[IPSEC] esp: Remove keys from esp_data structure
The keys are only used during initialisation so we don't need to carry them
in esp_data. Since we don't have to allocate them again, there is no need
to place a limit on the authentication key length anymore.
This patch also kills the unused auth.icv member.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
diff --git a/include/net/esp.h b/include/net/esp.h
index d05d8d2..e793d769 100644
--- a/include/net/esp.h
+++ b/include/net/esp.h
@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@
/* Confidentiality */
struct {
- u8 *key; /* Key */
- int key_len; /* Key length */
int padlen; /* 0..255 */
/* ivlen is offset from enc_data, where encrypted data start.
* It is logically different of crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm).
@@ -28,14 +26,9 @@
/* Integrity. It is active when icv_full_len != 0 */
struct {
- u8 *key; /* Key */
- int key_len; /* Length of the key */
u8 *work_icv;
int icv_full_len;
int icv_trunc_len;
- void (*icv)(struct esp_data*,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- int offset, int len, u8 *icv);
struct crypto_hash *tfm;
} auth;
};
diff --git a/net/ipv4/esp4.c b/net/ipv4/esp4.c
index 98767a4..d233e2e6 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/esp4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/esp4.c
@@ -343,11 +343,6 @@
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
u32 align;
- /* null auth and encryption can have zero length keys */
- if (x->aalg) {
- if (x->aalg->alg_key_len > 512)
- goto error;
- }
if (x->ealg == NULL)
goto error;
@@ -359,15 +354,14 @@
struct xfrm_algo_desc *aalg_desc;
struct crypto_hash *hash;
- esp->auth.key = x->aalg->alg_key;
- esp->auth.key_len = (x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
hash = crypto_alloc_hash(x->aalg->alg_name, 0,
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(hash))
goto error;
esp->auth.tfm = hash;
- if (crypto_hash_setkey(hash, esp->auth.key, esp->auth.key_len))
+ if (crypto_hash_setkey(hash, x->aalg->alg_key,
+ (x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8))
goto error;
aalg_desc = xfrm_aalg_get_byname(x->aalg->alg_name, 0);
@@ -389,8 +383,7 @@
if (!esp->auth.work_icv)
goto error;
}
- esp->conf.key = x->ealg->alg_key;
- esp->conf.key_len = (x->ealg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
+
tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(x->ealg->alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
goto error;
@@ -403,7 +396,8 @@
goto error;
esp->conf.ivinitted = 0;
}
- if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, esp->conf.key, esp->conf.key_len))
+ if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, x->ealg->alg_key,
+ (x->ealg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8))
goto error;
x->props.header_len = sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen;
if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
index 2db31ce..77281068 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
@@ -297,11 +297,6 @@
struct esp_data *esp = NULL;
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
- /* null auth and encryption can have zero length keys */
- if (x->aalg) {
- if (x->aalg->alg_key_len > 512)
- goto error;
- }
if (x->ealg == NULL)
goto error;
@@ -316,15 +311,14 @@
struct xfrm_algo_desc *aalg_desc;
struct crypto_hash *hash;
- esp->auth.key = x->aalg->alg_key;
- esp->auth.key_len = (x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
hash = crypto_alloc_hash(x->aalg->alg_name, 0,
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(hash))
goto error;
esp->auth.tfm = hash;
- if (crypto_hash_setkey(hash, esp->auth.key, esp->auth.key_len))
+ if (crypto_hash_setkey(hash, x->aalg->alg_key,
+ (x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8))
goto error;
aalg_desc = xfrm_aalg_get_byname(x->aalg->alg_name, 0);
@@ -346,8 +340,6 @@
if (!esp->auth.work_icv)
goto error;
}
- esp->conf.key = x->ealg->alg_key;
- esp->conf.key_len = (x->ealg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(x->ealg->alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
goto error;
@@ -360,7 +352,8 @@
goto error;
esp->conf.ivinitted = 0;
}
- if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, esp->conf.key, esp->conf.key_len))
+ if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, x->ealg->alg_key,
+ (x->ealg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8))
goto error;
x->props.header_len = sizeof(struct ipv6_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen;
if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL)