commit 1e93d0052d9a6b3d0b382eedceb18b519d603baf
author Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tue Jan 26 17:02:41 2010 -0500
committer Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Sun Feb 07 03:06:23 2010 -0500
tree b47cb67cdfd98e257c4d7fb7ed75f6930a1bf005
parent 9bbb6cad0173e6220f3ac609e26beb48dab3b7cd

ima: rename PATH_CHECK to FILE_CHECK

With the movement of the ima hooks functions were renamed from *path* to
*file* since they always deal with struct file.  This patch renames some of
the ima internal flags to make them consistent with the rest of the code.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

security/integrity/ima/ima.h

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index aa25a7e..47fb65d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
 void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
-enum ima_hooks { PATH_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
+enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
 
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
 void ima_init_policy(void);

security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 3cd58b6..2a5e0bc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -95,12 +95,12 @@
  * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy.
  * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
- * @function: calling function (PATH_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
+ * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
  *
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
  * 		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
  *	subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
- * 	func: PATH_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
+ * 	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
  * 	mask: contains the permission mask
  *	fsmagic: hex value
  *

security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index b76e1f0..294b005 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@
 	if (!iint)
 		return;
 	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-	rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK);
+	rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@
 
 	rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
 				 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
-				 PATH_CHECK);
+				 FILE_CHECK);
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e127839..4759d0f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
 	{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
-	{.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
+	{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
 };
 
@@ -282,8 +282,11 @@
 			break;
 		case Opt_func:
 			audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from);
-			if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
-				entry->func = PATH_CHECK;
+			if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
+			/* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
 				entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)