CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.
Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.
With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 937f6b5..49849d1 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@
int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
+ struct cred *cred = current->cred, *tcred = task->cred;
+
/* May we inspect the given task?
* This check is used both for attaching with ptrace
* and for allowing access to sensitive information in /proc.
@@ -123,19 +125,18 @@
* because setting up the necessary parent/child relationship
* or halting the specified task is impossible.
*/
- uid_t uid;
- gid_t gid;
+ uid_t uid = cred->uid;
+ gid_t gid = cred->gid;
int dumpable = 0;
/* Don't let security modules deny introspection */
if (task == current)
return 0;
- current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
- if ((uid != task->euid ||
- uid != task->suid ||
- uid != task->uid ||
- gid != task->egid ||
- gid != task->sgid ||
- gid != task->gid) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ if ((uid != tcred->euid ||
+ uid != tcred->suid ||
+ uid != tcred->uid ||
+ gid != tcred->egid ||
+ gid != tcred->sgid ||
+ gid != tcred->gid) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
return -EPERM;
smp_rmb();
if (task->mm)