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Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001/*
2 * linux/kernel/capability.c
3 *
4 * Copyright (C) 1997 Andrew Main <zefram@fysh.org>
5 *
Andrew Morgan72c2d582007-10-18 03:05:59 -07006 * Integrated into 2.1.97+, Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07007 * 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net>
Daniel Walker314f70f2007-10-18 03:06:08 -07008 */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07009
Joe Perchesf5645d32014-02-21 14:19:30 -080010#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
11
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +110012#include <linux/audit.h>
Randy.Dunlapc59ede72006-01-11 12:17:46 -080013#include <linux/capability.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070014#include <linux/mm.h>
Paul Gortmaker9984de12011-05-23 14:51:41 -040015#include <linux/export.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070016#include <linux/security.h>
17#include <linux/syscalls.h>
Serge E. Hallynb460cbc2007-10-18 23:39:52 -070018#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
Serge E. Hallyn34867402011-03-23 16:43:17 -070019#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070020#include <asm/uaccess.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070021
22/*
Andrew Morgane338d262008-02-04 22:29:42 -080023 * Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities
24 */
25
26const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
Andrew Morgane338d262008-02-04 22:29:42 -080027EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
Andrew Morgane338d262008-02-04 22:29:42 -080028
Serge E. Hallyn1f29fae2008-11-05 16:08:52 -060029int file_caps_enabled = 1;
30
31static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str)
32{
33 file_caps_enabled = 0;
34 return 1;
35}
36__setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable);
Serge E. Hallyn1f29fae2008-11-05 16:08:52 -060037
Iulia Manda28138932015-04-15 16:16:41 -070038#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER
Andrew Morgane338d262008-02-04 22:29:42 -080039/*
40 * More recent versions of libcap are available from:
41 *
42 * http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/
43 */
44
45static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void)
46{
Joe Perchesf5645d32014-02-21 14:19:30 -080047 char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
Andrew Morgane338d262008-02-04 22:29:42 -080048
Joe Perchesf5645d32014-02-21 14:19:30 -080049 pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities (legacy support in use)\n",
50 get_task_comm(name, current));
Andrew Morgane338d262008-02-04 22:29:42 -080051}
52
53/*
Andrew G. Morganca05a992008-05-27 22:05:17 -070054 * Version 2 capabilities worked fine, but the linux/capability.h file
55 * that accompanied their introduction encouraged their use without
56 * the necessary user-space source code changes. As such, we have
57 * created a version 3 with equivalent functionality to version 2, but
58 * with a header change to protect legacy source code from using
59 * version 2 when it wanted to use version 1. If your system has code
60 * that trips the following warning, it is using version 2 specific
61 * capabilities and may be doing so insecurely.
62 *
63 * The remedy is to either upgrade your version of libcap (to 2.10+,
64 * if the application is linked against it), or recompile your
65 * application with modern kernel headers and this warning will go
66 * away.
67 */
68
69static void warn_deprecated_v2(void)
70{
Joe Perchesf5645d32014-02-21 14:19:30 -080071 char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
Andrew G. Morganca05a992008-05-27 22:05:17 -070072
Joe Perchesf5645d32014-02-21 14:19:30 -080073 pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses deprecated v2 capabilities in a way that may be insecure\n",
74 get_task_comm(name, current));
Andrew G. Morganca05a992008-05-27 22:05:17 -070075}
76
77/*
78 * Version check. Return the number of u32s in each capability flag
79 * array, or a negative value on error.
80 */
81static int cap_validate_magic(cap_user_header_t header, unsigned *tocopy)
82{
83 __u32 version;
84
85 if (get_user(version, &header->version))
86 return -EFAULT;
87
88 switch (version) {
89 case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1:
90 warn_legacy_capability_use();
91 *tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1;
92 break;
93 case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2:
94 warn_deprecated_v2();
95 /*
96 * fall through - v3 is otherwise equivalent to v2.
97 */
98 case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3:
99 *tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3;
100 break;
101 default:
102 if (put_user((u32)_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
103 return -EFAULT;
104 return -EINVAL;
105 }
106
107 return 0;
108}
109
Andrew G. Morganab763c72008-07-23 21:28:25 -0700110/*
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +1100111 * The only thing that can change the capabilities of the current
112 * process is the current process. As such, we can't be in this code
113 * at the same time as we are in the process of setting capabilities
114 * in this process. The net result is that we can limit our use of
115 * locks to when we are reading the caps of another process.
Andrew G. Morganab763c72008-07-23 21:28:25 -0700116 */
117static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
118 kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp)
119{
120 int ret;
121
122 if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) {
123 struct task_struct *target;
124
Thomas Gleixner86fc80f2009-12-09 17:13:31 +0100125 rcu_read_lock();
Andrew G. Morganab763c72008-07-23 21:28:25 -0700126
127 target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
128 if (!target)
129 ret = -ESRCH;
130 else
131 ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp);
132
Thomas Gleixner86fc80f2009-12-09 17:13:31 +0100133 rcu_read_unlock();
Andrew G. Morganab763c72008-07-23 21:28:25 -0700134 } else
135 ret = security_capget(current, pEp, pIp, pPp);
136
137 return ret;
138}
139
Randy Dunlap207a7ba2005-07-27 11:45:10 -0700140/**
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700141 * sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process.
Randy Dunlap207a7ba2005-07-27 11:45:10 -0700142 * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
143 * target pid data
144 * @dataptr: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
145 * and inheritable capabilities that are returned
146 *
147 * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700148 */
Heiko Carstensb290ebe2009-01-14 14:14:06 +0100149SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700150{
Daniel Walker314f70f2007-10-18 03:06:08 -0700151 int ret = 0;
152 pid_t pid;
Andrew Morgane338d262008-02-04 22:29:42 -0800153 unsigned tocopy;
154 kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700155
Andrew G. Morganca05a992008-05-27 22:05:17 -0700156 ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy);
Andrew G. Morganc4a5af52009-11-23 04:57:52 +0000157 if ((dataptr == NULL) || (ret != 0))
158 return ((dataptr == NULL) && (ret == -EINVAL)) ? 0 : ret;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700159
Daniel Walker314f70f2007-10-18 03:06:08 -0700160 if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
161 return -EFAULT;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700162
Daniel Walker314f70f2007-10-18 03:06:08 -0700163 if (pid < 0)
164 return -EINVAL;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700165
Andrew G. Morganab763c72008-07-23 21:28:25 -0700166 ret = cap_get_target_pid(pid, &pE, &pI, &pP);
Andrew Morgane338d262008-02-04 22:29:42 -0800167 if (!ret) {
Andrew G. Morganca05a992008-05-27 22:05:17 -0700168 struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
Andrew Morgane338d262008-02-04 22:29:42 -0800169 unsigned i;
170
171 for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
172 kdata[i].effective = pE.cap[i];
173 kdata[i].permitted = pP.cap[i];
174 kdata[i].inheritable = pI.cap[i];
175 }
176
177 /*
Andrew G. Morganca05a992008-05-27 22:05:17 -0700178 * Note, in the case, tocopy < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S,
Andrew Morgane338d262008-02-04 22:29:42 -0800179 * we silently drop the upper capabilities here. This
180 * has the effect of making older libcap
181 * implementations implicitly drop upper capability
182 * bits when they perform a: capget/modify/capset
183 * sequence.
184 *
185 * This behavior is considered fail-safe
186 * behavior. Upgrading the application to a newer
187 * version of libcap will enable access to the newer
188 * capabilities.
189 *
190 * An alternative would be to return an error here
191 * (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to
Fabian Fredericka6c8c692014-06-04 16:11:19 -0700192 * unexpectedly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts
Andrew Morgane338d262008-02-04 22:29:42 -0800193 * before modification is attempted and the application
194 * fails.
195 */
Andrew Morgane338d262008-02-04 22:29:42 -0800196 if (copy_to_user(dataptr, kdata, tocopy
197 * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) {
198 return -EFAULT;
199 }
200 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700201
Daniel Walker314f70f2007-10-18 03:06:08 -0700202 return ret;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700203}
204
Randy Dunlap207a7ba2005-07-27 11:45:10 -0700205/**
Andrew G. Morganab763c72008-07-23 21:28:25 -0700206 * sys_capset - set capabilities for a process or (*) a group of processes
Randy Dunlap207a7ba2005-07-27 11:45:10 -0700207 * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
208 * target pid data
209 * @data: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
210 * and inheritable capabilities
211 *
David Howells1cdcbec2008-11-14 10:39:14 +1100212 * Set capabilities for the current process only. The ability to any other
213 * process(es) has been deprecated and removed.
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700214 *
215 * The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as:
216 *
David Howells1cdcbec2008-11-14 10:39:14 +1100217 * I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted
218 * P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted
219 * E: must be set to a subset of new permitted
Randy Dunlap207a7ba2005-07-27 11:45:10 -0700220 *
221 * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700222 */
Heiko Carstensb290ebe2009-01-14 14:14:06 +0100223SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700224{
Andrew G. Morganca05a992008-05-27 22:05:17 -0700225 struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
Arjan van de Ven825332e2009-10-14 08:17:36 +1100226 unsigned i, tocopy, copybytes;
Daniel Walker314f70f2007-10-18 03:06:08 -0700227 kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective;
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +1100228 struct cred *new;
Daniel Walker314f70f2007-10-18 03:06:08 -0700229 int ret;
230 pid_t pid;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700231
Andrew G. Morganca05a992008-05-27 22:05:17 -0700232 ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy);
233 if (ret != 0)
234 return ret;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700235
Daniel Walker314f70f2007-10-18 03:06:08 -0700236 if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
237 return -EFAULT;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700238
David Howells1cdcbec2008-11-14 10:39:14 +1100239 /* may only affect current now */
240 if (pid != 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current))
241 return -EPERM;
242
Arjan van de Ven825332e2009-10-14 08:17:36 +1100243 copybytes = tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct);
244 if (copybytes > sizeof(kdata))
245 return -EFAULT;
246
247 if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, copybytes))
Daniel Walker314f70f2007-10-18 03:06:08 -0700248 return -EFAULT;
Andrew Morgane338d262008-02-04 22:29:42 -0800249
250 for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
251 effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective;
252 permitted.cap[i] = kdata[i].permitted;
253 inheritable.cap[i] = kdata[i].inheritable;
254 }
Andrew G. Morganca05a992008-05-27 22:05:17 -0700255 while (i < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) {
Andrew Morgane338d262008-02-04 22:29:42 -0800256 effective.cap[i] = 0;
257 permitted.cap[i] = 0;
258 inheritable.cap[i] = 0;
259 i++;
260 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700261
Eric Paris7d8b6c62014-07-23 15:36:26 -0400262 effective.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
263 permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
264 inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
265
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +1100266 new = prepare_creds();
267 if (!new)
268 return -ENOMEM;
269
270 ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(),
271 &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
272 if (ret < 0)
273 goto error;
274
Eric W. Biedermanca24a232013-03-19 00:02:25 -0700275 audit_log_capset(new, current_cred());
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +1100276
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +1100277 return commit_creds(new);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700278
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +1100279error:
280 abort_creds(new);
Daniel Walker314f70f2007-10-18 03:06:08 -0700281 return ret;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700282}
Chris Wright12b59892006-03-25 03:07:41 -0800283
David Howells5cd9c582008-08-14 11:37:28 +0100284/**
Eric Paris25e75702012-01-03 12:25:15 -0500285 * has_ns_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
Serge E. Hallyn32632452011-03-23 16:43:21 -0700286 * @t: The task in question
287 * @ns: target user namespace
288 * @cap: The capability to be tested for
289 *
290 * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
291 * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
292 *
293 * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
294 */
295bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
296 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
297{
Eric Paris2920a842012-01-03 12:25:15 -0500298 int ret;
299
300 rcu_read_lock();
301 ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
302 rcu_read_unlock();
Serge E. Hallyn32632452011-03-23 16:43:21 -0700303
304 return (ret == 0);
305}
306
307/**
Eric Paris25e75702012-01-03 12:25:15 -0500308 * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
309 * @t: The task in question
310 * @cap: The capability to be tested for
311 *
312 * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
313 * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
314 *
315 * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
316 */
317bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
318{
319 return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
320}
321
322/**
Eric Paris7b61d642012-01-03 12:25:15 -0500323 * has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
324 * in a specific user ns.
