diff --git a/src/tech/security/android_4_2_security_enhancements.md b/src/tech/security/android_4_2_security_enhancements.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad00374
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tech/security/android_4_2_security_enhancements.md
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+#Security Enhancements in Android 4.2
+
+Android provides a multi-layered security model described in the [Android
+Security Overview](index.html).  Each update to Android includes dozens of
+security enhancements to protect users.  The following are some of the security
+enhancements introduced in Android 4.2:
+
++ **Application verification.**  Users can choose to enable “Verify Apps" and
+have applications screened by an application verifier, prior to installation.
+App verification can alert the user if they try to install an app that might be
+harmful; if an application is especially bad, it can block installation.
+
++ **More control of premium SMS.** Android will provide a notification if an
+application attempts to send SMS to a short code that uses premium services
+which might cause additional charges.  The user can choose whether to allow the
+application to send the message or block it.
+
++ **Always-on VPN.**  VPN can be configured so that applications will not have
+access to the network until a VPN connection is established.  This prevents
+applications from sending data across other networks.
+
++ **Certificate Pinning.** The Android core libraries now support
+[certificate pinning](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/http/X509TrustManagerExtensions.html). Pinned domains will receive a certificate validation
+failure if the certificate does not chain to a set of expected certificates.
+This protects against possible compromise of Certificate Authorities.
+
++ **Improved display of Android permissions.** Permissions have been organized
+into groups that are more easily understood by users.  During review of the
+permissions, the user can click on the permission to see more detailed
+information about the permission.
+
++ **installd hardening.** The installd daemon does not run as the root user,
+reducing potential attack surface for root privilege escalation.
+
++ **init script hardening.**  init scripts now apply O_NOFOLLOW semantics to
+prevent symlink related attacks.
+
++ **FORTIFY_SOURCE.**  Android now implements FORTIFY_SOURCE. This is used by
+system libraries and applications to prevent memory corruption.
+
++ **ContentProvider default configuration.**  Applications which target API
+level 17 will have "export" set to "false" by default for each
+[ContentProvider](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/ContentProvider.html),
+reducing default attack surface for applications.
+
++ **Cryptography.** Modified the default implementations of SecureRandom and
+Cipher.RSA to use OpenSSL.  Added SSL Socket support for TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2
+using OpenSSL 1.0.1
+
++ **Security Fixes.** Upgraded open source libraries with security fixes include
+WebKit, libpng, OpenSSL, and LibXML. Android 4.2 also includes fixes for
+Android-specific vulnerabilities. Information about these vulnerabilities has
+been provided to Open Handset Alliance members and fixes are available in
+Android Open Source Project.  To improve security, some devices with earlier
+versions of Android may also include these fixes.
diff --git a/src/tech/security/index.md b/src/tech/security/index.md
index cd42289..db5f140 100644
--- a/src/tech/security/index.md
+++ b/src/tech/security/index.md
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
 users and potential customers.   Google Play also provides community review,
 application [license
 verification](https://developer.android.com/guide/publishing/licensing.html),
-and other security services.
+application security scanning, and other security services.
 
 + **Android Updates**: The Android update service delivers new capabilities and
 security updates to Android devices, including updates through the web or over
@@ -268,6 +268,98 @@
 applications, files created by one application cannot be read or altered by
 another application.
 
+##Cryptography
+
+Android provides a set of cryptographic APIs for use by applications. These
+include  implementations of standard and commonly used cryptographic primitives
+such as AES, RSA, DSA, and SHA. Additionally, APIs are provided for higher level
+protocols such as SSL and HTTPS.
+
+Android 4.0 introduced the
+[KeyChain](http://developer.android.com/reference/android/security/KeyChain.html)
+class to allow applications to use the system credential storage for private
+keys and certificate chains.
+
+##Memory Management Security Enhancements
+
+Android includes many features that make common security issues harder to
+exploit. The Android SDK, compilers, and OS use tools to make common memory
+corruption issues significantly harder to exploit, including:
+
+**Android 1.5+**
+
++ ProPolice to prevent stack buffer overruns (-fstack-protector)
++ safe_iop to reduce integer overflows
++ Extensions to OpenBSD dlmalloc to prevent double free() vulnerabilities and
+to prevent chunk consolidation attacks.  Chunk consolidation attacks are a
+common way to exploit heap corruption.
++ OpenBSD calloc to prevent integer overflows during memory allocation
+
+**Android 2.3+**
+
++ Format string vulnerability protections (-Wformat-security -Werror=format-security)
++ Hardware-based No eXecute (NX) to prevent code execution on the stack and heap
++ Linux mmap_min_addr to mitigate null pointer dereference privilege
+escalation (further enhanced in Android 4.1)
+
+**Android 4.0+**
+
++ Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) to randomize key locations in memory
+
+**Android 4.1+**
+
++ PIE (Position Independent Executable) support
++ Read-only relocations / immediate binding (-Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now)
++ dmesg_restrict enabled (avoid leaking kernel addresses)
++ kptr_restrict enabled (avoid leaking kernel addresses)
+
+** Android 4.2+**
+
++ FORTIFY_SOURCE for system code
+
+##Rooting of Devices
+
+By default, on Android only the kernel and a small subset of the core
+applications run with root permissions. Android does not prevent a user or
+application with root permissions from modifying the operating system, kernel,
+and any other application.  In general, root has full access to all
+applications and all application data. Users that change the permissions on an
+Android device to grant root access to applications increase the security
+exposure to malicious applications and potential application flaws.
+
+The ability to modify an Android device they own is important to developers
+working with the Android platform. On many Android devices users have the
+ability to unlock the bootloader in order to allow installation of an alternate
+operating system. These alternate operating systems may allow an owner to gain
+root access for purposes of debugging applications and system components or to
+access features not presented to applications by Android APIs.
+
+On some devices, a person with physical control of a device and a USB cable is
+able to install a new operating system that provides root privileges to the
+user. To protect any existing user data from compromise the bootloader unlock
+mechanism requires that the bootloader erase any existing user data as part of
+the unlock step. Root access gained via exploiting a kernel bug or security
+hole can bypass this protection.
+
+Encrypting data with a key stored on-device does not protect the application
+data from root users. Applications can add a layer of data protection using
+encryption with a key stored off-device, such as on a server or a user
+password.  This approach can provide temporary protection while the key is not
+present, but at some point the key must be provided to the application and it
+then becomes accessible to root users.
+
+A more robust approach to protecting data from root users is through the use of
+hardware solutions. OEMs may choose to implement hardware solutions that limit
+access to specific types of content such as DRM for video playback, or the
+NFC-related trusted storage for Google wallet.
+
+In the case of a lost or stolen device, full filesystem encryption on Android
+devices uses the device password to protect the encryption key, so modifying
+the bootloader or operating system is not sufficient to access user data
+without the user’s device password.
+
+#User Security Features
+
 ##Filesystem Encryption
 
 Android 3.0 and later provides full filesystem encryption, so all user data can
@@ -312,80 +404,24 @@
 [https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin.html](https://devel
 oper.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin.html).
 
+##Credential Storage
 
-##Memory Management Security Enhancements
+By default, Android includes a set of predefined Certificate Authorities (CAs)
+that are trusted for operations such as establishing SSL connections within the
+browser. In Android 4.0 and later, users can disable preinstalled CAs within
+the system settings. Users can also add trusted CAs or certificates to the
+system by importing them from USB storage. Android 4.1 and later adds the
+ability for OEMs to add hardware-backed KeyChain storage which binds
+private keys to the device on which they are stored.
 
-Android includes many features that make common security issues harder to
-exploit. The Android SDK, compilers, and OS use tools to make common memory
-corruption issues significantly harder to exploit, including:
+##Virtual Private Network
 
-**Android 1.5+**
-
-+ ProPolice to prevent stack buffer overruns (-fstack-protector)
-+ safe_iop to reduce integer overflows
-+ Extensions to OpenBSD dlmalloc to prevent double free() vulnerabilities and
-to prevent chunk consolidation attacks.  Chunk consolidation attacks are a
-common way to exploit heap corruption.
-+ OpenBSD calloc to prevent integer overflows during memory allocation
-
-**Android 2.3+**
-
-+ Format string vulnerability protections (-Wformat-security -Werror=format-security)
-+ Hardware-based No eXecute (NX) to prevent code execution on the stack and heap
-+ Linux mmap_min_addr to mitigate null pointer dereference privilege
-escalation (further enhanced in Android 4.1)
-
-**Android 4.0+**
-
-+ Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) to randomize key locations in memory
-
-**Android 4.1+**
-
-+ PIE (Position Independent Executable) support
-+ Read-only relocations / immediate binding (-Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now)
-+ dmesg_restrict enabled (avoid leaking kernel addresses)
-+ kptr_restrict enabled (avoid leaking kernel addresses)
-
-##Rooting of Devices
-
-By default, on Android only the kernel and a small subset of the core
-applications run with root permissions. Android does not prevent a user or
-application with root permissions from modifying the operating system, kernel,
-and any other application.  In general, root has full access to all
-applications and all application data. Users that change the permissions on an
-Android device to grant root access to applications increase the security
-exposure to malicious applications and potential application flaws.
-
-The ability to modify an Android device they own is important to developers
-working with the Android platform. On many Android devices users have the
-ability to unlock the bootloader in order to allow installation of an alternate
-operating system. These alternate operating systems may allow an owner to gain
-root access for purposes of debugging applications and system components or to
-access features not presented to applications by Android APIs.
-
-On some devices, a person with physical control of a device and a USB cable is
-able to install a new operating system that provides root privileges to the
-user. To protect any existing user data from compromise the bootloader unlock
-mechanism requires that the bootloader erase any existing user data as part of
-the unlock step. Root access gained via exploiting a kernel bug or security
-hole can bypass this protection.
-
-Encrypting data with a key stored on-device does not protect the application
-data from root users. Applications can add a layer of data protection using
-encryption with a key stored off-device, such as on a server or a user
-password.  This approach can provide temporary protection while the key is not
-present, but at some point the key must be provided to the application and it
-then becomes accessible to root users.
-
-A more robust approach to protecting data from root users is through the use of
-hardware solutions. OEMs may choose to implement hardware solutions that limit
-access to specific types of content such as DRM for video playback, or the
-NFC-related trusted storage for Google wallet.
-
-In the case of a lost or stolen device, full filesystem encryption on Android
-devices uses the device password to protect the encryption key, so modifying
-the bootloader or operating system is not sufficient to access user data
-without the user’s device password.
+Android provides a built-in VPN client with support for PPTP, L2TP, and IPsec VPNs.
+In addition, Android 4.0 introduced the
+[VpnService](http://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService.html) class
+to support third-party VPN solutions. Android 4.2 introduced the ability for a
+user to configure the VPN as "always on" to indicate that applications can connect
+to the network only through the connected VPN.
 
 #Android Application Security
 
@@ -435,10 +471,11 @@
 
 ##The Android Permission Model: Accessing Protected APIs
 
-By default, an Android application can only access a limited range of system
-resources. The system manages Android application access to resources that, if
-used incorrectly or maliciously, could adversely impact the user experience,
-the network, or data on the device.
+All applications on Android run in an Application Sandbox, described earlier in
+this document. By default, an Android application can only access a limited
+range of system resources. The system manages Android application access to
+resources that, if used incorrectly or maliciously, could adversely impact the
+user experience, the network, or data on the device.
 
 These restrictions are implemented in a variety of different forms.  Some
 capabilities are restricted by an intentional lack of APIs to the sensitive
@@ -586,7 +623,7 @@
 of code (in this case, the Browser) that knows how to handle that Intent, and
 runs it. Intents can also be used to broadcast interesting events (such as a
 notification) system-wide. See
-[https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/Intent.html](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/Intent.html.
+[https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/Intent.html](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/Intent.html).
 
 + **ContentProviders**: A ContentProvider is a data storehouse that provides
 access to data on the device; the classic example is the ContentProvider that
@@ -614,6 +651,11 @@
 + In-App Billing
 + NFC Access
 
+Android 4.2 adds further control on the use of SMS. Android will provide a
+notification if an application attempts to send SMS to a short code that uses
+premium services which might cause additional charges.  The user can choose
+whether to allow the application to send the message or block it.
+
 ##SIM Card Access
 
 Low level access to the SIM card is not available to third-party apps. The OS
@@ -722,6 +764,15 @@
 l#uid) where two or more applications signed with same developer key can
 declare a shared UID in their manifest.
 
+##Application Verification
+
+Android 4.2 and later support application verification. Users can choose to
+enable “Verify Apps" and have applications evaluated by an application verifier
+prior to installation.  App verification can alert the user if they try to
+install an app that might be harmful; if an application is especially bad, it
+ can block installation.
+
+
 ##Digital Rights Management
 
 The Android platform provides an extensible DRM framework that lets
diff --git a/src/tech/security/sidebar2.md b/src/tech/security/sidebar2.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a751c77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tech/security/sidebar2.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Security Topics #
+- [Security Overview](/tech/security/index.html)
+- [Android 4.2](/tech/security/android_4_2_security_enhancements.html)
+
+