diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c11e42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2518 @@
+/*
+ *  Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
+ *
+ *  This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
+ *
+ *  Author:
+ *	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
+#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
+#include <linux/kd.h>
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
+
+#include "smack.h"
+
+/*
+ * I hope these are the hokeyist lines of code in the module. Casey.
+ */
+#define DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC	0x1cd1
+#define SOCKFS_MAGIC		0x534F434B
+#define TMPFS_MAGIC		0x01021994
+
+/**
+ * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
+ * @ip: a pointer to the inode
+ * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label
+ * or NULL if there was no label to fetch.
+ */
+static char *smk_fetch(struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
+
+	if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, in, SMK_LABELLEN);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return smk_import(in, rc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
+ * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
+ *
+ * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
+ */
+struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+
+	isp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (isp == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	isp->smk_inode = smack;
+	isp->smk_flags = 0;
+	mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
+
+	return isp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hooks.
+ * We he, that is fun!
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_ptrace - Smack approval on ptrace
+ * @ptp: parent task pointer
+ * @ctp: child task pointer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
+ *
+ * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
+ */
+static int smack_ptrace(struct task_struct *ptp, struct task_struct *ctp)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_ptrace(ptp, ctp);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = smk_access(ptp->security, ctp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+	if (rc != 0 && __capable(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
+ * @type: message type
+ *
+ * Require that the task has the floor label
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_syslog(int type)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char *sp = current->security;
+
+	rc = cap_syslog(type);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+
+	 if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known)
+		rc = -EACCES;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Superblock Hooks.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+
+	sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (sbsp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	sbsp->smk_root = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+	sbsp->smk_default = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+	sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+	sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known;
+	sbsp->smk_initialized = 0;
+	spin_lock_init(&sbsp->smk_sblock);
+
+	sb->s_security = sbsp;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	kfree(sb->s_security);
+	sb->s_security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
+ * @type: file system type
+ * @orig: where to start
+ * @smackopts
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ *
+ * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
+ * options list.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig,
+			      void *smackopts)
+{
+	char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
+
+	/* Binary mount data: just copy */
+	if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
+		copy_page(smackopts, orig);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (otheropts == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
+		if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
+			dp = smackopts;
+		else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
+			dp = smackopts;
+		else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
+			dp = smackopts;
+		else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
+			dp = smackopts;
+		else
+			dp = otheropts;
+
+		commap = strchr(cp, ',');
+		if (commap != NULL)
+			*commap = '\0';
+
+		if (*dp != '\0')
+			strcat(dp, ",");
+		strcat(dp, cp);
+	}
+
+	strcpy(orig, otheropts);
+	free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
+ * @sb: the file system superblock
+ * @data: the smack mount options
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
+ */
+static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+	struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
+	struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	char *op;
+	char *commap;
+	char *nsp;
+
+	spin_lock(&sp->smk_sblock);
+	if (sp->smk_initialized != 0) {
+		spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	sp->smk_initialized = 1;
+	spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
+
+	for (op = data; op != NULL; op = commap) {
+		commap = strchr(op, ',');
+		if (commap != NULL)
+			*commap++ = '\0';
+
+		if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSHAT, strlen(SMK_FSHAT)) == 0) {
+			op += strlen(SMK_FSHAT);
+			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
+			if (nsp != NULL)
+				sp->smk_hat = nsp;
+		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSFLOOR, strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR)) == 0) {
+			op += strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR);
+			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
+			if (nsp != NULL)
+				sp->smk_floor = nsp;
+		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSDEFAULT,
+				   strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT)) == 0) {
+			op += strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT);
+			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
+			if (nsp != NULL)
+				sp->smk_default = nsp;
+		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSROOT, strlen(SMK_FSROOT)) == 0) {
+			op += strlen(SMK_FSROOT);
+			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
+			if (nsp != NULL)
+				sp->smk_root = nsp;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize the root inode.
+	 */
+	isp = inode->i_security;
+	if (isp == NULL)
+		inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
+	else
+		isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
+ * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
+ * and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
+
+	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_mount - Smack check for mounting
+ * @dev_name: unused
+ * @nd: mount point
+ * @type: unused
+ * @flags: unused
+ * @data: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
+ * being mounted on, an error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct nameidata *nd,
+			  char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbp = nd->mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
+
+	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_umount - Smack check for unmounting
+ * @mnt: file system to unmount
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
+ * being unmounted, an error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbp;
+
+	sbp = mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
+
+	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Inode hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
+ * @inode - the inode in need of a blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current->security);
+	if (inode->i_security == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
+ * @inode - the inode with a blob
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer in inode
+ */
+static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	kfree(inode->i_security);
+	inode->i_security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
+ * @inode: the inode
+ * @dir: unused
+ * @name: where to put the attribute name
+ * @value: where to put the attribute value
+ * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
+ */
+static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+				     char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
+{
+	char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+
+	if (name) {
+		*name = kstrdup(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (*name == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (value) {
+		*value = kstrdup(isp, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (*value == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (len)
+		*len = strlen(isp) + 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
+ * @old_dentry: the existing object
+ * @dir: unused
+ * @new_dentry: the new object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
+			    struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char *isp;
+
+	isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
+	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE);
+
+	if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
+		isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
+		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @dentry: file to unlink
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
+ * and the object, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *ip = dentry->d_inode;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
+	 */
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		/*
+		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
+		 */
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @dentry: directory to unlink
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
+ * and the directory, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
+	 */
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		/*
+		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
+		 */
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
+ * @old_inode: the old directory
+ * @old_dentry: unused
+ * @new_inode: the new directory
+ * @new_dentry: unused
+ *
+ * Read and write access is required on both the old and
+ * new directories.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
+			      struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			      struct inode *new_inode,
+			      struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char *isp;
+
+	isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
+	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
+
+	if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
+		isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
+		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
+ * @inode: the inode in question
+ * @mask: the access requested
+ * @nd: unused
+ *
+ * This is the important Smack hook.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+				  struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+	/*
+	 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
+	 */
+	if (mask == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @iattr: for the force flag
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
+	 */
+	if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
+		return 0;
+
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
+ * @mnt: unused
+ * @dentry: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ * @value: unused
+ * @size: unused
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
+				void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+		if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0)
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
+ * @dentry: object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @value: attribute value
+ * @size: attribute size
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
+ * in the master label list.
+ */
+static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
+				      void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	char *nsp;
+
+	/*
+	 * Not SMACK
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK))
+		return;
+
+	if (size >= SMK_LABELLEN)
+		return;
+
+	isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+
+	/*
+	 * No locking is done here. This is a pointer
+	 * assignment.
+	 */
+	nsp = smk_import(value, size);
+	if (nsp != NULL)
+		isp->smk_inode = nsp;
+	else
+		isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/*
+ * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ *
+ * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+{
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 && !capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @buffer: where to put the result
+ * @size: size of the buffer
+ * @err: unused
+ *
+ * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode,
+				   const char *name, void **buffer,
+				   bool alloc)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	struct socket *sock;
+	struct super_block *sbp;
+	struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
+	char *isp;
+	int ilen;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
+		isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+		ilen = strlen(isp) + 1;
+		*buffer = isp;
+		return ilen;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
+	 */
+	sbp = ip->i_sb;
+	if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
+	if (sock == NULL)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
+		isp = ssp->smk_in;
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
+		isp = ssp->smk_out;
+	else
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	ilen = strlen(isp) + 1;
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		*buffer = isp;
+		rc = ilen;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @buffer: where they go
+ * @buffer_size: size of buffer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
+				    size_t buffer_size)
+{
+	int len = strlen(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
+
+	if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size) {
+		memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
+		return len;
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * File Hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_permission - Smack check on file operations
+ * @file: unused
+ * @mask: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ *
+ * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
+ * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
+ * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
+ *
+ * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
+ * label changing that SELinux does.
+ */
+static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
+ * label list, so no allocation is done.
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	file->f_security = current->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
+ * label list, so no memory is freed.
+ */
+static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	file->f_security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: what to do
+ * @arg: unused
+ *
+ * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			    unsigned long arg)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE);
+
+	if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ))
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has write access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: what action to check
+ * @arg: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			    unsigned long arg)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case F_DUPFD:
+	case F_GETFD:
+	case F_GETFL:
+	case F_GETLK:
+	case F_GETOWN:
+	case F_GETSIG:
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ);
+		break;
+	case F_SETFD:
+	case F_SETFL:
+	case F_SETLK:
+	case F_SETLKW:
+	case F_SETOWN:
+	case F_SETSIG:
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE);
+		break;
+	default:
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READWRITE);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
+ * @file: object in question
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ * Further research may be required on this one.
+ */
+static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
+{
+	file->f_security = current->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
+ * @tsk: The target task
+ * @fown: the object the signal come from
+ * @signum: unused
+ *
+ * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
+ * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				     struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
+{
+	struct file *file;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
+	 */
+	file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
+	rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	if (rc != 0 && __capable(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+	int may = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * This code relies on bitmasks.
+	 */
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+		may = MAY_READ;
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		may |= MAY_WRITE;
+
+	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, may);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Task hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_alloc_security - "allocate" a task blob
+ * @tsk: the task in need of a blob
+ *
+ * Smack isn't using copies of blobs. Everyone
+ * points to an immutable list. No alloc required.
+ * No data copy required.
+ *
+ * Always returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	tsk->security = current->security;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_free_security - "free" a task blob
+ * @task: the task with the blob
+ *
+ * Smack isn't using copies of blobs. Everyone
+ * points to an immutable list. The blobs never go away.
+ * There is no leak here.
+ */
+static void smack_task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	task->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @pgid: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
+ * @p: the object task
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
+ * @p: the object task
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
+ * @p: the object task
+ * @secid: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
+ */
+static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+	*secid = smack_to_secid(p->security);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @nice: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @ioprio: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @policy: unused
+ * @lp: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
+				   struct sched_param *lp)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @info: unused
+ * @sig: unused
+ * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ *
+ * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
+ * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
+ */
+static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+			   int sig, u32 secid)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Special cases where signals really ought to go through
+	 * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
+	 * make sense to change the caller so that it doesn't
+	 * bother with the LSM hook in these cases.
+	 */
+	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO &&
+	    (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
+	 * can write the receiver.
+	 */
+	if (secid == 0)
+		return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	/*
+	 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
+	 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
+	 * we can't take privilege into account.
+	 */
+	return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
+ * @p: task to wait for
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can wait for p, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = smk_access(current->security, p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow the operation to succeed if either task
+	 * has privilege to perform operations that might
+	 * account for the smack labels having gotten to
+	 * be different in the first place.
+	 *
+	 * This breaks the strict subjet/object access
+	 * control ideal, taking the object's privilege
+	 * state into account in the decision as well as
+	 * the smack value.
+	 */
+	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || __capable(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
+ * @p: task to copy from
+ * inode: inode to copy to
+ *
+ * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
+ */
+static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+	isp->smk_inode = p->security;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Socket hooks.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @family: unused
+ * @priority: memory allocation priority
+ *
+ * Assign Smack pointers to current
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
+ */
+static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+	char *csp = current->security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+
+	ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
+	if (ssp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ssp->smk_in = csp;
+	ssp->smk_out = csp;
+	ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
+
+	sk->sk_security = ssp;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	kfree(sk->sk_security);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_set_catset - convert a capset to netlabel mls categories
+ * @catset: the Smack categories
+ * @sap: where to put the netlabel categories
+ *
+ * Allocates and fills attr.mls.cat
+ */
+static void smack_set_catset(char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap)
+{
+	unsigned char *cp;
+	unsigned char m;
+	int cat;
+	int rc;
+	int byte;
+
+	if (catset == 0)
+		return;
+
+	sap->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
+	sap->attr.mls.cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+	sap->attr.mls.cat->startbit = 0;
+
+	for (cat = 1, cp = catset, byte = 0; byte < SMK_LABELLEN; cp++, byte++)
+		for (m = 0x80; m != 0; m >>= 1, cat++) {
+			if ((m & *cp) == 0)
+				continue;
+			rc = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(sap->attr.mls.cat,
+							  cat, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		}
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_to_secattr - fill a secattr from a smack value
+ * @smack: the smack value
+ * @nlsp: where the result goes
+ *
+ * Casey says that CIPSO is good enough for now.
+ * It can be used to effect.
+ * It can also be abused to effect when necessary.
+ * Appologies to the TSIG group in general and GW in particular.
+ */
+static void smack_to_secattr(char *smack, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlsp)
+{
+	struct smack_cipso cipso;
+	int rc;
+
+	switch (smack_net_nltype) {
+	case NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4:
+		nlsp->domain = NULL;
+		nlsp->flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN;
+		nlsp->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+
+		rc = smack_to_cipso(smack, &cipso);
+		if (rc == 0) {
+			nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = cipso.smk_level;
+			smack_set_catset(cipso.smk_catset, nlsp);
+		} else {
+			nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = smack_cipso_direct;
+			smack_set_catset(smack, nlsp);
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
+ * secattr and attach it to the socket.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	smack_to_secattr(ssp->smk_out, &secattr);
+	if (secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
+		rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, &secattr);
+
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @value: attribute value
+ * @size: size of the attribute
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+				   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	char *sp;
+	struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	struct socket *sock;
+
+	if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LABELLEN)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	sp = smk_import(value, size);
+	if (sp == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
+		nsp->smk_inode = sp;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
+	 */
+	if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
+	if (sock == NULL)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
+		ssp->smk_in = sp;
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
+		ssp->smk_out = sp;
+		return smack_netlabel(sock->sk);
+	} else
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @type: unused
+ * @protocol: unused
+ * @kern: unused
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+				    int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	if (family != PF_INET)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Set the outbound netlbl.
+	 */
+	return smack_netlabel(sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
+ * @flags: the S_ value
+ *
+ * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
+ */
+static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
+{
+	int may = 0;
+
+	if (flags & S_IRUGO)
+		may |= MAY_READ;
+	if (flags & S_IWUGO)
+		may |= MAY_WRITE;
+	if (flags & S_IXUGO)
+		may |= MAY_EXEC;
+
+	return may;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
+ * @msg: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	msg->security = current->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
+ * @msg: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	msg->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the smack value
+ */
+static char *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+	return (char *)shp->shm_perm.security;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
+
+	isp->security = current->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
+
+	isp->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ * @shmflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
+{
+	char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
+{
+	char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
+	int may;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT:
+		may = MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+	case SHM_LOCK:
+	case SHM_UNLOCK:
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		may = MAY_READWRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SHM_INFO:
+		/*
+		 * System level information.
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
+ * @shp: the object
+ * @shmaddr: unused
+ * @shmflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
+			   int shmflg)
+{
+	char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the smack value
+ */
+static char *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+	return (char *)sma->sem_perm.security;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
+
+	isp->security = current->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
+
+	isp->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ * @semflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
+{
+	char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
+{
+	char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
+	int may;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case GETPID:
+	case GETNCNT:
+	case GETZCNT:
+	case GETVAL:
+	case GETALL:
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT:
+		may = MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case SETVAL:
+	case SETALL:
+	case IPC_RMID:
+	case IPC_SET:
+		may = MAY_READWRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SEM_INFO:
+		/*
+		 * System level information
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
+ * @sma: the object
+ * @sops: unused
+ * @nsops: unused
+ * @alter: unused
+ *
+ * Treated as read and write in all cases.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
+			   unsigned nsops, int alter)
+{
+	char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
+
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
+ * @msq: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
+
+	kisp->security = current->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
+ * @msq: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
+
+	kisp->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
+ * @msq: the object
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the smack value
+ */
+static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+	return (char *)msq->q_perm.security;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @msqflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
+{
+	char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
+	return smk_curacc(msp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
+{
+	char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
+	int may;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT:
+		may = MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		may = MAY_READWRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case MSG_INFO:
+		/*
+		 * System level information
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return smk_curacc(msp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @msg: unused
+ * @msqflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+				  int msqflg)
+{
+	char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
+	return smk_curacc(msp, rc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @msg: unused
+ * @target: unused
+ * @type: unused
+ * @mode: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+			struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
+{
+	char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
+
+	return smk_curacc(msp, MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
+ * @ipp: the object permissions
+ * @flag: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
+{
+	char *isp = ipp->security;
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
+	return smk_curacc(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
+ * @opt_dentry: unused
+ * @inode: the object
+ *
+ * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
+ */
+static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct super_block *sbp;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	char *csp = current->security;
+	char *fetched;
+	char *final;
+	struct dentry *dp;
+
+	if (inode == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	isp = inode->i_security;
+
+	mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
+	/*
+	 * If the inode is already instantiated
+	 * take the quick way out
+	 */
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
+		goto unlockandout;
+
+	sbp = inode->i_sb;
+	sbsp = sbp->s_security;
+	/*
+	 * We're going to use the superblock default label
+	 * if there's no label on the file.
+	 */
+	final = sbsp->smk_default;
+
+	/*
+	 * This is pretty hackish.
+	 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
+	 * file system specific code, but it does help
+	 * with keeping it simple.
+	 */
+	switch (sbp->s_magic) {
+	case SMACK_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Casey says that it's a little embarassing
+		 * that the smack file system doesn't do
+		 * extended attributes.
+		 */
+		final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+		break;
+	case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
+		 */
+		final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+		break;
+	case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
+		 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
+		 * pty with respect.
+		 */
+		final = csp;
+		break;
+	case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Casey says sockets get the smack of the task.
+		 */
+		final = csp;
+		break;
+	case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
+		 * The superblock default suffices.
+		 */
+		break;
+	case TMPFS_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
+		 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
+		 * getting recreated on every reboot.
+		 */
+		final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+		/*
+		 * No break.
+		 *
+		 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
+		 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
+		 * to set mount options simulate setting the
+		 * superblock default.
+		 */
+	default:
+		/*
+		 * This isn't an understood special case.
+		 * Get the value from the xattr.
+		 *
+		 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
+		 * Use the aforeapplied default.
+		 * It would be curious if the label of the task
+		 * does not match that assigned.
+		 */
+		if (inode->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
+			break;
+		/*
+		 * Get the dentry for xattr.
+		 */
+		if (opt_dentry == NULL) {
+			dp = d_find_alias(inode);
+			if (dp == NULL)
+				break;
+		} else {
+			dp = dget(opt_dentry);
+			if (dp == NULL)
+				break;
+		}
+
+		fetched = smk_fetch(inode, dp);
+		if (fetched != NULL)
+			final = fetched;
+
+		dput(dp);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (final == NULL)
+		isp->smk_inode = csp;
+	else
+		isp->smk_inode = final;
+
+	isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
+
+unlockandout:
+	mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
+ * @p: the object task
+ * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
+ * @value: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
+{
+	char *cp;
+	int slen;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	cp = kstrdup(p->security, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (cp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	slen = strlen(cp);
+	*value = cp;
+	return slen;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
+ * @p: the object task
+ * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
+ * @value: the value to set
+ * @size: the size of the value
+ *
+ * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
+ * is permitted and only with privilege
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
+			     void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	char *newsmack;
+
+	if (!__capable(p, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/*
+	 * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
+	 * and supports no sane use case.
+	 */
+	if (p != current)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	newsmack = smk_import(value, size);
+	if (newsmack == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	p->security = newsmack;
+	return size;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
+ * @sock: one socket
+ * @other: the other socket
+ * @newsk: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
+ * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
+				     struct socket *other, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock);
+	struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other);
+
+	return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
+ * @sock: one socket
+ * @other: the other socket
+ *
+ * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
+ * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
+{
+	struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock);
+	struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other);
+
+	return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat
+ * 	pair to smack
+ * @sap: netlabel secattr
+ * @sip: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Copies a smack label into sip
+ */
+static void smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, char *sip)
+{
+	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	int pcat;
+
+	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
+		 * behaving the way we expect it to.
+		 *
+		 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
+		 * for the packet fall back on the network
+		 * ambient value.
+		 */
+		strncpy(sip, smack_net_ambient, SMK_MAXLEN);
+		return;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Get the categories, if any
+	 */
+	memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
+	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) != 0)
+		for (pcat = -1;;) {
+			pcat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
+							  pcat + 1);
+			if (pcat < 0)
+				break;
+			smack_catset_bit(pcat, smack);
+		}
+	/*
+	 * If it is CIPSO using smack direct mapping
+	 * we are already done. WeeHee.
+	 */
+	if (sap->attr.mls.lvl == smack_cipso_direct) {
+		memcpy(sip, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
+		return;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Look it up in the supplied table if it is not a direct mapping.
+	 */
+	smack_from_cipso(sap->attr.mls.lvl, smack, sip);
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
+ * @sk: socket
+ * @skb: packet
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	int rc;
+
+	if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
+	 */
+	memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
+	else
+		strncpy(smack, smack_net_ambient, SMK_MAXLEN);
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	/*
+	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
+	 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
+	 * This is the simplist possible security model
+	 * for networking.
+	 */
+	return smk_access(smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @optval: user's destination
+ * @optlen: size thereof
+ * @len: max thereoe
+ *
+ * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+					  char __user *optval,
+					  int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	int slen;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	slen = strlen(ssp->smk_packet) + 1;
+
+	if (slen > len)
+		rc = -ERANGE;
+	else if (copy_to_user(optval, ssp->smk_packet, slen) != 0)
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+
+	if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @skb: packet data
+ * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ */
+static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+					 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+
+{
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	struct sock *sk;
+	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	int family = PF_INET;
+	u32 s;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Only works for families with packets.
+	 */
+	if (sock != NULL) {
+		sk = sock->sk;
+		if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+			return 0;
+		family = sk->sk_family;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
+	 */
+	memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+
+	/*
+	 * Give up if we couldn't get anything
+	 */
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	s = smack_to_secid(smack);
+	if (s == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*secid = s;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sock_graft - graft access state between two sockets
+ * @sk: fresh sock
+ * @parent: donor socket
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ */
+static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (sk == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+		return;
+
+	ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	ssp->smk_in = current->security;
+	ssp->smk_out = current->security;
+	ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
+
+	rc = smack_netlabel(sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
+ * @sk: socket involved
+ * @skb: packet
+ * @req: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
+ * the socket, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				   struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr skb_secattr;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+	int rc;
+
+	if (skb == NULL)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&skb_secattr);
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &skb_secattr);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		smack_from_secattr(&skb_secattr, smack);
+	else
+		strncpy(smack, smack_known_huh.smk_known, SMK_MAXLEN);
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&skb_secattr);
+	/*
+	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
+	 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
+	 *
+	 * If the request is successful save the peer's label
+	 * so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
+	 */
+	rc = smk_access(smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		strncpy(ssp->smk_packet, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key management security hooks
+ *
+ * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
+ * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
+ * If you care about keys please have a look.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
+/**
+ * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
+ * @key: object
+ * @tsk: the task associated with the key
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * No allocation required
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk,
+			   unsigned long flags)
+{
+	key->security = tsk->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
+ * @key: the object
+ *
+ * Clear the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
+{
+	key->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
+ * @key_ref: gets to the object
+ * @context: task involved
+ * @perm: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
+ * an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
+				struct task_struct *context, key_perm_t perm)
+{
+	struct key *keyp;
+
+	keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	if (keyp == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
+	 * it may do so.
