capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely
The capabilities framework is based around credentials, not necessarily the
current task. Yet we still passed the current task down into LSMs from the
security_capable() LSM hook as if it was a meaningful portion of the security
decision. This patch removes the 'generic' passing of current and instead
forces individual LSMs to use current explicitly if they think it is
appropriate. In our case those LSMs are SELinux and AppArmor.
I believe the AppArmor use of current is incorrect, but that is wholely
unrelated to this patch. This patch does not change what AppArmor does, it
just makes it clear in the AppArmor code that it is doing it.
The SELinux code still uses current in it's audit message, which may also be
wrong and needs further investigation. Again this is NOT a change, it may
have always been wrong, this patch just makes it clear what is happening.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 3783202..ef4e2a8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -136,16 +136,16 @@
return 0;
}
-static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
+static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap, int audit)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
- int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit);
+ int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
if (!error) {
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
if (!unconfined(profile))
- error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit);
+ error = aa_capable(current, profile, cap, audit);
}
return error;
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index a93b3b7..89f02ff 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -66,7 +66,6 @@
/**
* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
- * @tsk: The task to query
* @cred: The credentials to use
* @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
* @cap: The capability to check for
@@ -80,8 +79,8 @@
* cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
* kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
*/
-int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit)
+int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
+ int cap, int audit)
{
for (;;) {
/* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
@@ -222,9 +221,8 @@
/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
* capability
*/
- if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
- current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
+ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns,
+ CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -870,7 +868,7 @@
& (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
|| ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
- || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
+ || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
@@ -936,7 +934,7 @@
{
int cap_sys_admin = 0;
- if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
@@ -963,7 +961,7 @@
int ret = 0;
if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
- ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
+ ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
if (ret == 0)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d9e1533..9ae68c6 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -157,8 +157,7 @@
int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
int cap)
{
- return security_ops->capable(current, cred, ns, cap,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
@@ -168,7 +167,7 @@
int ret;
cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
- ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ ret = security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
put_cred(cred);
return ret;
}
@@ -180,7 +179,7 @@
int ret;
cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
- ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ ret = security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
put_cred(cred);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e545b9f..c9605c4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1414,8 +1414,7 @@
#endif
/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
-static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
- const struct cred *cred,
+static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -1426,7 +1425,7 @@
int rc;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
- ad.tsk = tsk;
+ ad.tsk = current;
ad.u.cap = cap;
switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
@@ -1867,16 +1866,16 @@
* the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
*/
-static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
+static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap, int audit)
{
int rc;
- rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
+ rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+ return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
}
static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
@@ -1953,8 +1952,7 @@
{
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
- rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
- &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2858,8 +2856,7 @@
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
- error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
- &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+ error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
@@ -2992,8 +2989,8 @@
case KDSKBENT:
case KDSKBSENT:
- error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
+ SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
break;
/* default case assumes that the command will go