")
+    S_("rawip_socket")
+    S_("node")
+    S_("netif")
+    S_("netlink_socket")
+    S_("packet_socket")
+    S_("key_socket")
+    S_("unix_stream_socket")
+    S_("unix_dgram_socket")
+    S_("sem")
+    S_("msg")
+    S_("msgq")
+    S_("shm")
+    S_("ipc")
+    S_("passwd")
+    S_("drawable")
+    S_("window")
+    S_("gc")
+    S_("font")
+    S_("colormap")
+    S_("property")
+    S_("cursor")
+    S_("xclient")
+    S_("xinput")
+    S_("xserver")
+    S_("xextension")
+    S_("pax")
+    S_("netlink_route_socket")
+    S_("netlink_firewall_socket")
+    S_("netlink_tcpdiag_socket")
+    S_("netlink_nflog_socket")
+    S_("netlink_xfrm_socket")
+    S_("netlink_selinux_socket")
+    S_("netlink_audit_socket")
+    S_("netlink_ip6fw_socket")
+    S_("netlink_dnrt_socket")
+    S_("dbus")
+    S_("nscd")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/common_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/common_perm_to_string.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce5b6e2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/common_perm_to_string.h
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
+TB_(common_file_perm_to_string)
+    S_("ioctl")
+    S_("read")
+    S_("write")
+    S_("create")
+    S_("getattr")
+    S_("setattr")
+    S_("lock")
+    S_("relabelfrom")
+    S_("relabelto")
+    S_("append")
+    S_("unlink")
+    S_("link")
+    S_("rename")
+    S_("execute")
+    S_("swapon")
+    S_("quotaon")
+    S_("mounton")
+TE_(common_file_perm_to_string)
+
+TB_(common_socket_perm_to_string)
+    S_("ioctl")
+    S_("read")
+    S_("write")
+    S_("create")
+    S_("getattr")
+    S_("setattr")
+    S_("lock")
+    S_("relabelfrom")
+    S_("relabelto")
+    S_("append")
+    S_("bind")
+    S_("connect")
+    S_("listen")
+    S_("accept")
+    S_("getopt")
+    S_("setopt")
+    S_("shutdown")
+    S_("recvfrom")
+    S_("sendto")
+    S_("recv_msg")
+    S_("send_msg")
+    S_("name_bind")
+TE_(common_socket_perm_to_string)
+
+TB_(common_ipc_perm_to_string)
+    S_("create")
+    S_("destroy")
+    S_("getattr")
+    S_("setattr")
+    S_("read")
+    S_("write")
+    S_("associate")
+    S_("unix_read")
+    S_("unix_write")
+TE_(common_ipc_perm_to_string)
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..67ce7a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/*
+ * Interface to booleans in the security server. This is exported
+ * for the selinuxfs.
+ *
+ * Author: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_
+#define _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_
+
+int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values);
+
+int security_set_bools(int len, int *values);
+
+int security_get_bool_value(int bool);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4eef1b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_FLASK_H_
+#define _SELINUX_FLASK_H_
+
+/*
+ * Security object class definitions
+ */
+#define SECCLASS_SECURITY                                1
+#define SECCLASS_PROCESS                                 2
+#define SECCLASS_SYSTEM                                  3
+#define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY                              4
+#define SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM                              5
+#define SECCLASS_FILE                                    6
+#define SECCLASS_DIR                                     7
+#define SECCLASS_FD                                      8
+#define SECCLASS_LNK_FILE                                9
+#define SECCLASS_CHR_FILE                                10
+#define SECCLASS_BLK_FILE                                11
+#define SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE                               12
+#define SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE                               13
+#define SECCLASS_SOCKET                                  14
+#define SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET                              15
+#define SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET                              16
+#define SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET                            17
+#define SECCLASS_NODE                                    18
+#define SECCLASS_NETIF                                   19
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET                          20
+#define SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET                           21
+#define SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET                              22
+#define SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET                      23
+#define SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET                       24
+#define SECCLASS_SEM                                     25
+#define SECCLASS_MSG                                     26
+#define SECCLASS_MSGQ                                    27
+#define SECCLASS_SHM                                     28
+#define SECCLASS_IPC                                     29
+#define SECCLASS_PASSWD                                  30
+#define SECCLASS_DRAWABLE                                31
+#define SECCLASS_WINDOW                                  32
+#define SECCLASS_GC                                      33
+#define SECCLASS_FONT                                    34
+#define SECCLASS_COLORMAP                                35
+#define SECCLASS_PROPERTY                                36
+#define SECCLASS_CURSOR                                  37
+#define SECCLASS_XCLIENT                                 38
+#define SECCLASS_XINPUT                                  39
+#define SECCLASS_XSERVER                                 40
+#define SECCLASS_XEXTENSION                              41
+#define SECCLASS_PAX                                     42
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET                    43
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET                 44
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET                  45
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET                    46
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET                     47
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET                  48
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET                    49
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET                    50
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET                     51
+#define SECCLASS_DBUS                                    52
+#define SECCLASS_NSCD                                    53
+
+/*
+ * Security identifier indices for initial entities
+ */
+#define SECINITSID_KERNEL                               1
+#define SECINITSID_SECURITY                             2
+#define SECINITSID_UNLABELED                            3
+#define SECINITSID_FS                                   4
+#define SECINITSID_FILE                                 5
+#define SECINITSID_FILE_LABELS                          6
+#define SECINITSID_INIT                                 7
+#define SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET                           8
+#define SECINITSID_PORT                                 9
+#define SECINITSID_NETIF                                10
+#define SECINITSID_NETMSG                               11
+#define SECINITSID_NODE                                 12
+#define SECINITSID_IGMP_PACKET                          13
+#define SECINITSID_ICMP_SOCKET                          14
+#define SECINITSID_TCP_SOCKET                           15
+#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_MODPROBE                      16
+#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL                               17
+#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_FS                            18
+#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_KERNEL                        19
+#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_NET                           20
+#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_NET_UNIX                      21
+#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_VM                            22
+#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_DEV                           23
+#define SECINITSID_KMOD                                 24
+#define SECINITSID_POLICY                               25
+#define SECINITSID_SCMP_PACKET                          26
+#define SECINITSID_DEVNULL                              27
+
+#define SECINITSID_NUM                                  27
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4fac82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
+static char *initial_sid_to_string[] =
+{
+    "null",
+    "kernel",
+    "security",
+    "unlabeled",
+    "fs",
+    "file",
+    "file_labels",
+    "init",
+    "any_socket",
+    "port",
+    "netif",
+    "netmsg",
+    "node",
+    "igmp_packet",
+    "icmp_socket",
+    "tcp_socket",
+    "sysctl_modprobe",
+    "sysctl",
+    "sysctl_fs",
+    "sysctl_kernel",
+    "sysctl_net",
+    "sysctl_net_unix",
+    "sysctl_vm",
+    "sysctl_dev",
+    "kmod",
+    "policy",
+    "scmp_packet",
+    "devnull",
+};
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netif.h b/security/selinux/include/netif.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bd6f99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netif.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/*
+ * Network interface table.
+ *
+ * Network interfaces (devices) do not have a security field, so we
+ * maintain a table associating each interface with a SID.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_NETIF_H_
+#define _SELINUX_NETIF_H_
+
+int sel_netif_sids(struct net_device *dev, u32 *if_sid, u32 *msg_sid);
+
+#endif	/* _SELINUX_NETIF_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..887937c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+/*
+ *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *
+ *  This file contains the SELinux security data structures for kernel objects.
+ *
+ *  Author(s):  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ *              Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
+ *              Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
+ *              James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_
+#define _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_
+
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+
+struct task_security_struct {
+        unsigned long magic;           /* magic number for this module */
+	struct task_struct *task;      /* back pointer to task object */
+	u32 osid;            /* SID prior to last execve */
+	u32 sid;             /* current SID */
+	u32 exec_sid;        /* exec SID */
+	u32 create_sid;      /* fscreate SID */
+	u32 ptrace_sid;      /* SID of ptrace parent */
+};
+
+struct inode_security_struct {
+	unsigned long magic;           /* magic number for this module */
+        struct inode *inode;           /* back pointer to inode object */
+	struct list_head list;         /* list of inode_security_struct */
+	u32 task_sid;        /* SID of creating task */
+	u32 sid;             /* SID of this object */
+	u16 sclass;       /* security class of this object */
+	unsigned char initialized;     /* initialization flag */
+	struct semaphore sem;
+	unsigned char inherit;         /* inherit SID from parent entry */
+};
+
+struct file_security_struct {
+	unsigned long magic;            /* magic number for this module */
+	struct file *file;              /* back pointer to file object */
+	u32 sid;              /* SID of open file description */
+	u32 fown_sid;         /* SID of file owner (for SIGIO) */
+};
+
+struct superblock_security_struct {
+	unsigned long magic;            /* magic number for this module */
+	struct super_block *sb;         /* back pointer to sb object */
+	struct list_head list;          /* list of superblock_security_struct */
+	u32 sid;              /* SID of file system */
+	u32 def_sid;			/* default SID for labeling */
+	unsigned int behavior;          /* labeling behavior */
+	unsigned char initialized;      /* initialization flag */
+	unsigned char proc;             /* proc fs */
+	struct semaphore sem;
+	struct list_head isec_head;
+	spinlock_t isec_lock;
+};
+
+struct msg_security_struct {
+        unsigned long magic;		/* magic number for this module */
+	struct msg_msg *msg;		/* back pointer */
+	u32 sid;              /* SID of message */
+};
+
+struct ipc_security_struct {
+        unsigned long magic;		/* magic number for this module */
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perm; /* back pointer */
+	u16 sclass;	/* security class of this object */
+	u32 sid;              /* SID of IPC resource */
+};
+
+struct bprm_security_struct {
+	unsigned long magic;           /* magic number for this module */
+	struct linux_binprm *bprm;     /* back pointer to bprm object */
+	u32 sid;                       /* SID for transformed process */
+	unsigned char set;
+
+	/*
+	 * unsafe is used to share failure information from bprm_apply_creds()
+	 * to bprm_post_apply_creds().
+	 */
+	char unsafe;
+};
+
+struct netif_security_struct {
+	struct net_device *dev;		/* back pointer */
+	u32 if_sid;			/* SID for this interface */
+	u32 msg_sid;			/* default SID for messages received on this interface */
+};
+
+struct sk_security_struct {
+	unsigned long magic;		/* magic number for this module */
+	struct sock *sk;		/* back pointer to sk object */
+	u32 peer_sid;			/* SID of peer */
+};
+
+extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot;
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa187c9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/*
+ * Security server interface.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
+#define _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
+
+#include "flask.h"
+
+#define SECSID_NULL			0x00000000 /* unspecified SID */
+#define SECSID_WILD			0xffffffff /* wildcard SID */
+#define SECCLASS_NULL			0x0000 /* no class */
+
+#define SELINUX_MAGIC 0xf97cff8c
+
+/* Identify specific policy version changes */
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE		15
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL		16
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6		17
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS	18
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_VALIDATETRANS	19
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS		19
+
+/* Range of policy versions we understand*/
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN   POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX   POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
+extern int selinux_enabled;
+#else
+#define selinux_enabled 1
+#endif
+
+extern int selinux_mls_enabled;
+
+int security_load_policy(void * data, size_t len);
+
+struct av_decision {
+	u32 allowed;
+	u32 decided;
+	u32 auditallow;
+	u32 auditdeny;
+	u32 seqno;
+};
+
+int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+	u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+	struct av_decision *avd);
+
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+	u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+	u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_change_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+	u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext,
+	u32 *scontext_len);
+
+int security_context_to_sid(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+	u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username,
+			   u32 **sids, u32 *nel);
+
+int security_port_sid(u16 domain, u16 type, u8 protocol, u16 port,
+	u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid,
+	u32 *msg_sid);
+
+int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen,
+	u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+                                 u16 tclass);
+
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR		1 /* use xattr */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS		2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK		3 /* use task SIDs, e.g. pipefs/sockfs */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS		4 /* use the genfs support */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE		5 /* no labeling support */
+#define SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT	6 /* use mountpoint labeling */
+
+int security_fs_use(const char *fstype, unsigned int *behavior,
+	u32 *sid);
+
+int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
+	u32 *sid);
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..718d7be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+/*
+ * Network interface table.
+ *
+ * Network interfaces (devices) do not have a security field, so we
+ * maintain a table associating each interface with a SID.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netif.h"
+
+#define SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE	64
+#define SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX	1024
+
+#undef DEBUG
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+#define DEBUGP printk
+#else
+#define DEBUGP(format, args...)
+#endif
+
+struct sel_netif
+{
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct netif_security_struct nsec;
+	struct rcu_head rcu_head;
+};
+
+static u32 sel_netif_total;
+static LIST_HEAD(sel_netif_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netif_lock);
+static struct list_head sel_netif_hash[SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE];
+
+static inline u32 sel_netif_hasfn(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+	return (dev->ifindex & (SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/*
+ * All of the devices should normally fit in the hash, so we optimize
+ * for that case.
+ */
+static inline struct sel_netif *sel_netif_find(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+	struct list_head *pos;
+	int idx = sel_netif_hasfn(dev);
+
+	__list_for_each_rcu(pos, &sel_netif_hash[idx]) {
+		struct sel_netif *netif = list_entry(pos,
+		                                     struct sel_netif, list);
+		if (likely(netif->nsec.dev == dev))
+			return netif;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int sel_netif_insert(struct sel_netif *netif)
+{
+	int idx, ret = 0;
+	
+	if (sel_netif_total >= SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX) {
+		ret = -ENOSPC;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	
+	idx = sel_netif_hasfn(netif->nsec.dev);
+	list_add_rcu(&netif->list, &sel_netif_hash[idx]);
+	sel_netif_total++;
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void sel_netif_free(struct rcu_head *p)
+{
+	struct sel_netif *netif = container_of(p, struct sel_netif, rcu_head);
+
+	DEBUGP("%s: %s\n", __FUNCTION__, netif->nsec.dev->name);
+	kfree(netif);
+}
+
+static void sel_netif_destroy(struct sel_netif *netif)
+{
+	DEBUGP("%s: %s\n", __FUNCTION__, netif->nsec.dev->name);
+
+	list_del_rcu(&netif->list);
+	sel_netif_total--;
+	call_rcu(&netif->rcu_head, sel_netif_free);
+}
+
+static struct sel_netif *sel_netif_lookup(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct sel_netif *netif, *new;
+	struct netif_security_struct *nsec;
+
+	netif = sel_netif_find(dev);
+	if (likely(netif != NULL))
+		goto out;
+	
+	new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!new) {
+		netif = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	
+	memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+	nsec = &new->nsec;
+
+	ret = security_netif_sid(dev->name, &nsec->if_sid, &nsec->msg_sid);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		kfree(new);
+		netif = ERR_PTR(ret);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	nsec->dev = dev;
+	
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+	
+	netif = sel_netif_find(dev);
+	if (netif) {
+		spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+		kfree(new);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	
+	ret = sel_netif_insert(new);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+	
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(new);
+		netif = ERR_PTR(ret);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	netif = new;
+	
+	DEBUGP("new: ifindex=%u name=%s if_sid=%u msg_sid=%u\n", dev->ifindex, dev->name,
+	        nsec->if_sid, nsec->msg_sid);
+out:
+	return netif;
+}
+
+static void sel_netif_assign_sids(u32 if_sid_in, u32 msg_sid_in, u32 *if_sid_out, u32 *msg_sid_out)
+{
+	if (if_sid_out)
+		*if_sid_out = if_sid_in;
+	if (msg_sid_out)
+		*msg_sid_out = msg_sid_in;
+}
+
+static int sel_netif_sids_slow(struct net_device *dev, u32 *if_sid, u32 *msg_sid)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	u32 tmp_if_sid, tmp_msg_sid;
+	
+	ret = security_netif_sid(dev->name, &tmp_if_sid, &tmp_msg_sid);
+	if (!ret)
+		sel_netif_assign_sids(tmp_if_sid, tmp_msg_sid, if_sid, msg_sid);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int sel_netif_sids(struct net_device *dev, u32 *if_sid, u32 *msg_sid)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	struct sel_netif *netif;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	netif = sel_netif_lookup(dev);
+	if (IS_ERR(netif)) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		ret = sel_netif_sids_slow(dev, if_sid, msg_sid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	sel_netif_assign_sids(netif->nsec.if_sid, netif->nsec.msg_sid, if_sid, msg_sid);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void sel_netif_kill(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+	struct sel_netif *netif;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+	netif = sel_netif_find(dev);
+	if (netif)
+		sel_netif_destroy(netif);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+}
+
+static void sel_netif_flush(void)
+{
+	int idx;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+	for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE; idx++) {
+		struct sel_netif *netif;
+		
+		list_for_each_entry(netif, &sel_netif_hash[idx], list)
+			sel_netif_destroy(netif);
+	}
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
+}
+
+static int sel_netif_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+                                  u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
+{
+	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+		sel_netif_flush();
+		synchronize_net();
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler(struct notifier_block *this,
+                                             unsigned long event, void *ptr)
+{
+	struct net_device *dev = ptr;
+
+	if (event == NETDEV_DOWN)
+		sel_netif_kill(dev);
+
+	return NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block sel_netif_netdev_notifier = {
+	.notifier_call = sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler,
+};
+
+static __init int sel_netif_init(void)
+{
+	int i, err = 0;
+	
+	if (!selinux_enabled)
+		goto out;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE; i++)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netif_hash[i]);
+
+	register_netdevice_notifier(&sel_netif_netdev_notifier);
+	
+	err = avc_add_callback(sel_netif_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
+	                       SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
+	if (err)
+		panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
+
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+__initcall(sel_netif_init);
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlink.c b/security/selinux/netlink.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18d08ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/netlink.c
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+/*
+ * Netlink event notifications for SELinux.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/selinux_netlink.h>
+
+static struct sock *selnl;
+
+static int selnl_msglen(int msgtype)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	
+	switch (msgtype) {
+	case SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE:
+		ret = sizeof(struct selnl_msg_setenforce);
+		break;
+	
+	case SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD:
+		ret = sizeof(struct selnl_msg_policyload);
+		break;
+		
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void selnl_add_payload(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int len, int msgtype, void *data)
+{
+	switch (msgtype) {
+	case SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE: {
+		struct selnl_msg_setenforce *msg = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
+		
+		memset(msg, 0, len);
+		msg->val = *((int *)data);
+		break;
+	}
+	
+	case SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD: {
+		struct selnl_msg_policyload *msg = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
+		
+		memset(msg, 0, len);
+		msg->seqno = *((u32 *)data);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+}
+
+static void selnl_notify(int msgtype, void *data)
+{
+	int len;
+	unsigned char *tmp;
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
+	
+	len = selnl_msglen(msgtype);
+	
+	skb = alloc_skb(NLMSG_SPACE(len), GFP_USER);
+	if (!skb)
+		goto oom;
+
+	tmp = skb->tail;
+	nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, 0, 0, msgtype, len);
+	selnl_add_payload(nlh, len, msgtype, data);
+	nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - tmp;
+	netlink_broadcast(selnl, skb, 0, SELNL_GRP_AVC, GFP_USER);
+out:
+	return;
+	
+nlmsg_failure:
+	kfree_skb(skb);
+oom:
+	printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  OOM in %s\n", __FUNCTION__);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val)
+{
+	selnl_notify(SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE, &val);
+}
+
+void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno)
+{
+	selnl_notify(SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD, &seqno);
+}
+
+static int __init selnl_init(void)
+{
+	selnl = netlink_kernel_create(NETLINK_SELINUX, NULL);
+	if (selnl == NULL)
+		panic("SELinux:  Cannot create netlink socket.");
+	netlink_set_nonroot(NETLINK_SELINUX, NL_NONROOT_RECV);	
+	return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(selnl_init);
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa7fa03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+/*
+ * Netlink message type permission tables, for user generated messages.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
+#include <linux/if.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_queue.h>
+#include <linux/tcp_diag.h>
+#include <linux/xfrm.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "av_permissions.h"
+
+struct nlmsg_perm
+{
+	u16	nlmsg_type;
+	u32	perm;
+};
+
+static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] =
+{
+	{ RTM_NEWLINK,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELLINK,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETLINK,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_SETLINK,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_NEWADDR,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELADDR,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETADDR,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWROUTE,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELROUTE,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETROUTE,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWNEIGH,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELNEIGH,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETNEIGH,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWRULE,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELRULE,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETRULE,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWQDISC,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELQDISC,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETQDISC,		NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWTCLASS,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELTCLASS,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETTCLASS,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWTFILTER,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELTFILTER,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETTFILTER,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWACTION,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_DELACTION,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETACTION,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_NEWPREFIX,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ RTM_GETPREFIX,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_GETMULTICAST,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ RTM_GETANYCAST,	NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+};
+
+static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_firewall_perms[] =
+{
+	{ IPQM_MODE,		NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ IPQM_VERDICT,		NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+};
+
+static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] =
+{
+	{ TCPDIAG_GETSOCK,	NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+};
+
+static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] =
+{
+	{ XFRM_MSG_NEWSA,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_DELSA,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_GETSA,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ XFRM_MSG_UPDSA,	NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+};
+
+static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
+{
+	{ AUDIT_GET,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ AUDIT_SET,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ AUDIT_LIST,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ  },
+	{ AUDIT_ADD,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ AUDIT_DEL,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ AUDIT_USER,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+	{ AUDIT_LOGIN,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+};
+
+
+static int nlmsg_perm(u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm, struct nlmsg_perm *tab, size_t tabsize)
+{
+	int i, err = -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < tabsize/sizeof(struct nlmsg_perm); i++)
+		if (nlmsg_type == tab[i].nlmsg_type) {
+			*perm = tab[i].perm;
+			err = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	switch (sclass) {
+	case SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET:
+		err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_route_perms,
+				 sizeof(nlmsg_route_perms));
+		break;
+
+	case SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET:
+	case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
+		err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_firewall_perms,
+				 sizeof(nlmsg_firewall_perms));
+		break;
+
+	case SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET:
+		err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms,
+				 sizeof(nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms));
+		break;
+
+	case SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET:
+		err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_xfrm_perms,
+				 sizeof(nlmsg_xfrm_perms));
+		break;
+
+	case SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET:
+		err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_audit_perms,
+				 sizeof(nlmsg_audit_perms));
+		break;
+
+	/* No messaging from userspace, or class unknown/unhandled */
+	default:
+		err = -ENOENT;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0722156
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1340 @@
+/* Updated: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * 	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/config.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/major.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+
+/* selinuxfs pseudo filesystem for exporting the security policy API.
+   Based on the proc code and the fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c code. */
+
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+
+unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
+
+static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
+{
+	selinux_checkreqprot = simple_strtoul(str,NULL,0) ? 1 : 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
+
+
+static DECLARE_MUTEX(sel_sem);
+
+/* global data for booleans */
+static struct dentry *bool_dir = NULL;
+static int bool_num = 0;
+static int *bool_pending_values = NULL;
+
+extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
+
+/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a security operation. */
+static int task_has_security(struct task_struct *tsk,
+			     u32 perms)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	tsec = tsk->security;
+	if (!tsec)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+			    SECCLASS_SECURITY, perms, NULL);
+}
+
+enum sel_inos {
+	SEL_ROOT_INO = 2,
+	SEL_LOAD,	/* load policy */
+	SEL_ENFORCE,	/* get or set enforcing status */
+	SEL_CONTEXT,	/* validate context */
+	SEL_ACCESS,	/* compute access decision */
+	SEL_CREATE,	/* compute create labeling decision */
+	SEL_RELABEL,	/* compute relabeling decision */
+	SEL_USER,	/* compute reachable user contexts */
+	SEL_POLICYVERS,	/* return policy version for this kernel */
+	SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS, /* commit new boolean values */
+	SEL_MLS,	/* return if MLS policy is enabled */
+	SEL_DISABLE,	/* disable SELinux until next reboot */
+	SEL_AVC,	/* AVC management directory */
+	SEL_MEMBER,	/* compute polyinstantiation membership decision */
+	SEL_CHECKREQPROT, /* check requested protection, not kernel-applied one */
+};
+
+#define TMPBUFLEN	12
+static ssize_t sel_read_enforce(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", selinux_enforcing);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+	char *page;
+	ssize_t length;
+	int new_value;
+
+	if (count < 0 || count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (*ppos != 0) {
+		/* No partial writes. */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	length = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (new_value != selinux_enforcing) {
+		length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETENFORCE);
+		if (length)
+			goto out;
+		selinux_enforcing = new_value;
+		if (selinux_enforcing)
+			avc_ss_reset(0);
+		selnl_notify_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
+	}
+	length = count;
+out:
+	free_page((unsigned long) page);
+	return length;
+}
+#else
+#define sel_write_enforce NULL
+#endif
+
+static struct file_operations sel_enforce_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_enforce,
+	.write		= sel_write_enforce,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+	char *page;
+	ssize_t length;
+	int new_value;
+	extern int selinux_disable(void);
+
+	if (count < 0 || count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (*ppos != 0) {
+		/* No partial writes. */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	length = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (new_value) {
+		length = selinux_disable();
+		if (length < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	length = count;
+out:
+	free_page((unsigned long) page);
+	return length;
+}
+#else
+#define sel_write_disable NULL
+#endif
+
+static struct file_operations sel_disable_ops = {
+	.write		= sel_write_disable,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_policyvers(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+                                   size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_policyvers,
+};
+
+/* declaration for sel_write_load */
+static int sel_make_bools(void);
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", selinux_mls_enabled);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static struct file_operations sel_mls_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_mls,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+	int ret;
+	ssize_t length;
+	void *data = NULL;
+
+	down(&sel_sem);
+
+	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0) {
+		/* No partial writes. */
+		length = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((count < 0) || (count > 64 * 1024 * 1024)
+	    || (data = vmalloc(count)) == NULL) {
+		length = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	length = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_load_policy(data, count);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = sel_make_bools();
+	if (ret)
+		length = ret;
+	else
+		length = count;
+out:
+	up(&sel_sem);
+	vfree(data);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static struct file_operations sel_load_ops = {
+	.write		= sel_write_load,
+};
+
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+	char *page;
+	u32 sid;
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT);
+	if (length)
+		return length;
+
+	if (count < 0 || count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (*ppos != 0) {
+		/* No partial writes. */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	length = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+		goto out;
+
+	length = security_context_to_sid(page, count, &sid);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = count;
+out:
+	free_page((unsigned long) page);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static struct file_operations sel_context_ops = {
+	.write		= sel_write_context,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_checkreqprot(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", selinux_checkreqprot);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *page;
+	ssize_t length;
+	unsigned int new_value;
+
+	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT);
+	if (length)
+		return length;
+
+	if (count < 0 || count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (*ppos != 0) {
+		/* No partial writes. */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	length = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	selinux_checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
+	length = count;
+out:
+	free_page((unsigned long) page);
+	return length;
+}
+static struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_checkreqprot,
+	.write		= sel_write_checkreqprot,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Remaining nodes use transaction based IO methods like nfsd/nfsctl.c
+ */
+static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size);
+
+static ssize_t (*write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = {
+	[SEL_ACCESS] = sel_write_access,
+	[SEL_CREATE] = sel_write_create,
+	[SEL_RELABEL] = sel_write_relabel,
+	[SEL_USER] = sel_write_user,
+	[SEL_MEMBER] = sel_write_member,
+};
+
+static ssize_t selinux_transaction_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	ino_t ino =  file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+	char *data;
+	ssize_t rv;
+
+	if (ino >= sizeof(write_op)/sizeof(write_op[0]) || !write_op[ino])
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	data = simple_transaction_get(file, buf, size);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+	rv =  write_op[ino](file, data, size);
+	if (rv>0) {
+		simple_transaction_set(file, rv);
+		rv = size;
+	}
+	return rv;
+}
+
+static struct file_operations transaction_ops = {
+	.write		= selinux_transaction_write,
+	.read		= simple_transaction_read,
+	.release	= simple_transaction_release,
+};
+
+/*
+ * payload - write methods
+ * If the method has a response, the response should be put in buf,
+ * and the length returned.  Otherwise return 0 or and -error.
+ */
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	char *scon, *tcon;
+	u32 ssid, tsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	u32 req;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV);
+	if (length)
+		return length;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	scon = kmalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scon)
+		return length;
+	memset(scon, 0, size+1);
+
+	tcon = kmalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tcon)
+		goto out;
+	memset(tcon, 0, size+1);
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu %x", scon, tcon, &tclass, &req) != 4)
+		goto out2;
+
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+
+	length = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, req, &avd);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+
+	length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
+			  "%x %x %x %x %u",
+			  avd.allowed, avd.decided,
+			  avd.auditallow, avd.auditdeny,
+			  avd.seqno);
+out2:
+	kfree(tcon);
+out:
+	kfree(scon);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	char *scon, *tcon;
+	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	ssize_t length;
+	char *newcon;
+	u32 len;
+
+	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE);
+	if (length)
+		return length;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	scon = kmalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scon)
+		return length;
+	memset(scon, 0, size+1);
+
+	tcon = kmalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tcon)
+		goto out;
+	memset(tcon, 0, size+1);
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+		goto out2;
+
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+
+	length = security_transition_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+
+	length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+
+	if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  context size (%u) exceeds payload "
+		       "max\n", __FUNCTION__, len);
+		length = -ERANGE;
+		goto out3;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
+	length = len;
+out3:
+	kfree(newcon);
+out2:
+	kfree(tcon);
+out:
+	kfree(scon);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	char *scon, *tcon;
+	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	ssize_t length;
+	char *newcon;
+	u32 len;
+
+	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL);
+	if (length)
+		return length;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	scon = kmalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scon)
+		return length;
+	memset(scon, 0, size+1);
+
+	tcon = kmalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tcon)
+		goto out;
+	memset(tcon, 0, size+1);
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+		goto out2;
+
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+
+	length = security_change_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+
+	length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+
+	if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+		length = -ERANGE;
+		goto out3;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
+	length = len;
+out3:
+	kfree(newcon);
+out2:
+	kfree(tcon);
+out:
+	kfree(scon);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	char *con, *user, *ptr;
+	u32 sid, *sids;
+	ssize_t length;
+	char *newcon;
+	int i, rc;
+	u32 len, nsids;
+
+	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER);
+	if (length)
+		return length;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	con = kmalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!con)
+		return length;
+	memset(con, 0, size+1);
+
+	user = kmalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!user)
+		goto out;
+	memset(user, 0, size+1);
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
+		goto out2;
+
+	length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con)+1, &sid);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+
+	length = security_get_user_sids(sid, user, &sids, &nsids);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+
+	length = sprintf(buf, "%u", nsids) + 1;
+	ptr = buf + length;
+	for (i = 0; i < nsids; i++) {
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(sids[i], &newcon, &len);
+		if (rc) {
+			length = rc;
+			goto out3;
+		}
+		if ((length + len) >= SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+			kfree(newcon);
+			length = -ERANGE;
+			goto out3;
+		}
+		memcpy(ptr, newcon, len);
+		kfree(newcon);
+		ptr += len;
+		length += len;
+	}
+out3:
+	kfree(sids);
+out2:
+	kfree(user);
+out:
+	kfree(con);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	char *scon, *tcon;
+	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	ssize_t length;
+	char *newcon;
+	u32 len;
+
+	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER);
+	if (length)
+		return length;
+
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	scon = kmalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scon)
+		return length;
+	memset(scon, 0, size+1);
+
+	tcon = kmalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tcon)
+		goto out;
+	memset(tcon, 0, size+1);
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+		goto out2;
+
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+
+	length = security_member_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+
+	length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out2;
+
+	if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  context size (%u) exceeds payload "
+		       "max\n", __FUNCTION__, len);
+		length = -ERANGE;
+		goto out3;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
+	length = len;
+out3:
+	kfree(newcon);
+out2:
+	kfree(tcon);
+out:
+	kfree(scon);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static struct inode *sel_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode)
+{
+	struct inode *ret = new_inode(sb);
+
+	if (ret) {
+		ret->i_mode = mode;
+		ret->i_uid = ret->i_gid = 0;
+		ret->i_blksize = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
+		ret->i_blocks = 0;
+		ret->i_atime = ret->i_mtime = ret->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#define BOOL_INO_OFFSET 30
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
+			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *page = NULL;
+	ssize_t length;
+	ssize_t end;
+	ssize_t ret;
+	int cur_enforcing;
+	struct inode *inode;
+
+	down(&sel_sem);
+
+	ret = -EFAULT;
+
+	/* check to see if this file has been deleted */
+	if (!filep->f_op)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (count < 0 || count > PAGE_SIZE) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (!(page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL))) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	inode = filep->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(inode->i_ino - BOOL_INO_OFFSET);
+	if (cur_enforcing < 0) {
+		ret = cur_enforcing;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing,
+			  bool_pending_values[inode->i_ino - BOOL_INO_OFFSET]);
+	if (length < 0) {
+		ret = length;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (*ppos >= length) {
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (count + *ppos > length)
+		count = length - *ppos;
+	end = count + *ppos;
+	if (copy_to_user(buf, (char *) page + *ppos, count)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*ppos = end;
+	ret = count;
+out:
+	up(&sel_sem);
+	if (page)
+		free_page((unsigned long)page);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *page = NULL;
+	ssize_t length = -EFAULT;
+	int new_value;
+	struct inode *inode;
+
+	down(&sel_sem);
+
+	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* check to see if this file has been deleted */
+	if (!filep->f_op)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (count < 0 || count >= PAGE_SIZE) {
+		length = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (*ppos != 0) {
+		/* No partial writes. */
+		goto out;
+	}
+	page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page) {
+		length = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (new_value)
+		new_value = 1;
+
+	inode = filep->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	bool_pending_values[inode->i_ino - BOOL_INO_OFFSET] = new_value;
+	length = count;
+
+out:
+	up(&sel_sem);
+	if (page)
+		free_page((unsigned long) page);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static struct file_operations sel_bool_ops = {
+	.read           = sel_read_bool,
+	.write          = sel_write_bool,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
+				      const char __user *buf,
+				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *page = NULL;
+	ssize_t length = -EFAULT;
+	int new_value;
+
+	down(&sel_sem);
+
+	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
+	if (length)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* check to see if this file has been deleted */
+	if (!filep->f_op)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (count < 0 || count >= PAGE_SIZE) {
+		length = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (*ppos != 0) {
+		/* No partial writes. */
+		goto out;
+	}
+	page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page) {
+		length = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+		goto out;
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (new_value) {
+		security_set_bools(bool_num, bool_pending_values);
+	}
+
+	length = count;
+
+out:
+	up(&sel_sem);
+	if (page)
+		free_page((unsigned long) page);
+	return length;
+}
+
+static struct file_operations sel_commit_bools_ops = {
+	.write          = sel_commit_bools_write,
+};
+
+/* delete booleans - partial revoke() from
+ * fs/proc/generic.c proc_kill_inodes */
+static void sel_remove_bools(struct dentry *de)
+{
+	struct list_head *p, *node;
+	struct super_block *sb = de->d_sb;
+
+	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
+	node = de->d_subdirs.next;
+	while (node != &de->d_subdirs) {
+		struct dentry *d = list_entry(node, struct dentry, d_child);
+		list_del_init(node);
+
+		if (d->d_inode) {
+			d = dget_locked(d);
+			spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
+			d_delete(d);
+			simple_unlink(de->d_inode, d);
+			dput(d);
+			spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
+		}
+		node = de->d_subdirs.next;
+	}
+
+	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
+
+	file_list_lock();
+	list_for_each(p, &sb->s_files) {
+		struct file * filp = list_entry(p, struct file, f_list);
+		struct dentry * dentry = filp->f_dentry;
+
+		if (dentry->d_parent != de) {
+			continue;
+		}
+		filp->f_op = NULL;
+	}
+	file_list_unlock();
+}
+
+#define BOOL_DIR_NAME "booleans"
+
+static int sel_make_bools(void)
+{
+	int i, ret = 0;
+	ssize_t len;
+	struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
+	struct dentry *dir = bool_dir;
+	struct inode *inode = NULL;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	char **names = NULL, *page;
+	int num;
+	int *values = NULL;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	/* remove any existing files */
+	if (bool_pending_values)
+		kfree(bool_pending_values);
+
+	sel_remove_bools(dir);
+
+	if (!(page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = security_get_bools(&num, &names, &values);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+		dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, names[i]);
+		if (!dentry) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+		if (!inode) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
+		if (len < 0) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		} else if (len >= PAGE_SIZE) {
+			ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		isec = (struct inode_security_struct*)inode->i_security;
+		if ((ret = security_genfs_sid("selinuxfs", page, SECCLASS_FILE, &sid)))
+			goto err;
+		isec->sid = sid;
+		isec->initialized = 1;
+		inode->i_fop = &sel_bool_ops;
+		inode->i_ino = i + BOOL_INO_OFFSET;
+		d_add(dentry, inode);
+	}
+	bool_num = num;
+	bool_pending_values = values;
+out:
+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+	if (names) {
+		for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+			if (names[i])
+				kfree(names[i]);
+		}
+		kfree(names);
+	}
+	return ret;
+err:
+	d_genocide(dir);
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+#define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
+
+struct dentry *selinux_null = NULL;
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+					    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", avc_cache_threshold);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file * file,
+					     const char __user * buf,
+					     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+	char *page;
+	ssize_t ret;
+	int new_value;
+
+	if (count < 0 || count >= PAGE_SIZE) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (*ppos != 0) {
+		/* No partial writes. */
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto out_free;
+	}
+
+	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (new_value != avc_cache_threshold) {
+		ret = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_free;
+		avc_cache_threshold = new_value;
+	}
+	ret = count;
+out_free:
+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_avc_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *page;
+	ssize_t ret = 0;
+
+	page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ret = avc_get_hash_stats(page);
+	if (ret >= 0)
+		ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, ret);
+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_avc_cache_threshold,
+	.write		= sel_write_avc_cache_threshold,
+};
+
+static struct file_operations sel_avc_hash_stats_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_avc_hash_stats,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+static struct avc_cache_stats *sel_avc_get_stat_idx(loff_t *idx)
+{
+	int cpu;
+
+	for (cpu = *idx; cpu < NR_CPUS; ++cpu) {
+		if (!cpu_possible(cpu))
+			continue;
+		*idx = cpu + 1;
+		return &per_cpu(avc_cache_stats, cpu);
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *sel_avc_stats_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	loff_t n = *pos - 1;
+
+	if (*pos == 0)
+		return SEQ_START_TOKEN;
+
+	return sel_avc_get_stat_idx(&n);
+}
+
+static void *sel_avc_stats_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return sel_avc_get_stat_idx(pos);
+}
+
+static int sel_avc_stats_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct avc_cache_stats *st = v;
+
+	if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN)
+		seq_printf(seq, "lookups hits misses allocations reclaims "
+			   "frees\n");
+	else
+		seq_printf(seq, "%u %u %u %u %u %u\n", st->lookups,
+			   st->hits, st->misses, st->allocations,
+			   st->reclaims, st->frees);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void sel_avc_stats_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{ }
+
+static struct seq_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_seq_ops = {
+	.start		= sel_avc_stats_seq_start,
+	.next		= sel_avc_stats_seq_next,
+	.show		= sel_avc_stats_seq_show,
+	.stop		= sel_avc_stats_seq_stop,
+};
+
+static int sel_open_avc_cache_stats(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &sel_avc_cache_stats_seq_ops);
+}
+
+static struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_ops = {
+	.open		= sel_open_avc_cache_stats,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
+	.release	= seq_release,
+};
+#endif
+
+static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	int i, ret = 0;
+	static struct tree_descr files[] = {
+		{ "cache_threshold",
+		  &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR },
+		{ "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+		{ "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+#endif
+	};
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof (files) / sizeof (files[0]); i++) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+		struct dentry *dentry;
+
+		dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, files[i].name);
+		if (!dentry) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode);
+		if (!inode) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
+		d_add(dentry, inode);
+	}
+out:
+	return ret;
+err:
+	d_genocide(dir);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_dir(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	struct inode *inode;
+
+	inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
+	if (!inode) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
+	inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
+	d_add(dentry, inode);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+	static struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = {
+		[SEL_LOAD] = {"load", &sel_load_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR},
+		[SEL_ENFORCE] = {"enforce", &sel_enforce_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SEL_CONTEXT] = {"context", &sel_context_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_ACCESS] = {"access", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_CREATE] = {"create", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_RELABEL] = {"relabel", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_USER] = {"user", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_POLICYVERS] = {"policyvers", &sel_policyvers_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS] = {"commit_pending_bools", &sel_commit_bools_ops, S_IWUSR},
+		[SEL_MLS] = {"mls", &sel_mls_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, S_IWUSR},
+		[SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		[SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		/* last one */ {""}
+	};
+	ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME);
+	if (!dentry)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
+	if (!inode)
+		goto out;
+	inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
+	inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
+	d_add(dentry, inode);
+	bool_dir = dentry;
+	ret = sel_make_bools();
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, NULL_FILE_NAME);
+	if (!dentry)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO);
+	if (!inode)
+		goto out;
+	isec = (struct inode_security_struct*)inode->i_security;
+	isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
+	isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
+	isec->initialized = 1;
+
+	init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
+	d_add(dentry, inode);
+	selinux_null = dentry;
+
+	dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "avc");
+	if (!dentry)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = sel_make_dir(sb, dentry);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = sel_make_avc_files(dentry);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	return 0;
+out:
+	dput(dentry);
+	printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  failed while creating inodes\n", __FUNCTION__);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static struct super_block *sel_get_sb(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
+				      int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
+{
+	return get_sb_single(fs_type, flags, data, sel_fill_super);
+}
+
+static struct file_system_type sel_fs_type = {
+	.name		= "selinuxfs",
+	.get_sb		= sel_get_sb,
+	.kill_sb	= kill_litter_super,
+};
+
+struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
+
+static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	if (!selinux_enabled)
+		return 0;
+	err = register_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
+	if (!err) {
+		selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
+		if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "selinuxfs:  could not mount!\n");
+			err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount);
+			selinuxfs_mount = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	return err;
+}
+
+__initcall(init_sel_fs);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+void exit_sel_fs(void)
+{
+	unregister_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/Makefile b/security/selinux/ss/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bad7877
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#
+# Makefile for building the SELinux security server as part of the kernel tree.
+#
+
+EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include
+obj-y := ss.o
+
+ss-y := ebitmap.o hashtab.o symtab.o sidtab.o avtab.o policydb.o services.o conditional.o mls.o
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f238c03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the access vector table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * 	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+#define AVTAB_HASH(keyp) \
+((keyp->target_class + \
+ (keyp->target_type << 2) + \
+ (keyp->source_type << 9)) & \
+ AVTAB_HASH_MASK)
+
+static kmem_cache_t *avtab_node_cachep;
+
+static struct avtab_node*
+avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
+		  struct avtab_node * prev, struct avtab_node * cur,
+		  struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+	struct avtab_node * newnode;
+	newnode = kmem_cache_alloc(avtab_node_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
+	if (newnode == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	memset(newnode, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_node));
+	newnode->key = *key;
+	newnode->datum = *datum;
+	if (prev) {
+		newnode->next = prev->next;
+		prev->next = newnode;
+	} else {
+		newnode->next = h->htable[hvalue];
+		h->htable[hvalue] = newnode;
+	}
+
+	h->nel++;
+	return newnode;
+}
+
+static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+	for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+	     cur;
+	     prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+		    (datum->specified & cur->datum.specified))
+			return -EEXIST;
+		if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, cur, key, datum);
+	if(!newnode)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Unlike avtab_insert(), this function allow multiple insertions of the same
+ * key/specified mask into the table, as needed by the conditional avtab.
+ * It also returns a pointer to the node inserted.
+ */
+struct avtab_node *
+avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab * h, struct avtab_key * key, struct avtab_datum * datum)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return NULL;
+	hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+	for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+	     cur;
+	     prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+		    (datum->specified & cur->datum.specified))
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+			break;
+	}
+	newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, cur, key, datum);
+
+	return newnode;
+}
+
+struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, int specified)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+	for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+		    (specified & cur->datum.specified))
+			return &cur->datum;
+
+		if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* This search function returns a node pointer, and can be used in
+ * conjunction with avtab_search_next_node()
+ */
+struct avtab_node*
+avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, int specified)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+	for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+		    (specified & cur->datum.specified))
+			return cur;
+
+		if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+			break;
+		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+			break;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+struct avtab_node*
+avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified)
+{
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!node)
+		return NULL;
+
+	for (cur = node->next; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    node->key.target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    node->key.target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+		    (specified & cur->datum.specified))
+			return cur;
+
+		if (node->key.source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+			break;
+		if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    node->key.target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+			break;
+		if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+		    node->key.target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+		    node->key.target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+			break;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct avtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+	if (!h || !h->htable)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < AVTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		while (cur != NULL) {
+			temp = cur;
+			cur = cur->next;
+			kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
+		}
+		h->htable[i] = NULL;
+	}
+	vfree(h->htable);
+	h->htable = NULL;
+}
+
+
+int avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	h->htable = vmalloc(sizeof(*(h->htable)) * AVTAB_SIZE);
+	if (!h->htable)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	for (i = 0; i < AVTAB_SIZE; i++)
+		h->htable[i] = NULL;
+	h->nel = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
+{
+	int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+	struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+	slots_used = 0;
+	max_chain_len = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < AVTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		if (cur) {
+			slots_used++;
+			chain_len = 0;
+			while (cur) {
+				chain_len++;
+				cur = cur->next;
+			}
+
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest "
+	       "chain length %d\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used, AVTAB_SIZE,
+	       max_chain_len);
+}
+
+int avtab_read_item(void *fp, struct avtab_datum *avdatum, struct avtab_key *avkey)
+{
+	u32 buf[7];
+	u32 items, items2;
+	int rc;
+
+	memset(avkey, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_key));
+	memset(avdatum, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_datum));
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: entry overflow\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*items2);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	items = 0;
+	avkey->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+	avkey->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+	avkey->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+	avdatum->specified = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+	if (!(avdatum->specified & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE))) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: null entry\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	if ((avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AV) &&
+	    (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AV) {
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_ALLOWED)
+			avtab_allowed(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+			avtab_auditdeny(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
+			avtab_auditallow(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+	} else {
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION)
+			avtab_transition(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_CHANGE)
+			avtab_change(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_MEMBER)
+			avtab_member(avdatum) = le32_to_cpu(buf[items++]);
+	}
+	if (items != items2) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n",
+		       items2, items);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, u32 config)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct avtab_key avkey;
+	struct avtab_datum avdatum;
+	u32 buf[1];
+	u32 nel, i;
+
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: truncated table\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (!nel) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: table is empty\n");
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		if (avtab_read_item(fp, &avdatum, &avkey)) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		rc = avtab_insert(a, &avkey, &avdatum);
+		if (rc) {
+			if (rc == -ENOMEM)
+				printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: out of memory\n");
+			if (rc == -EEXIST)
+				printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: duplicate entry\n");
+			goto bad;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+
+bad:
+	avtab_destroy(a);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+void avtab_cache_init(void)
+{
+	avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
+					      sizeof(struct avtab_node),
+					      0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
+{
+	kmem_cache_destroy (avtab_node_cachep);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..519d4f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/*
+ * An access vector table (avtab) is a hash table
+ * of access vectors and transition types indexed
+ * by a type pair and a class.  An access vector
+ * table is used to represent the type enforcement
+ * tables.
+ *
+ *  Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * 	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
+#define _SS_AVTAB_H_
+
+struct avtab_key {
+	u32 source_type;	/* source type */
+	u32 target_type;	/* target type */
+	u32 target_class;	/* target object class */
+};
+
+struct avtab_datum {
+#define AVTAB_ALLOWED     1
+#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW  2
+#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY   4
+#define AVTAB_AV         (AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+#define AVTAB_TRANSITION 16
+#define AVTAB_MEMBER     32
+#define AVTAB_CHANGE     64
+#define AVTAB_TYPE       (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED    0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+	u32 specified;	/* what fields are specified */
+	u32 data[3];	/* access vectors or types */
+#define avtab_allowed(x) (x)->data[0]
+#define avtab_auditdeny(x) (x)->data[1]
+#define avtab_auditallow(x) (x)->data[2]
+#define avtab_transition(x) (x)->data[0]
+#define avtab_change(x) (x)->data[1]
+#define avtab_member(x) (x)->data[2]
+};
+
+struct avtab_node {
+	struct avtab_key key;
+	struct avtab_datum datum;
+	struct avtab_node *next;
+};
+
+struct avtab {
+	struct avtab_node **htable;
+	u32 nel;	/* number of elements */
+};
+
+int avtab_init(struct avtab *);
+struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *k, int specified);
+void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag);
+
+int avtab_read_item(void *fp, struct avtab_datum *avdatum, struct avtab_key *avkey);
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, u32 config);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key,
+					  struct avtab_datum *datum);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, int specified);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified);
+
+void avtab_cache_init(void);
+void avtab_cache_destroy(void);
+
+#define AVTAB_HASH_BITS 15
+#define AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
+#define AVTAB_HASH_MASK (AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
+
+#define AVTAB_SIZE AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS
+
+#endif	/* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b534411
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -0,0 +1,489 @@
+/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *          Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+
+/*
+ * cond_evaluate_expr evaluates a conditional expr
+ * in reverse polish notation. It returns true (1), false (0),
+ * or undefined (-1). Undefined occurs when the expression
+ * exceeds the stack depth of COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH.
+ */
+static int cond_evaluate_expr(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
+{
+
+	struct cond_expr *cur;
+	int s[COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+	int sp = -1;
+
+	for (cur = expr; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+		switch (cur->expr_type) {
+		case COND_BOOL:
+			if (sp == (COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+				return -1;
+			sp++;
+			s[sp] = p->bool_val_to_struct[cur->bool - 1]->state;
+			break;
+		case COND_NOT:
+			if (sp < 0)
+				return -1;
+			s[sp] = !s[sp];
+			break;
+		case COND_OR:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case COND_AND:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case COND_XOR:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] ^= s[sp + 1];
+			break;
+		case COND_EQ:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] = (s[sp] == s[sp + 1]);
+			break;
+		case COND_NEQ:
+			if (sp < 1)
+				return -1;
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] = (s[sp] != s[sp + 1]);
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * evaluate_cond_node evaluates the conditional stored in
+ * a struct cond_node and if the result is different than the
+ * current state of the node it sets the rules in the true/false
+ * list appropriately. If the result of the expression is undefined
+ * all of the rules are disabled for safety.
+ */
+int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
+{
+	int new_state;
+	struct cond_av_list* cur;
+
+	new_state = cond_evaluate_expr(p, node->expr);
+	if (new_state != node->cur_state) {
+		node->cur_state = new_state;
+		if (new_state == -1)
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
+		/* turn the rules on or off */
+		for (cur = node->true_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+			if (new_state <= 0) {
+				cur->node->datum.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+			} else {
+				cur->node->datum.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+			}
+		}
+
+		for (cur = node->false_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+			/* -1 or 1 */
+			if (new_state) {
+				cur->node->datum.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+			} else {
+				cur->node->datum.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	p->bool_val_to_struct = NULL;
+	p->cond_list = NULL;
+	if (avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab))
+		return -1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void cond_av_list_destroy(struct cond_av_list *list)
+{
+	struct cond_av_list *cur, *next;
+	for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = next) {
+		next = cur->next;
+		/* the avtab_ptr_t node is destroy by the avtab */
+		kfree(cur);
+	}
+}
+
+static void cond_node_destroy(struct cond_node *node)
+{
+	struct cond_expr *cur_expr, *next_expr;
+
+	for (cur_expr = node->expr; cur_expr != NULL; cur_expr = next_expr) {
+		next_expr = cur_expr->next;
+		kfree(cur_expr);
+	}
+	cond_av_list_destroy(node->true_list);
+	cond_av_list_destroy(node->false_list);
+	kfree(node);
+}
+
+static void cond_list_destroy(struct cond_node *list)
+{
+	struct cond_node *next, *cur;
+
+	if (list == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = next) {
+		next = cur->next;
+		cond_node_destroy(cur);
+	}
+}
+
+void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	if (p->bool_val_to_struct != NULL)
+		kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+	avtab_destroy(&p->te_cond_avtab);
+	cond_list_destroy(p->cond_list);
+}
+
+int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	if (p->bool_val_to_struct)
+		kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+	p->bool_val_to_struct = (struct cond_bool_datum**)
+		kmalloc(p->p_bools.nprim * sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum*), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	if (key)
+		kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+
+	booldatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+
+	if (!booldatum->value || booldatum->value > p->p_bools.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	p->p_bool_val_to_name[booldatum->value - 1] = key;
+	p->bool_val_to_struct[booldatum->value -1] = booldatum;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int bool_isvalid(struct cond_bool_datum *b)
+{
+	if (!(b->state == 0 || b->state == 1))
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+	u32 buf[3], len;
+	int rc;
+
+	booldatum = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!booldatum)
+		return -1;
+	memset(booldatum, 0, sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum));
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	booldatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	booldatum->state = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+	if (!bool_isvalid(booldatum))
+		goto err;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key)
+		goto err;
+	rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto err;
+	key[len] = 0;
+	if (hashtab_insert(h, key, booldatum))
+		goto err;
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	cond_destroy_bool(key, booldatum, NULL);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list **ret_list,
+			     struct cond_av_list *other)
+{
+	struct cond_av_list *list, *last = NULL, *cur;
+	struct avtab_key key;
+	struct avtab_datum datum;
+	struct avtab_node *node_ptr;
+	int rc;
+	u32 buf[1], i, len;
+	u8 found;
+
+	*ret_list = NULL;
+
+	len = 0;
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (len == 0) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if (avtab_read_item(fp, &datum, &key))
+			goto err;
+
+		/*
+		 * For type rules we have to make certain there aren't any
+		 * conflicting rules by searching the te_avtab and the
+		 * cond_te_avtab.
+		 */
+		if (datum.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) {
+			if (avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, &key, AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+				printk("security: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.");
+				goto err;
+			}
+			/*
+			 * If we are reading the false list other will be a pointer to
+			 * the true list. We can have duplicate entries if there is only
+			 * 1 other entry and it is in our true list.
+			 *
+			 * If we are reading the true list (other == NULL) there shouldn't
+			 * be any other entries.
+			 */
+			if (other) {
+				node_ptr = avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, &key, AVTAB_TYPE);
+				if (node_ptr) {
+					if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr, AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+						printk("security: too many conflicting type rules.");
+						goto err;
+					}
+					found = 0;
+					for (cur = other; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+						if (cur->node == node_ptr) {
+							found = 1;
+							break;
+						}
+					}
+					if (!found) {
+						printk("security: conflicting type rules.");
+						goto err;
+					}
+				}
+			} else {
+				if (avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, &key, AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+					printk("security: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.");
+					goto err;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, &key, &datum);
+		if (!node_ptr) {
+			printk("security: could not insert rule.");
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		list = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cond_av_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!list)
+			goto err;
+		memset(list, 0, sizeof(struct cond_av_list));
+
+		list->node = node_ptr;
+		if (i == 0)
+			*ret_list = list;
+		else
+			last->next = list;
+		last = list;
+
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	cond_av_list_destroy(*ret_list);
+	*ret_list = NULL;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int expr_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
+{
+	if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) {
+		printk("security: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (expr->bool > p->p_bools.nprim) {
+		printk("security: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
+{
+	u32 buf[2], len, i;
+	int rc;
+	struct cond_expr *expr = NULL, *last = NULL;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	node->cur_state = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	len = 0;
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* expr */
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		expr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cond_expr), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!expr) {
+			goto err;
+		}
+		memset(expr, 0, sizeof(struct cond_expr));
+
+		expr->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		expr->bool = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+		if (!expr_isvalid(p, expr)) {
+			kfree(expr);
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		if (i == 0) {
+			node->expr = expr;
+		} else {
+			last->next = expr;
+		}
+		last = expr;
+	}
+
+	if (cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL) != 0)
+		goto err;
+	if (cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, node->true_list) != 0)
+		goto err;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	cond_node_destroy(node);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	struct cond_node *node, *last = NULL;
+	u32 buf[1], i, len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		node = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cond_node), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!node)
+			goto err;
+		memset(node, 0, sizeof(struct cond_node));
+
+		if (cond_read_node(p, node, fp) != 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (i == 0) {
+			p->cond_list = node;
+		} else {
+			last->next = node;
+		}
+		last = node;
+	}
+	return 0;
+err:
+	cond_list_destroy(p->cond_list);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
+ * av table, and if so, add them to the result
+ */
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+
+	if(!ctab || !key || !avd)
+		return;
+
+	for(node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key, AVTAB_AV); node != NULL;
+				node = avtab_search_node_next(node, AVTAB_AV)) {
+		if ( (__u32) (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+		     (node->datum.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+			avd->allowed |= avtab_allowed(&node->datum);
+		if ( (__u32) (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+		     (node->datum.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+			/* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
+			 * permission we do NOT want to audit (dontaudit), we use
+			 * the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
+			 * are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
+			 */
+			avd->auditdeny &= avtab_auditdeny(&node->datum);
+		if ( (__u32) (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+		     (node->datum.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+			avd->auditallow |= avtab_auditallow(&node->datum);
+	}
+	return;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3a1fc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *          Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CONDITIONAL_H_
+#define _CONDITIONAL_H_
+
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "symtab.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+#define COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH 10
+
+/*
+ * A conditional expression is a list of operators and operands
+ * in reverse polish notation.
+ */
+struct cond_expr {
+#define COND_BOOL	1 /* plain bool */
+#define COND_NOT	2 /* !bool */
+#define COND_OR		3 /* bool || bool */
+#define COND_AND	4 /* bool && bool */
+#define COND_XOR	5 /* bool ^ bool */
+#define COND_EQ		6 /* bool == bool */
+#define COND_NEQ	7 /* bool != bool */
+#define COND_LAST	8
+	__u32 expr_type;
+	__u32 bool;
+	struct cond_expr *next;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Each cond_node contains a list of rules to be enabled/disabled
+ * depending on the current value of the conditional expression. This
+ * struct is for that list.
+ */
+struct cond_av_list {
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+	struct cond_av_list *next;
+};
+
+/*
+ * A cond node represents a conditional block in a policy. It
+ * contains a conditional expression, the current state of the expression,
+ * two lists of rules to enable/disable depending on the value of the
+ * expression (the true list corresponds to if and the false list corresponds
+ * to else)..
+ */
+struct cond_node {
+	int cur_state;
+	struct cond_expr *expr;
+	struct cond_av_list *true_list;
+	struct cond_av_list *false_list;
+	struct cond_node *next;
+};
+
+int cond_policydb_init(struct policydb* p);
+void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb* p);
+
+int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb* p);
+int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p);
+
+int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap);
+
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp);
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd);
+
+int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node);
+
+#endif /* _CONDITIONAL_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..149dda7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * A constraint is a condition that must be satisfied in
+ * order for one or more permissions to be granted.
+ * Constraints are used to impose additional restrictions
+ * beyond the type-based rules in `te' or the role-based
+ * transition rules in `rbac'.  Constraints are typically
+ * used to prevent a process from transitioning to a new user
+ * identity or role unless it is in a privileged type.
+ * Constraints are likewise typically used to prevent a
+ * process from labeling an object with a different user
+ * identity.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
+#define _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
+
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+
+#define CEXPR_MAXDEPTH 5
+
+struct constraint_expr {
+#define CEXPR_NOT		1 /* not expr */
+#define CEXPR_AND		2 /* expr and expr */
+#define CEXPR_OR		3 /* expr or expr */
+#define CEXPR_ATTR		4 /* attr op attr */
+#define CEXPR_NAMES		5 /* attr op names */
+	u32 expr_type;		/* expression type */
+
+#define CEXPR_USER 1		/* user */
+#define CEXPR_ROLE 2		/* role */
+#define CEXPR_TYPE 4		/* type */
+#define CEXPR_TARGET 8		/* target if set, source otherwise */
+#define CEXPR_XTARGET 16	/* special 3rd target for validatetrans rule */
+#define CEXPR_L1L2 32		/* low level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H2 64		/* low level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1L2 128		/* high level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1H2 256		/* high level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H1 512		/* low level 1 vs. high level 1 */
+#define CEXPR_L2H2 1024		/* low level 2 vs. high level 2 */
+	u32 attr;		/* attribute */
+
+#define CEXPR_EQ     1		/* == or eq */
+#define CEXPR_NEQ    2		/* != */
+#define CEXPR_DOM    3		/* dom */
+#define CEXPR_DOMBY  4		/* domby  */
+#define CEXPR_INCOMP 5		/* incomp */
+	u32 op;			/* operator */
+
+	struct ebitmap names;	/* names */
+
+	struct constraint_expr *next;   /* next expression */
+};
+
+struct constraint_node {
+	u32 permissions;	/* constrained permissions */
+	struct constraint_expr *expr;	/* constraint on permissions */
+	struct constraint_node *next;	/* next constraint */
+};
+
+#endif	/* _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0562bac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/*
+ * A security context is a set of security attributes
+ * associated with each subject and object controlled
+ * by the security policy.  Security contexts are
+  * externally represented as variable-length strings
+ * that can be interpreted by a user or application
+ * with an understanding of the security policy.
+ * Internally, the security server uses a simple
+ * structure.  This structure is private to the
+ * security server and can be changed without affecting
+ * clients of the security server.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_CONTEXT_H_
+#define _SS_CONTEXT_H_
+
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "mls_types.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+/*
+ * A security context consists of an authenticated user
+ * identity, a role, a type and a MLS range.
+ */
+struct context {
+	u32 user;
+	u32 role;
+	u32 type;
+	struct mls_range range;
+};
+
+static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
+{
+	memset(&c->range, 0, sizeof(c->range));
+}
+
+static inline int mls_context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
+{
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 1;
+
+	return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) &&
+		ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[0].cat,&c2->range.level[0].cat) &&
+		(c1->range.level[1].sens == c2->range.level[1].sens) &&
+		ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[1].cat,&c2->range.level[1].cat));
+}
+
+static inline void mls_context_destroy(struct context *c)
+{
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[0].cat);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[1].cat);
+	mls_context_init(c);
+}
+
+static inline void context_init(struct context *c)
+{
+	memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+}
+
+static inline int context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
+{
+	dst->user = src->user;
+	dst->role = src->role;
+	dst->type = src->type;
+	return mls_context_cpy(dst, src);
+}
+
+static inline void context_destroy(struct context *c)
+{
+	c->user = c->role = c->type = 0;
+	mls_context_destroy(c);
+}
+
+static inline int context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
+{
+	return ((c1->user == c2->user) &&
+		(c1->role == c2->role) &&
+		(c1->type == c2->type) &&
+		mls_context_cmp(c1, c2));
+}
+
+#endif	/* _SS_CONTEXT_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8ce9cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the extensible bitmap type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+
+	if (e1->highbit != e2->highbit)
+		return 0;
+
+	n1 = e1->node;
+	n2 = e2->node;
+	while (n1 && n2 &&
+	       (n1->startbit == n2->startbit) &&
+	       (n1->map == n2->map)) {
+		n1 = n1->next;
+		n2 = n2->next;
+	}
+
+	if (n1 || n2)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n, *new, *prev;
+
+	ebitmap_init(dst);
+	n = src->node;
+	prev = NULL;
+	while (n) {
+		new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!new) {
+			ebitmap_destroy(dst);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+		new->startbit = n->startbit;
+		new->map = n->map;
+		new->next = NULL;
+		if (prev)
+			prev->next = new;
+		else
+			dst->node = new;
+		prev = new;
+		n = n->next;
+	}
+
+	dst->highbit = src->highbit;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+
+	if (e1->highbit < e2->highbit)
+		return 0;
+
+	n1 = e1->node;
+	n2 = e2->node;
+	while (n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit <= n2->startbit)) {
+		if (n1->startbit < n2->startbit) {
+			n1 = n1->next;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if ((n1->map & n2->map) != n2->map)
+			return 0;
+
+		n1 = n1->next;
+		n2 = n2->next;
+	}
+
+	if (n2)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n;
+
+	if (e->highbit < bit)
+		return 0;
+
+	n = e->node;
+	while (n && (n->startbit <= bit)) {
+		if ((n->startbit + MAPSIZE) > bit) {
+			if (n->map & (MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit)))
+				return 1;
+			else
+				return 0;
+		}
+		n = n->next;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n, *prev, *new;
+
+	prev = NULL;
+	n = e->node;
+	while (n && n->startbit <= bit) {
+		if ((n->startbit + MAPSIZE) > bit) {
+			if (value) {
+				n->map |= (MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit));
+			} else {
+				n->map &= ~(MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit));
+				if (!n->map) {
+					/* drop this node from the bitmap */
+
+					if (!n->next) {
+						/*
+						 * this was the highest map
+						 * within the bitmap
+						 */
+						if (prev)
+							e->highbit = prev->startbit + MAPSIZE;
+						else
+							e->highbit = 0;
+					}
+					if (prev)
+						prev->next = n->next;
+					else
+						e->node = n->next;
+
+					kfree(n);
+				}
+			}
+			return 0;
+		}
+		prev = n;
+		n = n->next;
+	}
+
+	if (!value)
+		return 0;
+
+	new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+
+	new->startbit = bit & ~(MAPSIZE - 1);
+	new->map = (MAPBIT << (bit - new->startbit));
+
+	if (!n)
+		/* this node will be the highest map within the bitmap */
+		e->highbit = new->startbit + MAPSIZE;
+
+	if (prev) {
+		new->next = prev->next;
+		prev->next = new;
+	} else {
+		new->next = e->node;
+		e->node = new;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n, *temp;
+
+	if (!e)
+		return;
+
+	n = e->node;
+	while (n) {
+		temp = n;
+		n = n->next;
+		kfree(temp);
+	}
+
+	e->highbit = 0;
+	e->node = NULL;
+	return;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct ebitmap_node *n, *l;
+	u32 buf[3], mapsize, count, i;
+	u64 map;
+
+	ebitmap_init(e);
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	mapsize = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	e->highbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	count = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	if (mapsize != MAPSIZE) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
+		       "match my size %Zd (high bit was %d)\n", mapsize,
+		       MAPSIZE, e->highbit);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	if (!e->highbit) {
+		e->node = NULL;
+		goto ok;
+	}
+	if (e->highbit & (MAPSIZE - 1)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: high bit (%d) is not a "
+		       "multiple of the map size (%Zd)\n", e->highbit, MAPSIZE);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	l = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		n = kmalloc(sizeof(*n), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!n) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		memset(n, 0, sizeof(*n));
+
+		n->startbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+		if (n->startbit & (MAPSIZE - 1)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+			       "not a multiple of the map size (%Zd)\n",
+			       n->startbit, MAPSIZE);
+			goto bad_free;
+		}
+		if (n->startbit > (e->highbit - MAPSIZE)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+			       "beyond the end of the bitmap (%Zd)\n",
+			       n->startbit, (e->highbit - MAPSIZE));
+			goto bad_free;
+		}
+		rc = next_entry(&map, fp, sizeof(u64));
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+			goto bad_free;
+		}
+		n->map = le64_to_cpu(map);
+
+		if (!n->map) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: null map in "
+			       "ebitmap (startbit %d)\n", n->startbit);
+			goto bad_free;
+		}
+		if (l) {
+			if (n->startbit <= l->startbit) {
+				printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: start "
+				       "bit %d comes after start bit %d\n",
+				       n->startbit, l->startbit);
+				goto bad_free;
+			}
+			l->next = n;
+		} else
+			e->node = n;
+
+		l = n;
+	}
+
+ok:
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad_free:
+	kfree(n);
+bad:
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+	ebitmap_destroy(e);
+	goto out;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4713702
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/*
+ * An extensible bitmap is a bitmap that supports an
+ * arbitrary number of bits.  Extensible bitmaps are
+ * used to represent sets of values, such as types,
+ * roles, categories, and classes.
+ *
+ * Each extensible bitmap is implemented as a linked
+ * list of bitmap nodes, where each bitmap node has
+ * an explicitly specified starting bit position within
+ * the total bitmap.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_EBITMAP_H_
+#define _SS_EBITMAP_H_
+
+#define MAPTYPE u64			/* portion of bitmap in each node */
+#define MAPSIZE (sizeof(MAPTYPE) * 8)	/* number of bits in node bitmap */
+#define MAPBIT  1ULL			/* a bit in the node bitmap */
+
+struct ebitmap_node {
+	u32 startbit;		/* starting position in the total bitmap */
+	MAPTYPE map;		/* this node's portion of the bitmap */
+	struct ebitmap_node *next;
+};
+
+struct ebitmap {
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;	/* first node in the bitmap */
+	u32 highbit;	/* highest position in the total bitmap */
+};
+
+#define ebitmap_length(e) ((e)->highbit)
+#define ebitmap_startbit(e) ((e)->node ? (e)->node->startbit : 0)
+
+static inline void ebitmap_init(struct ebitmap *e)
+{
+	memset(e, 0, sizeof(*e));
+}
+
+int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src);
+int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit);
+int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value);
+void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
+
+#endif	/* _SS_EBITMAP_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26661fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the hash table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "hashtab.h"
+
+struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, void *key),
+                               int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2),
+                               u32 size)
+{
+	struct hashtab *p;
+	u32 i;
+
+	p = kmalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return p;
+
+	memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
+	p->size = size;
+	p->nel = 0;
+	p->hash_value = hash_value;
+	p->keycmp = keycmp;
+	p->htable = kmalloc(sizeof(*(p->htable)) * size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (p->htable == NULL) {
+		kfree(p);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+		p->htable[i] = NULL;
+
+	return p;
+}
+
+int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum)
+{
+	u32 hvalue;
+	struct hashtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+
+	if (!h || h->nel == HASHTAB_MAX_NODES)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hvalue = h->hash_value(h, key);
+	prev = NULL;
+	cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+	while (cur && h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) > 0) {
+		prev = cur;
+		cur = cur->next;
+	}
+
+	if (cur && (h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) == 0))
+		return -EEXIST;
+
+	newnode = kmalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (newnode == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memset(newnode, 0, sizeof(*newnode));
+	newnode->key = key;
+	newnode->datum = datum;
+	if (prev) {
+		newnode->next = prev->next;
+		prev->next = newnode;
+	} else {
+		newnode->next = h->htable[hvalue];
+		h->htable[hvalue] = newnode;
+	}
+
+	h->nel++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, void *key)
+{
+	u32 hvalue;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hvalue = h->hash_value(h, key);
+	cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+	while (cur != NULL && h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) > 0)
+		cur = cur->next;
+
+	if (cur == NULL || (h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) != 0))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return cur->datum;
+}
+
+void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h)
+{
+	u32 i;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		while (cur != NULL) {
+			temp = cur;
+			cur = cur->next;
+			kfree(temp);
+		}
+		h->htable[i] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	kfree(h->htable);
+	h->htable = NULL;
+
+	kfree(h);
+}
+
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
+		int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+		void *args)
+{
+	u32 i;
+	int ret;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!h)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		while (cur != NULL) {
+			ret = apply(cur->key, cur->datum, args);
+			if (ret)
+				return ret;
+			cur = cur->next;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
+{
+	u32 i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+	struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+	slots_used = 0;
+	max_chain_len = 0;
+	for (slots_used = max_chain_len = i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		if (cur) {
+			slots_used++;
+			chain_len = 0;
+			while (cur) {
+				chain_len++;
+				cur = cur->next;
+			}
+
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+	info->slots_used = slots_used;
+	info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4cc8581
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/*
+ * A hash table (hashtab) maintains associations between
+ * key values and datum values.  The type of the key values
+ * and the type of the datum values is arbitrary.  The
+ * functions for hash computation and key comparison are
+ * provided by the creator of the table.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_HASHTAB_H_
+#define _SS_HASHTAB_H_
+
+#define HASHTAB_MAX_NODES	0xffffffff
+
+struct hashtab_node {
+	void *key;
+	void *datum;
+	struct hashtab_node *next;
+};
+
+struct hashtab {
+	struct hashtab_node **htable;	/* hash table */
+	u32 size;			/* number of slots in hash table */
+	u32 nel;			/* number of elements in hash table */
+	u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, void *key);
+					/* hash function */
+	int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2);
+					/* key comparison function */
+};
+
+struct hashtab_info {
+	u32 slots_used;
+	u32 max_chain_len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Creates a new hash table with the specified characteristics.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if insufficent space is available or
+ * the new hash table otherwise.
+ */
+struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, void *key),
+                               int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2),
+                               u32 size);
+
+/*
+ * Inserts the specified (key, datum) pair into the specified hash table.
+ *
+ * Returns -ENOMEM on memory allocation error,
+ * -EEXIST if there is already an entry with the same key,
+ * -EINVAL for general errors or
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *k, void *d);
+
+/*
+ * Searches for the entry with the specified key in the hash table.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if no entry has the specified key or
+ * the datum of the entry otherwise.
+ */
+void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, void *k);
+
+/*
+ * Destroys the specified hash table.
+ */
+void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h);
+
+/*
+ * Applies the specified apply function to (key,datum,args)
+ * for each entry in the specified hash table.
+ *
+ * The order in which the function is applied to the entries
+ * is dependent upon the internal structure of the hash table.
+ *
+ * If apply returns a non-zero status, then hashtab_map will cease
+ * iterating through the hash table and will propagate the error
+ * return to its caller.
+ */
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
+		int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+		void *args);
+
+/* Fill info with some hash table statistics */
+void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info);
+
+#endif	/* _SS_HASHTAB_H */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..756036b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,527 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+/*
+ * Return the length in bytes for the MLS fields of the
+ * security context string representation of `context'.
+ */
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct context * context)
+{
+	int i, l, len, range;
+
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		range = 0;
+		len += strlen(policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+
+		for (i = 1; i <= ebitmap_length(&context->range.level[l].cat); i++) {
+			if (ebitmap_get_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i - 1)) {
+				if (range) {
+					range++;
+					continue;
+				}
+
+				len += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]) + 1;
+				range++;
+			} else {
+				if (range > 1)
+					len += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]) + 1;
+				range = 0;
+			}
+		}
+		/* Handle case where last category is the end of range */
+		if (range > 1)
+			len += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]) + 1;
+
+		if (l == 0) {
+			if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
+			                 &context->range.level[1]))
+				break;
+			else
+				len++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the MLS fields of `context' into the string `*scontext'.
