blob: 97ce8fae49b3bd063a78fd5d9a6cc3eb80254cf1 [file] [log] [blame]
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -07001/*
2 * AppArmor security module
3 *
4 * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
5 *
6 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
12 * License.
13 */
14
15#include <linux/security.h>
16#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
17#include <linux/mm.h>
18#include <linux/mman.h>
19#include <linux/mount.h>
20#include <linux/namei.h>
21#include <linux/ptrace.h>
22#include <linux/ctype.h>
23#include <linux/sysctl.h>
24#include <linux/audit.h>
Serge E. Hallyn34867402011-03-23 16:43:17 -070025#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -070026#include <net/sock.h>
27
28#include "include/apparmor.h"
29#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
30#include "include/audit.h"
31#include "include/capability.h"
32#include "include/context.h"
33#include "include/file.h"
34#include "include/ipc.h"
35#include "include/path.h"
36#include "include/policy.h"
37#include "include/procattr.h"
38
39/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
40int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
41
42/*
43 * LSM hook functions
44 */
45
46/*
47 * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles
48 */
49static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
50{
51 aa_free_task_context(cred->security);
52 cred->security = NULL;
53}
54
55/*
56 * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
57 */
58static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
59{
60 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
61 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
62 if (!cxt)
63 return -ENOMEM;
64
65 cred->security = cxt;
66 return 0;
67}
68
69/*
70 * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block
71 */
72static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
73 gfp_t gfp)
74{
75 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
76 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
77 if (!cxt)
78 return -ENOMEM;
79
80 aa_dup_task_context(cxt, old->security);
81 new->security = cxt;
82 return 0;
83}
84
85/*
86 * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
87 */
88static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
89{
90 const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = old->security;
91 struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = new->security;
92
93 aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
94}
95
96static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
97 unsigned int mode)
98{
99 int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
100 if (error)
101 return error;
102
103 return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
104}
105
106static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
107{
108 int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
109 if (error)
110 return error;
111
112 return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
113}
114
115/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
116static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
117 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
118{
119 struct aa_profile *profile;
120 const struct cred *cred;
121
122 rcu_read_lock();
123 cred = __task_cred(target);
124 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
125
126 *effective = cred->cap_effective;
127 *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
128 *permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
129
John Johansen25e75df2011-06-25 16:57:07 +0100130 if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700131 *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
132 *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
133 }
134 rcu_read_unlock();
135
136 return 0;
137}
138
Eric Paris6a9de492012-01-03 12:25:14 -0500139static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
140 int cap, int audit)
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700141{
142 struct aa_profile *profile;
143 /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
Eric Paris6a9de492012-01-03 12:25:14 -0500144 int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700145 if (!error) {
146 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
147 if (!unconfined(profile))
Eric Paris6a9de492012-01-03 12:25:14 -0500148 error = aa_capable(current, profile, cap, audit);
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700149 }
150 return error;
151}
152
153/**
154 * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
155 * @op: operation being checked
156 * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL)
157 * @mask: requested permissions mask
158 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
159 *
160 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
161 */
162static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask,
163 struct path_cond *cond)
164{
165 struct aa_profile *profile;
166 int error = 0;
167
168 profile = __aa_current_profile();
169 if (!unconfined(profile))
170 error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond);
171
172 return error;
173}
174
175/**
176 * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
177 * @op: operation being checked
178 * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
179 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
180 * @mask: requested permissions mask
181 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
182 *
183 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
184 */
185static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir,
186 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
187 struct path_cond *cond)
188{
189 struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry };
190
191 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
192}
193
194/**
195 * common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry
196 * @op: operation being checked
197 * @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL)
198 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
199 * @mask: requested permissions mask
200 *
201 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
202 */
203static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt,
204 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
205{
206 struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
207 struct path_cond cond = { dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
208 dentry->d_inode->i_mode
209 };
210
211 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond);
212}
213
214/**
215 * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
216 * @op: operation being checked
217 * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL)
218 * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL)
219 * @mask: requested permission mask
220 *
221 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
222 */
223static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir,
224 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
225{
226 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
227 struct path_cond cond = { };
228
229 if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(inode))
230 return 0;
231
232 cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
233 cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
234
235 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
236}
237
238/**
239 * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
240 * @op: operation being checked
241 * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL)
242 * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL)
243 * @mask: request permission mask
244 * @mode: created file mode
245 *
246 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
247 */
248static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
249 u32 mask, umode_t mode)
250{
251 struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
252
253 if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry->d_inode))
254 return 0;
255
256 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
257}
258
259static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
260{
261 return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
262}
263
264static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
Al Viro4572bef2011-11-21 14:56:21 -0500265 umode_t mode)
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700266{
267 return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
268 S_IFDIR);
269}
270
271static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
272{
273 return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
274}
275
276static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
Al Viro04fc66e2011-11-21 14:58:38 -0500277 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700278{
279 return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
280}
281
James Morris4d6ec102010-07-30 09:02:04 +1000282static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path)
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700283{
284 struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
285 path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
286 };
287
288 if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
289 return 0;
290
291 return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE,
292 &cond);
293}
294
295static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
296 const char *old_name)
297{
298 return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
299 S_IFLNK);
300}
301
302static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
303 struct dentry *new_dentry)
304{
305 struct aa_profile *profile;
306 int error = 0;
307
308 if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
309 return 0;
310
311 profile = aa_current_profile();
312 if (!unconfined(profile))
313 error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
314 return error;
315}
316
317static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
318 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
319{
320 struct aa_profile *profile;
321 int error = 0;
322
323 if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
324 return 0;
325
326 profile = aa_current_profile();
327 if (!unconfined(profile)) {
328 struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
329 struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
330 struct path_cond cond = { old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
331 old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode
332 };
333
334 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0,
335 MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE |
336 AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE,
337 &cond);
338 if (!error)
339 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path,
340 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE |
341 AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
342
343 }
344 return error;
345}
346
Al Virocdcf1162011-12-08 10:51:53 -0500347static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700348{
Al Virocdcf1162011-12-08 10:51:53 -0500349 if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700350 return 0;
351
Al Virocdcf1162011-12-08 10:51:53 -0500352 return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, path->mnt, path->dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700353}
354
355static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
356{
357 struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
358 path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
359 };
360
361 if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
362 return 0;
363
364 return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond);
365}
366
367static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
368{
369 if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode))
370 return 0;
371
372 return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, mnt, dentry,
373 AA_MAY_META_READ);
374}
375
376static int apparmor_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
377{
378 struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
379 struct aa_profile *profile;
380 int error = 0;
381
382 if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode))
383 return 0;
384
385 /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
386 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
387 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
388 * actually execute the image.
389 */
390 if (current->in_execve) {
391 fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
392 return 0;
393 }
394
395 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
396 if (!unconfined(profile)) {
397 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
398 struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
399
400 error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
401 aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
402 /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
403 fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
404 }
405
406 return error;
407}
408
409static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
410{
411 /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
412 file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL);
413 if (!file->f_security)
414 return -ENOMEM;
415 return 0;
416
417}
418
419static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
420{
421 struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security;
422
423 aa_free_file_context(cxt);
424}
425
426static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
427{
428 struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
429 struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred);
430 int error = 0;
431
432 BUG_ON(!fprofile);
433
434 if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
435 !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode))
436 return 0;
437
438 profile = __aa_current_profile();
439
440 /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
441 * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
442 * was granted.
443 *
444 * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file
445 * delegation from unconfined tasks
446 */
447 if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) &&
448 ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow)))
449 error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask);
450
451 return error;
452}
453
454static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
455{
456 return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
457}
458
459static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
460{
461 u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
462
463 if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
464 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
465
466 return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
467}
468
469static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
470 unsigned long flags)
471{
472 struct dentry *dentry;
473 int mask = 0;
474
475 if (!file || !file->f_security)
476 return 0;
477
478 if (prot & PROT_READ)
479 mask |= MAY_READ;
480 /*
481 * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
482 * write back to the files
483 */
484 if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
485 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
486 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
487 mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
488
489 dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
490 return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
491}
492
493static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
494 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
495 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
496{
497 int rc = 0;
498
499 /* do DAC check */
500 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
501 if (rc || addr_only)
502 return rc;
503
504 return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
505}
506
507static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
508 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
509{
510 return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
511 !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
512}
513
514static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
515 char **value)
516{
517 int error = -ENOENT;
518 struct aa_profile *profile;
519 /* released below */
520 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
521 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security;
522 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
523
524 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
525 error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile),
526 value);
527 else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous)
528 error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->previous),
529 value);
530 else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec)
531 error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->onexec),
532 value);
533 else
534 error = -EINVAL;
535
536 put_cred(cred);
537
538 return error;
539}
540
541static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
542 void *value, size_t size)
543{
544 char *command, *args = value;
545 size_t arg_size;
546 int error;
547
548 if (size == 0)
549 return -EINVAL;
550 /* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
551 * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
552 * so that AppArmor can null terminate them
553 */
554 if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
555 if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
556 return -EINVAL;
557 args[size] = '\0';
558 }
559
560 /* task can only write its own attributes */
561 if (current != task)
562 return -EACCES;
563
564 args = value;
565 args = strim(args);
566 command = strsep(&args, " ");
567 if (!args)
568 return -EINVAL;
569 args = skip_spaces(args);
570 if (!*args)
571 return -EINVAL;
572
573 arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
574 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
575 if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
576 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
577 !AA_DO_TEST);
578 } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
579 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
580 AA_DO_TEST);
581 } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
582 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
583 !AA_DO_TEST);
584 } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
585 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
586 AA_DO_TEST);
587 } else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) {
588 error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
589 } else {
590 struct common_audit_data sa;
591 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
592 sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
593 sa.aad.info = name;
594 sa.aad.error = -EINVAL;
Kees Cooka5b2c5b2011-05-31 11:31:41 -0700595 return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED,
596 __aa_current_profile(), GFP_KERNEL,
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700597 &sa, NULL);
598 }
599 } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
600 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
601 !AA_DO_TEST);
602 } else {
603 /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
604 return -EINVAL;
605 }
606 if (!error)
607 error = size;
608 return error;
609}
610
Jiri Slaby7cb4dc92010-08-11 11:28:02 +0200611static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
612 unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700613{
John Johansen1780f2d2011-06-08 15:07:47 -0700614 struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700615 int error = 0;
616
617 if (!unconfined(profile))
John Johansen3a2dc832010-09-06 10:10:20 -0700618 error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, task, resource, new_rlim);
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700619
620 return error;
621}
622
623static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
624 .name = "apparmor",
625
626 .ptrace_access_check = apparmor_ptrace_access_check,
627 .ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme,
628 .capget = apparmor_capget,
629 .capable = apparmor_capable,
630
631 .path_link = apparmor_path_link,
632 .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink,
633 .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink,
634 .path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir,
635 .path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir,
636 .path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod,
637 .path_rename = apparmor_path_rename,
638 .path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod,
639 .path_chown = apparmor_path_chown,
640 .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate,
641 .dentry_open = apparmor_dentry_open,
642 .inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr,
643
644 .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission,
645 .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security,
646 .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security,
647 .file_mmap = apparmor_file_mmap,
648 .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect,
649 .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock,
650
651 .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr,
652 .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr,
653
654 .cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
655 .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free,
656 .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare,
657 .cred_transfer = apparmor_cred_transfer,
658
659 .bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds,
660 .bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds,
661 .bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds,
662 .bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
663
664 .task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit,
665};
666
667/*
668 * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
669 */
670
Stephen Rothwell101d6c82010-08-02 12:00:43 +1000671static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
672static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
Rusty Russellb8aa09f2011-12-15 13:41:32 +1030673#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
Stephen Rothwell101d6c82010-08-02 12:00:43 +1000674static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
675 .set = param_set_aabool,
676 .get = param_get_aabool
677};
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700678
Stephen Rothwell101d6c82010-08-02 12:00:43 +1000679static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
680static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
Rusty Russellb8aa09f2011-12-15 13:41:32 +1030681#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
Stephen Rothwell101d6c82010-08-02 12:00:43 +1000682static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
683 .set = param_set_aauint,
684 .get = param_get_aauint
685};
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700686
Stephen Rothwell101d6c82010-08-02 12:00:43 +1000687static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
688static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
Rusty Russellb8aa09f2011-12-15 13:41:32 +1030689#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
Stephen Rothwell101d6c82010-08-02 12:00:43 +1000690static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
691 .set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
692 .get = param_get_aalockpolicy
693};
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700694
695static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
696static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700697
698static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
699static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700700
701/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
702 * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
703 */
704
705/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
706enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
707module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
708 &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
709
710/* Debug mode */
Rusty Russell90ab5ee2012-01-13 09:32:20 +1030711bool aa_g_debug;
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700712module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
713
714/* Audit mode */
715enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
716module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
717 &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
718
719/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
720 * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
721 */
Rusty Russell90ab5ee2012-01-13 09:32:20 +1030722bool aa_g_audit_header = 1;
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700723module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
724 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
725
726/* lock out loading/removal of policy
727 * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
728 * load policy, if lock_policy is set
729 */
Rusty Russell90ab5ee2012-01-13 09:32:20 +1030730bool aa_g_lock_policy;
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700731module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
732 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
733
734/* Syscall logging mode */
Rusty Russell90ab5ee2012-01-13 09:32:20 +1030735bool aa_g_logsyscall;
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700736module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
737
738/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
739unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
740module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
741
742/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
743 * on the loaded policy is done.
