blob: 157517763565668d050a628f98630199764d825c [file] [log] [blame]
Tejun Heo60a53172009-02-09 22:17:40 +09001/*
2 * GCC stack protector support.
3 *
4 * Stack protector works by putting predefined pattern at the start of
5 * the stack frame and verifying that it hasn't been overwritten when
6 * returning from the function. The pattern is called stack canary
7 * and unfortunately gcc requires it to be at a fixed offset from %gs.
8 * On x86_64, the offset is 40 bytes and on x86_32 20 bytes. x86_64
9 * and x86_32 use segment registers differently and thus handles this
10 * requirement differently.
11 *
12 * On x86_64, %gs is shared by percpu area and stack canary. All
13 * percpu symbols are zero based and %gs points to the base of percpu
14 * area. The first occupant of the percpu area is always
15 * irq_stack_union which contains stack_canary at offset 40. Userland
16 * %gs is always saved and restored on kernel entry and exit using
17 * swapgs, so stack protector doesn't add any complexity there.
18 *
19 * On x86_32, it's slightly more complicated. As in x86_64, %gs is
20 * used for userland TLS. Unfortunately, some processors are much
21 * slower at loading segment registers with different value when
22 * entering and leaving the kernel, so the kernel uses %fs for percpu
23 * area and manages %gs lazily so that %gs is switched only when
24 * necessary, usually during task switch.
25 *
26 * As gcc requires the stack canary at %gs:20, %gs can't be managed
27 * lazily if stack protector is enabled, so the kernel saves and
28 * restores userland %gs on kernel entry and exit. This behavior is
29 * controlled by CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS and accessors are defined in
30 * system.h to hide the details.
31 */
32
Ingo Molnarb2b062b2009-01-18 18:37:14 +010033#ifndef _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H
34#define _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H 1
35
Tejun Heo76397f72009-02-09 22:17:39 +090036#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
37
Ingo Molnarb2b062b2009-01-18 18:37:14 +010038#include <asm/tsc.h>
Brian Gerst947e76c2009-01-19 12:21:28 +090039#include <asm/processor.h>
Tejun Heo76397f72009-02-09 22:17:39 +090040#include <asm/percpu.h>
Tejun Heo60a53172009-02-09 22:17:40 +090041#include <asm/system.h>
42#include <asm/desc.h>
Tejun Heo76397f72009-02-09 22:17:39 +090043#include <linux/random.h>
Ingo Molnarb2b062b2009-01-18 18:37:14 +010044
45/*
Tejun Heo60a53172009-02-09 22:17:40 +090046 * 24 byte read-only segment initializer for stack canary. Linker
47 * can't handle the address bit shifting. Address will be set in
48 * head_32 for boot CPU and setup_per_cpu_areas() for others.
49 */
50#define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT \
Akinobu Mita1e5de182009-07-19 00:12:20 +090051 [GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x4090, 0, 0x18),
Tejun Heo60a53172009-02-09 22:17:40 +090052
53/*
Ingo Molnarb2b062b2009-01-18 18:37:14 +010054 * Initialize the stackprotector canary value.
55 *
56 * NOTE: this must only be called from functions that never return,
57 * and it must always be inlined.
58 */
59static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
60{
61 u64 canary;
62 u64 tsc;
63
Tejun Heo60a53172009-02-09 22:17:40 +090064#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
Brian Gerst947e76c2009-01-19 12:21:28 +090065 BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(union irq_stack_union, stack_canary) != 40);
Tejun Heo60a53172009-02-09 22:17:40 +090066#endif
Tejun Heoc6e50f92009-01-20 12:29:19 +090067 /*
Ingo Molnarb2b062b2009-01-18 18:37:14 +010068 * We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source
69 * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init,
70 * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later
71 * on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too.
72 */
73 get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
74 tsc = __native_read_tsc();
75 canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL);
76
77 current->stack_canary = canary;
Tejun Heo60a53172009-02-09 22:17:40 +090078#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
Brian Gerst947e76c2009-01-19 12:21:28 +090079 percpu_write(irq_stack_union.stack_canary, canary);
Tejun Heo60a53172009-02-09 22:17:40 +090080#else
Jeremy Fitzhardinge1ea0d142009-09-03 12:27:15 -070081 percpu_write(stack_canary.canary, canary);
Tejun Heo60a53172009-02-09 22:17:40 +090082#endif
83}
84
85static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu)
86{
87#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
Jeremy Fitzhardinge1ea0d142009-09-03 12:27:15 -070088 unsigned long canary = (unsigned long)&per_cpu(stack_canary, cpu);
Tejun Heo60a53172009-02-09 22:17:40 +090089 struct desc_struct *gdt_table = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
90 struct desc_struct desc;
91
92 desc = gdt_table[GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY];
Akinobu Mita57594742009-07-19 00:11:06 +090093 set_desc_base(&desc, canary);
Tejun Heo60a53172009-02-09 22:17:40 +090094 write_gdt_entry(gdt_table, GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY, &desc, DESCTYPE_S);
95#endif
96}
97
98static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void)
99{
100#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
101 asm("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (__KERNEL_STACK_CANARY) : "memory");
102#endif
103}
104
105#else /* CC_STACKPROTECTOR */
106
107#define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT
108
109/* dummy boot_init_stack_canary() is defined in linux/stackprotector.h */
110
111static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu)
112{ }
113
114static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void)
115{
116#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
117 asm volatile ("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (0));
118#endif
Ingo Molnarb2b062b2009-01-18 18:37:14 +0100119}
120
Tejun Heo76397f72009-02-09 22:17:39 +0900121#endif /* CC_STACKPROTECTOR */
122#endif /* _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H */