Bluetooth: Update SMP crypto functions to take the SMP context
Passing the full SMP context instead of just the crypto context lets us
use the crypto handle from the context which in turn removes the need to
lock the hci_dev. Passing the SMP context instead of just the crypto
handle allows a bit more detailed logging which is helpful in
multi-adapter scenarios.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 39ca961..2566a3e 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -172,13 +172,16 @@
return 0;
}
-static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
- u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia,
- u8 _rat, bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
+static int smp_c1(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 k[16], u8 r[16], u8 preq[7],
+ u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, bdaddr_t *ra,
+ u8 res[16])
{
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
u8 p1[16], p2[16];
int err;
+ BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
+
memset(p1, 0, 16);
/* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
@@ -196,7 +199,7 @@
u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
/* res = e(k, res) */
- err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
+ err = smp_e(smp->tfm_aes, k, res);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
return err;
@@ -206,23 +209,26 @@
u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
/* res = e(k, res) */
- err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
+ err = smp_e(smp->tfm_aes, k, res);
if (err)
BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
return err;
}
-static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16],
- u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
+static int smp_s1(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16], u8 r2[16],
+ u8 _r[16])
{
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
int err;
+ BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
+
/* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
memcpy(_r, r2, 8);
memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
- err = smp_e(tfm, k, _r);
+ err = smp_e(smp->tfm_aes, k, _r);
if (err)
BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
@@ -475,23 +481,15 @@
static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
- struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
- struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = hdev->tfm_aes;
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
int ret;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
- /* Prevent mutual access to hdev->tfm_aes */
- hci_dev_lock(hdev);
-
- ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+ ret = smp_c1(smp, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
cp.confirm_val);
-
- hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
-
if (ret)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
@@ -506,25 +504,17 @@
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
- struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
- struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = hdev->tfm_aes;
u8 confirm[16];
int ret;
- if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(tfm))
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(smp->tfm_aes))
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
- /* Prevent mutual access to hdev->tfm_aes */
- hci_dev_lock(hdev);
-
- ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+ ret = smp_c1(smp, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
-
- hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
-
if (ret)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
@@ -538,7 +528,7 @@
__le64 rand = 0;
__le16 ediv = 0;
- smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
+ smp_s1(smp, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
@@ -556,7 +546,7 @@
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
smp->prnd);
- smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
+ smp_s1(smp, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);