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Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001/*
2 * random.c -- A strong random number generator
3 *
Matt Mackall9e95ce22005-04-16 15:25:56 -07004 * Copyright Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>, 2003, 2004, 2005
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07005 *
6 * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All
7 * rights reserved.
8 *
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
11 * are met:
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13 * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
14 * including the disclaimer of warranties.
15 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
17 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
18 * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
19 * products derived from this software without specific prior
20 * written permission.
21 *
22 * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
23 * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
24 * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
25 * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
26 * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
27 *
28 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
29 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
30 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
31 * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
32 * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
33 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
34 * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
35 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
36 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
37 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
38 * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
39 * DAMAGE.
40 */
41
42/*
43 * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....)
44 *
45 * This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
46 * and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
47 * Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
48 * for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is
49 * desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
50 * predict by an attacker.
51 *
52 * Theory of operation
53 * ===================
54 *
55 * Computers are very predictable devices. Hence it is extremely hard
56 * to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to
57 * pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a
58 * algorithm. Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess
59 * the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some
60 * applications this is not acceptable. So instead, we must try to
61 * gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which
62 * must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to
63 * generate random numbers. In a Unix environment, this is best done
64 * from inside the kernel.
65 *
66 * Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard
67 * timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other
68 * events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an
69 * outside observer to measure. Randomness from these sources are
70 * added to an "entropy pool", which is mixed using a CRC-like function.
71 * This is not cryptographically strong, but it is adequate assuming
72 * the randomness is not chosen maliciously, and it is fast enough that
73 * the overhead of doing it on every interrupt is very reasonable.
74 * As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep
75 * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into
76 * the random number generator's internal state.
77 *
78 * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA
79 * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The SHA hash avoids
80 * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool. It is believed to
81 * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information
82 * about the input of SHA from its output. Even if it is possible to
83 * analyze SHA in some clever way, as long as the amount of data
84 * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in
85 * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable. For this
86 * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many
87 * bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it
88 * outputs random numbers.
89 *
90 * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate
91 * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be
92 * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior
93 * outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of SHA, which is
94 * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility.
95 * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority
96 * of purposes.
97 *
98 * Exported interfaces ---- output
99 * ===============================
100 *
101 * There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to
102 * be used from within the kernel:
103 *
104 * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
105 *
106 * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
107 * and place it in the requested buffer.
108 *
109 * The two other interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and
110 * /dev/urandom. /dev/random is suitable for use when very high
111 * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or
112 * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of
113 * bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator)
114 * contained in the entropy pool.
115 *
116 * The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return
117 * as many bytes as are requested. As more and more random bytes are
118 * requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge,
119 * this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically
120 * strong. For many applications, however, this is acceptable.
121 *
122 * Exported interfaces ---- input
123 * ==============================
124 *
125 * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
126 * from the devices are:
127 *
128 * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
129 * unsigned int value);
130 * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
131 *
132 * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as
133 * the event type information from the hardware.
134 *
135 * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the inter-interrupt timing as random
136 * inputs to the entropy pool. Note that not all interrupts are good
137 * sources of randomness! For example, the timer interrupts is not a
138 * good choice, because the periodicity of the interrupts is too
139 * regular, and hence predictable to an attacker. Disk interrupts are
140 * a better measure, since the timing of the disk interrupts are more
141 * unpredictable.
142 *
143 * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a
144 * particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the
145 * first and second order deltas of the event timings.
146 *
147 * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup
148 * ============================================
149 *
150 * When any operating system starts up, it will go through a sequence
151 * of actions that are fairly predictable by an adversary, especially
152 * if the start-up does not involve interaction with a human operator.
153 * This reduces the actual number of bits of unpredictability in the
154 * entropy pool below the value in entropy_count. In order to
155 * counteract this effect, it helps to carry information in the
156 * entropy pool across shut-downs and start-ups. To do this, put the
157 * following lines an appropriate script which is run during the boot
158 * sequence:
159 *
160 * echo "Initializing random number generator..."
161 * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
162 * # Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up
163 * # Load and then save the whole entropy pool
164 * if [ -f $random_seed ]; then
165 * cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom
166 * else
167 * touch $random_seed
168 * fi
169 * chmod 600 $random_seed
170 * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
171 *
172 * and the following lines in an appropriate script which is run as
173 * the system is shutdown:
174 *
175 * # Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up
176 * # Save the whole entropy pool
177 * echo "Saving random seed..."
178 * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
179 * touch $random_seed
180 * chmod 600 $random_seed
181 * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
182 *
183 * For example, on most modern systems using the System V init
184 * scripts, such code fragments would be found in
185 * /etc/rc.d/init.d/random. On older Linux systems, the correct script
186 * location might be in /etc/rcb.d/rc.local or /etc/rc.d/rc.0.
187 *
188 * Effectively, these commands cause the contents of the entropy pool
189 * to be saved at shut-down time and reloaded into the entropy pool at
190 * start-up. (The 'dd' in the addition to the bootup script is to
191 * make sure that /etc/random-seed is different for every start-up,
192 * even if the system crashes without executing rc.0.) Even with
193 * complete knowledge of the start-up activities, predicting the state
194 * of the entropy pool requires knowledge of the previous history of
195 * the system.
196 *
197 * Configuring the /dev/random driver under Linux
198 * ==============================================
199 *
200 * The /dev/random driver under Linux uses minor numbers 8 and 9 of
201 * the /dev/mem major number (#1). So if your system does not have
202 * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created
203 * by using the commands:
204 *
205 * mknod /dev/random c 1 8
206 * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
207 *
208 * Acknowledgements:
209 * =================
210 *
211 * Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived
212 * from Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from private
213 * discussions with Phil Karn. Colin Plumb provided a faster random
214 * number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy
215 * pool, taken from PGPfone. Dale Worley has also contributed many
216 * useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver.
217 *
218 * Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should
219 * not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP.
220 *
221 * Further background information on this topic may be obtained from
222 * RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald
223 * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller.
224 */
225
226#include <linux/utsname.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700227#include <linux/module.h>
228#include <linux/kernel.h>
229#include <linux/major.h>
230#include <linux/string.h>
231#include <linux/fcntl.h>
232#include <linux/slab.h>
233#include <linux/random.h>
234#include <linux/poll.h>
235#include <linux/init.h>
236#include <linux/fs.h>
237#include <linux/genhd.h>
238#include <linux/interrupt.h>
Andrea Righi27ac7922008-07-23 21:28:13 -0700239#include <linux/mm.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700240#include <linux/spinlock.h>
241#include <linux/percpu.h>
242#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
243
244#include <asm/processor.h>
245#include <asm/uaccess.h>
246#include <asm/irq.h>
247#include <asm/io.h>
248
249/*
250 * Configuration information
251 */
252#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS 128
253#define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS 32
254#define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512
255
256/*
257 * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on
258 * /dev/random. Should be enough to do a significant reseed.
259 */
260static int random_read_wakeup_thresh = 64;
261
262/*
263 * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
264 * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
265 * access to /dev/random.
266 */
267static int random_write_wakeup_thresh = 128;
268
269/*
270 * When the input pool goes over trickle_thresh, start dropping most
271 * samples to avoid wasting CPU time and reduce lock contention.
272 */
273
Christoph Lameter6c036522005-07-07 17:56:59 -0700274static int trickle_thresh __read_mostly = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 28;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700275
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -0700276static DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, trickle_count);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700277
278/*
279 * A pool of size .poolwords is stirred with a primitive polynomial
280 * of degree .poolwords over GF(2). The taps for various sizes are
281 * defined below. They are chosen to be evenly spaced (minimum RMS
282 * distance from evenly spaced; the numbers in the comments are a
283 * scaled squared error sum) except for the last tap, which is 1 to
284 * get the twisting happening as fast as possible.
285 */
286static struct poolinfo {
287 int poolwords;
288 int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
289} poolinfo_table[] = {
290 /* x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 -- 105 */
291 { 128, 103, 76, 51, 25, 1 },
292 /* x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 -- 15 */
293 { 32, 26, 20, 14, 7, 1 },
294#if 0
295 /* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1 -- 115 */
296 { 2048, 1638, 1231, 819, 411, 1 },
297
298 /* x^1024 + x^817 + x^615 + x^412 + x^204 + x + 1 -- 290 */
299 { 1024, 817, 615, 412, 204, 1 },
300
301 /* x^1024 + x^819 + x^616 + x^410 + x^207 + x^2 + 1 -- 115 */
302 { 1024, 819, 616, 410, 207, 2 },
303
304 /* x^512 + x^411 + x^308 + x^208 + x^104 + x + 1 -- 225 */
305 { 512, 411, 308, 208, 104, 1 },
306
307 /* x^512 + x^409 + x^307 + x^206 + x^102 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
308 { 512, 409, 307, 206, 102, 2 },
309 /* x^512 + x^409 + x^309 + x^205 + x^103 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
310 { 512, 409, 309, 205, 103, 2 },
311
312 /* x^256 + x^205 + x^155 + x^101 + x^52 + x + 1 -- 125 */
313 { 256, 205, 155, 101, 52, 1 },
314
315 /* x^128 + x^103 + x^78 + x^51 + x^27 + x^2 + 1 -- 70 */
316 { 128, 103, 78, 51, 27, 2 },
317
318 /* x^64 + x^52 + x^39 + x^26 + x^14 + x + 1 -- 15 */
319 { 64, 52, 39, 26, 14, 1 },
320#endif
321};
322
323#define POOLBITS poolwords*32
324#define POOLBYTES poolwords*4
325
326/*
327 * For the purposes of better mixing, we use the CRC-32 polynomial as
328 * well to make a twisted Generalized Feedback Shift Reigster
329 *
330 * (See M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992. Twisted GFSR generators. ACM
331 * Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation 2(3):179-194.
332 * Also see M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1994. Twisted GFSR generators
333 * II. ACM Transactions on Mdeling and Computer Simulation 4:254-266)
334 *
335 * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this.
336 *
337 * We have not analyzed the resultant polynomial to prove it primitive;
338 * in fact it almost certainly isn't. Nonetheless, the irreducible factors
339 * of a random large-degree polynomial over GF(2) are more than large enough
340 * that periodicity is not a concern.
341 *
342 * The input hash is much less sensitive than the output hash. All
343 * that we want of it is that it be a good non-cryptographic hash;
344 * i.e. it not produce collisions when fed "random" data of the sort
345 * we expect to see. As long as the pool state differs for different
346 * inputs, we have preserved the input entropy and done a good job.
347 * The fact that an intelligent attacker can construct inputs that
348 * will produce controlled alterations to the pool's state is not
349 * important because we don't consider such inputs to contribute any
350 * randomness. The only property we need with respect to them is that
351 * the attacker can't increase his/her knowledge of the pool's state.
352 * Since all additions are reversible (knowing the final state and the
353 * input, you can reconstruct the initial state), if an attacker has
354 * any uncertainty about the initial state, he/she can only shuffle
355 * that uncertainty about, but never cause any collisions (which would
356 * decrease the uncertainty).
357 *
358 * The chosen system lets the state of the pool be (essentially) the input
359 * modulo the generator polymnomial. Now, for random primitive polynomials,
360 * this is a universal class of hash functions, meaning that the chance
361 * of a collision is limited by the attacker's knowledge of the generator
362 * polynomail, so if it is chosen at random, an attacker can never force
363 * a collision. Here, we use a fixed polynomial, but we *can* assume that
364 * ###--> it is unknown to the processes generating the input entropy. <-###
365 * Because of this important property, this is a good, collision-resistant
366 * hash; hash collisions will occur no more often than chance.
367 */
368
369/*
370 * Static global variables
371 */
372static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);
373static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
Jeff Dike9a6f70b2008-04-29 01:03:08 -0700374static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700375
376#if 0
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -0700377static int debug;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700378module_param(debug, bool, 0644);
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -0700379#define DEBUG_ENT(fmt, arg...) do { \
380 if (debug) \
381 printk(KERN_DEBUG "random %04d %04d %04d: " \
382 fmt,\
383 input_pool.entropy_count,\
384 blocking_pool.entropy_count,\
385 nonblocking_pool.entropy_count,\
386 ## arg); } while (0)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700387#else
388#define DEBUG_ENT(fmt, arg...) do {} while (0)
389#endif
390
391/**********************************************************************
392 *
393 * OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle
394 * storing entropy in an entropy pool.
