xfrm: Workaround incompatibility of ESN and async crypto
ESN for esp is defined in RFC 4303. This RFC assumes that the
sequence number counters are always up to date. However,
this is not true if an async crypto algorithm is employed.
If the sequence number counters are not up to date on sequence
number check, we may incorrectly update the upper 32 bit of
the sequence number. This leads to a DOS.
We workaround this by comparing the upper sequence number,
(used for authentication) with the upper sequence number
computed after the async processing. We drop the packet
if these numbers are different.
To do this, we introduce a recheck function that does this
check in the ESN case.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
index 54a0dc2e..ab2bb42 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@
/* only the first xfrm gets the encap type */
encap_type = 0;
- if (async && x->repl->check(x, skb, seq)) {
+ if (async && x->repl->recheck(x, skb, seq)) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATESEQERROR);
goto drop_unlock;
}