commit 41126226e186d92a45ed664e546abb5204588359
author Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com> Fri Apr 18 13:30:14 2008 -0700
committer Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Mon Apr 28 06:28:24 2008 -0400
tree cd31de9587e81b01934fe95e574be109dd0129c7
parent 7719e437fac119e57b17588bab3a8e39ff9d22eb

[patch 1/2] audit: let userspace fully control TTY input auditing

Remove the code that automatically disables TTY input auditing in processes
that open TTYs when they have no other TTY open; this heuristic was
intended to automatically handle daemons, but it has false positives (e.g.
with sshd) that make it impossible to control TTY input auditing from a PAM
module.  With this patch, TTY input auditing is controlled from user-space
only.

On the other hand, not even for daemons does it make sense to audit "input"
from PTY masters; this data was produced by a program writing to the PTY
slave, and does not represent data entered by the user.

Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

drivers/char/tty_io.c

diff --git a/drivers/char/tty_io.c b/drivers/char/tty_io.c
index 4d3c701..afddccf 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tty_io.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tty_io.c
@@ -2755,7 +2755,6 @@
 		__proc_set_tty(current, tty);
 	spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
 	mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
-	tty_audit_opening();
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2818,10 +2817,8 @@
 
 	check_tty_count(tty, "tty_open");
 	retval = ptm_driver->open(tty, filp);
-	if (!retval) {
-		tty_audit_opening();
+	if (!retval)
 		return 0;
-	}
 out1:
 	release_dev(filp);
 	return retval;