+ * Update `*scontext' to point to the end of the MLS fields.
+ */
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
+                        char **scontext)
+{
+	char *scontextp;
+	int i, l, range, wrote_sep;
+
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	scontextp = *scontext;
+
+	*scontextp = ':';
+	scontextp++;
+
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		range = 0;
+		wrote_sep = 0;
+		strcpy(scontextp,
+		       policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+		scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+
+		/* categories */
+		for (i = 1; i <= ebitmap_length(&context->range.level[l].cat); i++) {
+			if (ebitmap_get_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i - 1)) {
+				if (range) {
+					range++;
+					continue;
+				}
+
+				if (!wrote_sep) {
+					*scontextp++ = ':';
+					wrote_sep = 1;
+				} else
+					*scontextp++ = ',';
+				strcpy(scontextp, policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]);
+				scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]);
+				range++;
+			} else {
+				if (range > 1) {
+					if (range > 2)
+						*scontextp++ = '.';
+					else
+						*scontextp++ = ',';
+
+					strcpy(scontextp, policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]);
+					scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]);
+				}
+				range = 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* Handle case where last category is the end of range */
+		if (range > 1) {
+			if (range > 2)
+				*scontextp++ = '.';
+			else
+				*scontextp++ = ',';
+
+			strcpy(scontextp, policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]);
+			scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 2]);
+		}
+
+		if (l == 0) {
+			if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
+			                 &context->range.level[1]))
+				break;
+			else {
+				*scontextp = '-';
+				scontextp++;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	*scontext = scontextp;
+	return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if the MLS fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' are valid.  Return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
+{
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	int i, l;
+
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * MLS range validity checks: high must dominate low, low level must
+	 * be valid (category set <-> sensitivity check), and high level must
+	 * be valid (category set <-> sensitivity check)
+	 */
+	if (!mls_level_dom(&c->range.level[1], &c->range.level[0]))
+		/* High does not dominate low. */
+		return 0;
+
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		if (!c->range.level[l].sens || c->range.level[l].sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+			return 0;
+		levdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_levels.table,
+			p->p_sens_val_to_name[c->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+		if (!levdatum)
+			return 0;
+
+		for (i = 1; i <= ebitmap_length(&c->range.level[l].cat); i++) {
+			if (ebitmap_get_bit(&c->range.level[l].cat, i - 1)) {
+				if (i > p->p_cats.nprim)
+					return 0;
+				if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&levdatum->level->cat, i - 1))
+					/*
+					 * Category may not be associated with
+					 * sensitivity in low level.
+					 */
+					return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (c->role == OBJECT_R_VAL)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * User must be authorized for the MLS range.
+	 */
+	if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
+		return 0;
+	usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
+	if (!mls_range_contains(usrdatum->range, c->range))
+		return 0; /* user may not be associated with range */
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
+ * `context' based on the string representation in
+ * the string `*scontext'.  Update `*scontext' to
+ * point to the end of the string representation of
+ * the MLS fields.
+ *
+ * This function modifies the string in place, inserting
+ * NULL characters to terminate the MLS fields.
+ */
+int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
+		       char **scontext,
+		       struct context *context)
+{
+
+	char delim;
+	char *scontextp, *p, *rngptr;
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum, *rngdatum;
+	int l, rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* No MLS component to the security context. */
+	if (!oldc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Extract low sensitivity. */
+	scontextp = p = *scontext;
+	while (*p && *p != ':' && *p != '-')
+		p++;
+
+	delim = *p;
+	if (delim != 0)
+		*p++ = 0;
+
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		levdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_levels.table, scontextp);
+		if (!levdatum) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		context->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
+
+		if (delim == ':') {
+			/* Extract category set. */
+			while (1) {
+				scontextp = p;
+				while (*p && *p != ',' && *p != '-')
+					p++;
+				delim = *p;
+				if (delim != 0)
+					*p++ = 0;
+
+				/* Separate into range if exists */
+				if ((rngptr = strchr(scontextp, '.')) != NULL) {
+					/* Remove '.' */
+					*rngptr++ = 0;
+				}
+
+				catdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_cats.table,
+				                          scontextp);
+				if (!catdatum) {
+					rc = -EINVAL;
+					goto out;
+				}
+
+				rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+				                     catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				/* If range, set all categories in range */
+				if (rngptr) {
+					int i;
+
+					rngdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_cats.table, rngptr);
+					if (!rngdatum) {
+						rc = -EINVAL;
+						goto out;
+					}
+
+					if (catdatum->value >= rngdatum->value) {
+						rc = -EINVAL;
+						goto out;
+					}
+
+					for (i = catdatum->value; i < rngdatum->value; i++) {
+						rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i, 1);
+						if (rc)
+							goto out;
+					}
+				}
+
+				if (delim != ',')
+					break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (delim == '-') {
+			/* Extract high sensitivity. */
+			scontextp = p;
+			while (*p && *p != ':')
+				p++;
+
+			delim = *p;
+			if (delim != 0)
+				*p++ = 0;
+		} else
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (l == 0) {
+		context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
+		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat,
+				 &context->range.level[0].cat);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	*scontext = ++p;
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copies the MLS range from `src' into `dst'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_copy_context(struct context *dst,
+				   struct context *src)
+{
+	int l, rc = 0;
+
+	/* Copy the MLS range from the source context */
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		dst->range.level[l].sens = src->range.level[l].sens;
+		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[l].cat,
+				 &src->range.level[l].cat);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copies the effective MLS range from `src' into `dst'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_scopy_context(struct context *dst,
+                                    struct context *src)
+{
+	int l, rc = 0;
+
+	/* Copy the MLS range from the source context */
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		dst->range.level[l].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[l].cat,
+				 &src->range.level[0].cat);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copies the MLS range `range' into `context'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
+                                struct mls_range *range)
+{
+	int l, rc = 0;
+
+	/* Copy the MLS range into the  context */
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		context->range.level[l].sens = range->level[l].sens;
+		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+				 &range->level[l].cat);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+                         struct context *usercon)
+{
+	if (selinux_mls_enabled) {
+		struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]);
+		struct mls_level *fromcon_clr = &(fromcon->range.level[1]);
+		struct mls_level *user_low = &(user->range.level[0]);
+		struct mls_level *user_clr = &(user->range.level[1]);
+		struct mls_level *user_def = &(user->dfltlevel);
+		struct mls_level *usercon_sen = &(usercon->range.level[0]);
+		struct mls_level *usercon_clr = &(usercon->range.level[1]);
+
+		/* Honor the user's default level if we can */
+		if (mls_level_between(user_def, fromcon_sen, fromcon_clr)) {
+			*usercon_sen = *user_def;
+		} else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_sen, user_def, user_clr)) {
+			*usercon_sen = *fromcon_sen;
+		} else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_clr, user_low, user_def)) {
+			*usercon_sen = *user_low;
+		} else
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/* Lower the clearance of available contexts
+		   if the clearance of "fromcon" is lower than
+		   that of the user's default clearance (but
+		   only if the "fromcon" clearance dominates
+		   the user's computed sensitivity level) */
+		if (mls_level_dom(user_clr, fromcon_clr)) {
+			*usercon_clr = *fromcon_clr;
+		} else if (mls_level_dom(fromcon_clr, user_clr)) {
+			*usercon_clr = *user_clr;
+		} else
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert the MLS fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' from the values specified in the
+ * policy `oldp' to the values specified in the policy `newp'.
+ */
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
+			struct policydb *newp,
+			struct context *c)
+{
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+	struct ebitmap bitmap;
+	int l, i;
+
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+		levdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_levels.table,
+			oldp->p_sens_val_to_name[c->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+
+		if (!levdatum)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		c->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
+
+		ebitmap_init(&bitmap);
+		for (i = 1; i <= ebitmap_length(&c->range.level[l].cat); i++) {
+			if (ebitmap_get_bit(&c->range.level[l].cat, i - 1)) {
+				int rc;
+
+				catdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_cats.table,
+				         	oldp->p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]);
+				if (!catdatum)
+					return -EINVAL;
+				rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+			}
+		}
+		ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[l].cat);
+		c->range.level[l].cat = bitmap;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
+		    struct context *tcontext,
+		    u16 tclass,
+		    u32 specified,
+		    struct context *newcontext)
+{
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (specified) {
+	case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+		if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS) {
+			struct range_trans *rangetr;
+			/* Look for a range transition rule. */
+			for (rangetr = policydb.range_tr; rangetr;
+			     rangetr = rangetr->next) {
+				if (rangetr->dom == scontext->type &&
+				    rangetr->type == tcontext->type) {
+					/* Set the range from the rule */
+					return mls_range_set(newcontext,
+					                     &rangetr->range);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		/* Fallthrough */
+	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+		if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS)
+			/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
+			return mls_copy_context(newcontext, scontext);
+		else
+			/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
+			return mls_scopy_context(newcontext, scontext);
+	case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+		/* Only polyinstantiate the MLS attributes if
+		   the type is being polyinstantiated */
+		if (newcontext->type != tcontext->type) {
+			/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
+			return mls_scopy_context(newcontext, scontext);
+		} else {
+			/* Use the related object MLS attributes. */
+			return mls_copy_context(newcontext, tcontext);
+		}
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d37bea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ * Multi-level security (MLS) policy operations.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_MLS_H_
+#define _SS_MLS_H_
+
+#include "context.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context);
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, char **scontext);
+int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
+
+int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
+	               char **scontext,
+		       struct context *context);
+
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
+			struct policydb *newp,
+			struct context *context);
+
+int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
+		    struct context *tcontext,
+		    u16 tclass,
+		    u32 specified,
+		    struct context *newcontext);
+
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+                         struct context *usercon);
+
+#endif	/* _SS_MLS_H */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c692d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Type definitions for the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
+#define _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+struct mls_level {
+	u32 sens;		/* sensitivity */
+	struct ebitmap cat;	/* category set */
+};
+
+struct mls_range {
+	struct mls_level level[2]; /* low == level[0], high == level[1] */
+};
+
+static inline int mls_level_eq(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2)
+{
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 1;
+
+	return ((l1->sens == l2->sens) &&
+	        ebitmap_cmp(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
+}
+
+static inline int mls_level_dom(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2)
+{
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return 1;
+
+	return ((l1->sens >= l2->sens) &&
+	        ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
+}
+
+#define mls_level_incomp(l1, l2) \
+(!mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && !mls_level_dom((l2), (l1)))
+
+#define mls_level_between(l1, l2, l3) \
+(mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && mls_level_dom((l3), (l1)))
+
+#define mls_range_contains(r1, r2) \
+(mls_level_dom(&(r2).level[0], &(r1).level[0]) && \
+ mls_level_dom(&(r1).level[1], &(r2).level[1]))
+
+#endif	/* _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14190ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1843 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the policy database.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * 	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "security.h"
+
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+
+#define _DEBUG_HASHES
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
+static char *symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
+	"common prefixes",
+	"classes",
+	"roles",
+	"types",
+	"users",
+	"bools",
+	"levels",
+	"categories",
+};
+#endif
+
+int selinux_mls_enabled = 0;
+
+static unsigned int symtab_sizes[SYM_NUM] = {
+	2,
+	32,
+	16,
+	512,
+	128,
+	16,
+	16,
+	16,
+};
+
+struct policydb_compat_info {
+	int version;
+	int sym_num;
+	int ocon_num;
+};
+
+/* These need to be updated if SYM_NUM or OCON_NUM changes */
+static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
+	{
+		.version        = POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE,
+		.sym_num        = SYM_NUM - 3,
+		.ocon_num       = OCON_NUM - 1,
+	},
+	{
+		.version        = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL,
+		.sym_num        = SYM_NUM - 2,
+		.ocon_num       = OCON_NUM - 1,
+	},
+	{
+		.version        = POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6,
+		.sym_num        = SYM_NUM - 2,
+		.ocon_num       = OCON_NUM,
+	},
+	{
+		.version        = POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS,
+		.sym_num        = SYM_NUM - 2,
+		.ocon_num       = OCON_NUM,
+	},
+	{
+		.version        = POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS,
+		.sym_num        = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num       = OCON_NUM,
+	},
+};
+
+static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct policydb_compat_info *info = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(policydb_compat)/sizeof(*info); i++) {
+		if (policydb_compat[i].version == version) {
+			info = &policydb_compat[i];
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return info;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the role table.
+ */
+static int roles_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	int rc;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+
+	role = kmalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!role) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memset(role, 0, sizeof(*role));
+	role->value = ++p->p_roles.nprim;
+	if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_free_role;
+	}
+	key = kmalloc(strlen(OBJECT_R)+1,GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free_role;
+	}
+	strcpy(key, OBJECT_R);
+	rc = hashtab_insert(p->p_roles.table, key, role);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_free_key;
+out:
+	return rc;
+
+out_free_key:
+	kfree(key);
+out_free_role:
+	kfree(role);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a policy database structure.
+ */
+static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	int i, rc;
+
+	memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+		rc = symtab_init(&p->symtab[i], symtab_sizes[i]);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free_symtab;
+	}
+
+	rc = avtab_init(&p->te_avtab);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_free_symtab;
+
+	rc = roles_init(p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_free_avtab;
+
+	rc = cond_policydb_init(p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_free_avtab;
+
+out:
+	return rc;
+
+out_free_avtab:
+	avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
+
+out_free_symtab:
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
+		hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_index functions are used to
+ * define the val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays
+ * in a policy database structure.  The val_to_name
+ * arrays are used when converting security context
+ * structures into string representations.  The
+ * val_to_struct arrays are used when the attributes
+ * of a class, role, or user are needed.
+ */
+
+static int common_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+	comdatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+	if (!comdatum->value || comdatum->value > p->p_commons.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	p->p_common_val_to_name[comdatum->value - 1] = key;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+
+	cladatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+	if (!cladatum->value || cladatum->value > p->p_classes.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	p->p_class_val_to_name[cladatum->value - 1] = key;
+	p->class_val_to_struct[cladatum->value - 1] = cladatum;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+
+	role = datum;
+	p = datap;
+	if (!role->value || role->value > p->p_roles.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	p->p_role_val_to_name[role->value - 1] = key;
+	p->role_val_to_struct[role->value - 1] = role;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+
+	typdatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+
+	if (typdatum->primary) {
+		if (!typdatum->value || typdatum->value > p->p_types.nprim)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		p->p_type_val_to_name[typdatum->value - 1] = key;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+	usrdatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+	if (!usrdatum->value || usrdatum->value > p->p_users.nprim)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	p->p_user_val_to_name[usrdatum->value - 1] = key;
+	p->user_val_to_struct[usrdatum->value - 1] = usrdatum;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+
+	levdatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+
+	if (!levdatum->isalias) {
+		if (!levdatum->level->sens ||
+		    levdatum->level->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		p->p_sens_val_to_name[levdatum->level->sens - 1] = key;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+
+	catdatum = datum;
+	p = datap;
+
+	if (!catdatum->isalias) {
+		if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		p->p_cat_val_to_name[catdatum->value - 1] = key;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
+{
+	common_index,
+	class_index,
+	role_index,
+	type_index,
+	user_index,
+	cond_index_bool,
+	sens_index,
+	cat_index,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Define the common val_to_name array and the class
+ * val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays in a policy
+ * database structure.
+ *
+ * Caller must clean up upon failure.
+ */
+static int policydb_index_classes(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	p->p_common_val_to_name =
+		kmalloc(p->p_commons.nprim * sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p->p_common_val_to_name) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->p_commons.table, common_index, p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	p->class_val_to_struct =
+		kmalloc(p->p_classes.nprim * sizeof(*(p->class_val_to_struct)), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p->class_val_to_struct) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	p->p_class_val_to_name =
+		kmalloc(p->p_classes.nprim * sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p->p_class_val_to_name) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->p_classes.table, class_index, p);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
+static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+		struct hashtab *h = s[i].table;
+		struct hashtab_info info;
+
+		hashtab_stat(h, &info);
+		printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
+		       "longest chain length %d\n", symtab_name[i], h->nel,
+		       info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len);
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Define the other val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays
+ * in a policy database structure.
+ *
+ * Caller must clean up on failure.
+ */
+static int policydb_index_others(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	int i, rc = 0;
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "security:  %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools",
+	       p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim, p->p_bools.nprim);
+	if (selinux_mls_enabled)
+		printk(", %d sens, %d cats", p->p_levels.nprim,
+		       p->p_cats.nprim);
+	printk("\n");
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "security:  %d classes, %d rules\n",
+	       p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
+	avtab_hash_eval(&p->te_avtab, "rules");
+	symtab_hash_eval(p->symtab);
+#endif
+
+	p->role_val_to_struct =
+		kmalloc(p->p_roles.nprim * sizeof(*(p->role_val_to_struct)),
+		        GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p->role_val_to_struct) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	p->user_val_to_struct =
+		kmalloc(p->p_users.nprim * sizeof(*(p->user_val_to_struct)),
+		        GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p->user_val_to_struct) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (cond_init_bool_indexes(p)) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = SYM_ROLES; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+		p->sym_val_to_name[i] =
+			kmalloc(p->symtab[i].nprim * sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!p->sym_val_to_name[i]) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		rc = hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, index_f[i], p);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_destroy functions are used to
+ * free any memory allocated for each kind of
+ * symbol data in the policy database.
+ */
+
+static int perm_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int common_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	comdatum = datum;
+	hashtab_map(comdatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+	hashtab_destroy(comdatum->permissions.table);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+	struct constraint_node *constraint, *ctemp;
+	struct constraint_expr *e, *etmp;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	cladatum = datum;
+	hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+	hashtab_destroy(cladatum->permissions.table);
+	constraint = cladatum->constraints;
+	while (constraint) {
+		e = constraint->expr;
+		while (e) {
+			ebitmap_destroy(&e->names);
+			etmp = e;
+			e = e->next;
+			kfree(etmp);
+		}
+		ctemp = constraint;
+		constraint = constraint->next;
+		kfree(ctemp);
+	}
+
+	constraint = cladatum->validatetrans;
+	while (constraint) {
+		e = constraint->expr;
+		while (e) {
+			ebitmap_destroy(&e->names);
+			etmp = e;
+			e = e->next;
+			kfree(etmp);
+		}
+		ctemp = constraint;
+		constraint = constraint->next;
+		kfree(ctemp);
+	}
+
+	kfree(cladatum->comkey);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct role_datum *role;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	role = datum;
+	ebitmap_destroy(&role->dominates);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&role->types);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	usrdatum = datum;
+	ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->roles);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[0].cat);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[1].cat);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->dfltlevel.cat);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+
+	kfree(key);
+	levdatum = datum;
+	ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
+	kfree(levdatum->level);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
+{
+	common_destroy,
+	class_destroy,
+	role_destroy,
+	type_destroy,
+	user_destroy,
+	cond_destroy_bool,
+	sens_destroy,
+	cat_destroy,
+};
+
+static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, int i)
+{
+	context_destroy(&c->context[0]);
+	context_destroy(&c->context[1]);
+	if (i == OCON_ISID || i == OCON_FS ||
+	    i == OCON_NETIF || i == OCON_FSUSE)
+		kfree(c->u.name);
+	kfree(c);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free any memory allocated by a policy database structure.
+ */
+void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+	struct ocontext *c, *ctmp;
+	struct genfs *g, *gtmp;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+		hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, destroy_f[i], NULL);
+		hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+		if (p->sym_val_to_name[i])
+			kfree(p->sym_val_to_name[i]);
+	}
+
+	if (p->class_val_to_struct)
+		kfree(p->class_val_to_struct);
+	if (p->role_val_to_struct)
+		kfree(p->role_val_to_struct);
+	if (p->user_val_to_struct)
+		kfree(p->user_val_to_struct);
+
+	avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < OCON_NUM; i++) {
+		c = p->ocontexts[i];
+		while (c) {
+			ctmp = c;
+			c = c->next;
+			ocontext_destroy(ctmp,i);
+		}
+	}
+
+	g = p->genfs;
+	while (g) {
+		kfree(g->fstype);
+		c = g->head;
+		while (c) {
+			ctmp = c;
+			c = c->next;
+			ocontext_destroy(ctmp,OCON_FSUSE);
+		}
+		gtmp = g;
+		g = g->next;
+		kfree(gtmp);
+	}
+
+	cond_policydb_destroy(p);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load the initial SIDs specified in a policy database
+ * structure into a SID table.
+ */
+int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
+{
+	struct ocontext *head, *c;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = sidtab_init(s);
+	if (rc) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  out of memory on SID table init\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	head = p->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
+	for (c = head; c; c = c->next) {
+		if (!c->context[0].user) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security:  SID %s was never "
+			       "defined.\n", c->u.name);
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (sidtab_insert(s, c->sid[0], &c->context[0])) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security:  unable to load initial "
+			       "SID %s.\n", c->u.name);
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if the fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' are valid.  Return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
+{
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+	if (!c->role || c->role > p->p_roles.nprim)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!c->type || c->type > p->p_types.nprim)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (c->role != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
+		/*
+		 * Role must be authorized for the type.
+		 */
+		role = p->role_val_to_struct[c->role - 1];
+		if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types,
+				     c->type - 1))
+			/* role may not be associated with type */
+			return 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * User must be authorized for the role.
+		 */
+		usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
+		if (!usrdatum)
+			return 0;
+
+		if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&usrdatum->roles,
+				     c->role - 1))
+			/* user may not be associated with role */
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!mls_context_isvalid(p, c))
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a MLS range structure from a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
+{
+	u32 buf[2], items;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	items = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls:  range overflow\n");
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * items);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls:  truncated range\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	r->level[0].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	if (items > 1)
+		r->level[1].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	else
+		r->level[1].sens = r->level[0].sens;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
+	if (rc) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls:  error reading low "
+		       "categories\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (items > 1) {
+		rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls:  error reading high "
+			       "categories\n");
+			goto bad_high;
+		}
+	} else {
+		rc = ebitmap_cpy(&r->level[1].cat, &r->level[0].cat);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls:  out of memory\n");
+			goto bad_high;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad_high:
+	ebitmap_destroy(&r->level[0].cat);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read and validate a security context structure
+ * from a policydb binary representation file.
+ */
+static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c,
+				     struct policydb *p,
+				     void *fp)
+{
+	u32 buf[3];
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: context truncated\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	c->user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	c->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	c->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+		if (mls_read_range_helper(&c->range, fp)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security: error reading MLS range of "
+			       "context\n");
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(p, c)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  invalid security context\n");
+		context_destroy(c);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+	}
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_read functions are used to
+ * read the symbol data from a policy database
+ * binary representation file.
+ */
+
+static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct perm_datum *perdatum;
+	int rc;
+	u32 buf[2], len;
+
+	perdatum = kmalloc(sizeof(*perdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!perdatum) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memset(perdatum, 0, sizeof(*perdatum));
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+	key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+	key[len] = 0;
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, perdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad:
+	perm_destroy(key, perdatum, NULL);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct common_datum *comdatum;
+	u32 buf[4], len, nel;
+	int i, rc;
+
+	comdatum = kmalloc(sizeof(*comdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!comdatum) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memset(comdatum, 0, sizeof(*comdatum));
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	comdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+	rc = symtab_init(&comdatum->permissions, PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+
+	key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+	key[len] = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = perm_read(p, comdatum->permissions.table, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, comdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad:
+	common_destroy(key, comdatum, NULL);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static int read_cons_helper(struct constraint_node **nodep, int ncons,
+                            int allowxtarget, void *fp)
+{
+	struct constraint_node *c, *lc;
+	struct constraint_expr *e, *le;
+	u32 buf[3], nexpr;
+	int rc, i, j, depth;
+
+	lc = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < ncons; i++) {
+		c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!c)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+
+		if (lc) {
+			lc->next = c;
+		} else {
+			*nodep = c;
+		}
+
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
+		if (rc < 0)
+			return rc;
+		c->permissions = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		nexpr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		le = NULL;
+		depth = -1;
+		for (j = 0; j < nexpr; j++) {
+			e = kmalloc(sizeof(*e), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!e)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+			memset(e, 0, sizeof(*e));
+
+			if (le) {
+				le->next = e;
+			} else {
+				c->expr = e;
+			}
+
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 3));
+			if (rc < 0)
+				return rc;
+			e->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			e->attr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+			e->op = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+			switch (e->expr_type) {
+			case CEXPR_NOT:
+				if (depth < 0)
+					return -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_AND:
+			case CEXPR_OR:
+				if (depth < 1)
+					return -EINVAL;
+				depth--;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_ATTR:
+				if (depth == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+					return -EINVAL;
+				depth++;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_NAMES:
+				if (!allowxtarget && (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET))
+					return -EINVAL;
+				if (depth == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+					return -EINVAL;
+				depth++;
+				if (ebitmap_read(&e->names, fp))
+					return -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			default:
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			le = e;
+		}
+		if (depth != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		lc = c;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+	u32 buf[6], len, len2, ncons, nel;
+	int i, rc;
+
+	cladatum = kmalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cladatum) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memset(cladatum, 0, sizeof(*cladatum));
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*6);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	len2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	cladatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	rc = symtab_init(&cladatum->permissions, PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+	cladatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[4]);
+
+	ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
+
+	key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+	key[len] = 0;
+
+	if (len2) {
+		cladatum->comkey = kmalloc(len2 + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!cladatum->comkey) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		rc = next_entry(cladatum->comkey, fp, len2);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto bad;
+		cladatum->comkey[len2] = 0;
+
+		cladatum->comdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_commons.table,
+						    cladatum->comkey);
+		if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security:  unknown common %s\n",
+			       cladatum->comkey);
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto bad;
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = perm_read(p, cladatum->permissions.table, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = read_cons_helper(&cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_VALIDATETRANS) {
+		/* grab the validatetrans rules */
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto bad;
+		ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		rc = read_cons_helper(&cladatum->validatetrans, ncons, 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, cladatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad:
+	class_destroy(key, cladatum, NULL);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	int rc;
+	u32 buf[2], len;
+
+	role = kmalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!role) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memset(role, 0, sizeof(*role));
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	role->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+	key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+	key[len] = 0;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_read(&role->dominates, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_read(&role->types, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	if (strcmp(key, OBJECT_R) == 0) {
+		if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "Role %s has wrong value %d\n",
+			       OBJECT_R, role->value);
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		rc = 0;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, role);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad:
+	role_destroy(key, role, NULL);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+	int rc;
+	u32 buf[3], len;
+
+	typdatum = kmalloc(sizeof(*typdatum),GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!typdatum) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		return rc;
+	}
+	memset(typdatum, 0, sizeof(*typdatum));
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	typdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	typdatum->primary = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+	key[len] = 0;
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, typdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad:
+	type_destroy(key, typdatum, NULL);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Read a MLS level structure from a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_read_level(struct mls_level *lp, void *fp)
+{
+	u32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	memset(lp, 0, sizeof(*lp));
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: truncated level\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	lp->sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	if (ebitmap_read(&lp->cat, fp)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls:  error reading level "
+		       "categories\n");
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+bad:
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	int rc;
+	u32 buf[2], len;
+
+	usrdatum = kmalloc(sizeof(*usrdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!usrdatum) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memset(usrdatum, 0, sizeof(*usrdatum));
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	usrdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+	key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+	key[len] = 0;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_read(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+		rc = mls_read_range_helper(&usrdatum->range, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+		rc = mls_read_level(&usrdatum->dfltlevel, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, usrdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad:
+	user_destroy(key, usrdatum, NULL);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct level_datum *levdatum;
+	int rc;
+	u32 buf[2], len;
+
+	levdatum = kmalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!levdatum) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memset(levdatum, 0, sizeof(*levdatum));
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	levdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+	key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!key) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+	key[len] = 0;
+
+	levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(struct mls_level), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!levdatum->level) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	if (mls_read_level(levdatum->level, fp)) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, levdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad:
+	sens_destroy(key, levdatum, NULL);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
+{
+	char *key = NULL;
+	struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+	int rc;
+	u32 buf[3], len;
+
+	catdatum = kmalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!catdatum) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memset(catdatum, 0, sizeof(*catdatum));
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+
+	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+	catdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+	key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!key) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+	key[len] = 0;
+
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, catdatum);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+out:
+	return rc;
+
+bad:
+	cat_destroy(key, catdatum, NULL);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static int (*read_f[SYM_NUM]) (struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) =
+{
+	common_read,
+	class_read,
+	role_read,
+	type_read,
+	user_read,
+	cond_read_bool,
+	sens_read,
+	cat_read,
+};
+
+extern int ss_initialized;
+
+/*
+ * Read the configuration data from a policy database binary
+ * representation file into a policy database structure.
+ */
+int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	struct role_allow *ra, *lra;
+	struct role_trans *tr, *ltr;
+	struct ocontext *l, *c, *newc;
+	struct genfs *genfs_p, *genfs, *newgenfs;
+	int i, j, rc;
+	u32 buf[8], len, len2, config, nprim, nel, nel2;
+	char *policydb_str;
+	struct policydb_compat_info *info;
+	struct range_trans *rt, *lrt;
+
+	config = 0;
+
+	rc = policydb_init(p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Read the magic number and string length. */
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)* 2);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
+		buf[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf[i]);
+
+	if (buf[0] != POLICYDB_MAGIC) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  policydb magic number 0x%x does "
+		       "not match expected magic number 0x%x\n",
+		       buf[0], POLICYDB_MAGIC);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	len = buf[1];
+	if (len != strlen(POLICYDB_STRING)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  policydb string length %d does not "
+		       "match expected length %Zu\n",
+		       len, strlen(POLICYDB_STRING));
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	policydb_str = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!policydb_str) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  unable to allocate memory for policydb "
+		       "string of length %d\n", len);
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	rc = next_entry(policydb_str, fp, len);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  truncated policydb string identifier\n");
+		kfree(policydb_str);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	policydb_str[len] = 0;
+	if (strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  policydb string %s does not match "
+		       "my string %s\n", policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING);
+		kfree(policydb_str);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	/* Done with policydb_str. */
+	kfree(policydb_str);
+	policydb_str = NULL;
+
+	/* Read the version, config, and table sizes. */
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*4);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+		buf[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf[i]);
+
+	p->policyvers = buf[0];
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN ||
+	    p->policyvers > POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX) {
+	    	printk(KERN_ERR "security:  policydb version %d does not match "
+	    	       "my version range %d-%d\n",
+	    	       buf[0], POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN, POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
+	    	goto bad;
+	}
+
+	if ((buf[1] & POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS)) {
+		if (ss_initialized && !selinux_mls_enabled) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "Cannot switch between non-MLS and MLS "
+			       "policies\n");
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		selinux_mls_enabled = 1;
+		config |= POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS;
+
+		if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "security policydb version %d (MLS) "
+			       "not backwards compatible\n", p->policyvers);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (ss_initialized && selinux_mls_enabled) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "Cannot switch between MLS and non-MLS "
+			       "policies\n");
+			goto bad;
+		}
+	}
+
+	info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
+	if (!info) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  unable to find policy compat info "
+		       "for version %d\n", p->policyvers);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	if (buf[2] != info->sym_num || buf[3] != info->ocon_num) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
+		       "not match mine (%d,%d)\n", buf[2], buf[3],
+		       info->sym_num, info->ocon_num);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < info->sym_num; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto bad;
+		nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
+			rc = read_f[i](p, p->symtab[i].table, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				goto bad;
+		}
+
+		p->symtab[i].nprim = nprim;
+	}
+
+	rc = avtab_read(&p->te_avtab, fp, config);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL) {
+		rc = cond_read_list(p, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	ltr = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		tr = kmalloc(sizeof(*tr), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!tr) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		memset(tr, 0, sizeof(*tr));
+		if (ltr) {
+			ltr->next = tr;
+		} else {
+			p->role_tr = tr;
+		}
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto bad;
+		tr->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		tr->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		tr->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+		ltr = tr;
+	}
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	lra = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		ra = kmalloc(sizeof(*ra), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ra) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		memset(ra, 0, sizeof(*ra));
+		if (lra) {
+			lra->next = ra;
+		} else {
+			p->role_allow = ra;
+		}
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto bad;
+		ra->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		ra->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		lra = ra;
+	}
+
+	rc = policydb_index_classes(p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	rc = policydb_index_others(p);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto bad;
+		nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		l = NULL;
+		for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
+			c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!c) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto bad;
+			}
+			memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+			if (l) {
+				l->next = c;
+			} else {
+				p->ocontexts[i] = c;
+			}
+			l = c;
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			switch (i) {
+			case OCON_ISID:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+				if (rc < 0)
+					goto bad;
+				c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto bad;
+				break;
+			case OCON_FS:
+			case OCON_NETIF:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+				if (rc < 0)
+					goto bad;
+				len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+				if (!c->u.name) {
+					rc = -ENOMEM;
+					goto bad;
+				}
+				rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len);
+				if (rc < 0)
+					goto bad;
+				c->u.name[len] = 0;
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto bad;
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[1], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto bad;
+				break;
+			case OCON_PORT:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
+				if (rc < 0)
+					goto bad;
+				c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+				c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto bad;
+				break;
+			case OCON_NODE:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)* 2);
+				if (rc < 0)
+					goto bad;
+				c->u.node.addr = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				c->u.node.mask = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto bad;
+				break;
+			case OCON_FSUSE:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+				if (rc < 0)
+					goto bad;
+				c->v.behavior = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE)
+					goto bad;
+				len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+				c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+				if (!c->u.name) {
+					rc = -ENOMEM;
+					goto bad;
+				}
+				rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len);
+				if (rc < 0)
+					goto bad;
+				c->u.name[len] = 0;
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto bad;
+				break;
+			case OCON_NODE6: {
+				int k;
+
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8);
+				if (rc < 0)
+					goto bad;
+				for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+					c->u.node6.addr[k] = le32_to_cpu(buf[k]);
+				for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+					c->u.node6.mask[k] = le32_to_cpu(buf[k+4]);
+				if (context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp))
+					goto bad;
+				break;
+			}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto bad;
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	genfs_p = NULL;
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto bad;
+		len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		newgenfs = kmalloc(sizeof(*newgenfs), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!newgenfs) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		memset(newgenfs, 0, sizeof(*newgenfs));
+
+		newgenfs->fstype = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!newgenfs->fstype) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			kfree(newgenfs);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		rc = next_entry(newgenfs->fstype, fp, len);
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
+			kfree(newgenfs);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		newgenfs->fstype[len] = 0;
+		for (genfs_p = NULL, genfs = p->genfs; genfs;
+		     genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) {
+			if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) {
+				printk(KERN_ERR "security:  dup genfs "
+				       "fstype %s\n", newgenfs->fstype);
+				kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
+				kfree(newgenfs);
+				goto bad;
+			}
+			if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+		newgenfs->next = genfs;
+		if (genfs_p)
+			genfs_p->next = newgenfs;
+		else
+			p->genfs = newgenfs;
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto bad;
+		nel2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		for (j = 0; j < nel2; j++) {
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+			if (rc < 0)
+				goto bad;
+			len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+			newc = kmalloc(sizeof(*newc), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!newc) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto bad;
+			}
+			memset(newc, 0, sizeof(*newc));
+
+			newc->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!newc->u.name) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto bad_newc;
+			}
+			rc = next_entry(newc->u.name, fp, len);
+			if (rc < 0)
+				goto bad_newc;
+			newc->u.name[len] = 0;
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+			if (rc < 0)
+				goto bad_newc;
+			newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			if (context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p, fp))
+				goto bad_newc;
+			for (l = NULL, c = newgenfs->head; c;
+			     l = c, c = c->next) {
+				if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) &&
+				    (!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass ||
+				     newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) {
+					printk(KERN_ERR "security:  dup genfs "
+					       "entry (%s,%s)\n",
+					       newgenfs->fstype, c->u.name);
+					goto bad_newc;
+				}
+				len = strlen(newc->u.name);
+				len2 = strlen(c->u.name);
+				if (len > len2)
+					break;
+			}
+
+			newc->next = c;
+			if (l)
+				l->next = newc;
+			else
+				newgenfs->head = newc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto bad;
+		nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		lrt = NULL;
+		for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+			rt = kmalloc(sizeof(*rt), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!rt) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				goto bad;
+			}
+			memset(rt, 0, sizeof(*rt));
+			if (lrt)
+				lrt->next = rt;
+			else
+				p->range_tr = rt;
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
+			if (rc < 0)
+				goto bad;
+			rt->dom = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			rt->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+			rc = mls_read_range_helper(&rt->range, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				goto bad;
+			lrt = rt;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad_newc:
+	ocontext_destroy(newc,OCON_FSUSE);
+bad:
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+	policydb_destroy(p);
+	goto out;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2470e2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+/*
+ * A policy database (policydb) specifies the
+ * configuration data for the security policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * 	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_POLICYDB_H_
+#define _SS_POLICYDB_H_
+
+#include "symtab.h"
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "constraint.h"
+
+/*
+ * A datum type is defined for each kind of symbol
+ * in the configuration data:  individual permissions,
+ * common prefixes for access vectors, classes,
+ * users, roles, types, sensitivities, categories, etc.
+ */
+
+/* Permission attributes */
+struct perm_datum {
+	u32 value;		/* permission bit + 1 */
+};
+
+/* Attributes of a common prefix for access vectors */
+struct common_datum {
+	u32 value;			/* internal common value */
+	struct symtab permissions;	/* common permissions */
+};
+
+/* Class attributes */
+struct class_datum {
+	u32 value;			/* class value */
+	char *comkey;			/* common name */
+	struct common_datum *comdatum;	/* common datum */
+	struct symtab permissions;	/* class-specific permission symbol table */
+	struct constraint_node *constraints;	/* constraints on class permissions */
+	struct constraint_node *validatetrans;	/* special transition rules */
+};
+
+/* Role attributes */
+struct role_datum {
+	u32 value;			/* internal role value */
+	struct ebitmap dominates;	/* set of roles dominated by this role */
+	struct ebitmap types;		/* set of authorized types for role */
+};
+
+struct role_trans {
+	u32 role;		/* current role */
+	u32 type;		/* program executable type */
+	u32 new_role;		/* new role */
+	struct role_trans *next;
+};
+
+struct role_allow {
+	u32 role;		/* current role */
+	u32 new_role;		/* new role */
+	struct role_allow *next;
+};
+
+/* Type attributes */
+struct type_datum {
+	u32 value;		/* internal type value */
+	unsigned char primary;	/* primary name? */
+};
+
+/* User attributes */
+struct user_datum {
+	u32 value;			/* internal user value */
+	struct ebitmap roles;		/* set of authorized roles for user */
+	struct mls_range range;		/* MLS range (min - max) for user */
+	struct mls_level dfltlevel;	/* default login MLS level for user */
+};
+
+
+/* Sensitivity attributes */
+struct level_datum {
+	struct mls_level *level;	/* sensitivity and associated categories */
+	unsigned char isalias;	/* is this sensitivity an alias for another? */
+};
+
+/* Category attributes */
+struct cat_datum {
+	u32 value;		/* internal category bit + 1 */
+	unsigned char isalias;  /* is this category an alias for another? */
+};
+
+struct range_trans {
+	u32 dom;			/* current process domain */
+	u32 type;			/* program executable type */
+	struct mls_range range;		/* new range */
+	struct range_trans *next;
+};
+
+/* Boolean data type */
+struct cond_bool_datum {
+	__u32 value;		/* internal type value */
+	int state;
+};
+
+struct cond_node;
+
+/*
+ * The configuration data includes security contexts for
+ * initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems, TCP and UDP port numbers,
+ * network interfaces, and nodes.  This structure stores the
+ * relevant data for one such entry.  Entries of the same kind
+ * (e.g. all initial SIDs) are linked together into a list.
+ */
+struct ocontext {
+	union {
+		char *name;	/* name of initial SID, fs, netif, fstype, path */
+		struct {
+			u8 protocol;
+			u16 low_port;
+			u16 high_port;
+		} port;		/* TCP or UDP port information */
+		struct {
+			u32 addr;
+			u32 mask;
+		} node;		/* node information */
+		struct {
+			u32 addr[4];
+			u32 mask[4];
+		} node6;        /* IPv6 node information */
+	} u;
+	union {
+		u32 sclass;  /* security class for genfs */
+		u32 behavior;  /* labeling behavior for fs_use */
+	} v;
+	struct context context[2];	/* security context(s) */
+	u32 sid[2];	/* SID(s) */
+	struct ocontext *next;
+};
+
+struct genfs {
+	char *fstype;
+	struct ocontext *head;
+	struct genfs *next;
+};
+
+/* symbol table array indices */
+#define SYM_COMMONS 0
+#define SYM_CLASSES 1
+#define SYM_ROLES   2
+#define SYM_TYPES   3
+#define SYM_USERS   4
+#define SYM_BOOLS   5
+#define SYM_LEVELS  6
+#define SYM_CATS    7
+#define SYM_NUM     8
+
+/* object context array indices */
+#define OCON_ISID  0	/* initial SIDs */
+#define OCON_FS    1	/* unlabeled file systems */
+#define OCON_PORT  2	/* TCP and UDP port numbers */
+#define OCON_NETIF 3	/* network interfaces */
+#define OCON_NODE  4	/* nodes */
+#define OCON_FSUSE 5	/* fs_use */
+#define OCON_NODE6 6	/* IPv6 nodes */
+#define OCON_NUM   7
+
+/* The policy database */
+struct policydb {
+	/* symbol tables */
+	struct symtab symtab[SYM_NUM];
+#define p_commons symtab[SYM_COMMONS]
+#define p_classes symtab[SYM_CLASSES]
+#define p_roles symtab[SYM_ROLES]
+#define p_types symtab[SYM_TYPES]
+#define p_users symtab[SYM_USERS]
+#define p_bools symtab[SYM_BOOLS]
+#define p_levels symtab[SYM_LEVELS]
+#define p_cats symtab[SYM_CATS]
+
+	/* symbol names indexed by (value - 1) */
+	char **sym_val_to_name[SYM_NUM];
+#define p_common_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_COMMONS]
+#define p_class_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_CLASSES]
+#define p_role_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_ROLES]
+#define p_type_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_TYPES]
+#define p_user_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_USERS]
+#define p_bool_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_BOOLS]
+#define p_sens_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS]
+#define p_cat_val_to_name sym_val_to_name[SYM_CATS]
+
+	/* class, role, and user attributes indexed by (value - 1) */
+	struct class_datum **class_val_to_struct;
+	struct role_datum **role_val_to_struct;
+	struct user_datum **user_val_to_struct;
+
+	/* type enforcement access vectors and transitions */
+	struct avtab te_avtab;
+
+	/* role transitions */
+	struct role_trans *role_tr;
+
+	/* bools indexed by (value - 1) */
+	struct cond_bool_datum **bool_val_to_struct;
+	/* type enforcement conditional access vectors and transitions */
+	struct avtab te_cond_avtab;
+	/* linked list indexing te_cond_avtab by conditional */
+	struct cond_node* cond_list;
+
+	/* role allows */
+	struct role_allow *role_allow;
+
+	/* security contexts of initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems,
+	   TCP or UDP port numbers, network interfaces and nodes */
+	struct ocontext *ocontexts[OCON_NUM];
+
+        /* security contexts for files in filesystems that cannot support
+	   a persistent label mapping or use another
+	   fixed labeling behavior. */
+  	struct genfs *genfs;
+
+	/* range transitions */
+	struct range_trans *range_tr;
+
+	unsigned int policyvers;
+};
+
+extern void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
+extern int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s);
+extern int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
+extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+
+#define PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE 32
+
+#define POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS    1
+
+#define OBJECT_R "object_r"
+#define OBJECT_R_VAL 1
+
+#define POLICYDB_MAGIC SELINUX_MAGIC
+#define POLICYDB_STRING "SE Linux"
+
+struct policy_file {
+	char *data;
+	size_t len;
+};
+
+static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
+{
+	if (bytes > fp->len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(buf, fp->data, bytes);
+	fp->data += bytes;
+	fp->len -= bytes;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif	/* _SS_POLICYDB_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a820cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1777 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ *           James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * 	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "services.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+
+extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
+unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
+
+static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
+#define POLICY_RDLOCK read_lock(&policy_rwlock)
+#define POLICY_WRLOCK write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
+#define POLICY_RDUNLOCK read_unlock(&policy_rwlock)
+#define POLICY_WRUNLOCK write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
+
+static DECLARE_MUTEX(load_sem);
+#define LOAD_LOCK down(&load_sem)
+#define LOAD_UNLOCK up(&load_sem)
+
+static struct sidtab sidtab;
+struct policydb policydb;
+int ss_initialized = 0;
+
+/*
+ * The largest sequence number that has been used when
+ * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
+ * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
+ * occurs.
+ */
+static u32 latest_granting = 0;
+
+/* Forward declaration. */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
+				    u32 *scontext_len);
+
+/*
+ * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
+ * when it is applied to the specified source and target
+ * security contexts.
+ *
+ * xcontext is a special beast...  It is used by the validatetrans rules
+ * only.  For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
+ * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
+ * of the process performing the transition.  All other callers of
+ * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
+ */
+static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
+				struct context *tcontext,
+				struct context *xcontext,
+				struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
+{
+	u32 val1, val2;
+	struct context *c;
+	struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
+	struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
+	struct constraint_expr *e;
+	int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+	int sp = -1;
+
+	for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
+		switch (e->expr_type) {
+		case CEXPR_NOT:
+			BUG_ON(sp < 0);
+			s[sp] = !s[sp];
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_AND:
+			BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] &= s[sp+1];
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_OR:
+			BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] |= s[sp+1];
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_ATTR:
+			if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+				return 0;
+			switch (e->attr) {
+			case CEXPR_USER:
+				val1 = scontext->user;
+				val2 = tcontext->user;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_TYPE:
+				val1 = scontext->type;
+				val2 = tcontext->type;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_ROLE:
+				val1 = scontext->role;
+				val2 = tcontext->role;
+				r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
+				r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
+				switch (e->op) {
+				case CEXPR_DOM:
+					s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+								  val2 - 1);
+					continue;
+				case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+					s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+								  val1 - 1);
+					continue;
+				case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+					s[++sp] = ( !ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+								     val2 - 1) &&
+						    !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+								     val1 - 1) );
+					continue;
+				default:
+					break;
+				}
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_L1L2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_L1H2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_H1L2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_H1H2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_L1H1:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_L2H2:
+				l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+mls_ops:
+			switch (e->op) {
+			case CEXPR_EQ:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_NEQ:
+				s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_DOM:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
+				continue;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+			break;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+
+			switch (e->op) {
+			case CEXPR_EQ:
+				s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_NEQ:
+				s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
+				break;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_NAMES:
+			if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+				return 0;
+			c = scontext;
+			if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
+				c = tcontext;
+			else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
+				c = xcontext;
+				if (!c) {
+					BUG();
+					return 0;
+				}
+			}
+			if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
+				val1 = c->user;
+			else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
+				val1 = c->role;
+			else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
+				val1 = c->type;
+			else {
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+
+			switch (e->op) {
+			case CEXPR_EQ:
+				s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_NEQ:
+				s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+				break;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			BUG();
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	BUG_ON(sp != 0);
+	return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
+ * the permissions in a particular class.
+ */
+static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
+				     struct context *tcontext,
+				     u16 tclass,
+				     u32 requested,
+				     struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct constraint_node *constraint;
+	struct role_allow *ra;
+	struct avtab_key avkey;
+	struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
+	struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+
+	/*
+	 * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions.
+	 * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class()
+	 * in case a newer policy version is loaded, allowing sockets
+	 * to remain in the correct class.
+	 */
+	if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
+		if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET &&
+		    tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)
+			tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+
+	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av:  unrecognized class %d\n",
+		       tclass);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
+	 */
+	avd->allowed = 0;
+	avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
+	avd->auditallow = 0;
+	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+	avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+
+	/*
+	 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
+	 * this permission check, then use it.
+	 */
+	avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
+	avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
+	avkey.target_class = tclass;
+	avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey, AVTAB_AV);
+	if (avdatum) {
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_ALLOWED)
+			avd->allowed = avtab_allowed(avdatum);
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+			avd->auditdeny = avtab_auditdeny(avdatum);
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
+			avd->auditallow = avtab_auditallow(avdatum);
+	}
+
+	/* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
+	cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
+
+	/*
+	 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
+	 * the MLS policy).
+	 */
+	constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
+	while (constraint) {
+		if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
+		    !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
+					  constraint->expr)) {
+			avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(constraint->permissions);
+		}
+		constraint = constraint->next;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If checking process transition permission and the
+	 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
+	 * pair.
+	 */
+	if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS &&
+	    (avd->allowed & (PROCESS__TRANSITION | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION)) &&
+	    scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
+		for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+			if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
+			    tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
+				break;
+		}
+		if (!ra)
+			avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
+			                                PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
+                                           struct context *ncontext,
+                                           struct context *tcontext,
+                                           u16 tclass)
+{
+	char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
+	u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
+
+	if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	audit_log(current->audit_context,
+	          "security_validate_transition:  denied for"
+	          " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+	          o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
+out:
+	kfree(o);
+	kfree(n);
+	kfree(t);
+
+	if (!selinux_enforcing)
+		return 0;
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+                                 u16 tclass)
+{
+	struct context *ocontext;
+	struct context *ncontext;
+	struct context *tcontext;
+	struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+	struct constraint_node *constraint;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	/*
+	 * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions.
+	 * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class()
+	 * in case a newer policy version is loaded, allowing sockets
+	 * to remain in the correct class.
+	 */
+	if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
+		if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET &&
+		    tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)
+			tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+
+	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition:  "
+		       "unrecognized class %d\n", tclass);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+	ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
+	if (!ocontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
+		       " unrecognized SID %d\n", oldsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
+	if (!ncontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
+		       " unrecognized SID %d\n", newsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
+		       " unrecognized SID %d\n", tasksid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
+	while (constraint) {
+		if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
+		                          constraint->expr)) {
+			rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
+			                                     tcontext, tclass);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		constraint = constraint->next;
+	}
+
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ *
+ * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
+ * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid or %0
+ * if the access vector decisions were computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
+			u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass,
+			u32 requested,
+			struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		avd->allowed = requested;
+		avd->decided = requested;
+		avd->auditallow = 0;
+		avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+		avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       ssid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       tsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass,
+				       requested, avd);
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
+ * allocated string of the correct size.  Set `*scontext'
+ * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
+ * the length of the string.
+ */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	char *scontextp;
+
+	*scontext = NULL;
+	*scontext_len = 0;
+
+	/* Compute the size of the context. */
+	*scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
+
+	/* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
+	scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!scontextp) {
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	*scontext = scontextp;
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
+	 */
+	sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
+		policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1],
+		policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1],
+		policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
+	scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) +
+	             1 + strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) +
+	             1 + strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
+
+	mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
+
+	*scontextp = 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
+
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size.  Set @scontext
+ * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	struct context *context;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
+			char *scontextp;
+
+			*scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
+			scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len,GFP_ATOMIC);
+			strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]);
+			*scontext = scontextp;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_to_context:  called before initial "
+		       "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", sid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	if (!context) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_to_context:  unrecognized SID "
+		       "%d\n", sid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
+out_unlock:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+out:
+	return rc;
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
+{
+	char *scontext2;
+	struct context context;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		int i;
+
+		for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+			if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
+				*sid = i;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		*sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	/* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it.
+	   The string should already by null terminated, but we append a
+	   null suffix to the copy to avoid problems with the existing
+	   attr package, which doesn't view the null terminator as part
+	   of the attribute value. */
+	scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1,GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scontext2) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
+	scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
+
+	context_init(&context);
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	/* Parse the security context. */
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	scontextp = (char *) scontext2;
+
+	/* Extract the user. */
+	p = scontextp;
+	while (*p && *p != ':')
+		p++;
+
+	if (*p == 0)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	*p++ = 0;
+
+	usrdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, scontextp);
+	if (!usrdatum)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	context.user = usrdatum->value;
+
+	/* Extract role. */
+	scontextp = p;
+	while (*p && *p != ':')
+		p++;
+
+	if (*p == 0)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	*p++ = 0;
+
+	role = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, scontextp);
+	if (!role)
+		goto out_unlock;
+	context.role = role->value;
+
+	/* Extract type. */
+	scontextp = p;
+	while (*p && *p != ':')
+		p++;
+	oldc = *p;
+	*p++ = 0;
+
+	typdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, scontextp);
+	if (!typdatum)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	context.type = typdatum->value;
+
+	rc = mls_context_to_sid(oldc, &p, &context);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	if ((p - scontext2) < scontext_len) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &context)) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	/* Obtain the new sid. */
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
+out_unlock:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	context_destroy(&context);
+	kfree(scontext2);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
+	struct context *scontext,
+	struct context *tcontext,
+	u16 tclass,
+	struct context *newcontext)
+{
+	char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
+	u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
+
+	if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	audit_log(current->audit_context,
+		  "security_compute_sid:  invalid context %s"
+		  " for scontext=%s"
+		  " tcontext=%s"
+		  " tclass=%s",
+		  n, s, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
+out:
+	kfree(s);
+	kfree(t);
+	kfree(n);
+	if (!selinux_enforcing)
+		return 0;
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
+				u32 tsid,
+				u16 tclass,
+				u32 specified,
+				u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
+	struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
+	struct avtab_key avkey;
+	struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+	unsigned int type_change = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		switch (tclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+			*out_sid = ssid;
+			break;
+		default:
+			*out_sid = tsid;
+			break;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_sid:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       ssid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_sid:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       tsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	context_init(&newcontext);
+
+	/* Set the user identity. */
+	switch (specified) {
+	case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+		/* Use the process user identity. */
+		newcontext.user = scontext->user;
+		break;
+	case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+		/* Use the related object owner. */
+		newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* Set the role and type to default values. */
+	switch (tclass) {
+	case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+		/* Use the current role and type of process. */
+		newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+		newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Use the well-defined object role. */
+		newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
+		/* Use the type of the related object. */
+		newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+	}
+
+	/* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
+	avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
+	avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
+	avkey.target_class = tclass;
+	avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey, AVTAB_TYPE);
+
+	/* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
+	if(!avdatum) {
+		node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, specified);
+		for (; node != NULL; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
+			if (node->datum.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
+				avdatum = &node->datum;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	type_change = (avdatum && (avdatum->specified & specified));
+	if (type_change) {
+		/* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
+		switch (specified) {
+		case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+			newcontext.type = avtab_transition(avdatum);
+			break;
+		case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+			newcontext.type = avtab_member(avdatum);
+			break;
+		case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+			newcontext.type = avtab_change(avdatum);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Check for class-specific changes. */
+	switch (tclass) {
+	case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+		if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
+			/* Look for a role transition rule. */
+			for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr;
+			     roletr = roletr->next) {
+				if (roletr->role == scontext->role &&
+				    roletr->type == tcontext->type) {
+					/* Use the role transition rule. */
+					newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* Set the MLS attributes.
+	   This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
+	rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, &newcontext);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/* Check the validity of the context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
+		rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
+							tcontext,
+							tclass,
+							&newcontext);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	/* Obtain the sid for the context. */
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+out_unlock:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	context_destroy(&newcontext);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
+ * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid,
+			    u32 tsid,
+			    u16 tclass,
+			    u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, out_sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
+ * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
+			u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass,
+			u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
+ * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
+			u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass,
+			u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that each permission that is defined under the
+ * existing policy is still defined with the same value
+ * in the new policy.