325 * @t: The task in question
326 * @ns: target user namespace
327 * @cap: The capability to be tested for
328 *
329 * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
330 * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
331 * Do not write an audit message for the check.
332 *
333 * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
334 */
335bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
336 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
337{
338 int ret;
339
340 rcu_read_lock();
341 ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
342 rcu_read_unlock();
343
344 return (ret == 0);
345}
346
347/**
348 * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) in the
349 * initial user ns
Serge E. Hallyn32632452011-03-23 16:43:21 -0700350 * @t: The task in question
351 * @cap: The capability to be tested for
352 *
353 * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
354 * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not. Don't write an
355 * audit message for the check.
356 *
357 * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
358 */
359bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
360{
Eric Paris7b61d642012-01-03 12:25:15 -0500361 return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
Serge E. Hallyn32632452011-03-23 16:43:21 -0700362}
363
364/**
Serge E. Hallyn34867402011-03-23 16:43:17 -0700365 * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
366 * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
367 * @cap: The capability to be tested for
368 *
369 * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
370 * available for use, false if not.
371 *
372 * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
373 * assumption that it's about to be used.
374 */
375bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
Chris Wright12b59892006-03-25 03:07:41 -0800376{
Eric Paris637d32d2008-10-29 15:42:12 +1100377 if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
Joe Perchesf5645d32014-02-21 14:19:30 -0800378 pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
Eric Paris637d32d2008-10-29 15:42:12 +1100379 BUG();
380 }
381
Linus Torvalds951880e2012-01-17 10:19:41 -0800382 if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
David Howells5cd9c582008-08-14 11:37:28 +0100383 current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
Serge E. Hallyn34867402011-03-23 16:43:17 -0700384 return true;
Chris Wright12b59892006-03-25 03:07:41 -0800385 }
Serge E. Hallyn34867402011-03-23 16:43:17 -0700386 return false;
Chris Wright12b59892006-03-25 03:07:41 -0800387}
Serge E. Hallyn34867402011-03-23 16:43:17 -0700388EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
389
Iulia Manda28138932015-04-15 16:16:41 -0700390
391/**
392 * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
393 * @cap: The capability to be tested for
394 *
395 * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
396 * available for use, false if not.
397 *
398 * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
399 * assumption that it's about to be used.
400 */
401bool capable(int cap)
402{
403 return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
404}
405EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
406#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
407
Serge E. Hallyn34867402011-03-23 16:43:17 -0700408/**
Linus Torvalds935d8aa2013-04-14 10:06:31 -0700409 * file_ns_capable - Determine if the file's opener had a capability in effect
410 * @file: The file we want to check
411 * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
412 * @cap: The capability to be tested for
413 *
414 * Return true if task that opened the file had a capability in effect
415 * when the file was opened.
416 *
417 * This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV because the caller may not
418 * actually be privileged.
419 */
Fabian Fredericka6c8c692014-06-04 16:11:19 -0700420bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns,
421 int cap)
Linus Torvalds935d8aa2013-04-14 10:06:31 -0700422{
423 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap)))
424 return false;
425
426 if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0)
427 return true;
428
429 return false;
430}
431EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable);
432
433/**
Andy Lutomirski23adbe12014-06-10 12:45:42 -0700434 * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped
Eric W. Biederman1a48e2a2011-11-14 16:24:06 -0800435 * @inode: The inode in question
436 * @cap: The capability in question
437 *
Andy Lutomirski23adbe12014-06-10 12:45:42 -0700438 * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at
439 * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are
440 * mapped into the current user namespace.
Eric W. Biederman1a48e2a2011-11-14 16:24:06 -0800441 */
Andy Lutomirski23adbe12014-06-10 12:45:42 -0700442bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
Eric W. Biederman1a48e2a2011-11-14 16:24:06 -0800443{
444 struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
445
Andy Lutomirski23adbe12014-06-10 12:45:42 -0700446 return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
447 kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
Eric W. Biederman1a48e2a2011-11-14 16:24:06 -0800448}
Andy Lutomirski23adbe12014-06-10 12:45:42 -0700449EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid);