Merge branch 'master' of git+ssh://git.samba.org/data/git/sfrench/cifs-2.6
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c
index 84e8c07..24b3dfc 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c
@@ -676,14 +676,23 @@
{
char c;
int rc;
+ static bool warned;
rc = get_user(c, buffer);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (c == '0' || c == 'n' || c == 'N')
multiuser_mount = 0;
- else if (c == '1' || c == 'y' || c == 'Y')
+ else if (c == '1' || c == 'y' || c == 'Y') {
multiuser_mount = 1;
+ if (!warned) {
+ warned = true;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS VFS: The legacy multiuser "
+ "mount code is scheduled to be deprecated in "
+ "3.5. Please switch to using the multiuser "
+ "mount option.");
+ }
+ }
return count;
}
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c
index 2272fd5..e622863 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c
@@ -113,9 +113,11 @@
MAX_MECH_STR_LEN +
UID_KEY_LEN + (sizeof(uid_t) * 2) +
CREDUID_KEY_LEN + (sizeof(uid_t) * 2) +
- USER_KEY_LEN + strlen(sesInfo->user_name) +
PID_KEY_LEN + (sizeof(pid_t) * 2) + 1;
+ if (sesInfo->user_name)
+ desc_len += USER_KEY_LEN + strlen(sesInfo->user_name);
+
spnego_key = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
description = kzalloc(desc_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (description == NULL)
@@ -152,8 +154,10 @@
dp = description + strlen(description);
sprintf(dp, ";creduid=0x%x", sesInfo->cred_uid);
- dp = description + strlen(description);
- sprintf(dp, ";user=%s", sesInfo->user_name);
+ if (sesInfo->user_name) {
+ dp = description + strlen(description);
+ sprintf(dp, ";user=%s", sesInfo->user_name);
+ }
dp = description + strlen(description);
sprintf(dp, ";pid=0x%x", current->pid);
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
index 5d9b9ac..bce99e6 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
@@ -420,15 +420,20 @@
}
/* convert ses->user_name to unicode and uppercase */
- len = strlen(ses->user_name);
+ len = ses->user_name ? strlen(ses->user_name) : 0;
user = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
if (user == NULL) {
cERROR(1, "calc_ntlmv2_hash: user mem alloc failure\n");
rc = -ENOMEM;
return rc;
}
- len = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp);
- UniStrupr(user);
+
+ if (len) {
+ len = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp);
+ UniStrupr(user);
+ } else {
+ memset(user, '\0', 2);
+ }
rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
(char *)user, 2 * len);
diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c
index 4666780..28f23c0 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/connect.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <linux/inet.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include "cifspdu.h"
#include "cifsglob.h"
@@ -225,74 +226,90 @@
static int coalesce_t2(struct smb_hdr *psecond, struct smb_hdr *pTargetSMB)
{
- struct smb_t2_rsp *pSMB2 = (struct smb_t2_rsp *)psecond;
+ struct smb_t2_rsp *pSMBs = (struct smb_t2_rsp *)psecond;
struct smb_t2_rsp *pSMBt = (struct smb_t2_rsp *)pTargetSMB;
- char *data_area_of_target;
- char *data_area_of_buf2;
+ char *data_area_of_tgt;
+ char *data_area_of_src;
int remaining;
- unsigned int byte_count, total_in_buf;
- __u16 total_data_size, total_in_buf2;
+ unsigned int byte_count, total_in_tgt;
+ __u16 tgt_total_cnt, src_total_cnt, total_in_src;
- total_data_size = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.TotalDataCount);
+ src_total_cnt = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.TotalDataCount);
+ tgt_total_cnt = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.TotalDataCount);
- if (total_data_size !=
- get_unaligned_le16(&pSMB2->t2_rsp.TotalDataCount))
- cFYI(1, "total data size of primary and secondary t2 differ");
+ if (tgt_total_cnt != src_total_cnt)
+ cFYI(1, "total data count of primary and secondary t2 differ "
+ "source=%hu target=%hu", src_total_cnt, tgt_total_cnt);
- total_in_buf = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataCount);
+ total_in_tgt = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataCount);
- remaining = total_data_size - total_in_buf;
+ remaining = tgt_total_cnt - total_in_tgt;
- if (remaining < 0)
+ if (remaining < 0) {
+ cFYI(1, "Server sent too much data. tgt_total_cnt=%hu "
+ "total_in_tgt=%hu", tgt_total_cnt, total_in_tgt);
return -EPROTO;
-
- if (remaining == 0) /* nothing to do, ignore */
- return 0;
-
- total_in_buf2 = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMB2->t2_rsp.DataCount);
- if (remaining < total_in_buf2) {
- cFYI(1, "transact2 2nd response contains too much data");
}
+ if (remaining == 0) {
+ /* nothing to do, ignore */
+ cFYI(1, "no more data remains");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ total_in_src = get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.DataCount);
+ if (remaining < total_in_src)
