diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt
index 1d19256..8cfca17 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 - min_unmapped_ratio
 - min_slab_ratio
 - panic_on_oom
+- mmap_min_address
 
 ==============================================================
 
@@ -216,3 +217,17 @@
 The default value is 0.
 1 and 2 are for failover of clustering. Please select either
 according to your policy of failover.
+
+==============================================================
+
+mmap_min_addr
+
+This file indicates the amount of address space  which a user process will
+be restricted from mmaping.  Since kernel null dereference bugs could
+accidentally operate based on the information in the first couple of pages
+of memory userspace processes should not be allowed to write to them.  By
+default this value is set to 0 and no protections will be enforced by the
+security module.  Setting this value to something like 64k will allow the
+vast majority of applications to work correctly and provide defense in depth
+against future potential kernel bugs.
+
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 9eb9e0f..c11dc8a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
 extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 extern int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
 
+extern unsigned long mmap_min_addr;
 /*
  * Values used in the task_security_ops calls
  */
@@ -1241,8 +1242,9 @@
 	int (*file_ioctl) (struct file * file, unsigned int cmd,
 			   unsigned long arg);
 	int (*file_mmap) (struct file * file,
-			  unsigned long reqprot,
-			  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
+			  unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
+			  unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr,
+			  unsigned long addr_only);
 	int (*file_mprotect) (struct vm_area_struct * vma,
 			      unsigned long reqprot,
 			      unsigned long prot);
@@ -1814,9 +1816,12 @@
 
 static inline int security_file_mmap (struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 				      unsigned long prot,
-				      unsigned long flags)
+				      unsigned long flags,
+				      unsigned long addr,
+				      unsigned long addr_only)
 {
-	return security_ops->file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags);
+	return security_ops->file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr,
+					addr_only);
 }
 
 static inline int security_file_mprotect (struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -2489,7 +2494,9 @@
 
 static inline int security_file_mmap (struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 				      unsigned long prot,
-				      unsigned long flags)
+				      unsigned long flags,
+				      unsigned long addr,
+				      unsigned long addr_only)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 51f5dac..d93e13d 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -949,6 +949,16 @@
 		.strategy	= &sysctl_jiffies,
 	},
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+	{
+		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
+		.procname	= "mmap_min_addr",
+		.data		= &mmap_min_addr,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(unsigned long),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= &proc_doulongvec_minmax,
+	},
+#endif
 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) || \
    (defined(CONFIG_SUPERH) && defined(CONFIG_VSYSCALL))
 	{
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 906ed40..9f70c8e 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1023,10 +1023,10 @@
 		}
 	}
 
-	error = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
+	error = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
-		
+
 	/* Clear old maps */
 	error = -ENOMEM;
 munmap_back:
diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c
index 5d4bd4f..bc7c52e 100644
--- a/mm/mremap.c
+++ b/mm/mremap.c
@@ -291,6 +291,10 @@
 		if ((addr <= new_addr) && (addr+old_len) > new_addr)
 			goto out;
 
+		ret = security_file_mmap(0, 0, 0, 0, new_addr, 1);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+
 		ret = do_munmap(mm, new_addr, new_len);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
@@ -390,8 +394,13 @@
 
 			new_addr = get_unmapped_area(vma->vm_file, 0, new_len,
 						vma->vm_pgoff, map_flags);
-			ret = new_addr;
-			if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
+			if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK) {
+				ret = new_addr;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			ret = security_file_mmap(0, 0, 0, 0, new_addr, 1);
+			if (ret)
 				goto out;
 		}
 		ret = move_vma(vma, addr, old_len, new_len, new_addr);
diff --git a/mm/nommu.c b/mm/nommu.c
index 2b16b00..989e2e9 100644
--- a/mm/nommu.c
+++ b/mm/nommu.c
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@
 	}
 
 	/* allow the security API to have its say */
-	ret = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
+	ret = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 8ffd764..d6a112c 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -420,8 +420,12 @@
 
 static int dummy_file_mmap (struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 			    unsigned long prot,
-			    unsigned long flags)
+			    unsigned long flags,
+			    unsigned long addr,
+			    unsigned long addr_only)
 {
+	if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
+		return -EACCES;
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index fc8601b..27e5863 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 extern void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);
 
 struct security_operations *security_ops;	/* Initialized to NULL */
+unsigned long mmap_min_addr;		/* 0 means no protection */
 
 static inline int verify(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index e4396a8..78c408f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@
 				}
 			}
 			if (inode)
-				audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%ld",
+				audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
 						 inode->i_sb->s_id,
 						 inode->i_ino);
 			break;
@@ -832,6 +832,7 @@
  * @tsid: target security identifier
  * @tclass: target security class
  * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
+ * @flags:  AVC_STRICT or 0
  * @avd: access vector decisions
  *
  * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
@@ -846,8 +847,9 @@
  * should be released for the auditing.
  */
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-                         u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-                         struct av_decision *avd)
+			 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			 unsigned flags,
+			 struct av_decision *avd)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
 	struct avc_entry entry, *p_ae;
@@ -874,7 +876,7 @@
 	denied = requested & ~(p_ae->avd.allowed);
 
 	if (!requested || denied) {
-		if (selinux_enforcing)
+		if (selinux_enforcing || (flags & AVC_STRICT))
 			rc = -EACCES;
 		else
 			if (node)
@@ -909,7 +911,7 @@
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd);
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
 	avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ad8dd4e..aff8f46 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1592,9 +1592,10 @@
 	rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
-					SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
-					CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
-					NULL);
+					  SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
+					  CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
+					  0,
+					  NULL);
 
 	if (rc == 0)
 		cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2568,12 +2569,16 @@
 }
 
 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-			     unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+			     unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
+			     unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
 {
-	int rc;
+	int rc = 0;
+	u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct*)(current->security))->sid;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
-	if (rc)
+	if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
+				  MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
+	if (rc || addr_only)
 		return rc;
 
 	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
@@ -3124,17 +3129,19 @@
 /**
  * selinux_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet
  * @skb: the packet
- * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only external labels
  * @sid: the packet's SID
  *
  * Description:
  * Check the various different forms of external packet labeling and determine
- * the external SID for the packet.
+ * the external SID for the packet.  If only one form of external labeling is
+ * present then it is used, if both labeled IPsec and NetLabel labels are
+ * present then the SELinux type information is taken from the labeled IPsec
+ * SA and the MLS sensitivity label information is taken from the NetLabel
+ * security attributes.  This bit of "magic" is done in the call to
+ * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid().
  *
  */
-static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
-				   u32 base_sid,
-				   u32 *sid)
+static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
 {
 	u32 xfrm_sid;
 	u32 nlbl_sid;
@@ -3142,10 +3149,9 @@
 	selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
 	if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
 					 (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ?
-					  base_sid : xfrm_sid),
+					  SECINITSID_NETMSG : xfrm_sid),
 					 &nlbl_sid) != 0)
 		nlbl_sid = SECSID_NULL;
-
 	*sid = (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL ? xfrm_sid : nlbl_sid);
 }
 
@@ -3690,7 +3696,7 @@
 	if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
 		selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
 	else if (skb)
-		selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peer_secid);
+		selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peer_secid);
 
 	if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
 		err = -EINVAL;
@@ -3751,7 +3757,7 @@
 	u32 newsid;
 	u32 peersid;
 
-	selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peersid);
+	selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peersid);
 	if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
 		req->secid = sksec->sid;
 		req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
@@ -3789,7 +3795,7 @@
 {
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
-	selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &sksec->peer_sid);
+	selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &sksec->peer_sid);
 }
 
 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
@@ -4626,7 +4632,7 @@
 		if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
 			error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
 						     SECCLASS_PROCESS,
-						     PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
+						     PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
 			if (!error)
 				tsec->sid = sid;
 			task_unlock(p);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index b83e740..049bf69 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -158,3 +158,4 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, "create")
    S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind")
    S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, "name_connect")
+   S_(SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, "mmap_zero")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index 5fee173..eda89a2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -823,3 +823,4 @@
 #define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                    0x00200000UL
 #define DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND                    0x00400000UL
 #define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT                 0x00800000UL
+#define MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO                     0x00000001UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 6ed10c3..e145f6e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -102,9 +102,11 @@
                u16 tclass, u32 requested,
                struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
 
+#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-                         u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-                         struct av_decision *avd);
+			 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			 unsigned flags,
+			 struct av_decision *avd);
 
 int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                  u16 tclass, u32 requested,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
index 3787990..e77de0e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
@@ -63,3 +63,4 @@
     S_("key")
     S_(NULL)
     S_("dccp_socket")
+    S_("memprotect")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
index 35f309f..a9c2b20 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
 #define SECCLASS_PACKET                                  57
 #define SECCLASS_KEY                                     58
 #define SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET                             60
+#define SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT                              61
 
 /*
  * Security identifier indices for initial entities
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index b94378a..83bdd4d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
 
 int security_load_policy(void * data, size_t len);
 
+#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
 struct av_decision {
 	u32 allowed;
 	u32 decided;
@@ -87,6 +88,9 @@
 
 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
 
+int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses);
+int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
+
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR		1 /* use xattr */
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS		2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK		3 /* use task SIDs, e.g. pipefs/sockfs */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index e64eca2..8192e8b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -158,9 +158,7 @@
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr);
 	if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
-		rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
-						    base_sid,
-						    sid);
+		rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, base_sid, sid);
 	else
 		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
@@ -198,7 +196,7 @@
 	if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
 	    secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE &&
 	    security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
-					   SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+					   SECINITSID_NETMSG,
 					   &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
 		sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
@@ -295,38 +293,32 @@
 				struct avc_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	int rc;
-	u32 netlbl_sid;
-	u32 recv_perm;
+	u32 nlbl_sid;
+	u32 perm;
 
-	rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
-					  SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
-					  &netlbl_sid);
+	rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, SECINITSID_NETMSG, &nlbl_sid);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
-
-	if (netlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL)
-		return 0;
+	if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+		nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 
 	switch (sksec->sclass) {
 	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
-		recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+		perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 		break;
 	case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
-		recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+		perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 		break;
 	default:
-		recv_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+		perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 	}
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid,
-			  netlbl_sid,
-			  sksec->sclass,
-			  recv_perm,
-			  ad);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc);
+	if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
+		netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc);
 	return rc;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index aca099a..c9e92da 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -67,6 +67,10 @@
 static int bool_num = 0;
 static int *bool_pending_values = NULL;
 
+/* global data for classes */
+static struct dentry *class_dir = NULL;
+static unsigned long last_class_ino;
+
 extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
 
 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a security operation. */
@@ -106,6 +110,7 @@
 
 #define SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET 	0x01000000
 #define SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET	0x02000000
+#define SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET	0x04000000
 #define SEL_INO_MASK		0x00ffffff
 
 #define TMPBUFLEN	12
@@ -237,6 +242,11 @@
 
 /* declaration for sel_write_load */
 static int sel_make_bools(void);
+static int sel_make_classes(void);
+
+/* declaration for sel_make_class_dirs */
+static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			unsigned long *ino);
 
 static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -287,10 +297,18 @@
 		goto out;
 
 	ret = sel_make_bools();
+	if (ret) {
+		length = ret;
+		goto out1;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_classes();
 	if (ret)
 		length = ret;
 	else
 		length = count;
+
+out1:
 	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
 		"policy loaded auid=%u",
 		audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
@@ -940,9 +958,8 @@
 	.write          = sel_commit_bools_write,
 };
 
-/* delete booleans - partial revoke() from
- * fs/proc/generic.c proc_kill_inodes */
-static void sel_remove_bools(struct dentry *de)
+/* partial revoke() from fs/proc/generic.c proc_kill_inodes */
+static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de)
 {
 	struct list_head *p, *node;
 	struct super_block *sb = de->d_sb;
@@ -998,7 +1015,7 @@
 	kfree(bool_pending_values);
 	bool_pending_values = NULL;
 
-	sel_remove_bools(dir);
+	sel_remove_entries(dir);
 
 	if (!(page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL)))
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1048,7 +1065,7 @@
 	return ret;
 err:
 	kfree(values);
-	sel_remove_bools(dir);
+	sel_remove_entries(dir);
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	goto out;
 }
@@ -1294,7 +1311,227 @@
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+static inline unsigned int sel_div(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
+{
+	return a / b - (a % b < 0);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long sel_class_to_ino(u16 class)
+{
+	return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1)) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
+}
+
+static inline u16 sel_ino_to_class(unsigned long ino)
+{
+	return sel_div(ino & SEL_INO_MASK, SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long sel_perm_to_ino(u16 class, u32 perm)
+{
+	return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1) + perm) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
+}
+
+static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino)
+{
+	return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) % (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file * file, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	ssize_t rc, len;
+	char *page;
+	unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+
+	page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_class,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file * file, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	ssize_t rc, len;
+	char *page;
+	unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+
+	page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE,"%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_perm,
+};
+
+static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
+				struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	int i, rc = 0, nperms;
+	char **perms;
+
+	rc = security_get_permissions(objclass, &perms, &nperms);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nperms; i++) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+		struct dentry *dentry;
+
+		dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, perms[i]);
+		if (!dentry) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out1;
+		}
+
+		inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+		if (!inode) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out1;
+		}
+		inode->i_fop = &sel_perm_ops;
+		/* i+1 since perm values are 1-indexed */
+		inode->i_ino = sel_perm_to_ino(classvalue, i+1);
+		d_add(dentry, inode);
+	}
+
+out1:
+	for (i = 0; i < nperms; i++)
+		kfree(perms[i]);
+	kfree(perms);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index,
+					struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
+	struct inode *inode = NULL;
+	int rc;
+
+	dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, "index");
+	if (!dentry) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+	if (!inode) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	inode->i_fop = &sel_class_ops;
+	inode->i_ino = sel_class_to_ino(index);
+	d_add(dentry, inode);
+
+	dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, "perms");
+	if (!dentry) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = sel_make_dir(dir->d_inode, dentry, &last_class_ino);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = sel_make_perm_files(classname, index, dentry);
+
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void sel_remove_classes(void)
+{
+	struct list_head *class_node;
+
+	list_for_each(class_node, &class_dir->d_subdirs) {
+		struct dentry *class_subdir = list_entry(class_node,
+					struct dentry, d_u.d_child);
+		struct list_head *class_subdir_node;
+
+		list_for_each(class_subdir_node, &class_subdir->d_subdirs) {
+			struct dentry *d = list_entry(class_subdir_node,
+						struct dentry, d_u.d_child);
+
+			if (d->d_inode)
+				if (d->d_inode->i_mode & S_IFDIR)
+					sel_remove_entries(d);
+		}
+
+		sel_remove_entries(class_subdir);
+	}
+
+	sel_remove_entries(class_dir);
+}
+
+static int sel_make_classes(void)
+{
+	int rc = 0, nclasses, i;
+	char **classes;
+
+	/* delete any existing entries */
+	sel_remove_classes();
+
+	rc = security_get_classes(&classes, &nclasses);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* +2 since classes are 1-indexed */
+	last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses+2);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++) {
+		struct dentry *class_name_dir;
+
+		class_name_dir = d_alloc_name(class_dir, classes[i]);
+		if (!class_name_dir) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out1;
+		}
+
+		rc = sel_make_dir(class_dir->d_inode, class_name_dir,
+				&last_class_ino);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out1;
+
+		/* i+1 since class values are 1-indexed */
+		rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(classes[i], i+1,
+				class_name_dir);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out1;
+	}
+
+out1:
+	for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++)
+		kfree(classes[i]);
+	kfree(classes);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			unsigned long *ino)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 	struct inode *inode;
@@ -1306,7 +1543,7 @@
 	}
 	inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
 	inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
-	inode->i_ino = ++sel_last_ino;
+	inode->i_ino = ++(*ino);
 	/* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
 	inc_nlink(inode);
 	d_add(dentry, inode);
@@ -1352,7 +1589,7 @@
 		goto err;
 	}
 
-	ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry);
+	ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err;
 
@@ -1385,7 +1622,7 @@
 		goto err;
 	}
 
-	ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry);
+	ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err;
 
@@ -1399,7 +1636,7 @@
 		goto err;
 	}
 
-	ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry);
+	ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err;
 
@@ -1407,6 +1644,18 @@
 	if (ret)
 		goto err;
 
+	dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "class");
+	if (!dentry) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
+	class_dir = dentry;
+
 out:
 	return ret;
 err:
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 0ac1021..f05f97a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
@@ -598,6 +599,7 @@
 	struct range_trans *rt, *lrt = NULL;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+		cond_resched();
 		hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, destroy_f[i], NULL);
 		hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
 	}
@@ -612,6 +614,7 @@
 	avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < OCON_NUM; i++) {
+		cond_resched();
 		c = p->ocontexts[i];
 		while (c) {
 			ctmp = c;
@@ -623,6 +626,7 @@
 
 	g = p->genfs;
 	while (g) {
+		cond_resched();
 		kfree(g->fstype);
 		c = g->head;
 		while (c) {
@@ -639,18 +643,21 @@
 	cond_policydb_destroy(p);
 
 	for (tr = p->role_tr; tr; tr = tr->next) {
+		cond_resched();
 		kfree(ltr);
 		ltr = tr;
 	}
 	kfree(ltr);
 
 	for (ra = p->role_allow; ra; ra = ra -> next) {
+		cond_resched();
 		kfree(lra);
 		lra = ra;
 	}
 	kfree(lra);
 
 	for (rt = p->range_tr; rt; rt = rt -> next) {
+		cond_resched();
 		if (lrt) {
 			ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[0].cat);
 			ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[1].cat);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 40660ff..b5f017f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1587,19 +1587,18 @@
 			   u32 *nel)
 {
 	struct context *fromcon, usercon;
-	u32 *mysids, *mysids2, sid;
+	u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
 	u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
 	struct user_datum *user;
 	struct role_datum *role;
-	struct av_decision avd;
 	struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
 	int rc = 0, i, j;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
-		*sids = NULL;
-		*nel = 0;
+	*sids = NULL;
+	*nel = 0;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized)
 		goto out;
-	}
 
 	POLICY_RDLOCK;
 
@@ -1635,17 +1634,9 @@
 			if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
 				continue;
 
-			rc = context_struct_compute_av(fromcon, &usercon,
-						       SECCLASS_PROCESS,
-						       PROCESS__TRANSITION,
-						       &avd);
-			if (rc ||  !(avd.allowed & PROCESS__TRANSITION))
-				continue;
 			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
-			if (rc) {
-				kfree(mysids);
+			if (rc)
 				goto out_unlock;
-			}
 			if (mynel < maxnel) {
 				mysids[mynel++] = sid;
 			} else {
@@ -1653,7 +1644,6 @@
 				mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
 				if (!mysids2) {
 					rc = -ENOMEM;
-					kfree(mysids);
 					goto out_unlock;
 				}
 				memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
@@ -1664,11 +1654,32 @@
 		}
 	}
 
-	*sids = mysids;
-	*nel = mynel;
-
 out_unlock:
 	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	if (rc || !mynel) {
+		kfree(mysids);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!mysids2) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		kfree(mysids);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
+					  SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+					  PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
+					  NULL);
+		if (!rc)
+			mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+	kfree(mysids);
+	*sids = mysids2;
+	*nel = j;
 out:
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -1996,6 +2007,101 @@
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+	struct class_datum *datum = d;
+	char *name = k, **classes = args;
+	int value = datum->value - 1;
+
+	classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!classes[value])
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
+{
+	int rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	*nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
+	*classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(*classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*classes)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
+			*classes);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		int i;
+		for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
+			kfree((*classes)[i]);
+		kfree(*classes);
+	}
+
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+	struct perm_datum *datum = d;
+	char *name = k, **perms = args;
+	int value = datum->value - 1;
+
+	perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!perms[value])
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
+{
+	int rc = -ENOMEM, i;
+	struct class_datum *match;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
+	if (!match) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:  unrecognized class %s\n",
+			__FUNCTION__, class);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	*nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
+	*perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(*perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*perms)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (match->comdatum) {
+		rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
+				get_permissions_callback, *perms);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
+			*perms);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto err;
+
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+
+err:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
+		kfree((*perms)[i]);
+	kfree(*perms);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 struct selinux_audit_rule {
 	u32 au_seqno;
 	struct context au_ctxt;