tree b8190d17aa5d59508f8c979ce0160f21bef89500
parent 2f3238aebedb243804f58d62d57244edec4149b2
author Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> 1350334927 +1030
committer Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> 1355452524 +1030

security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook

Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to
the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let
Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its
read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example,
read extended attributes for signatures, etc.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>