cifs: allow sec=none mounts to work against servers that don't support extended security
In the case of sec=none, we're not sending a username or password, so
there's little benefit to mandating NTLMSSP auth. Allow it to use
unencapsulated auth in that case.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c
index 99eeaa1..0a7fdc3 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/connect.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c
@@ -1061,6 +1061,7 @@
#endif
case Opt_sec_none:
vol->nullauth = 1;
+ vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM;
break;
default:
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad security option: %s\n", value);