FPII-2974 :[Part 1]Elevation of privilege vulnerability in kernel file system CVE-2016-7097 A-32458736
posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
Change-Id: I951bde052791c196f84f568531c494fec33559fb
References: CVE-2016-7097
diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
index 5e325a4..48c5075 100644
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -335,6 +335,37 @@
return not_equiv;
}
+/**
+ * posix_acl_update_mode - update mode in set_acl
+ *
+ * Update the file mode when setting an ACL: compute the new file permission
+ * bits based on the ACL. In addition, if the ACL is equivalent to the new
+ * file mode, set *acl to NULL to indicate that no ACL should be set.
+ *
+ * As with chmod, clear the setgit bit if the caller is not in the owning group
+ * or capable of CAP_FSETID (see inode_change_ok).
+ *
+ * Called from set_acl inode operations.
+ */
+int posix_acl_update_mode(struct inode *inode, umode_t *mode_p,
+ struct posix_acl **acl)
+{
+ umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
+ int error;
+
+ error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(*acl, &mode);
+ if (error < 0)
+ return error;
+ if (error == 0)
+ *acl = NULL;
+ if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
+ !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
+ mode &= ~S_ISGID;
+ *mode_p = mode;
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_update_mode);
+
/*
* Modify the ACL for the chmod syscall.
*/