netfilter: xtables: check for standard verdicts in policies
This adds the second check that Rusty wanted to have a long time ago. :-)
Base chain policies must have absolute verdicts that cease processing
in the table, otherwise rule execution may continue in an unexpected
spurious fashion (e.g. next chain that follows in memory).
Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de>
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
index b0599b9..a5d0c27 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -740,6 +740,21 @@
return ret;
}
+static bool check_underflow(struct ip6t_entry *e)
+{
+ const struct ip6t_entry_target *t;
+ unsigned int verdict;
+
+ if (!unconditional(&e->ipv6))
+ return false;
+ t = ip6t_get_target(e);
+ if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
+ return false;
+ verdict = ((struct ip6t_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
+ verdict = -verdict - 1;
+ return verdict == NF_DROP || verdict == NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
static int
check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
@@ -772,8 +787,10 @@
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
- if (!unconditional(&e->ipv6)) {
- pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional\n");
+ if (!check_underflow(e)) {
+ pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
+ "use the STANDARD target with "
+ "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];