[NETFILTER]: Missed and reordered checks in {arp,ip,ip6}_tables
There is a number of issues in parsing user-provided table in
translate_table(). Malicious user with CAP_NET_ADMIN may crash system by
passing special-crafted table to the *_tables.
The first issue is that mark_source_chains() function is called before entry
content checks. In case of standard target, mark_source_chains() function
uses t->verdict field in order to determine new position. But the check, that
this field leads no further, than the table end, is in check_entry(), which
is called later, than mark_source_chains().
The second issue, that there is no check that target_offset points inside
entry. If so, *_ITERATE_MATCH macro will follow further, than the entry
ends. As a result, we'll have oops or memory disclosure.
And the third issue, that there is no check that the target is completely
inside entry. Results are the same, as in previous issue.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Kirill Korotaev <dev@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
index 4b90927..e2c7f6e 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -547,12 +547,18 @@
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct ipt_entry_target) > e->next_offset)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
j = 0;
ret = IPT_MATCH_ITERATE(e, check_match, name, &e->ip, e->comefrom, &j);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup_matches;
t = ipt_get_target(e);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset)
+ goto cleanup_matches;
target = try_then_request_module(xt_find_target(AF_INET,
t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision),
@@ -712,19 +718,17 @@
}
}
- if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0))
- return -ELOOP;
-
/* Finally, each sanity check must pass */
i = 0;
ret = IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size,
check_entry, name, size, &i);
- if (ret != 0) {
- IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size,
- cleanup_entry, &i);
- return ret;
- }
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ ret = -ELOOP;
+ if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0))
+ goto cleanup;
/* And one copy for every other CPU */
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
@@ -732,6 +736,9 @@
memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry0, newinfo->size);
}
+ return 0;
+cleanup:
+ IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, cleanup_entry, &i);
return ret;
}
@@ -1463,6 +1470,10 @@
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target) >
+ e->next_offset)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
off = 0;
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
@@ -1472,6 +1483,9 @@
goto cleanup_matches;
t = ipt_get_target(e);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset)
+ goto cleanup_matches;
target = try_then_request_module(xt_find_target(AF_INET,
t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision),