selinux: wrap AVC state
Wrap the AVC state within the selinux_state structure and
pass it explicitly to all AVC functions. The AVC private state
is encapsulated in a selinux_avc structure that is referenced
from the selinux_state.
This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or
APIs (userspace or LSM).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e7eaef2..21b377a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -468,12 +468,14 @@ static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
int rc;
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
return rc;
}
@@ -484,12 +486,14 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
{
const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
int rc;
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
return rc;
}
@@ -1774,9 +1778,11 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
return -EINVAL;
}
- rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
+ rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
+ sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
- int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
+ int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
+ sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
if (rc2)
return rc2;
}
@@ -1802,7 +1808,8 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
sid = cred_sid(cred);
isec = inode->i_security;
- return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
}
/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
@@ -1875,7 +1882,8 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
ad.u.file = file;
if (sid != fsec->sid) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, fsec->sid,
SECCLASS_FD,
FD__USE,
&ad);
@@ -1945,7 +1953,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
ad.u.dentry = dentry;
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
&ad);
if (rc)
@@ -1956,11 +1965,13 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
- return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ newsid, sbsec->sid,
SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
}
@@ -1989,7 +2000,8 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
av = DIR__SEARCH;
av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2009,7 +2021,8 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
return 0;
}
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
return rc;
}
@@ -2033,16 +2046,19 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, old_isec->sid,
old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, old_isec->sid,
old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2052,13 +2068,15 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, new_isec->sid,
new_isec->sclass,
(new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
if (rc)
@@ -2078,7 +2096,8 @@ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
sbsec = sb->s_security;
- return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
}
/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
@@ -2155,7 +2174,8 @@ static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
u32 mysid = current_sid();
u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
- return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
}
@@ -2168,13 +2188,15 @@ static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
int rc;
if (mysid != fromsid) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
- return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
NULL);
}
@@ -2184,7 +2206,8 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
- return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
NULL);
}
@@ -2203,7 +2226,8 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
ad.u.path = file->f_path;
if (sid != fsec->sid) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, fsec->sid,
SECCLASS_FD,
FD__USE,
&ad);
@@ -2221,7 +2245,8 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
return 0;
isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
- return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
&ad);
}
@@ -2232,21 +2257,25 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
u32 csid = task_sid(child);
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
- return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
- return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
}
static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
- return avc_has_perm(task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
}
static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
}
@@ -2255,7 +2284,8 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
}
@@ -2315,18 +2345,21 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
switch (type) {
case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
/* Set level of messages printed to console */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
NULL);
}
/* All other syslog types */
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
}
@@ -2393,7 +2426,8 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
if (nosuid)
av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
- rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
if (!rc)
return 0;
@@ -2476,25 +2510,29 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
ad.u.file = bprm->file;
if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
} else {
/* Check permissions for the transition. */
- rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* Check for shared state */
if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
NULL);
if (rc)
@@ -2506,7 +2544,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
if (ptsid != 0) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
if (rc)
@@ -2520,7 +2559,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
/* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
the noatsecure permission is granted between
the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
- rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
NULL);
bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
@@ -2612,7 +2652,8 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
* lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
*/
- rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
if (rc) {
/* protect against do_prlimit() */
@@ -2652,7 +2693,8 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
* kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
*/
- rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
if (rc) {
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) {
memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
@@ -3081,7 +3123,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
if (IS_ERR(isec))
return PTR_ERR(isec);
- return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
+ return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
}
@@ -3097,7 +3140,8 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
ad.u.inode = inode;
- rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
+ rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -3135,7 +3179,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
if (IS_ERR(isec))
return PTR_ERR(isec);
- rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
+ rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
&denied);
@@ -3224,7 +3269,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
ad.u.dentry = dentry;
isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -3261,7 +3307,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -3271,7 +3318,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (rc)
return rc;
- return avc_has_perm(newsid,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ newsid,
sbsec->sid,
SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
@@ -3489,7 +3537,7 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
isec = inode_security(inode);
if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
- fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
+ fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
/* No change since file_open check. */
return 0;
@@ -3529,7 +3577,8 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ ssid, fsec->sid,
SECCLASS_FD,
FD__USE,
&ad);
@@ -3541,8 +3590,9 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
return 0;
isec = inode_security(inode);
- rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
- requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
+ rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
+ ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+ requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
out:
return rc;
}
@@ -3610,7 +3660,8 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
* private file mapping that will also be writable.
* This has an additional check.
*/
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
if (rc)
goto error;
@@ -3640,7 +3691,8 @@ static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
u32 sid = current_sid();
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
}
@@ -3684,13 +3736,15 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
int rc = 0;
if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
} else if (!vma->vm_file &&
((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
} else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
/*
@@ -3782,7 +3836,8 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
else
perm = signal_to_av(signum);
- return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ fsec->fown_sid, sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
}
@@ -3808,7 +3863,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
* struct as its SID.
*/
fsec->isid = isec->sid;
- fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
+ fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
/*
* Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
* between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
@@ -3827,7 +3882,8 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
{
u32 sid = current_sid();
- return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
}
/*
@@ -3901,7 +3957,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
u32 sid = current_sid();
int ret;
- ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
+ ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, secid,
SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
NULL);
@@ -3925,7 +3982,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
u32 sid = current_sid();
int ret;
- ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
+ ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid,
SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
NULL);
@@ -3942,7 +4000,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
}
@@ -3956,7 +4015,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
/* init_module */
if (file == NULL)
- return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
/* finit_module */
@@ -3966,13 +4026,15 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
fsec = file->f_security;
if (sid != fsec->sid) {
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
- return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
}
@@ -3994,19 +4056,22 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
}
static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
}
static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
}
@@ -4017,19 +4082,22 @@ static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
}
static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
}
static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
}
@@ -4044,7 +4112,8 @@ static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcre
av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
- return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
}
@@ -4058,7 +4127,8 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p),
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), task_sid(p),
SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
return 0;
@@ -4066,19 +4136,22 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
}
static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
}
static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
}
@@ -4093,7 +4166,8 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
perm = signal_to_av(sig);
if (!secid)
secid = current_sid();
- return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
}
static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
@@ -4428,7 +4502,8 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->sk = sk;
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
&ad);
}
@@ -4448,7 +4523,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
if (rc)
return rc;
- return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
}
static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
@@ -4557,7 +4633,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net->family = family;
- err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+ err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sksec->sid, sid,
sksec->sclass,
SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
if (err)
@@ -4601,7 +4678,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
else
ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
- err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+ err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sksec->sid, sid,
sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
if (err)
goto out;
@@ -4686,7 +4764,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
- err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
+ err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -4798,7 +4877,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->sk = other;
- err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
+ err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
sksec_other->sclass,
UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
if (err)
@@ -4829,7 +4909,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
- return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
&ad);
}
@@ -4844,7 +4925,8 @@ static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
if (err)
return err;
- err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
+ err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ peer_sid, if_sid,
SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -4852,7 +4934,8 @@ static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
if (err)
return err;
- return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ peer_sid, node_sid,
SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
}
@@ -4875,7 +4958,8 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
return err;
if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
- err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
PACKET__RECV, &ad);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -4940,7 +5024,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
return err;
}
- err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
+ err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
PEER__RECV, &ad);
if (err) {
selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
@@ -4949,7 +5034,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
if (secmark_active) {
- err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
PACKET__RECV, &ad);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -5132,7 +5218,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
- err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
+ err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -5306,7 +5393,9 @@ static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
__tsec = current_security();
tsid = __tsec->sid;
- return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
+ NULL);
}
static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
@@ -5354,7 +5443,8 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
* connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
* get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
- return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
NULL);
}
@@ -5362,7 +5452,8 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
{
struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
}
@@ -5390,11 +5481,13 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
u32 sid = current_sid();
int err;
- err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+ err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
- err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+ err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -5485,7 +5578,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
}
if (secmark_active)
- if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+ if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ peer_sid, skb->secmark,
SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
return NF_DROP;
@@ -5597,7 +5691,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_DROP;
if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
- if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
+ if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
@@ -5720,7 +5815,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_DROP;
if (secmark_active)
- if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+ if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ peer_sid, skb->secmark,
SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
@@ -5730,13 +5826,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
return NF_DROP;
- if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
+ if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ peer_sid, if_sid,
SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
return NF_DROP;
- if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
+ if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ peer_sid, node_sid,
SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
}
@@ -5824,7 +5922,8 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
- return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
}
static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
@@ -5854,7 +5953,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
if (rc) {
ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
@@ -5879,7 +5979,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
- return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
}
@@ -5892,7 +5993,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
case IPC_INFO:
case MSG_INFO:
/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
case IPC_STAT:
case MSG_STAT:
@@ -5941,15 +6043,18 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
/* Can this process write to the queue? */
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
if (!rc)
/* Can this process send the message */
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
MSG__SEND, &ad);
if (!rc)
/* Can the message be put in the queue? */
- rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
return rc;
@@ -5971,10 +6076,12 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid,
SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
if (!rc)
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, msec->sid,
SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
return rc;
}
@@ -5996,7 +6103,8 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
SHM__CREATE, &ad);
if (rc) {
ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
@@ -6021,7 +6129,8 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
- return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
}
@@ -6035,7 +6144,8 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
case IPC_INFO:
case SHM_INFO:
/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
case IPC_STAT:
case SHM_STAT:
@@ -6089,7 +6199,8 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
SEM__CREATE, &ad);
if (rc) {
ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
@@ -6114,7 +6225,8 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
- return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
}
@@ -6128,7 +6240,8 @@ static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
case IPC_INFO:
case SEM_INFO:
/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
- return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
case GETPID:
case GETNCNT:
@@ -6214,7 +6327,8 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
__tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
if (current != p) {
- error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
+ error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
if (error)
goto bad;
@@ -6263,19 +6377,24 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
* Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
*/
if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
- error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
- error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
- error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
- error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
- error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
else
error = -EINVAL;
@@ -6332,7 +6451,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
} else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
tsec->create_sid = sid;
} else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
- error = avc_has_perm(mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE,
+ error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE,
NULL);
if (error)
goto abort_change;
@@ -6354,7 +6474,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
}
/* Check permissions for the transition. */
- error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
if (error)
goto abort_change;
@@ -6363,7 +6484,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
if (ptsid != 0) {
- error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
if (error)
goto abort_change;
@@ -6489,7 +6611,8 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
ksec = key->security;
- return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
}
static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
@@ -6525,7 +6648,8 @@ static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
- return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sec->sid, sid,
SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
}
@@ -6549,7 +6673,8 @@ static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name));
ibendport.port = port_num;
ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
- return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sec->sid, sid,
SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
}
@@ -6582,11 +6707,13 @@ static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
switch (cmd) {
case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
- ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
+ ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
NULL);
break;
case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
- ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
+ ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
NULL);
break;
default:
@@ -6626,14 +6753,16 @@ static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
map = file->private_data;
bpfsec = map->security;
- ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
if (ret)
return ret;
} else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
prog = file->private_data;
bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
- ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -6647,7 +6776,8 @@ static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
bpfsec = map->security;
- return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
}
@@ -6657,7 +6787,8 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
- return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
}
@@ -6958,6 +7089,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss);
+ selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
cred_init_security();