Revert "CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #2]"
This reverts commit 14eaddc967b16017d4a1a24d2be6c28ecbe06ed8.
David has a better version to come.
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 5b8a132..e22f48c 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -529,21 +529,8 @@
*
* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
*/
-#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_task_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)
-
-/**
- * has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited)
- * @t: The task in question
- * @cap: The capability to be tested for
- *
- * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect, false if not, but don't write an audit message for the
- * check.
- *
- * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
- */
-#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) \
- (security_task_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)
+#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)
+#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) (security_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)
extern int capable(int cap);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 76989b8..3416cb8 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -48,9 +48,7 @@
* These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
* as the default capabilities functions
*/
-extern int cap_capable(int cap, int audit);
-extern int cap_task_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- int cap, int audit);
+extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit);
extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
@@ -1197,18 +1195,9 @@
* @permitted contains the permitted capability set.
* Return 0 and update @new if permission is granted.
* @capable:
- * Check whether the current process has the @cap capability in its
- * subjective/effective credentials.
- * @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
- * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
- * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
- * @task_capable:
- * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in its
- * objective/real credentials.
+ * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability.
* @tsk contains the task_struct for the process.
- * @cred contains the credentials to use.
* @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
- * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
* Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
* @acct:
* Check permission before enabling or disabling process accounting. If
@@ -1301,9 +1290,7 @@
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
- int (*capable) (int cap, int audit);
- int (*task_capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- int cap, int audit);
+ int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit);
int (*acct) (struct file *file);
int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table, int op);
int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
@@ -1569,9 +1556,8 @@
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-int security_capable(int cap);
-int security_task_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
-int security_task_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
+int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
+int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int security_acct(struct file *file);
int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op);
int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
@@ -1768,31 +1754,14 @@
return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-static inline int security_capable(int cap)
+static inline int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
- return cap_capable(cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ return cap_capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
-static inline int security_task_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+static inline int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
- int ret;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- ret = cap_task_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return ret;
-}
-
-static inline
-int security_task_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
-{
- int ret;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- ret = cap_task_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), cap,
- SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return ret;
+ return cap_capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
}
static inline int security_acct(struct file *file)
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index df62f53..36b4b4d 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@
BUG();
}
- if (security_capable(cap) == 0) {
+ if (has_capability(current, cap)) {
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index fd1493d..2dce66f 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -826,7 +826,6 @@
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, acct);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capable);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_capable);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quotactl);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quota_on);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sysctl);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 7f0b2a6..7971354 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -43,44 +43,28 @@
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
/**
- * cap_capable - Determine whether current has a particular effective capability
+ * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
+ * @tsk: The task to query
* @cap: The capability to check for
* @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
*
* Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
- * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not. Note that
- * this uses current's subjective/effective credentials.
+ * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
*
* NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
* function. That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable() returns 0
* when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable() returns 1 for this
* case.
*/
-int cap_capable(int cap, int audit)
+int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
{
- return cap_raised(current_cap(), cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
-}
+ __u32 cap_raised;
-/**
- * cap_has_capability - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
- * @tsk: The task to query
- * @cred: The credentials to use
- * @cap: The capability to check for
- * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
- *
- * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
- * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not. Note that
- * this uses the task's objective/real credentials.
- *
- * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's
- * has_capability() function. That is, it has the reverse semantics:
- * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
- * kernel's has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
- */
-int cap_task_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, int cap,
- int audit)
-{
- return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
+ /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ cap_raised = cap_raised(__task_cred(tsk)->cap_effective, cap);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return cap_raised ? 0 : -EPERM;
}
/**
@@ -176,7 +160,7 @@
/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
* capability
*/
- if (cap_capable(CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
+ if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
return 0;
#endif
return 1;
@@ -885,7 +869,7 @@
& (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
|| ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
- || (cap_capable(CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
+ || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
* [1] no changing of bits that are locked
* [2] no unlocking of locks
@@ -966,7 +950,7 @@
{
int cap_sys_admin = 0;
- if (cap_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
+ if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
}
diff --git a/security/root_plug.c b/security/root_plug.c
index 559578f..40fb4f1 100644
--- a/security/root_plug.c
+++ b/security/root_plug.c
@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@
.capget = cap_capget,
.capset = cap_capset,
.capable = cap_capable,
- .task_capable = cap_task_capable,
.bprm_set_creds = cap_bprm_set_creds,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 9bbc8e5..d85dbb3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -154,31 +154,14 @@
effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-int security_capable(int cap)
+int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
- return security_ops->capable(cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
-int security_task_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
- const struct cred *cred;
- int ret;
-
- cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
- ret = security_ops->task_capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
- put_cred(cred);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int security_task_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
-{
- const struct cred *cred;
- int ret;
-
- cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
- ret = security_ops->task_capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
- put_cred(cred);
- return ret;
+ return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
}
int security_acct(struct file *file)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index eb6c451..df30a75 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1433,13 +1433,12 @@
/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
- const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit)
{
struct avc_audit_data ad;
struct av_decision avd;
u16 sclass;
- u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+ u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
int rc;
@@ -1866,27 +1865,15 @@
return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
}
-static int selinux_capable(int cap, int audit)
+static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->capable(cap, audit);
+ rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap, audit);
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_capability(current, current_cred(), cap, audit);
-}
-
-static int selinux_task_capable(struct task_struct *tsk,
- const struct cred *cred, int cap, int audit)
-{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->task_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+ return task_has_capability(tsk, cap, audit);
}
static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
@@ -2050,7 +2037,7 @@
{
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
- rc = selinux_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2893,7 +2880,7 @@
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
- error = selinux_capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
&size);
@@ -5581,7 +5568,6 @@
.capset = selinux_capset,
.sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
.capable = selinux_capable,
- .task_capable = selinux_task_capable,
.quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
.quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
.syslog = selinux_syslog,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 7f12cc7..6bfaba6 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2827,7 +2827,6 @@
.capget = cap_capget,
.capset = cap_capset,
.capable = cap_capable,
- .task_capable = cap_task_capable,
.syslog = smack_syslog,
.settime = cap_settime,
.vm_enough_memory = cap_vm_enough_memory,