395 *
396 **********************************************************************/
397
398struct entropy_store;
399struct entropy_store {
Matt Mackall43358202008-04-29 01:03:01 -0700400 /* read-only data: */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700401 struct poolinfo *poolinfo;
402 __u32 *pool;
403 const char *name;
404 int limit;
405 struct entropy_store *pull;
406
407 /* read-write data: */
Matt Mackall43358202008-04-29 01:03:01 -0700408 spinlock_t lock;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700409 unsigned add_ptr;
Andrew Morton8b76f462008-09-02 14:36:14 -0700410 int entropy_count; /* Must at no time exceed ->POOLBITS! */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700411 int input_rotate;
412};
413
414static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS];
415static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
416static __u32 nonblocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
417
418static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
419 .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],
420 .name = "input",
421 .limit = 1,
Ingo Molnare4d91912006-07-03 00:24:34 -0700422 .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(&input_pool.lock),
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700423 .pool = input_pool_data
424};
425
426static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = {
427 .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1],
428 .name = "blocking",
429 .limit = 1,
430 .pull = &input_pool,
Ingo Molnare4d91912006-07-03 00:24:34 -0700431 .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(&blocking_pool.lock),
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700432 .pool = blocking_pool_data
433};
434
435static struct entropy_store nonblocking_pool = {
436 .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1],
437 .name = "nonblocking",
438 .pull = &input_pool,
Ingo Molnare4d91912006-07-03 00:24:34 -0700439 .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(&nonblocking_pool.lock),
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700440 .pool = nonblocking_pool_data
441};
442
443/*
Matt Mackalle68e5b62008-04-29 01:03:05 -0700444 * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700445 * update the entropy estimate. The caller should call
Matt Mackalladc782d2008-04-29 01:03:07 -0700446 * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate.
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700447 *
448 * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate
449 * degree, and then twisted. We twist by three bits at a time because
450 * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
451 * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
452 */
Matt Mackalle68e5b62008-04-29 01:03:05 -0700453static void mix_pool_bytes_extract(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
454 int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700455{
456 static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
457 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
458 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
Matt Mackall993ba212008-04-29 01:03:04 -0700459 unsigned long i, j, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
Matt Mackallfeee7692008-04-29 01:03:02 -0700460 int input_rotate;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700461 int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
Matt Mackalle68e5b62008-04-29 01:03:05 -0700462 const char *bytes = in;
Matt Mackall6d38b822008-04-29 01:03:03 -0700463 __u32 w;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700464 unsigned long flags;
465
466 /* Taps are constant, so we can load them without holding r->lock. */
467 tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1;
468 tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2;
469 tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3;
470 tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4;
471 tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700472
473 spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700474 input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
Matt Mackall993ba212008-04-29 01:03:04 -0700475 i = r->add_ptr;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700476
Matt Mackalle68e5b62008-04-29 01:03:05 -0700477 /* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */
478 while (nbytes--) {
479 w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate & 31);
Matt Mackall993ba212008-04-29 01:03:04 -0700480 i = (i - 1) & wordmask;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700481
482 /* XOR in the various taps */
Matt Mackall993ba212008-04-29 01:03:04 -0700483 w ^= r->pool[i];
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700484 w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask];
485 w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask];
486 w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask];
487 w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask];
488 w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask];
Matt Mackall993ba212008-04-29 01:03:04 -0700489
490 /* Mix the result back in with a twist */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700491 r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
Matt Mackallfeee7692008-04-29 01:03:02 -0700492
493 /*
494 * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
495 * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits
496 * rotation, so that successive passes spread the
497 * input bits across the pool evenly.
498 */
499 input_rotate += i ? 7 : 14;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700500 }
501
502 r->input_rotate = input_rotate;
Matt Mackall993ba212008-04-29 01:03:04 -0700503 r->add_ptr = i;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700504
Matt Mackall993ba212008-04-29 01:03:04 -0700505 if (out)
506 for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
Matt Mackalle68e5b62008-04-29 01:03:05 -0700507 ((__u32 *)out)[j] = r->pool[(i - j) & wordmask];
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700508
509 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
510}
511
Matt Mackalle68e5b62008-04-29 01:03:05 -0700512static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, int bytes)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700513{
Matt Mackalle68e5b62008-04-29 01:03:05 -0700514 mix_pool_bytes_extract(r, in, bytes, NULL);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700515}
516
517/*
518 * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy
519 */
Matt Mackalladc782d2008-04-29 01:03:07 -0700520static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700521{
522 unsigned long flags;
Andrew Morton8b76f462008-09-02 14:36:14 -0700523 int entropy_count;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700524
Matt Mackalladc782d2008-04-29 01:03:07 -0700525 if (!nbits)
526 return;
527
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700528 spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
529
Matt Mackalladc782d2008-04-29 01:03:07 -0700530 DEBUG_ENT("added %d entropy credits to %s\n", nbits, r->name);
Andrew Morton8b76f462008-09-02 14:36:14 -0700531 entropy_count = r->entropy_count;
532 entropy_count += nbits;
533 if (entropy_count < 0) {
Matt Mackalladc782d2008-04-29 01:03:07 -0700534 DEBUG_ENT("negative entropy/overflow\n");
Andrew Morton8b76f462008-09-02 14:36:14 -0700535 entropy_count = 0;
536 } else if (entropy_count > r->poolinfo->POOLBITS)
537 entropy_count = r->poolinfo->POOLBITS;
538 r->entropy_count = entropy_count;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700539
Matt Mackall88c730d2008-04-29 01:02:56 -0700540 /* should we wake readers? */
Andrew Morton8b76f462008-09-02 14:36:14 -0700541 if (r == &input_pool && entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh) {
Matt Mackall88c730d2008-04-29 01:02:56 -0700542 wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
Jeff Dike9a6f70b2008-04-29 01:03:08 -0700543 kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
544 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700545 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
546}
547
548/*********************************************************************
549 *
550 * Entropy input management
551 *
552 *********************************************************************/
553
554/* There is one of these per entropy source */
555struct timer_rand_state {
556 cycles_t last_time;
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -0700557 long last_delta, last_delta2;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700558 unsigned dont_count_entropy:1;
559};
560
561static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state;
562static struct timer_rand_state *irq_timer_state[NR_IRQS];
563
564/*
565 * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
566 * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
567 * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
568 *
569 * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
570 * the type of event which just happened. This is currently 0-255 for
571 * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
572 *
573 */
574static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
575{
576 struct {
577 cycles_t cycles;
578 long jiffies;
579 unsigned num;
580 } sample;
581 long delta, delta2, delta3;
582
583 preempt_disable();
584 /* if over the trickle threshold, use only 1 in 4096 samples */
585 if (input_pool.entropy_count > trickle_thresh &&
586 (__get_cpu_var(trickle_count)++ & 0xfff))
587 goto out;
588
589 sample.jiffies = jiffies;
590 sample.cycles = get_cycles();
591 sample.num = num;
Matt Mackalle68e5b62008-04-29 01:03:05 -0700592 mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &sample, sizeof(sample));
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700593
594 /*
595 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
596 * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
597 * in order to make our estimate.
598 */
599
600 if (!state->dont_count_entropy) {
601 delta = sample.jiffies - state->last_time;
602 state->last_time = sample.jiffies;
603
604 delta2 = delta - state->last_delta;
605 state->last_delta = delta;
606
607 delta3 = delta2 - state->last_delta2;
608 state->last_delta2 = delta2;
609
610 if (delta < 0)
611 delta = -delta;
612 if (delta2 < 0)
613 delta2 = -delta2;
614 if (delta3 < 0)
615 delta3 = -delta3;
616 if (delta > delta2)
617 delta = delta2;
618 if (delta > delta3)
619 delta = delta3;
620
621 /*
622 * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
623 * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
624 * and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits.
625 */
Matt Mackalladc782d2008-04-29 01:03:07 -0700626 credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool,
627 min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11));
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700628 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700629out:
630 preempt_enable();
631}
632
Stephen Hemmingerd2515752006-01-11 12:17:38 -0800633void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700634 unsigned int value)
635{
636 static unsigned char last_value;
637
638 /* ignore autorepeat and the like */
639 if (value == last_value)
640 return;
641
642 DEBUG_ENT("input event\n");
643 last_value = value;
644 add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
645 (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
646}
Dmitry Torokhov80fc9f52006-10-11 01:43:58 -0400647EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700648
649void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
650{
Stephen Hemmingerc80544d2007-10-18 03:07:05 -0700651 if (irq >= NR_IRQS || irq_timer_state[irq] == NULL)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700652 return;
653
654 DEBUG_ENT("irq event %d\n", irq);
655 add_timer_randomness(irq_timer_state[irq], 0x100 + irq);
656}
657
David Howells93614012006-09-30 20:45:40 +0200658#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700659void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
660{
661 if (!disk || !disk->random)
662 return;
663 /* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */
Tejun Heof331c022008-09-03 09:01:48 +0200664 DEBUG_ENT("disk event %d:%d\n",
665 MAJOR(disk_devt(disk)), MINOR(disk_devt(disk)));
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700666
Tejun Heof331c022008-09-03 09:01:48 +0200667 add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700668}
David Howells93614012006-09-30 20:45:40 +0200669#endif
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700670
671#define EXTRACT_SIZE 10
672
673/*********************************************************************
674 *
675 * Entropy extraction routines
676 *
677 *********************************************************************/
678
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -0700679static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700680 size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd);
681
682/*
683 * This utility inline function is responsible for transfering entropy
684 * from the primary pool to the secondary extraction pool. We make
685 * sure we pull enough for a 'catastrophic reseed'.
686 */
687static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
688{
689 __u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
690
691 if (r->pull && r->entropy_count < nbytes * 8 &&
692 r->entropy_count < r->poolinfo->POOLBITS) {
Matt Mackall5a021e92007-07-19 11:30:14 -0700693 /* If we're limited, always leave two wakeup worth's BITS */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700694 int rsvd = r->limit ? 0 : random_read_wakeup_thresh/4;
Matt Mackall5a021e92007-07-19 11:30:14 -0700695 int bytes = nbytes;
696
697 /* pull at least as many as BYTES as wakeup BITS */
698 bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8);
699 /* but never more than the buffer size */
700 bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp));
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700701
702 DEBUG_ENT("going to reseed %s with %d bits "
703 "(%d of %d requested)\n",
704 r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8, r->entropy_count);
705
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -0700706 bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
707 random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8, rsvd);
Matt Mackalle68e5b62008-04-29 01:03:05 -0700708 mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes);
Matt Mackalladc782d2008-04-29 01:03:07 -0700709 credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700710 }
711}
712
713/*
714 * These functions extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
715 * returns it in a buffer.
716 *
717 * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before
718 * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding while the
719 * reserved parameter indicates how much entropy we must leave in the
720 * pool after each pull to avoid starving other readers.
721 *
722 * Note: extract_entropy() assumes that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words.
723 */
724
725static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min,
726 int reserved)
727{
728 unsigned long flags;
729
730 BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->POOLBITS);
731
732 /* Hold lock while accounting */
733 spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
734
735 DEBUG_ENT("trying to extract %d bits from %s\n",
736 nbytes * 8, r->name);
737
738 /* Can we pull enough? */
739 if (r->entropy_count / 8 < min + reserved) {
740 nbytes = 0;
741 } else {
742 /* If limited, never pull more than available */
743 if (r->limit && nbytes + reserved >= r->entropy_count / 8)
744 nbytes = r->entropy_count/8 - reserved;
745
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -0700746 if (r->entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes + reserved)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700747 r->entropy_count -= nbytes*8;
748 else
749 r->entropy_count = reserved;
750
Jeff Dike9a6f70b2008-04-29 01:03:08 -0700751 if (r->entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700752 wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
Jeff Dike9a6f70b2008-04-29 01:03:08 -0700753 kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
754 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700755 }
756
757 DEBUG_ENT("debiting %d entropy credits from %s%s\n",
758 nbytes * 8, r->name, r->limit ? "" : " (unlimited)");
759
760 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
761
762 return nbytes;
763}
764
765static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
766{
Matt Mackall602b6ae2007-05-29 21:54:27 -0500767 int i;
Matt Mackalle68e5b62008-04-29 01:03:05 -0700768 __u32 hash[5], workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
769 __u8 extract[64];
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700770
Matt Mackall1c0ad3d2008-04-29 01:03:00 -0700771 /* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */
Matt Mackallffd8d3f2008-04-29 01:02:59 -0700772 sha_init(hash);
Matt Mackall1c0ad3d2008-04-29 01:03:00 -0700773 for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16)
Matt Mackallffd8d3f2008-04-29 01:02:59 -0700774 sha_transform(hash, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700775
776 /*
Matt Mackall1c0ad3d2008-04-29 01:03:00 -0700777 * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking
778 * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool
779 * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous
780 * ouputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By
781 * mixing at least a SHA1 worth of hash data back, we make
782 * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the
783 * hash.
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700784 */
Matt Mackalle68e5b62008-04-29 01:03:05 -0700785 mix_pool_bytes_extract(r, hash, sizeof(hash), extract);
Matt Mackall1c0ad3d2008-04-29 01:03:00 -0700786
787 /*
788 * To avoid duplicates, we atomically extract a portion of the
789 * pool while mixing, and hash one final time.
790 */
Matt Mackalle68e5b62008-04-29 01:03:05 -0700791 sha_transform(hash, extract, workspace);
Matt Mackallffd8d3f2008-04-29 01:02:59 -0700792 memset(extract, 0, sizeof(extract));
793 memset(workspace, 0, sizeof(workspace));
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700794
795 /*
Matt Mackall1c0ad3d2008-04-29 01:03:00 -0700796 * In case the hash function has some recognizable output
797 * pattern, we fold it in half. Thus, we always feed back
798 * twice as much data as we output.
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700799 */
Matt Mackallffd8d3f2008-04-29 01:02:59 -0700800 hash[0] ^= hash[3];
801 hash[1] ^= hash[4];
802 hash[2] ^= rol32(hash[2], 16);
803 memcpy(out, hash, EXTRACT_SIZE);
804 memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700805}
806
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -0700807static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700808 size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved)
809{
810 ssize_t ret = 0, i;
811 __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
812
813 xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
814 nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved);
815
816 while (nbytes) {
817 extract_buf(r, tmp);
818 i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
819 memcpy(buf, tmp, i);
820 nbytes -= i;
821 buf += i;
822 ret += i;
823 }
824
825 /* Wipe data just returned from memory */
826 memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
827
828 return ret;
829}
830
831static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
832 size_t nbytes)
833{
834 ssize_t ret = 0, i;
835 __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
836
837 xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
838 nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0);
839
840 while (nbytes) {
841 if (need_resched()) {
842 if (signal_pending(current)) {
843 if (ret == 0)
844 ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
845 break;
846 }
847 schedule();
848 }
849
850 extract_buf(r, tmp);
851 i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
852 if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
853 ret = -EFAULT;
854 break;
855 }
856
857 nbytes -= i;
858 buf += i;
859 ret += i;
860 }
861
862 /* Wipe data just returned from memory */
863 memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
864
865 return ret;
866}
867
868/*
869 * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some
870 * number of good random numbers, suitable for seeding TCP sequence
871 * numbers, etc.
872 */
873void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
874{
875 extract_entropy(&nonblocking_pool, buf, nbytes, 0, 0);
876}
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700877EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
878
879/*
880 * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
881 *
882 * @r: pool to initialize
883 *
884 * This function clears the pool's entropy count and mixes some system
885 * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared
886 * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool.
887 */
888static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
889{
Eric Dumazetf8595812007-03-28 14:22:33 -0700890 ktime_t now;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700891 unsigned long flags;
892
893 spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
894 r->entropy_count = 0;
895 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
896
Eric Dumazetf8595812007-03-28 14:22:33 -0700897 now = ktime_get_real();
Matt Mackalle68e5b62008-04-29 01:03:05 -0700898 mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
899 mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700900}
901
Matt Mackall53c3f632008-04-29 01:02:58 -0700902static int rand_initialize(void)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700903{
904 init_std_data(&input_pool);
905 init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
906 init_std_data(&nonblocking_pool);
907 return 0;
908}
909module_init(rand_initialize);
910
911void rand_initialize_irq(int irq)
912{
913 struct timer_rand_state *state;
914
915 if (irq >= NR_IRQS || irq_timer_state[irq])
916 return;
917
918 /*
Eric Dumazetf8595812007-03-28 14:22:33 -0700919 * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700920 * source.
921 */
Eric Dumazetf8595812007-03-28 14:22:33 -0700922 state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
923 if (state)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700924 irq_timer_state[irq] = state;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700925}
926
David Howells93614012006-09-30 20:45:40 +0200927#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700928void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
929{
930 struct timer_rand_state *state;
931
932 /*
Eric Dumazetf8595812007-03-28 14:22:33 -0700933 * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700934 * source.
935 */
Eric Dumazetf8595812007-03-28 14:22:33 -0700936 state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
937 if (state)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700938 disk->random = state;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700939}
David Howells93614012006-09-30 20:45:40 +0200940#endif
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700941
942static ssize_t
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -0700943random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700944{
945 ssize_t n, retval = 0, count = 0;
946
947 if (nbytes == 0)
948 return 0;
949
950 while (nbytes > 0) {
951 n = nbytes;
952 if (n > SEC_XFER_SIZE)
953 n = SEC_XFER_SIZE;
954
955 DEBUG_ENT("reading %d bits\n", n*8);
956
957 n = extract_entropy_user(&blocking_pool, buf, n);
958
959 DEBUG_ENT("read got %d bits (%d still needed)\n",
960 n*8, (nbytes-n)*8);
961
962 if (n == 0) {
963 if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
964 retval = -EAGAIN;
965 break;
966 }
967
968 DEBUG_ENT("sleeping?\n");
969
970 wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait,
971 input_pool.entropy_count >=
972 random_read_wakeup_thresh);
973
974 DEBUG_ENT("awake\n");
975
976 if (signal_pending(current)) {
977 retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
978 break;
979 }
980
981 continue;
982 }
983
984 if (n < 0) {
985 retval = n;
986 break;
987 }
988 count += n;
989 buf += n;
990 nbytes -= n;
991 break; /* This break makes the device work */
992 /* like a named pipe */
993 }
994
995 /*
996 * If we gave the user some bytes, update the access time.
997 */
998 if (count)
999 file_accessed(file);
1000
1001 return (count ? count : retval);
1002}
1003
1004static ssize_t
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -07001005urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001006{
1007 return extract_entropy_user(&nonblocking_pool, buf, nbytes);
1008}
1009
1010static unsigned int
1011random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
1012{
1013 unsigned int mask;
1014
1015 poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait);
1016 poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
1017 mask = 0;
1018 if (input_pool.entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
1019 mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
1020 if (input_pool.entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
1021 mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
1022 return mask;
1023}
1024
Matt Mackall7f397dc2007-05-29 21:58:10 -05001025static int
1026write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
1027{
1028 size_t bytes;
1029 __u32 buf[16];
1030 const char __user *p = buffer;
1031
1032 while (count > 0) {
1033 bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf));
1034 if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes))
1035 return -EFAULT;
1036
1037 count -= bytes;
1038 p += bytes;
1039
Matt Mackalle68e5b62008-04-29 01:03:05 -07001040 mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes);
Matt Mackall91f3f1e2008-02-06 01:37:20 -08001041 cond_resched();
Matt Mackall7f397dc2007-05-29 21:58:10 -05001042 }
1043
1044 return 0;
1045}
1046
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -07001047static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
1048 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001049{
Matt Mackall7f397dc2007-05-29 21:58:10 -05001050 size_t ret;
1051 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001052
Matt Mackall7f397dc2007-05-29 21:58:10 -05001053 ret = write_pool(&blocking_pool, buffer, count);
1054 if (ret)
1055 return ret;
1056 ret = write_pool(&nonblocking_pool, buffer, count);
1057 if (ret)
1058 return ret;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001059
Matt Mackall7f397dc2007-05-29 21:58:10 -05001060 inode->i_mtime = current_fs_time(inode->i_sb);
1061 mark_inode_dirty(inode);
1062 return (ssize_t)count;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001063}
1064
Matt Mackall43ae4862008-04-29 01:02:58 -07001065static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001066{
1067 int size, ent_count;
1068 int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
1069 int retval;
1070
1071 switch (cmd) {
1072 case RNDGETENTCNT:
Matt Mackall43ae4862008-04-29 01:02:58 -07001073 /* inherently racy, no point locking */
1074 if (put_user(input_pool.entropy_count, p))
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001075 return -EFAULT;
1076 return 0;
1077 case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
1078 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
1079 return -EPERM;
1080 if (get_user(ent_count, p))
1081 return -EFAULT;
Matt Mackalladc782d2008-04-29 01:03:07 -07001082 credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, ent_count);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001083 return 0;
1084 case RNDADDENTROPY:
1085 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
1086 return -EPERM;
1087 if (get_user(ent_count, p++))
1088 return -EFAULT;
1089 if (ent_count < 0)
1090 return -EINVAL;
1091 if (get_user(size, p++))
1092 return -EFAULT;
Matt Mackall7f397dc2007-05-29 21:58:10 -05001093 retval = write_pool(&input_pool, (const char __user *)p,
1094 size);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001095 if (retval < 0)
1096 return retval;
Matt Mackalladc782d2008-04-29 01:03:07 -07001097 credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, ent_count);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001098 return 0;
1099 case RNDZAPENTCNT:
1100 case RNDCLEARPOOL:
1101 /* Clear the entropy pool counters. */
1102 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
1103 return -EPERM;
Matt Mackall53c3f632008-04-29 01:02:58 -07001104 rand_initialize();
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001105 return 0;
1106 default:
1107 return -EINVAL;
1108 }
1109}
1110
Jeff Dike9a6f70b2008-04-29 01:03:08 -07001111static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
1112{
1113 return fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &fasync);
1114}
1115
1116static int random_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
1117{
1118 return fasync_helper(-1, filp, 0, &fasync);
1119}
1120
Arjan van de Ven2b8693c2007-02-12 00:55:32 -08001121const struct file_operations random_fops = {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001122 .read = random_read,
1123 .write = random_write,
1124 .poll = random_poll,
Matt Mackall43ae4862008-04-29 01:02:58 -07001125 .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
Jeff Dike9a6f70b2008-04-29 01:03:08 -07001126 .fasync = random_fasync,
1127 .release = random_release,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001128};
1129
Arjan van de Ven2b8693c2007-02-12 00:55:32 -08001130const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001131 .read = urandom_read,
1132 .write = random_write,
Matt Mackall43ae4862008-04-29 01:02:58 -07001133 .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
Jeff Dike9a6f70b2008-04-29 01:03:08 -07001134 .fasync = random_fasync,
1135 .release = random_release,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001136};
1137
1138/***************************************************************
1139 * Random UUID interface
1140 *
1141 * Used here for a Boot ID, but can be useful for other kernel
1142 * drivers.
1143 ***************************************************************/
1144
1145/*
1146 * Generate random UUID
1147 */
1148void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16])
1149{
1150 get_random_bytes(uuid_out, 16);
1151 /* Set UUID version to 4 --- truely random generation */
1152 uuid_out[6] = (uuid_out[6] & 0x0F) | 0x40;
1153 /* Set the UUID variant to DCE */
1154 uuid_out[8] = (uuid_out[8] & 0x3F) | 0x80;
1155}
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001156EXPORT_SYMBOL(generate_random_uuid);
1157
1158/********************************************************************
1159 *
1160 * Sysctl interface
1161 *
1162 ********************************************************************/
1163
1164#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
1165
1166#include <linux/sysctl.h>
1167
1168static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh;
1169static int max_read_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
1170static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
1171static char sysctl_bootid[16];
1172
1173/*
1174 * These functions is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
1175 * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
1176 * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
1177 *
1178 * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, it will be returned
1179 * as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format. If accesses via the
1180 * sysctl system call, it is returned as 16 bytes of binary data.
1181 */
1182static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
1183 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
1184{
1185 ctl_table fake_table;
1186 unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
1187
1188 uuid = table->data;
1189 if (!uuid) {
1190 uuid = tmp_uuid;
1191 uuid[8] = 0;
1192 }
1193 if (uuid[8] == 0)
1194 generate_random_uuid(uuid);
1195
1196 sprintf(buf, "%02x%02x%02x%02x-%02x%02x-%02x%02x-%02x%02x-"
1197 "%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
1198 uuid[0], uuid[1], uuid[2], uuid[3],
1199 uuid[4], uuid[5], uuid[6], uuid[7],
1200 uuid[8], uuid[9], uuid[10], uuid[11],
1201 uuid[12], uuid[13], uuid[14], uuid[15]);
1202 fake_table.data = buf;
1203 fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf);
1204
1205 return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, filp, buffer, lenp, ppos);
1206}
1207
1208static int uuid_strategy(ctl_table *table, int __user *name, int nlen,
1209 void __user *oldval, size_t __user *oldlenp,
Alexey Dobriyan1f29bcd2006-12-10 02:19:10 -08001210 void __user *newval, size_t newlen)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001211{
1212 unsigned char tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
1213 unsigned int len;
1214
1215 if (!oldval || !oldlenp)
1216 return 1;
1217
1218 uuid = table->data;
1219 if (!uuid) {
1220 uuid = tmp_uuid;
1221 uuid[8] = 0;
1222 }
1223 if (uuid[8] == 0)
1224 generate_random_uuid(uuid);
1225
1226 if (get_user(len, oldlenp))
1227 return -EFAULT;
1228 if (len) {
1229 if (len > 16)
1230 len = 16;
1231 if (copy_to_user(oldval, uuid, len) ||
1232 put_user(len, oldlenp))
1233 return -EFAULT;
1234 }
1235 return 1;
1236}
1237
1238static int sysctl_poolsize = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
1239ctl_table random_table[] = {
1240 {
1241 .ctl_name = RANDOM_POOLSIZE,
1242 .procname = "poolsize",
1243 .data = &sysctl_poolsize,
1244 .maxlen = sizeof(int),
1245 .mode = 0444,
1246 .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
1247 },
1248 {
1249 .ctl_name = RANDOM_ENTROPY_COUNT,
1250 .procname = "entropy_avail",
1251 .maxlen = sizeof(int),
1252 .mode = 0444,
1253 .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
1254 .data = &input_pool.entropy_count,
1255 },
1256 {
1257 .ctl_name = RANDOM_READ_THRESH,
1258 .procname = "read_wakeup_threshold",
1259 .data = &random_read_wakeup_thresh,
1260 .maxlen = sizeof(int),
1261 .mode = 0644,
1262 .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
1263 .strategy = &sysctl_intvec,
1264 .extra1 = &min_read_thresh,
1265 .extra2 = &max_read_thresh,
1266 },
1267 {
1268 .ctl_name = RANDOM_WRITE_THRESH,
1269 .procname = "write_wakeup_threshold",
1270 .data = &random_write_wakeup_thresh,
1271 .maxlen = sizeof(int),
1272 .mode = 0644,
1273 .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
1274 .strategy = &sysctl_intvec,
1275 .extra1 = &min_write_thresh,
1276 .extra2 = &max_write_thresh,
1277 },
1278 {
1279 .ctl_name = RANDOM_BOOT_ID,
1280 .procname = "boot_id",
1281 .data = &sysctl_bootid,
1282 .maxlen = 16,
1283 .mode = 0444,
1284 .proc_handler = &proc_do_uuid,
1285 .strategy = &uuid_strategy,
1286 },
1287 {
1288 .ctl_name = RANDOM_UUID,
1289 .procname = "uuid",
1290 .maxlen = 16,
1291 .mode = 0444,
1292 .proc_handler = &proc_do_uuid,
1293 .strategy = &uuid_strategy,
1294 },
1295 { .ctl_name = 0 }
1296};
1297#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
1298
1299/********************************************************************
1300 *
1301 * Random funtions for networking
1302 *
1303 ********************************************************************/
1304
1305/*
1306 * TCP initial sequence number picking. This uses the random number
1307 * generator to pick an initial secret value. This value is hashed
1308 * along with the TCP endpoint information to provide a unique
1309 * starting point for each pair of TCP endpoints. This defeats
1310 * attacks which rely on guessing the initial TCP sequence number.
1311 * This algorithm was suggested by Steve Bellovin.
1312 *
1313 * Using a very strong hash was taking an appreciable amount of the total
1314 * TCP connection establishment time, so this is a weaker hash,
1315 * compensated for by changing the secret periodically.
1316 */
1317
1318/* F, G and H are basic MD4 functions: selection, majority, parity */
1319#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z))))
1320#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) + (((x) ^ (y)) & (z)))
1321#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
1322
1323/*
1324 * The generic round function. The application is so specific that
1325 * we don't bother protecting all the arguments with parens, as is generally
1326 * good macro practice, in favor of extra legibility.
1327 * Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation
1328 */
1329#define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s) \
1330 (a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)))
1331#define K1 0
1332#define K2 013240474631UL
1333#define K3 015666365641UL
1334
1335#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
1336
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -07001337static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform(__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001338{
1339 __u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
1340
1341 /* Round 1 */
1342 ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + K1, 3);
1343 ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + K1, 7);
1344 ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + K1, 11);
1345 ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + K1, 19);
1346 ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K1, 3);
1347 ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + K1, 7);
1348 ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + K1, 11);
1349 ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K1, 19);
1350 ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + K1, 3);
1351 ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + K1, 7);
1352 ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[10] + K1, 11);
1353 ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[11] + K1, 19);
1354
1355 /* Round 2 */
1356 ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + K2, 3);
1357 ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 3] + K2, 5);
1358 ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 5] + K2, 9);
1359 ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K2, 13);
1360 ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K2, 3);
1361 ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[11] + K2, 5);
1362 ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 0] + K2, 9);
1363 ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K2, 13);
1364 ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K2, 3);
1365 ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + K2, 5);
1366 ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 8] + K2, 9);
1367 ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[10] + K2, 13);
1368
1369 /* Round 3 */
1370 ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 3] + K3, 3);
1371 ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 7] + K3, 9);
1372 ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[11] + K3, 11);
1373 ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K3, 15);
1374 ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 6] + K3, 3);
1375 ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[10] + K3, 9);
1376 ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 1] + K3, 11);
1377 ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 5] + K3, 15);
1378 ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K3, 3);
1379 ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + K3, 9);
1380 ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 4] + K3, 11);
1381 ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + K3, 15);
1382
1383 return buf[1] + b; /* "most hashed" word */
1384 /* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
1385}
1386#endif
1387
1388#undef ROUND
1389#undef F
1390#undef G
1391#undef H
1392#undef K1
1393#undef K2
1394#undef K3
1395
1396/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
1397#define REKEY_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
1398/*
1399 * Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
1400 * bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
1401 * bit 0-23: hash(source,dest)
1402 *
1403 * The implementation is similar to the algorithm described
1404 * in the Appendix of RFC 1185, except that
1405 * - it uses a 1 MHz clock instead of a 250 kHz clock
1406 * - it performs a rekey every 5 minutes, which is equivalent
1407 * to a (source,dest) tulple dependent forward jump of the
1408 * clock by 0..2^(HASH_BITS+1)
1409 *
1410 * Thus the average ISN wraparound time is 68 minutes instead of
1411 * 4.55 hours.
1412 *
1413 * SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
1414 * Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
1415 *
1416 */
1417#define COUNT_BITS 8
1418#define COUNT_MASK ((1 << COUNT_BITS) - 1)
1419#define HASH_BITS 24
1420#define HASH_MASK ((1 << HASH_BITS) - 1)
1421
1422static struct keydata {
1423 __u32 count; /* already shifted to the final position */
1424 __u32 secret[12];
1425} ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2];
1426
1427static unsigned int ip_cnt;
1428
David Howells65f27f32006-11-22 14:55:48 +00001429static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001430
David Howells65f27f32006-11-22 14:55:48 +00001431static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(rekey_work, rekey_seq_generator);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001432
1433/*
1434 * Lock avoidance:
1435 * The ISN generation runs lockless - it's just a hash over random data.
1436 * State changes happen every 5 minutes when the random key is replaced.
1437 * Synchronization is performed by having two copies of the hash function
1438 * state and rekey_seq_generator always updates the inactive copy.
1439 * The copy is then activated by updating ip_cnt.
1440 * The implementation breaks down if someone blocks the thread
1441 * that processes SYN requests for more than 5 minutes. Should never
1442 * happen, and even if that happens only a not perfectly compliant
1443 * ISN is generated, nothing fatal.
1444 */
David Howells65f27f32006-11-22 14:55:48 +00001445static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001446{
1447 struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1 ^ (ip_cnt & 1)];
1448
1449 get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
1450 keyptr->count = (ip_cnt & COUNT_MASK) << HASH_BITS;
1451 smp_wmb();
1452 ip_cnt++;
1453 schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work, REKEY_INTERVAL);
1454}
1455
1456static inline struct keydata *get_keyptr(void)
1457{
1458 struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt & 1];
1459
1460 smp_rmb();
1461
1462 return keyptr;
1463}
1464
1465static __init int seqgen_init(void)
1466{
1467 rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
1468 return 0;
1469}
1470late_initcall(seqgen_init);
1471
1472#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
Al Virob09b845c2006-11-14 20:52:19 -08001473__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
1474 __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001475{
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001476 __u32 seq;
1477 __u32 hash[12];
1478 struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
1479
1480 /* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
1481 * Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
1482 */
1483
1484 memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -07001485 hash[4] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
1486 memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001487
Al Virob09b845c2006-11-14 20:52:19 -08001488 seq = twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001489 seq += keyptr->count;
1490
Eric Dumazet6dd10a62007-11-13 21:12:14 -08001491 seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001492
1493 return seq;
1494}
1495EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
1496#endif
1497
1498/* The code below is shamelessly stolen from secure_tcp_sequence_number().
1499 * All blames to Andrey V. Savochkin <saw@msu.ru>.
1500 */
Al Virob09b845c2006-11-14 20:52:19 -08001501__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001502{
1503 struct keydata *keyptr;
1504 __u32 hash[4];
1505
1506 keyptr = get_keyptr();
1507
1508 /*
1509 * Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
1510 * The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
1511 * which is then hashed with random data.
1512 */
Al Virob09b845c2006-11-14 20:52:19 -08001513 hash[0] = (__force __u32)daddr;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001514 hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
1515 hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
1516 hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
1517
1518 return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
1519}
1520
1521#ifdef CONFIG_INET
1522
Al Virob09b845c2006-11-14 20:52:19 -08001523__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
1524 __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001525{
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001526 __u32 seq;
1527 __u32 hash[4];
1528 struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
1529
1530 /*
1531 * Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
1532 * (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
1533 * Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
1534 * then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
1535 */
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -07001536 hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
1537 hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
1538 hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
1539 hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001540
1541 seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret) & HASH_MASK;
1542 seq += keyptr->count;
1543 /*
1544 * As close as possible to RFC 793, which
1545 * suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
1546 * Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
Eric Dumazet9b42c332007-10-01 13:58:36 -07001547 * For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
1548 * For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but
1549 * we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq
1550 * overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes).
1551 * Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001552 */
Eric Dumazet6dd10a62007-11-13 21:12:14 -08001553 seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6;
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -07001554
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001555 return seq;
1556}
1557
Arnaldo Carvalho de Meloa7f5e7f2005-12-13 23:25:31 -08001558/* Generate secure starting point for ephemeral IPV4 transport port search */
Al Virob09b845c2006-11-14 20:52:19 -08001559u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001560{
1561 struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
1562 u32 hash[4];
1563
1564 /*
1565 * Pick a unique starting offset for each ephemeral port search
1566 * (saddr, daddr, dport) and 48bits of random data.
1567 */
Al Virob09b845c2006-11-14 20:52:19 -08001568 hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
1569 hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
1570 hash[2] = (__force u32)dport ^ keyptr->secret[10];
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001571 hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
1572
1573 return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
1574}
Stephen Hemminger9f593652008-08-18 21:32:32 -07001575EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001576
1577#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -07001578u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
1579 __be16 dport)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001580{
1581 struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
1582 u32 hash[12];
1583
1584 memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
Al Virob09b845c2006-11-14 20:52:19 -08001585 hash[4] = (__force u32)dport;
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -07001586 memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001587
Al Virob09b845c2006-11-14 20:52:19 -08001588 return twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001589}
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001590#endif
1591
Arnaldo Carvalho de Meloc4365c92005-08-09 20:12:30 -07001592#if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE)
1593/* Similar to secure_tcp_sequence_number but generate a 48 bit value
1594 * bit's 32-47 increase every key exchange
1595 * 0-31 hash(source, dest)
1596 */
Al Virob09b845c2006-11-14 20:52:19 -08001597u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
1598 __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
Arnaldo Carvalho de Meloc4365c92005-08-09 20:12:30 -07001599{
Arnaldo Carvalho de Meloc4365c92005-08-09 20:12:30 -07001600 u64 seq;
1601 __u32 hash[4];
1602 struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
1603
Al Virob09b845c2006-11-14 20:52:19 -08001604 hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
1605 hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
1606 hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
Arnaldo Carvalho de Meloc4365c92005-08-09 20:12:30 -07001607 hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
1608
1609 seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
1610 seq |= ((u64)keyptr->count) << (32 - HASH_BITS);
1611
Eric Dumazet6dd10a62007-11-13 21:12:14 -08001612 seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
Arnaldo Carvalho de Meloc4365c92005-08-09 20:12:30 -07001613 seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
Matt Mackall90b75ee2008-04-29 01:02:55 -07001614
Arnaldo Carvalho de Meloc4365c92005-08-09 20:12:30 -07001615 return seq;
1616}
Arnaldo Carvalho de Meloc4365c92005-08-09 20:12:30 -07001617EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
1618#endif
1619
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001620#endif /* CONFIG_INET */
1621
1622
1623/*
1624 * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but
1625 * with the goal of minimal entropy pool depletion. As a result, the random
1626 * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of
1627 * depleting entropy is too high
1628 */
1629unsigned int get_random_int(void)
1630{
1631 /*
1632 * Use IP's RNG. It suits our purpose perfectly: it re-keys itself
1633 * every second, from the entropy pool (and thus creates a limited
1634 * drain on it), and uses halfMD4Transform within the second. We
1635 * also mix it with jiffies and the PID:
1636 */
Al Virob09b845c2006-11-14 20:52:19 -08001637 return secure_ip_id((__force __be32)(current->pid + jiffies));
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001638}
1639
1640/*
1641 * randomize_range() returns a start address such that
1642 *
1643 * [...... <range> .....]
1644 * start end
1645 *
1646 * a <range> with size "len" starting at the return value is inside in the
1647 * area defined by [start, end], but is otherwise randomized.
1648 */
1649unsigned long
1650randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long len)
1651{
1652 unsigned long range = end - len - start;
1653
1654 if (end <= start + len)
1655 return 0;
1656 return PAGE_ALIGN(get_random_int() % range + start);
1657}