+	 */
+	if (keyp->security == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * This should not occur
+	 */
+	if (context->security == NULL)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	return smk_access(context->security, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+/*
+ * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
+ * @secid: incoming integer
+ * @secdata: destination
+ * @seclen: how long it is
+ *
+ * Exists for networking code.
+ */
+static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+{
+	char *sp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+
+	*secdata = sp;
+	*seclen = strlen(sp);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * smack_release_secctx - don't do anything.
+ * @key_ref: unused
+ * @context: unused
+ * @perm: unused
+ *
+ * Exists to make sure nothing gets done, and properly
+ */
+static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+{
+}
+
+static struct security_operations smack_ops = {
+	.ptrace = 			smack_ptrace,
+	.capget = 			cap_capget,
+	.capset_check = 		cap_capset_check,
+	.capset_set = 			cap_capset_set,
+	.capable = 			cap_capable,
+	.syslog = 			smack_syslog,
+	.settime = 			cap_settime,
+	.vm_enough_memory = 		cap_vm_enough_memory,
+
+	.bprm_apply_creds = 		cap_bprm_apply_creds,
+	.bprm_set_security = 		cap_bprm_set_security,
+	.bprm_secureexec = 		cap_bprm_secureexec,
+
+	.sb_alloc_security = 		smack_sb_alloc_security,
+	.sb_free_security = 		smack_sb_free_security,
+	.sb_copy_data = 		smack_sb_copy_data,
+	.sb_kern_mount = 		smack_sb_kern_mount,
+	.sb_statfs = 			smack_sb_statfs,
+	.sb_mount = 			smack_sb_mount,
+	.sb_umount = 			smack_sb_umount,
+
+	.inode_alloc_security = 	smack_inode_alloc_security,
+	.inode_free_security = 		smack_inode_free_security,
+	.inode_init_security = 		smack_inode_init_security,
+	.inode_link = 			smack_inode_link,
+	.inode_unlink = 		smack_inode_unlink,
+	.inode_rmdir = 			smack_inode_rmdir,
+	.inode_rename = 		smack_inode_rename,
+	.inode_permission = 		smack_inode_permission,
+	.inode_setattr = 		smack_inode_setattr,
+	.inode_getattr = 		smack_inode_getattr,
+	.inode_setxattr = 		smack_inode_setxattr,
+	.inode_post_setxattr = 		smack_inode_post_setxattr,
+	.inode_getxattr = 		smack_inode_getxattr,
+	.inode_removexattr = 		smack_inode_removexattr,
+	.inode_getsecurity = 		smack_inode_getsecurity,
+	.inode_setsecurity = 		smack_inode_setsecurity,
+	.inode_listsecurity = 		smack_inode_listsecurity,
+
+	.file_permission = 		smack_file_permission,
+	.file_alloc_security = 		smack_file_alloc_security,
+	.file_free_security = 		smack_file_free_security,
+	.file_ioctl = 			smack_file_ioctl,
+	.file_lock = 			smack_file_lock,
+	.file_fcntl = 			smack_file_fcntl,
+	.file_set_fowner = 		smack_file_set_fowner,
+	.file_send_sigiotask = 		smack_file_send_sigiotask,
+	.file_receive = 		smack_file_receive,
+
+	.task_alloc_security = 		smack_task_alloc_security,
+	.task_free_security = 		smack_task_free_security,
+	.task_post_setuid =		cap_task_post_setuid,
+	.task_setpgid = 		smack_task_setpgid,
+	.task_getpgid = 		smack_task_getpgid,
+	.task_getsid = 			smack_task_getsid,
+	.task_getsecid = 		smack_task_getsecid,
+	.task_setnice = 		smack_task_setnice,
+	.task_setioprio = 		smack_task_setioprio,
+	.task_getioprio = 		smack_task_getioprio,
+	.task_setscheduler = 		smack_task_setscheduler,
+	.task_getscheduler = 		smack_task_getscheduler,
+	.task_movememory = 		smack_task_movememory,
+	.task_kill = 			smack_task_kill,
+	.task_wait = 			smack_task_wait,
+	.task_reparent_to_init =	cap_task_reparent_to_init,
+	.task_to_inode = 		smack_task_to_inode,
+
+	.ipc_permission = 		smack_ipc_permission,
+
+	.msg_msg_alloc_security = 	smack_msg_msg_alloc_security,
+	.msg_msg_free_security = 	smack_msg_msg_free_security,
+
+	.msg_queue_alloc_security = 	smack_msg_queue_alloc_security,
+	.msg_queue_free_security = 	smack_msg_queue_free_security,
+	.msg_queue_associate = 		smack_msg_queue_associate,
+	.msg_queue_msgctl = 		smack_msg_queue_msgctl,
+	.msg_queue_msgsnd = 		smack_msg_queue_msgsnd,
+	.msg_queue_msgrcv = 		smack_msg_queue_msgrcv,
+
+	.shm_alloc_security = 		smack_shm_alloc_security,
+	.shm_free_security = 		smack_shm_free_security,
+	.shm_associate = 		smack_shm_associate,
+	.shm_shmctl = 			smack_shm_shmctl,
+	.shm_shmat = 			smack_shm_shmat,
+
+	.sem_alloc_security = 		smack_sem_alloc_security,
+	.sem_free_security = 		smack_sem_free_security,
+	.sem_associate = 		smack_sem_associate,
+	.sem_semctl = 			smack_sem_semctl,
+	.sem_semop = 			smack_sem_semop,
+
+	.netlink_send =			cap_netlink_send,
+	.netlink_recv = 		cap_netlink_recv,
+
+	.d_instantiate = 		smack_d_instantiate,
+
+	.getprocattr = 			smack_getprocattr,
+	.setprocattr = 			smack_setprocattr,
+
+	.unix_stream_connect = 		smack_unix_stream_connect,
+	.unix_may_send = 		smack_unix_may_send,
+
+	.socket_post_create = 		smack_socket_post_create,
+	.socket_sock_rcv_skb = 		smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
+	.socket_getpeersec_stream =	smack_socket_getpeersec_stream,
+	.socket_getpeersec_dgram =	smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+	.sk_alloc_security = 		smack_sk_alloc_security,
+	.sk_free_security = 		smack_sk_free_security,
+	.sock_graft = 			smack_sock_graft,
+	.inet_conn_request = 		smack_inet_conn_request,
+ /* key management security hooks */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	.key_alloc = 			smack_key_alloc,
+	.key_free = 			smack_key_free,
+	.key_permission = 		smack_key_permission,
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+	.secid_to_secctx = 		smack_secid_to_secctx,
+	.release_secctx = 		smack_release_secctx,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smack_init - initialize the smack system
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static __init int smack_init(void)
+{
+	printk(KERN_INFO "Smack:  Initializing.\n");
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the security state for the initial task.
+	 */
+	current->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize locks
+	 */
+	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_unset.smk_cipsolock);
+	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_cipsolock);
+	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_cipsolock);
+	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_star.smk_cipsolock);
+	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_cipsolock);
+	spin_lock_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_cipsolock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Register with LSM
+	 */
+	if (register_security(&smack_ops))
+		panic("smack: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
+ * all processes and objects when they are created.
+ */
+security_initcall(smack_init);
+