diff --git a/crypto/crypto_user.c b/crypto/crypto_user.c
index 3ba6ef50..16f8693 100644
--- a/crypto/crypto_user.c
+++ b/crypto/crypto_user.c
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@
 	type -= CRYPTO_MSG_BASE;
 	link = &crypto_dispatch[type];
 
-	if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if ((type == (CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG - CRYPTO_MSG_BASE) &&
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 106be0d..a3cd8ca 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@
 	u8 *data = (u8*) buf;
 
 	/* Several chips lock up trying to read undefined config space */
-	if (security_capable(&init_user_ns, filp->f_cred, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) {
+	if (security_capable(filp->f_cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) {
 		size = dev->cfg_size;
 	} else if (dev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_CARDBUS) {
 		size = 128;
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
index 44f76e8..c77628a 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@
 			goto next_msg;
 		}
 
-		if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
 			err = -EPERM;
 			goto next_msg;
 		}
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index 9252ee3..c602b8d 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@
 
 	state = *get_task_state(task);
 	vsize = eip = esp = 0;
-	permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+	permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT);
 	mm = get_task_mm(task);
 	if (mm) {
 		vsize = task_vsize(mm);
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index a63d13d..12d52de 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -380,7 +380,6 @@
 struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
 
 extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
-extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set;
 extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
 
 /*
@@ -544,9 +543,10 @@
 extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
 			      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
+extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
+				      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 extern bool capable(int cap);
 extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
-extern bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
 extern bool nsown_capable(int cap);
 
 /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 4030896..adadf71 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -358,10 +358,12 @@
 #define current_security()	(current_cred_xxx(security))
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
-#define current_user_ns() (current_cred_xxx(user_ns))
+#define current_user_ns()	(current_cred_xxx(user_ns))
+#define task_user_ns(task)	(task_cred_xxx((task), user_ns))
 #else
 extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
-#define current_user_ns() (&init_user_ns)
+#define current_user_ns()	(&init_user_ns)
+#define task_user_ns(task)	(&init_user_ns)
 #endif
 
 
diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
index 800f113..a27e56c 100644
--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -127,8 +127,9 @@
 			  struct task_struct *new_parent);
 extern void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child);
 extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer);
-#define PTRACE_MODE_READ   1
-#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 2
+#define PTRACE_MODE_READ	0x01
+#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH	0x02
+#define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT	0x04
 /* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
 extern int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
 /* Returns true on success, false on denial. */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 0ccceb9..83c18e8 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@
  * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
  * as the default capabilities functions
  */
-extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
-		       struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit);
+extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+		       int cap, int audit);
 extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
 extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@
 struct seq_file;
 
 extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-extern int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
 
 void reset_security_ops(void);
 
@@ -799,12 +798,6 @@
  *	@skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message.
  *	Return 0 if the information was successfully saved and message
  *	is allowed to be transmitted.
- * @netlink_recv:
- *	Check permission before processing the received netlink message in
- *	@skb.
- *	@skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message.
- *	@cap indicates the capability required
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  *
  * Security hooks for Unix domain networking.
  *
@@ -1268,7 +1261,6 @@
  * @capable:
  *	Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated
  *	credentials.
- *	@tsk contains the task_struct for the process.
  *	@cred contains the credentials to use.
  *	@ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in
  *	@cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
@@ -1392,8 +1384,8 @@
 		       const kernel_cap_t *effective,
 		       const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
 		       const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-	int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
-			struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit);
+	int (*capable) (const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+			int cap, int audit);
 	int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
 	int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry);
 	int (*syslog) (int type);
@@ -1563,7 +1555,6 @@
 			  struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter);
 
 	int (*netlink_send) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-	int (*netlink_recv) (struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
 
 	void (*d_instantiate) (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
 
@@ -1675,12 +1666,10 @@
 		    const kernel_cap_t *effective,
 		    const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
 		    const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
+int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 			int cap);
-int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
-			int cap);
-int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk,
-			struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+			     int cap);
 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry);
 int security_syslog(int type);
@@ -1817,7 +1806,6 @@
 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
 int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1875,32 +1863,15 @@
 	return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
-static inline int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns,
-				   const struct cred *cred, int cap)
+static inline int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
+				   struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 {
-	return cap_capable(current, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+	return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
 }
 
-static inline int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static inline
-int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), ns, cap,
-			       SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return ret;
+static inline int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred,
+					   struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) {
+	return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
 }
 
 static inline int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id,
@@ -2517,11 +2488,6 @@
 	return cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
 }
 
-static inline int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
-{
-	return cap_netlink_recv(skb, cap);
-}
-
 static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2c1d6ab..57e3f51 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -601,13 +601,13 @@
 	case AUDIT_TTY_SET:
 	case AUDIT_TRIM:
 	case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV:
-		if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+		if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
 			err = -EPERM;
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_USER:
 	case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
 	case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
-		if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+		if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
 			err = -EPERM;
 		break;
 	default:  /* bad msg */
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index b463871..0fcf1c1 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -287,24 +287,7 @@
 }
 
 /**
- * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
- * @t: The task in question
- * @cap: The capability to be tested for
- *
- * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
- *
- * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
- */
-bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
-{
-	int ret = security_real_capable(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
-
-	return (ret == 0);
-}
-
-/**
- * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
+ * has_ns_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
  * @t: The task in question
  * @ns: target user namespace
  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
@@ -317,13 +300,58 @@
 bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
 		       struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 {
-	int ret = security_real_capable(t, ns, cap);
+	int ret;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return (ret == 0);
 }
 
 /**
- * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
+ * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
+ * @t: The task in question
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
+ */
+bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+{
+	return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
+}
+
+/**
+ * has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
+ * in a specific user ns.
+ * @t: The task in question
+ * @ns: target user namespace
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
+ * Do not write an audit message for the check.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
+ */
+bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
+			       struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return (ret == 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) in the
+ * initial user ns
  * @t: The task in question
  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
  *
@@ -335,28 +363,10 @@
  */
 bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
 {
-	int ret = security_real_capable_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
-
-	return (ret == 0);
+	return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
 }
 
 /**
- * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
- * @cap: The capability to be tested for
- *
- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
- * available for use, false if not.
- *
- * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
- * assumption that it's about to be used.
- */
-bool capable(int cap)
-{
-	return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
-
-/**
  * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
  * @ns:  The usernamespace we want the capability in
  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
@@ -374,7 +384,7 @@
 		BUG();
 	}
 
-	if (security_capable(ns, current_cred(), cap) == 0) {
+	if (has_ns_capability(current, ns, cap)) {
 		current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
 		return true;
 	}
@@ -383,18 +393,20 @@
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
 
 /**
- * task_ns_capable - Determine whether current task has a superior
- * capability targeted at a specific task's user namespace.
- * @t: The task whose user namespace is targeted.
- * @cap: The capability in question.
+ * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
  *
- *  Return true if it does, false otherwise.
+ * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
+ * available for use, false if not.
+ *
+ * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
+ * assumption that it's about to be used.
  */
-bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+bool capable(int cap)
 {
-	return ns_capable(task_cred_xxx(t, user)->user_ns, cap);
+	return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(task_ns_capable);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
 
 /**
  * nsown_capable - Check superior capability to one's own user_ns
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 78ab24a..00ab2ca 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -172,6 +172,14 @@
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
+{
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
+		return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+	else
+		return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+}
+
 int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
@@ -198,7 +206,7 @@
 	     cred->gid == tcred->sgid &&
 	     cred->gid == tcred->gid))
 		goto ok;
-	if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+	if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user->user_ns, mode))
 		goto ok;
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return -EPERM;
@@ -207,7 +215,7 @@
 	smp_rmb();
 	if (task->mm)
 		dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
-	if (!dumpable && !task_ns_capable(task, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+	if (!dumpable  && !ptrace_has_cap(task_user_ns(task), mode))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
@@ -277,7 +285,7 @@
 	task->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
 	if (seize)
 		task->ptrace |= PT_SEIZED;
-	if (task_ns_capable(task, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+	if (ns_capable(task_user_ns(task), CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 		task->ptrace |= PT_PTRACE_CAP;
 
 	__ptrace_link(task, current);
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index fd7b25e..df00cb0 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -4330,7 +4330,7 @@
 		goto out_free_cpus_allowed;
 	}
 	retval = -EPERM;
-	if (!check_same_owner(p) && !task_ns_capable(p, CAP_SYS_NICE))
+	if (!check_same_owner(p) && !ns_capable(task_user_ns(p), CAP_SYS_NICE))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	retval = security_task_setscheduler(p);
diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
index dbf2dda..f16444b 100644
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -1960,7 +1960,7 @@
 	sz_idx = type>>2;
 	kind = type&3;
 
-	if (kind != 2 && security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (kind != 2 && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (kind == 2 && nlh->nlmsg_flags&NLM_F_DUMP) {
diff --git a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
index 69975e0..1531135 100644
--- a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
+++ b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
 	if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len)
 		return;
 
-	if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
 
 	/* Eventually we might send routing messages too */
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
index a057fe6..94d45e1 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@
 	if (type <= IPQM_BASE)
 		return;
 
-	if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&queue_lock);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
index fb80a23..a34c9e4 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@
 	if (type <= IPQM_BASE)
 		return;
 
-	if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&queue_lock);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
index b4f8d84..4d70785 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
 	const struct nfnetlink_subsystem *ss;
 	int type, err;
 
-	if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* All the messages must at least contain nfgenmsg */
diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
index a403b61..c29d256 100644
--- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) &&
-	    security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	    !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 637f11a..66b84fb 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -2290,7 +2290,7 @@
 	link = &xfrm_dispatch[type];
 
 	/* All operations require privileges, even GET */
-	if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if ((type == (XFRM_MSG_GETSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE) ||
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 68d50c5..97ce8fa 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -136,16 +136,16 @@
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
-			    struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
+static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+			    int cap, int audit)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
-	int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit);
+	int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
 	if (!error) {
 		profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 		if (!unconfined(profile))
-			error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit);
+			error = aa_capable(current, profile, cap, audit);
 	}
 	return error;
 }
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 3b5883b..2f680eb 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -998,7 +998,6 @@
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semctl);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semop);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_send);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_recv);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index ee4f848..7ce191e 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -56,17 +56,8 @@
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
-{
-	if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), cap))
-		return -EPERM;
-	return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
-
 /**
  * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
- * @tsk: The task to query
  * @cred: The credentials to use
  * @ns:  The user namespace in which we need the capability
  * @cap: The capability to check for
@@ -80,8 +71,8 @@
  * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
  * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
  */
-int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
-		struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit)
+int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
+		int cap, int audit)
 {
 	for (;;) {
 		/* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
@@ -222,9 +213,8 @@
 	/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
 	 * capability
 	 */
-	if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
-			current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
-			SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
+	if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns,
+			CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
 		return 0;
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -874,7 +864,7 @@
 		     & (new->securebits ^ arg2))			/*[1]*/
 		    || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))	/*[2]*/
 		    || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS))	/*[3]*/
-		    || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
+		    || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
 				    current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
 				    SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0)		/*[4]*/
 			/*
@@ -940,7 +930,7 @@
 {
 	int cap_sys_admin = 0;
 
-	if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+	if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
 			SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
 		cap_sys_admin = 1;
 	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
@@ -967,7 +957,7 @@
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
-		ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
+		ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
 				  SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
 		/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
 		if (ret == 0)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 214502c..d754249 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -155,35 +155,16 @@
 				    effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
-int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
+int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 		     int cap)
 {
-	return security_ops->capable(current, cred, ns, cap,
-				     SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+	return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
 }
 
-int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
-			  int cap)
+int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+			     int cap)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred;
-	int ret;
-
-	cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
-	ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
-	put_cred(cred);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk,
-				  struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
-{
-	const struct cred *cred;
-	int ret;
-
-	cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
-	ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
-	put_cred(cred);
-	return ret;
+	return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
 }
 
 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
@@ -994,12 +975,6 @@
 	return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
 }
 
-int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
-{
-	return security_ops->netlink_recv(skb, cap);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_netlink_recv);
-
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
 	return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7cd4c3a..6a3683e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1415,8 +1415,7 @@
 #endif
 
 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
-static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
-			       const struct cred *cred,
+static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
 			       int cap, int audit)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -1427,7 +1426,7 @@
 	int rc;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
-	ad.tsk = tsk;
+	ad.tsk = current;
 	ad.u.cap = cap;
 
 	switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
@@ -1811,7 +1810,7 @@
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
 		u32 sid = current_sid();
 		u32 csid = task_sid(child);
 		return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
@@ -1868,16 +1867,16 @@
  * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
  */
 
-static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
-			   struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
+static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+			   int cap, int audit)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
+	rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+	return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
 }
 
 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
@@ -1954,8 +1953,7 @@
 {
 	int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
 
-	rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
-			     &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+	rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
 			     SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2859,8 +2857,7 @@
 	 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
 	 * in-core context value, not a denial.
 	 */
-	error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
-				&init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+	error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
 				SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
 	if (!error)
 		error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
@@ -2993,8 +2990,8 @@
 
 	case KDSKBENT:
 	case KDSKBSENT:
-		error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
-					SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+		error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
+					    SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
 		break;
 
 	/* default case assumes that the command will go
@@ -4718,24 +4715,6 @@
 	return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
 }
 
-static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
-{
-	int err;
-	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	u32 sid;
-
-	err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
-	ad.u.cap = capability;
-
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
-			    CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
-}
-
 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
 			      struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
 			      u16 sclass)
@@ -5464,7 +5443,6 @@
 	.vm_enough_memory =		selinux_vm_enough_memory,
 
 	.netlink_send =			selinux_netlink_send,
-	.netlink_recv =			selinux_netlink_recv,
 
 	.bprm_set_creds =		selinux_bprm_set_creds,
 	.bprm_committing_creds =	selinux_bprm_committing_creds,