| /* |
| * fscrypt_supp.h |
| * |
| * This is included by filesystems configured with encryption support. |
| */ |
| |
| #ifndef _LINUX_FSCRYPT_SUPP_H |
| #define _LINUX_FSCRYPT_SUPP_H |
| |
| #include <linux/fscrypt_common.h> |
| |
| /* crypto.c */ |
| extern struct kmem_cache *fscrypt_info_cachep; |
| extern struct fscrypt_ctx *fscrypt_get_ctx(const struct inode *, gfp_t); |
| extern void fscrypt_release_ctx(struct fscrypt_ctx *); |
| extern struct page *fscrypt_encrypt_page(const struct inode *, struct page *, |
| unsigned int, unsigned int, |
| u64, gfp_t); |
| extern int fscrypt_decrypt_page(const struct inode *, struct page *, unsigned int, |
| unsigned int, u64); |
| extern void fscrypt_restore_control_page(struct page *); |
| |
| extern const struct dentry_operations fscrypt_d_ops; |
| |
| static inline void fscrypt_set_d_op(struct dentry *dentry) |
| { |
| d_set_d_op(dentry, &fscrypt_d_ops); |
| } |
| |
| static inline void fscrypt_set_encrypted_dentry(struct dentry *dentry) |
| { |
| spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock); |
| dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_WITH_KEY; |
| spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); |
| } |
| |
| /* policy.c */ |
| extern int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *, const void __user *); |
| extern int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *, void __user *); |
| extern int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *, struct inode *); |
| extern int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *, struct inode *, |
| void *, bool); |
| /* keyinfo.c */ |
| extern int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *); |
| extern void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *, struct fscrypt_info *); |
| |
| /* fname.c */ |
| extern int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *, const struct qstr *, |
| int lookup, struct fscrypt_name *); |
| extern void fscrypt_free_filename(struct fscrypt_name *); |
| extern u32 fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const struct inode *, u32); |
| extern int fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(const struct inode *, u32, |
| struct fscrypt_str *); |
| extern void fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(struct fscrypt_str *); |
| extern int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *, u32, u32, |
| const struct fscrypt_str *, struct fscrypt_str *); |
| extern int fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk(struct inode *, const struct qstr *, |
| struct fscrypt_str *); |
| |
| #define FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE 32 |
| |
| /* Extracts the second-to-last ciphertext block; see explanation below */ |
| #define FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST(name, len) \ |
| ((name) + round_down((len) - FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE - 1, \ |
| FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE)) |
| |
| #define FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE |
| |
| /** |
| * fscrypt_digested_name - alternate identifier for an on-disk filename |
| * |
| * When userspace lists an encrypted directory without access to the key, |
| * filenames whose ciphertext is longer than FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE |
| * bytes are shown in this abbreviated form (base64-encoded) rather than as the |
| * full ciphertext (base64-encoded). This is necessary to allow supporting |
| * filenames up to NAME_MAX bytes, since base64 encoding expands the length. |
| * |
| * To make it possible for filesystems to still find the correct directory entry |
| * despite not knowing the full on-disk name, we encode any filesystem-specific |
| * 'hash' and/or 'minor_hash' which the filesystem may need for its lookups, |
| * followed by the second-to-last ciphertext block of the filename. Due to the |
| * use of the CBC-CTS encryption mode, the second-to-last ciphertext block |
| * depends on the full plaintext. (Note that ciphertext stealing causes the |
| * last two blocks to appear "flipped".) This makes accidental collisions very |
| * unlikely: just a 1 in 2^128 chance for two filenames to collide even if they |
| * share the same filesystem-specific hashes. |
| * |
| * However, this scheme isn't immune to intentional collisions, which can be |
| * created by anyone able to create arbitrary plaintext filenames and view them |
| * without the key. Making the "digest" be a real cryptographic hash like |
| * SHA-256 over the full ciphertext would prevent this, although it would be |
| * less efficient and harder to implement, especially since the filesystem would |
| * need to calculate it for each directory entry examined during a search. |
| */ |
| struct fscrypt_digested_name { |
| u32 hash; |
| u32 minor_hash; |
| u8 digest[FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
| }; |
| |
| /** |
| * fscrypt_match_name() - test whether the given name matches a directory entry |
| * @fname: the name being searched for |
| * @de_name: the name from the directory entry |
| * @de_name_len: the length of @de_name in bytes |
| * |
| * Normally @fname->disk_name will be set, and in that case we simply compare |
| * that to the name stored in the directory entry. The only exception is that |
| * if we don't have the key for an encrypted directory and a filename in it is |
| * very long, then we won't have the full disk_name and we'll instead need to |
| * match against the fscrypt_digested_name. |
| * |
| * Return: %true if the name matches, otherwise %false. |
| */ |
| static inline bool fscrypt_match_name(const struct fscrypt_name *fname, |
| const u8 *de_name, u32 de_name_len) |
| { |
| if (unlikely(!fname->disk_name.name)) { |
| const struct fscrypt_digested_name *n = |
| (const void *)fname->crypto_buf.name; |
| if (WARN_ON_ONCE(fname->usr_fname->name[0] != '_')) |
| return false; |
| if (de_name_len <= FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE) |
| return false; |
| return !memcmp(FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST(de_name, de_name_len), |
| n->digest, FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE); |
| } |
| |
| if (de_name_len != fname->disk_name.len) |
| return false; |
| return !memcmp(de_name, fname->disk_name.name, fname->disk_name.len); |
| } |
| |
| /* bio.c */ |
| extern void fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages(struct fscrypt_ctx *, struct bio *); |
| extern void fscrypt_pullback_bio_page(struct page **, bool); |
| extern int fscrypt_zeroout_range(const struct inode *, pgoff_t, sector_t, |
| unsigned int); |
| |
| #endif /* _LINUX_FSCRYPT_SUPP_H */ |