Bluetooth: Fix sending wrong authentication requirements
Until we support any pairing method (Passkey Entry, OOB) that gives
MITM protection we shouldn't send that we have MITM protection.
Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 03489e5..7e55846 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -187,18 +187,6 @@
msecs_to_jiffies(SMP_TIMEOUT));
}
-static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 level)
-{
- switch (level) {
- case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
- /* Right now we don't support bonding */
- return SMP_AUTH_MITM;
-
- default:
- return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
- }
-}
-
static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp,
@@ -542,7 +530,6 @@
{
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
- __u8 authreq;
BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
@@ -580,19 +567,17 @@
smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
- authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
-
if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
- build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
+ build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, SMP_AUTH_NONE);
smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
} else {
struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
- cp.auth_req = authreq;
+ cp.auth_req = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}