net: Kill register_sysctl_rotable
register_sysctl_rotable never caught on as an interesting way to
register sysctls. My take on the situation is that what we want are
sysctls that we can only see in the initial network namespace. What we
have implemented with register_sysctl_rotable are sysctls that we can
see in all of the network namespaces and can only change in the initial
network namespace.
That is a very silly way to go. Just register the network sysctls
in the initial network namespace and we don't have any weird special
cases to deal with.
The sysctls affected are:
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ipfrag_secret_interval
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ipfrag_max_dist
/proc/sys/net/ipv6/ip6frag_secret_interval
/proc/sys/net/ipv6/mld_max_msf
I really don't expect anyone will miss them if they can't read them in a
child user namespace.
CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
index 247c69b..8f67633 100644
--- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
+++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@
static struct ctl_table empty[1];
kmemleak_not_leak(register_sysctl_paths(net_core_path, empty));
- register_net_sysctl_rotable(net_core_path, net_core_table);
+ register_net_sysctl(&init_net, "net/core", net_core_table);
return register_pernet_subsys(&sysctl_core_ops);
}