+ cFYI(1, "transact2 2nd response contains too much data");
+
/* find end of first SMB data area */
- data_area_of_target = (char *)&pSMBt->hdr.Protocol +
+ data_area_of_tgt = (char *)&pSMBt->hdr.Protocol +
get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataOffset);
+
/* validate target area */
+ data_area_of_src = (char *)&pSMBs->hdr.Protocol +
+ get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.DataOffset);
- data_area_of_buf2 = (char *)&pSMB2->hdr.Protocol +
- get_unaligned_le16(&pSMB2->t2_rsp.DataOffset);
+ data_area_of_tgt += total_in_tgt;
- data_area_of_target += total_in_buf;
-
- /* copy second buffer into end of first buffer */
- total_in_buf += total_in_buf2;
+ total_in_tgt += total_in_src;
/* is the result too big for the field? */
- if (total_in_buf > USHRT_MAX)
+ if (total_in_tgt > USHRT_MAX) {
+ cFYI(1, "coalesced DataCount too large (%u)", total_in_tgt);
return -EPROTO;
- put_unaligned_le16(total_in_buf, &pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataCount);
+ }
+ put_unaligned_le16(total_in_tgt, &pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataCount);
/* fix up the BCC */
byte_count = get_bcc(pTargetSMB);
- byte_count += total_in_buf2;
+ byte_count += total_in_src;
/* is the result too big for the field? */
- if (byte_count > USHRT_MAX)
+ if (byte_count > USHRT_MAX) {
+ cFYI(1, "coalesced BCC too large (%u)", byte_count);
return -EPROTO;
+ }
put_bcc(byte_count, pTargetSMB);
byte_count = be32_to_cpu(pTargetSMB->smb_buf_length);
- byte_count += total_in_buf2;
+ byte_count += total_in_src;
/* don't allow buffer to overflow */
- if (byte_count > CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE - 4)
+ if (byte_count > CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE - 4) {
+ cFYI(1, "coalesced BCC exceeds buffer size (%u)", byte_count);
return -ENOBUFS;
+ }
pTargetSMB->smb_buf_length = cpu_to_be32(byte_count);
- memcpy(data_area_of_target, data_area_of_buf2, total_in_buf2);
+ /* copy second buffer into end of first buffer */
+ memcpy(data_area_of_tgt, data_area_of_src, total_in_src);
- if (remaining == total_in_buf2) {
- cFYI(1, "found the last secondary response");
- return 0; /* we are done */
- } else /* more responses to go */
+ if (remaining != total_in_src) {
+ /* more responses to go */
+ cFYI(1, "waiting for more secondary responses");
return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* we are done */
+ cFYI(1, "found the last secondary response");
+ return 0;
}
static void
@@ -1578,11 +1595,14 @@
}
}
- if (vol->multiuser && !(vol->secFlg & CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5)) {
- cERROR(1, "Multiuser mounts currently require krb5 "
- "authentication!");
+#ifndef CONFIG_KEYS
+ /* Muliuser mounts require CONFIG_KEYS support */
+ if (vol->multiuser) {
+ cERROR(1, "Multiuser mounts require kernels with "
+ "CONFIG_KEYS enabled.");
goto cifs_parse_mount_err;
}
+#endif
if (vol->UNCip == NULL)
vol->UNCip = &vol->UNC[2];
@@ -1981,10 +2001,16 @@
return 0;
break;
default:
+ /* NULL username means anonymous session */
+ if (ses->user_name == NULL) {
+ if (!vol->nullauth)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
/* anything else takes username/password */
- if (ses->user_name == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (strncmp(ses->user_name, vol->username,
+ if (strncmp(ses->user_name,
+ vol->username ? vol->username : "",
MAX_USERNAME_SIZE))
return 0;
if (strlen(vol->username) != 0 &&
@@ -2039,6 +2065,132 @@
cifs_put_tcp_session(server);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
+/* strlen("cifs:a:") + INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 1 */
+#define CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE (7 + INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 1)
+
+/* Populate username and pw fields from keyring if possible */
+static int
+cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ char *desc, *delim, *payload;
+ ssize_t len;
+ struct key *key;
+ struct TCP_Server_Info *server = ses->server;
+ struct sockaddr_in *sa;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
+ struct user_key_payload *upayload;
+
+ desc = kmalloc(CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!desc)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* try to find an address key first */
+ switch (server->dstaddr.ss_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ sa = (struct sockaddr_in *)&server->dstaddr;
+ sprintf(desc, "cifs:a:%pI4", &sa->sin_addr.s_addr);
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&server->dstaddr;
+ sprintf(desc, "cifs:a:%pI6c", &sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
+ break;
+ default:
+ cFYI(1, "Bad ss_family (%hu)", server->dstaddr.ss_family);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ cFYI(1, "%s: desc=%s", __func__, desc);
+ key = request_key(&key_type_logon, desc, "");
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ if (!ses->domainName) {
+ cFYI(1, "domainName is NULL");
+ rc = PTR_ERR(key);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ /* didn't work, try to find a domain key */
+ sprintf(desc, "cifs:d:%s", ses->domainName);
+ cFYI(1, "%s: desc=%s", __func__, desc);
+ key = request_key(&key_type_logon, desc, "");
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(key);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ down_read(&key->sem);
+ upayload = key->payload.data;
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(upayload)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(key);
+ goto out_key_put;
+ }
+
+ /* find first : in payload */
+ payload = (char *)upayload->data;
+ delim = strnchr(payload, upayload->datalen, ':');
+ cFYI(1, "payload=%s", payload);
+ if (!delim) {
+ cFYI(1, "Unable to find ':' in payload (datalen=%d)",
+ upayload->datalen);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_key_put;
+ }
+
+ len = delim - payload;
+ if (len > MAX_USERNAME_SIZE || len <= 0) {
+ cFYI(1, "Bad value from username search (len=%ld)", len);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_key_put;
+ }
+
+ vol->username = kstrndup(payload, len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!vol->username) {
+ cFYI(1, "Unable to allocate %ld bytes for username", len);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_key_put;
+ }
+ cFYI(1, "%s: username=%s", __func__, vol->username);
+
+ len = key->datalen - (len + 1);
+ if (len > MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE || len <= 0) {
+ cFYI(1, "Bad len for password search (len=%ld)", len);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ kfree(vol->username);
+ vol->username = NULL;
+ goto out_key_put;
+ }
+
+ ++delim;
+ vol->password = kstrndup(delim, len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!vol->password) {
+ cFYI(1, "Unable to allocate %ld bytes for password", len);
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ kfree(vol->username);
+ vol->username = NULL;
+ goto out_key_put;
+ }
+
+out_key_put:
+ up_read(&key->sem);
+ key_put(key);
+out_err:
+ kfree(desc);
+ cFYI(1, "%s: returning %d", __func__, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+#else /* ! CONFIG_KEYS */
+static inline int
+cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol __attribute__((unused)),
+ struct cifs_ses *ses __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+ return -ENOSYS;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
static bool warned_on_ntlm; /* globals init to false automatically */
static struct cifs_ses *
@@ -2914,18 +3066,33 @@
#define CIFS_DEFAULT_IOSIZE (1024 * 1024)
/*
- * Windows only supports a max of 60k reads. Default to that when posix
- * extensions aren't in force.
+ * Windows only supports a max of 60kb reads and 65535 byte writes. Default to
+ * those values when posix extensions aren't in force. In actuality here, we
+ * use 65536 to allow for a write that is a multiple of 4k. Most servers seem
+ * to be ok with the extra byte even though Windows doesn't send writes that
+ * are that large.
+ *
+ * Citation:
+ *
+ * http://blogs.msdn.com/b/openspecification/archive/2009/04/10/smb-maximum-transmit-buffer-size-and-performance-tuning.aspx
*/
#define CIFS_DEFAULT_NON_POSIX_RSIZE (60 * 1024)
+#define CIFS_DEFAULT_NON_POSIX_WSIZE (65536)
static unsigned int
cifs_negotiate_wsize(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct smb_vol *pvolume_info)
{
__u64 unix_cap = le64_to_cpu(tcon->fsUnixInfo.Capability);
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server;
- unsigned int wsize = pvolume_info->wsize ? pvolume_info->wsize :
- CIFS_DEFAULT_IOSIZE;
+ unsigned int wsize;
+
+ /* start with specified wsize, or default */
+ if (pvolume_info->wsize)
+ wsize = pvolume_info->wsize;
+ else if (tcon->unix_ext && (unix_cap & CIFS_UNIX_LARGE_WRITE_CAP))
+ wsize = CIFS_DEFAULT_IOSIZE;
+ else
+ wsize = CIFS_DEFAULT_NON_POSIX_WSIZE;
/* can server support 24-bit write sizes? (via UNIX extensions) */
if (!tcon->unix_ext || !(unix_cap & CIFS_UNIX_LARGE_WRITE_CAP))
@@ -3136,10 +3303,9 @@
return -EINVAL;
if (volume_info->nullauth) {
- cFYI(1, "null user");
- volume_info->username = kzalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (volume_info->username == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ cFYI(1, "Anonymous login");
+ kfree(volume_info->username);
+ volume_info->username = NULL;
} else if (volume_info->username) {
/* BB fixme parse for domain name here */
cFYI(1, "Username: %s", volume_info->username);
@@ -3657,16 +3823,38 @@
return rc;
}
+static int
+cifs_set_vol_auth(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses)
+{
+ switch (ses->server->secType) {
+ case Kerberos:
+ vol->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_KRB5;
+ return 0;
+ case NTLMv2:
+ vol->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMV2;
+ break;
+ case NTLM:
+ vol->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLM;
+ break;
+ case RawNTLMSSP:
+ vol->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMSSP;
+ break;
+ case LANMAN:
+ vol->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_LANMAN;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return cifs_set_cifscreds(vol, ses);
+}
+
static struct cifs_tcon *
cifs_construct_tcon(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, uid_t fsuid)
{
+ int rc;
struct cifs_tcon *master_tcon = cifs_sb_master_tcon(cifs_sb);
struct cifs_ses *ses;
struct cifs_tcon *tcon = NULL;
struct smb_vol *vol_info;
- char username[28]; /* big enough for "krb50x" + hex of ULONG_MAX 6+16 */
- /* We used to have this as MAX_USERNAME which is */
- /* way too big now (256 instead of 32) */
vol_info = kzalloc(sizeof(*vol_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (vol_info == NULL) {
@@ -3674,8 +3862,6 @@
goto out;
}
- snprintf(username, sizeof(username), "krb50x%x", fsuid);
- vol_info->username = username;
vol_info->local_nls = cifs_sb->local_nls;
vol_info->linux_uid = fsuid;
vol_info->cred_uid = fsuid;
@@ -3685,8 +3871,11 @@
vol_info->local_lease = master_tcon->local_lease;
vol_info->no_linux_ext = !master_tcon->unix_ext;
- /* FIXME: allow for other secFlg settings */
- vol_info->secFlg = CIFSSEC_MUST_KRB5;
+ rc = cifs_set_vol_auth(vol_info, master_tcon->ses);
+ if (rc) {
+ tcon = ERR_PTR(rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
/* get a reference for the same TCP session */
spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
@@ -3709,6 +3898,8 @@
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNIX)
reset_cifs_unix_caps(0, tcon, NULL, vol_info);
out:
+ kfree(vol_info->username);
+ kfree(vol_info->password);
kfree(vol_info);
return tcon;
diff --git a/include/keys/user-type.h b/include/keys/user-type.h
index c37c342..bc9ec1d 100644
--- a/include/keys/user-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/user-type.h
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
- * the payload for a key of type "user"
+ * the payload for a key of type "user" or "logon"
* - once filled in and attached to a key:
* - the payload struct is invariant may not be changed, only replaced
* - the payload must be read with RCU procedures or with the key semaphore
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
};
extern struct key_type key_type_user;
+extern struct key_type key_type_logon;
extern int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen);
extern int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen);
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index c7a7cae..65647f8 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
extern struct key_type key_type_dead;
extern struct key_type key_type_user;
+extern struct key_type key_type_logon;
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 4f64c72..7ada801 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -999,6 +999,7 @@
list_add_tail(&key_type_keyring.link, &key_types_list);
list_add_tail(&key_type_dead.link, &key_types_list);
list_add_tail(&key_type_user.link, &key_types_list);
+ list_add_tail(&key_type_logon.link, &key_types_list);
/* record the root user tracking */
rb_link_node(&root_key_user.node,
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index 69ff52c..6e1a627 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include "internal.h"
+static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc);
+
/*
* user defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
* arbitrary blob of data as the payload
@@ -36,6 +38,24 @@
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user);
/*
+ * This key type is essentially the same as key_type_user, but it does
+ * not define a .read op. This is suitable for storing username and
+ * password pairs in the keyring that you do not want to be readable
+ * from userspace.
+ */
+struct key_type key_type_logon = {
+ .name = "logon",
+ .instantiate = user_instantiate,
+ .update = user_update,
+ .match = user_match,
+ .revoke = user_revoke,
+ .destroy = user_destroy,
+ .describe = user_describe,
+ .vet_description = logon_vet_description,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_logon);
+
+/*
* instantiate a user defined key
*/
int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
@@ -189,3 +209,20 @@
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_read);
+
+/* Vet the description for a "logon" key */
+static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc)
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ /* require a "qualified" description string */
+ p = strchr(desc, ':');
+ if (!p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* also reject description with ':' as first char */
+ if (p == desc)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}