+ */
+static int validate_perm(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct hashtab *h;
+	struct perm_datum *perdatum, *perdatum2;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+
+	h = p;
+	perdatum = datum;
+
+	perdatum2 = hashtab_search(h, key);
+	if (!perdatum2) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  permission %s disappeared",
+		       (char *)key);
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (perdatum->value != perdatum2->value) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  the value of permission %s changed",
+		       (char *)key);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+	}
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that each class that is defined under the
+ * existing policy is still defined with the same
+ * attributes in the new policy.
+ */
+static int validate_class(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct policydb *newp;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum, *cladatum2;
+	int rc;
+
+	newp = p;
+	cladatum = datum;
+
+	cladatum2 = hashtab_search(newp->p_classes.table, key);
+	if (!cladatum2) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  class %s disappeared\n",
+		       (char *)key);
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (cladatum->value != cladatum2->value) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  the value of class %s changed\n",
+		       (char *)key);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((cladatum->comdatum && !cladatum2->comdatum) ||
+	    (!cladatum->comdatum && cladatum2->comdatum)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  the inherits clause for the access "
+		       "vector definition for class %s changed\n", (char *)key);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (cladatum->comdatum) {
+		rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->comdatum->permissions.table, validate_perm,
+		                 cladatum2->comdatum->permissions.table);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(" in the access vector definition for class "
+			       "%s\n", (char *)key);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, validate_perm,
+	                 cladatum2->permissions.table);
+	if (rc)
+		printk(" in access vector definition for class %s\n",
+		       (char *)key);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
+static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
+		     struct context *context,
+		     void *arg)
+{
+	struct sidtab *s = arg;
+
+	return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
+}
+
+static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (selinux_enforcing) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		char *s;
+		u32 len;
+
+		context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len);
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  context %s is invalid\n", s);
+		kfree(s);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+struct convert_context_args {
+	struct policydb *oldp;
+	struct policydb *newp;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Convert the values in the security context
+ * structure `c' from the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->newp'.  Verify that the
+ * context is valid under the new policy.
+ */
+static int convert_context(u32 key,
+			   struct context *c,
+			   void *p)
+{
+	struct convert_context_args *args;
+	struct context oldc;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	char *s;
+	u32 len;
+	int rc;
+
+	args = p;
+
+	rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Convert the user. */
+	usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
+	                          args->oldp->p_user_val_to_name[c->user - 1]);
+	if (!usrdatum) {
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	c->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+	/* Convert the role. */
+	role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
+	                      args->oldp->p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
+	if (!role) {
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	c->role = role->value;
+
+	/* Convert the type. */
+	typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
+	                          args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
+	if (!typdatum) {
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	c->type = typdatum->value;
+
+	rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
+		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	context_destroy(&oldc);
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad:
+	context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
+	context_destroy(&oldc);
+	printk(KERN_ERR "security:  invalidating context %s\n", s);
+	kfree(s);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
+
+/**
+ * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
+ * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
+ * This function will flush the access vector cache after
+ * loading the new policy.
+ */
+int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb;
+	struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
+	struct convert_context_args args;
+	u32 seqno;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
+
+	LOAD_LOCK;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		avtab_cache_init();
+		if (policydb_read(&policydb, fp)) {
+			LOAD_UNLOCK;
+			avtab_cache_destroy();
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) {
+			LOAD_UNLOCK;
+			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
+			avtab_cache_destroy();
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
+		ss_initialized = 1;
+
+		LOAD_UNLOCK;
+		selinux_complete_init();
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+#if 0
+	sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
+#endif
+
+	if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp)) {
+		LOAD_UNLOCK;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	sidtab_init(&newsidtab);
+
+	/* Verify that the existing classes did not change. */
+	if (hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, validate_class, &newpolicydb)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  the definition of an existing "
+		       "class changed\n");
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Clone the SID table. */
+	sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
+	if (sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab)) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Convert the internal representations of contexts
+	   in the new SID table and remove invalid SIDs. */
+	args.oldp = &policydb;
+	args.newp = &newpolicydb;
+	sidtab_map_remove_on_error(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
+
+	/* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
+	memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
+	sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
+
+	/* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
+	POLICY_WRLOCK;
+	memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
+	sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
+	seqno = ++latest_granting;
+	policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
+	POLICY_WRUNLOCK;
+	LOAD_UNLOCK;
+
+	/* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
+	policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
+	sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
+
+	avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+	selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+
+	return 0;
+
+err:
+	LOAD_UNLOCK;
+	sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
+	policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
+	return rc;
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
+ * @domain: communication domain aka address family
+ * @type: socket type
+ * @protocol: protocol number
+ * @port: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_port_sid(u16 domain,
+		      u16 type,
+		      u8 protocol,
+		      u16 port,
+		      u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
+	while (c) {
+		if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
+		    c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
+		    c->u.port.high_port >= port)
+			break;
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		if (!c->sid[0]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+						   &c->context[0],
+						   &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*out_sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else {
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
+	}
+
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
+ * @name: interface name
+ * @if_sid: interface SID
+ * @msg_sid: default SID for received packets
+ */
+int security_netif_sid(char *name,
+		       u32 *if_sid,
+		       u32 *msg_sid)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
+	while (c) {
+		if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
+			break;
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+						  &c->context[0],
+						  &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+						   &c->context[1],
+						   &c->sid[1]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*if_sid = c->sid[0];
+		*msg_sid = c->sid[1];
+	} else {
+		*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
+		*msg_sid = SECINITSID_NETMSG;
+	}
+
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
+{
+	int i, fail = 0;
+
+	for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+		if(addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
+			fail = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	return !fail;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
+ * @domain: communication domain aka address family
+ * @addrp: address
+ * @addrlen: address length in bytes
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
+		      void *addrp,
+		      u32 addrlen,
+		      u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	switch (domain) {
+	case AF_INET: {
+		u32 addr;
+
+		if (addrlen != sizeof(u32)) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
+
+		c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
+		while (c) {
+			if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
+				break;
+			c = c->next;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case AF_INET6:
+		if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
+		while (c) {
+			if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
+						c->u.node6.mask))
+				break;
+			c = c->next;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		if (!c->sid[0]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+						   &c->context[0],
+						   &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*out_sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else {
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+	}
+
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#define SIDS_NEL 25
+
+/**
+ * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
+ * @fromsid: starting SID
+ * @username: username
+ * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
+ * @nel: number of elements in @sids
+ *
+ * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
+ * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
+ * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
+ * array containing the set of SIDs.  Set *@nel to the
+ * number of elements in the array.
+ */
+
+int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
+	                   char *username,
+			   u32 **sids,
+			   u32 *nel)
+{
+	struct context *fromcon, usercon;
+	u32 *mysids, *mysids2, sid;
+	u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
+	struct user_datum *user;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int rc = 0, i, j;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		*sids = NULL;
+		*nel = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
+	if (!fromcon) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
+	if (!user) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	usercon.user = user->value;
+
+	mysids = kmalloc(maxnel*sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!mysids) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	memset(mysids, 0, maxnel*sizeof(*mysids));
+
+	for (i = ebitmap_startbit(&user->roles); i < ebitmap_length(&user->roles); i++) {
+		if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&user->roles, i))
+			continue;
+		role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
+		usercon.role = i+1;
+		for (j = ebitmap_startbit(&role->types); j < ebitmap_length(&role->types); j++) {
+			if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types, j))
+				continue;
+			usercon.type = j+1;
+
+			if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
+				continue;
+
+			rc = context_struct_compute_av(fromcon, &usercon,
+						       SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+						       PROCESS__TRANSITION,
+						       &avd);
+			if (rc ||  !(avd.allowed & PROCESS__TRANSITION))
+				continue;
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
+			if (rc) {
+				kfree(mysids);
+				goto out_unlock;
+			}
+			if (mynel < maxnel) {
+				mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+			} else {
+				maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
+				mysids2 = kmalloc(maxnel*sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
+				if (!mysids2) {
+					rc = -ENOMEM;
+					kfree(mysids);
+					goto out_unlock;
+				}
+				memset(mysids2, 0, maxnel*sizeof(*mysids2));
+				memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
+				kfree(mysids);
+				mysids = mysids2;
+				mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	*sids = mysids;
+	*nel = mynel;
+
+out_unlock:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
+ * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
+ * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
+ */
+int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+	               char *path,
+		       u16 sclass,
+		       u32 *sid)
+{
+	int len;
+	struct genfs *genfs;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	int rc = 0, cmp = 0;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+		cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
+		if (cmp <= 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (!genfs || cmp) {
+		*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+		len = strlen(c->u.name);
+		if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
+		    (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (!c) {
+		*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!c->sid[0]) {
+		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+					   &c->context[0],
+					   &c->sid[0]);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	*sid = c->sid[0];
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @behavior: labeling behavior
+ * @sid: SID for filesystem (superblock)
+ */
+int security_fs_use(
+	const char *fstype,
+	unsigned int *behavior,
+	u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+	while (c) {
+		if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
+			break;
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		*behavior = c->v.behavior;
+		if (!c->sid[0]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+						   &c->context[0],
+						   &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else {
+		rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid);
+		if (rc) {
+			*behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+			rc = 0;
+		} else {
+			*behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
+{
+	int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	*names = NULL;
+	*values = NULL;
+
+	*len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	if (!*len) {
+		rc = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	*names = (char**)kmalloc(sizeof(char*) * *len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*names)
+		goto err;
+	memset(*names, 0, sizeof(char*) * *len);
+
+	*values = (int*)kmalloc(sizeof(int) * *len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*values)
+		goto err;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
+		size_t name_len;
+		(*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+		name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
+		(*names)[i] = (char*)kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!(*names)[i])
+			goto err;
+		strncpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
+		(*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+err:
+	if (*names) {
+		for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
+			if ((*names)[i])
+				kfree((*names)[i]);
+	}
+	if (*values)
+		kfree(*values);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+
+int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
+{
+	int i, rc = 0;
+	int lenp, seqno = 0;
+	struct cond_node *cur;
+
+	POLICY_WRLOCK;
+
+	lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	if (len != lenp) {
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "security: committed booleans { ");
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if (values[i]) {
+			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
+		} else {
+			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
+		}
+		if (i != 0)
+			printk(", ");
+		printk("%s:%d", policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
+		       policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state);
+	}
+	printk(" }\n");
+
+	for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+		rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	seqno = ++latest_granting;
+
+out:
+	POLICY_WRUNLOCK;
+	if (!rc) {
+		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	int len;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	if (bool >= len) {
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8d907e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SERVICES_H_
+#define _SS_SERVICES_H_
+
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+
+extern struct policydb policydb;
+
+#endif	/* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..871c33b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the SID table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+
+#define SIDTAB_HASH(sid) \
+(sid & SIDTAB_HASH_MASK)
+
+#define INIT_SIDTAB_LOCK(s) spin_lock_init(&s->lock)
+#define SIDTAB_LOCK(s, x) spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, x)
+#define SIDTAB_UNLOCK(s, x) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, x)
+
+int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	s->htable = kmalloc(sizeof(*(s->htable)) * SIDTAB_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!s->htable)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++)
+		s->htable[i] = NULL;
+	s->nel = 0;
+	s->next_sid = 1;
+	s->shutdown = 0;
+	INIT_SIDTAB_LOCK(s);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
+{
+	int hvalue, rc = 0;
+	struct sidtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+
+	if (!s) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
+	prev = NULL;
+	cur = s->htable[hvalue];
+	while (cur != NULL && sid > cur->sid) {
+		prev = cur;
+		cur = cur->next;
+	}
+
+	if (cur && sid == cur->sid) {
+		rc = -EEXIST;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	newnode = kmalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (newnode == NULL) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	newnode->sid = sid;
+	if (context_cpy(&newnode->context, context)) {
+		kfree(newnode);
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (prev) {
+		newnode->next = prev->next;
+		wmb();
+		prev->next = newnode;
+	} else {
+		newnode->next = s->htable[hvalue];
+		wmb();
+		s->htable[hvalue] = newnode;
+	}
+
+	s->nel++;
+	if (sid >= s->next_sid)
+		s->next_sid = sid + 1;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+	int hvalue;
+	struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!s)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
+	cur = s->htable[hvalue];
+	while (cur != NULL && sid > cur->sid)
+		cur = cur->next;
+
+	if (cur == NULL || sid != cur->sid) {
+		/* Remap invalid SIDs to the unlabeled SID. */
+		sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+		hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
+		cur = s->htable[hvalue];
+		while (cur != NULL && sid > cur->sid)
+			cur = cur->next;
+		if (!cur || sid != cur->sid)
+			return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return &cur->context;
+}
+
+int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s,
+	       int (*apply) (u32 sid,
+			     struct context *context,
+			     void *args),
+	       void *args)
+{
+	int i, rc = 0;
+	struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+	if (!s)
+		goto out;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = s->htable[i];
+		while (cur != NULL) {
+			rc = apply(cur->sid, &cur->context, args);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			cur = cur->next;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+void sidtab_map_remove_on_error(struct sidtab *s,
+				int (*apply) (u32 sid,
+					      struct context *context,
+					      void *args),
+				void *args)
+{
+	int i, ret;
+	struct sidtab_node *last, *cur, *temp;
+
+	if (!s)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		last = NULL;
+		cur = s->htable[i];
+		while (cur != NULL) {
+			ret = apply(cur->sid, &cur->context, args);
+			if (ret) {
+				if (last) {
+					last->next = cur->next;
+				} else {
+					s->htable[i] = cur->next;
+				}
+
+				temp = cur;
+				cur = cur->next;
+				context_destroy(&temp->context);
+				kfree(temp);
+				s->nel--;
+			} else {
+				last = cur;
+				cur = cur->next;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline u32 sidtab_search_context(struct sidtab *s,
+						  struct context *context)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = s->htable[i];
+		while (cur != NULL) {
+			if (context_cmp(&cur->context, context))
+				return cur->sid;
+			cur = cur->next;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
+			  struct context *context,
+			  u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	u32 sid;
+	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	*out_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
+	if (!sid) {
+		SIDTAB_LOCK(s, flags);
+		/* Rescan now that we hold the lock. */
+		sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
+		if (sid)
+			goto unlock_out;
+		/* No SID exists for the context.  Allocate a new one. */
+		if (s->next_sid == UINT_MAX || s->shutdown) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto unlock_out;
+		}
+		sid = s->next_sid++;
+		ret = sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
+		if (ret)
+			s->next_sid--;
+unlock_out:
+		SIDTAB_UNLOCK(s, flags);
+	}
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	*out_sid = sid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void sidtab_hash_eval(struct sidtab *h, char *tag)
+{
+	int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+	struct sidtab_node *cur;
+
+	slots_used = 0;
+	max_chain_len = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = h->htable[i];
+		if (cur) {
+			slots_used++;
+			chain_len = 0;
+			while (cur) {
+				chain_len++;
+				cur = cur->next;
+			}
+
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+		}
+	}
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest "
+	       "chain length %d\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used, SIDTAB_SIZE,
+	       max_chain_len);
+}
+
+void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct sidtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+	if (!s)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+		cur = s->htable[i];
+		while (cur != NULL) {
+			temp = cur;
+			cur = cur->next;
+			context_destroy(&temp->context);
+			kfree(temp);
+		}
+		s->htable[i] = NULL;
+	}
+	kfree(s->htable);
+	s->htable = NULL;
+	s->nel = 0;
+	s->next_sid = 1;
+}
+
+void sidtab_set(struct sidtab *dst, struct sidtab *src)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	SIDTAB_LOCK(src, flags);
+	dst->htable = src->htable;
+	dst->nel = src->nel;
+	dst->next_sid = src->next_sid;
+	dst->shutdown = 0;
+	SIDTAB_UNLOCK(src, flags);
+}
+
+void sidtab_shutdown(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	SIDTAB_LOCK(s, flags);
+	s->shutdown = 1;
+	SIDTAB_UNLOCK(s, flags);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2fe9dfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/*
+ * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a hash table
+ * of security context structures indexed by SID value.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SIDTAB_H_
+#define _SS_SIDTAB_H_
+
+#include "context.h"
+
+struct sidtab_node {
+	u32 sid;		/* security identifier */
+	struct context context;	/* security context structure */
+	struct sidtab_node *next;
+};
+
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BITS 7
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << SIDTAB_HASH_BITS)
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_MASK (SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
+
+#define SIDTAB_SIZE SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS
+
+struct sidtab {
+	struct sidtab_node **htable;
+	unsigned int nel;	/* number of elements */
+	unsigned int next_sid;	/* next SID to allocate */
+	unsigned char shutdown;
+	spinlock_t lock;
+};
+
+int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s);
+int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context);
+struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid);
+
+int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s,
+	       int (*apply) (u32 sid,
+			     struct context *context,
+			     void *args),
+	       void *args);
+
+void sidtab_map_remove_on_error(struct sidtab *s,
+				int (*apply) (u32 sid,
+					      struct context *context,
+					      void *args),
+				void *args);
+
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
+			  struct context *context,
+			  u32 *sid);
+
+void sidtab_hash_eval(struct sidtab *h, char *tag);
+void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s);
+void sidtab_set(struct sidtab *dst, struct sidtab *src);
+void sidtab_shutdown(struct sidtab *s);
+
+#endif	/* _SS_SIDTAB_H_ */
+
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24a10d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the symbol table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "symtab.h"
+
+static unsigned int symhash(struct hashtab *h, void *key)
+{
+	char *p, *keyp;
+	unsigned int size;
+	unsigned int val;
+
+	val = 0;
+	keyp = key;
+	size = strlen(keyp);
+	for (p = keyp; (p - keyp) < size; p++)
+		val = (val << 4 | (val >> (8*sizeof(unsigned int)-4))) ^ (*p);
+	return val & (h->size - 1);
+}
+
+static int symcmp(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2)
+{
+	char *keyp1, *keyp2;
+
+	keyp1 = key1;
+	keyp2 = key2;
+	return strcmp(keyp1, keyp2);
+}
+
+
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size)
+{
+	s->table = hashtab_create(symhash, symcmp, size);
+	if (!s->table)
+		return -1;
+	s->nprim = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca422b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/*
+ * A symbol table (symtab) maintains associations between symbol
+ * strings and datum values.  The type of the datum values
+ * is arbitrary.  The symbol table type is implemented
+ * using the hash table type (hashtab).
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SYMTAB_H_
+#define _SS_SYMTAB_H_
+
+#include "hashtab.h"
+
+struct symtab {
+	struct hashtab *table;	/* hash table (keyed on a string) */
+	u32 nprim;		/* number of primary names in table */
+};
+
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size);
+
+#endif	/* _SS_SYMTAB_H_ */
+
+