ext4 crypto: fix bugs in ext4_encrypted_zeroout()
Fix multiple bugs in ext4_encrypted_zeroout(), including one that
could cause us to write an encrypted zero page to the wrong location
on disk, potentially causing data and file system corruption.
Fortunately, this tends to only show up in stress tests, but even with
these fixes, we are seeing some test failures with generic/127 --- but
these are now caused by data failures instead of metadata corruption.
Since ext4_encrypted_zeroout() is only used for some optimizations to
keep the extent tree from being too fragmented, and
ext4_encrypted_zeroout() itself isn't all that optimized from a time
or IOPS perspective, disable the extent tree optimization for
encrypted inodes for now. This prevents the data corruption issues
reported by generic/127 until we can figure out what's going wrong.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c
index 2553aa8..7f486e3 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/extents.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c
@@ -3558,6 +3558,9 @@
max_zeroout = sbi->s_extent_max_zeroout_kb >>
(inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 10);
+ if (ext4_encrypted_inode(inode))
+ max_zeroout = 0;
+
/* If extent is less than s_max_zeroout_kb, zeroout directly */
if (max_zeroout && (ee_len <= max_zeroout)) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, ex);