744 */
Rusty Russell90ab5ee2012-01-13 09:32:20 +1030745bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700746module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool,
747 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
748
749/* Boot time disable flag */
Rusty Russell90ab5ee2012-01-13 09:32:20 +1030750static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700751module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aabool, S_IRUSR);
752
753static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
754{
755 unsigned long enabled;
756 int error = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
757 if (!error)
758 apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
759 return 1;
760}
761
762__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
763
764/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
Stephen Rothwell101d6c82010-08-02 12:00:43 +1000765static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700766{
767 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
768 return -EPERM;
769 if (aa_g_lock_policy)
770 return -EACCES;
771 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
772}
773
Stephen Rothwell101d6c82010-08-02 12:00:43 +1000774static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700775{
776 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
777 return -EPERM;
778 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
779}
780
Stephen Rothwell101d6c82010-08-02 12:00:43 +1000781static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700782{
783 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
784 return -EPERM;
785 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
786}
787
Stephen Rothwell101d6c82010-08-02 12:00:43 +1000788static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700789{
790 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
791 return -EPERM;
792 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
793}
794
Stephen Rothwell101d6c82010-08-02 12:00:43 +1000795static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700796{
797 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
798 return -EPERM;
799 return param_set_uint(val, kp);
800}
801
Stephen Rothwell101d6c82010-08-02 12:00:43 +1000802static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700803{
804 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
805 return -EPERM;
806 return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
807}
808
809static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
810{
811 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
812 return -EPERM;
813
814 if (!apparmor_enabled)
815 return -EINVAL;
816
817 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
818}
819
820static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
821{
822 int i;
823 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
824 return -EPERM;
825
826 if (!apparmor_enabled)
827 return -EINVAL;
828
829 if (!val)
830 return -EINVAL;
831
832 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
833 if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
834 aa_g_audit = i;
835 return 0;
836 }
837 }
838
839 return -EINVAL;
840}
841
842static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
843{
844 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
845 return -EPERM;
846
847 if (!apparmor_enabled)
848 return -EINVAL;
849
850 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
851}
852
853static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
854{
855 int i;
856 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
857 return -EPERM;
858
859 if (!apparmor_enabled)
860 return -EINVAL;
861
862 if (!val)
863 return -EINVAL;
864
865 for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
866 if (strcmp(val, profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
867 aa_g_profile_mode = i;
868 return 0;
869 }
870 }
871
872 return -EINVAL;
873}
874
875/*
876 * AppArmor init functions
877 */
878
879/**
880 * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task.
881 *
882 * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
883 */
884static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
885{
886 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
887 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
888
889 cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
890 if (!cxt)
891 return -ENOMEM;
892
893 cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
894 cred->security = cxt;
895
896 return 0;
897}
898
899static int __init apparmor_init(void)
900{
901 int error;
902
903 if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) {
904 aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
905 apparmor_enabled = 0;
906 return 0;
907 }
908
909 error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
910 if (error) {
911 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
912 goto alloc_out;
913 }
914
915 error = set_init_cxt();
916 if (error) {
917 AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
918 goto register_security_out;
919 }
920
921 error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
922 if (error) {
923 AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
wzt.wzt@gmail.coma26d2792010-11-10 16:05:15 +0800924 goto set_init_cxt_out;
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700925 }
926
927 /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
928 apparmor_initialized = 1;
929 if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
930 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
931 else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
932 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
933 else
934 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
935
936 return error;
937
wzt.wzt@gmail.coma26d2792010-11-10 16:05:15 +0800938set_init_cxt_out:
939 aa_free_task_context(current->real_cred->security);
940
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700941register_security_out:
942 aa_free_root_ns();
943
944alloc_out:
945 aa_destroy_aafs();
946
947 apparmor_enabled = 0;
948 return error;
John Johansenb5e95b42010-07-29 14:48:07 -0700949}
950
951security_initcall(apparmor_init);