Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | #ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H |
| 2 | #define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1 |
| 3 | |
Serge E. Hallyn | 5975c72 | 2009-10-29 11:40:17 -0500 | [diff] [blame] | 4 | /* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies |
| 5 | whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the |
| 6 | setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be |
| 7 | changed from user-level. */ |
| 8 | #define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X)) |
| 9 | #ifdef __KERNEL__ |
| 10 | #define issecure(X) (issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits)) |
| 11 | #endif |
| 12 | |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 13 | #define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000 |
| 14 | |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 15 | /* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support |
| 16 | inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under |
| 17 | compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks |
| 18 | *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is |
Andrew G. Morgan | 086f731 | 2008-07-04 09:59:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 19 | 0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 20 | executable file. */ |
Andrew G. Morgan | 3898b1b | 2008-04-28 02:13:40 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 21 | #define SECURE_NOROOT 0 |
| 22 | #define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED 1 /* make bit-0 immutable */ |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 23 | |
Serge E. Hallyn | 5975c72 | 2009-10-29 11:40:17 -0500 | [diff] [blame] | 24 | #define SECBIT_NOROOT (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)) |
| 25 | #define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)) |
| 26 | |
Andrew G. Morgan | 086f731 | 2008-07-04 09:59:58 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 27 | /* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup". |
| 28 | When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on |
| 29 | set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause |
| 30 | capabilities to be gained/lost. */ |
Andrew G. Morgan | 3898b1b | 2008-04-28 02:13:40 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 31 | #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2 |
| 32 | #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3 /* make bit-2 immutable */ |
| 33 | |
Serge E. Hallyn | 5975c72 | 2009-10-29 11:40:17 -0500 | [diff] [blame] | 34 | #define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) |
| 35 | #define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \ |
| 36 | (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)) |
| 37 | |
Andrew G. Morgan | 3898b1b | 2008-04-28 02:13:40 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 38 | /* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after |
| 39 | transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by |
| 40 | bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both |
| 41 | bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d |
| 42 | child can use this feature again. */ |
| 43 | #define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS 4 |
| 44 | #define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED 5 /* make bit-4 immutable */ |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 45 | |
Serge E. Hallyn | 5975c72 | 2009-10-29 11:40:17 -0500 | [diff] [blame] | 46 | #define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) |
| 47 | #define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)) |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 48 | |
Andrew G. Morgan | 3898b1b | 2008-04-28 02:13:40 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 49 | #define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \ |
| 50 | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \ |
| 51 | issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) |
| 52 | #define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1) |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 53 | |
| 54 | #endif /* !_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */ |