external/boringssl: Sync to 5e578c9dba73460c3eb17f771c77fc8e36f7812e.
This includes the following changes:
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/58e449904e248f34bdfc2be7a609c58bcb0257b7..5e578c9dba73460c3eb17f771c77fc8e36f7812e
Test: BoringSSL CTS Presubmits
Change-Id: Ic1541b034545fa58a284ca35134b3719303455c7
diff --git a/src/crypto/cipher_extra/e_chacha20poly1305.c b/src/crypto/cipher_extra/e_chacha20poly1305.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c433053
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/cipher_extra/e_chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/chacha.h>
+#include <openssl/cipher.h>
+#include <openssl/cpu.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/poly1305.h>
+
+#include "../fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+
+#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16
+
+struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx {
+ unsigned char key[32];
+};
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
+static int asm_capable(void) {
+ const int sse41_capable = (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << 19)) != 0;
+ return sse41_capable;
+}
+
+// chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.pl. It
+// decrypts |plaintext_len| bytes from |ciphertext| and writes them to
+// |out_plaintext|. On entry, |aead_data| must contain the final 48 bytes of
+// the initial ChaCha20 block, i.e. the key, followed by four zeros, followed
+// by the nonce. On exit, it will contain the calculated tag value, which the
+// caller must check.
+extern void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
+ const uint8_t *ciphertext,
+ size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
+ size_t ad_len, uint8_t *aead_data);
+
+// chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.pl. It
+// encrypts |plaintext_len| bytes from |plaintext| and writes them to
+// |out_ciphertext|. On entry, |aead_data| must contain the final 48 bytes of
+// the initial ChaCha20 block, i.e. the key, followed by four zeros, followed
+// by the nonce. On exit, it will contain the calculated tag value, which the
+// caller must append to the ciphertext.
+extern void chacha20_poly1305_seal(uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
+ const uint8_t *plaintext,
+ size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
+ size_t ad_len, uint8_t *aead_data);
+#else
+static int asm_capable(void) {
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
+ const uint8_t *ciphertext,
+ size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
+ size_t ad_len, uint8_t *aead_data) {}
+
+static void chacha20_poly1305_seal(uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
+ const uint8_t *plaintext,
+ size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
+ size_t ad_len, uint8_t *aead_data) {}
+#endif
+
+static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+ size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
+ struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx;
+
+ if (tag_len == 0) {
+ tag_len = POLY1305_TAG_LEN;
+ }
+
+ if (tag_len > POLY1305_TAG_LEN) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (key_len != sizeof(c20_ctx->key)) {
+ return 0; /* internal error - EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this. */
+ }
+
+ c20_ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx));
+ if (c20_ctx == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(c20_ctx->key, key, key_len);
+ ctx->aead_state = c20_ctx;
+ ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {
+ struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(c20_ctx->key, sizeof(c20_ctx->key));
+ OPENSSL_free(c20_ctx);
+}
+
+static void poly1305_update_length(poly1305_state *poly1305, size_t data_len) {
+ uint8_t length_bytes[8];
+
+ for (unsigned i = 0; i < sizeof(length_bytes); i++) {
+ length_bytes[i] = data_len;
+ data_len >>= 8;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, length_bytes, sizeof(length_bytes));
+}
+
+static void poly1305_update_padded_16(poly1305_state *poly1305,
+ const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) {
+ static const uint8_t padding[16] = { 0 }; /* Padding is all zeros. */
+
+ CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len);
+ if (data_len % 16 != 0) {
+ CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, padding,
+ sizeof(padding) - (data_len % 16));
+ }
+}
+
+/* calc_tag fills |tag| with the authentication tag for the given inputs. */
+static void calc_tag(uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN],
+ const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx,
+ const uint8_t nonce[12], const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
+ const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_len) {
+ alignas(16) uint8_t poly1305_key[32];
+ OPENSSL_memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
+ CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, sizeof(poly1305_key),
+ c20_ctx->key, nonce, 0);
+
+ poly1305_state ctx;
+ CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&ctx, poly1305_key);
+ poly1305_update_padded_16(&ctx, ad, ad_len);
+ poly1305_update_padded_16(&ctx, ciphertext, ciphertext_len);
+ poly1305_update_length(&ctx, ad_len);
+ poly1305_update_length(&ctx, ciphertext_len);
+ CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&ctx, tag);
+}
+
+static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal_scatter(
+ const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag,
+ size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
+ size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *ad,
+ size_t ad_len) {
+ const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
+
+ if (nonce_len != 12) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* |CRYPTO_chacha_20| uses a 32-bit block counter. Therefore we disallow
+ * individual operations that work on more than 256GB at a time.
+ * |in_len_64| is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
+ * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
+ * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
+ * the warning. */
+ const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
+ if (in_len_64 >= (UINT64_C(1) << 32) * 64 - 64) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (max_out_tag_len < ctx->tag_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ alignas(16) uint8_t tag[48];
+
+ if (asm_capable()) {
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(tag, c20_ctx->key, 32);
+ OPENSSL_memset(tag + 32, 0, 4);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(tag + 32 + 4, nonce, 12);
+ chacha20_poly1305_seal(out, in, in_len, ad, ad_len, tag);
+ } else {
+ CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, c20_ctx->key, nonce, 1);
+ calc_tag(tag, c20_ctx, nonce, ad, ad_len, out, in_len);
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out_tag, tag, ctx->tag_len);
+ *out_tag_len = ctx->tag_len;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_open_gather(
+ const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *nonce,
+ size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *in_tag,
+ size_t in_tag_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+ const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
+
+ if (nonce_len != 12) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (in_tag_len != ctx->tag_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* |CRYPTO_chacha_20| uses a 32-bit block counter. Therefore we disallow
+ * individual operations that work on more than 256GB at a time.
+ * |in_len_64| is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
+ * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
+ * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
+ * the warning. */
+ const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
+ if (in_len_64 >= (UINT64_C(1) << 32) * 64 - 64) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ alignas(16) uint8_t tag[48];
+
+ if (asm_capable()) {
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(tag, c20_ctx->key, 32);
+ OPENSSL_memset(tag + 32, 0, 4);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(tag + 32 + 4, nonce, 12);
+ chacha20_poly1305_open(out, in, in_len, ad, ad_len, tag);
+ } else {
+ calc_tag(tag, c20_ctx, nonce, ad, ad_len, in, in_len);
+ CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, c20_ctx->key, nonce, 1);
+ }
+
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_chacha20_poly1305 = {
+ 32, /* key len */
+ 12, /* nonce len */
+ POLY1305_TAG_LEN, /* overhead */
+ POLY1305_TAG_LEN, /* max tag length */
+ aead_chacha20_poly1305_init,
+ NULL, /* init_with_direction */
+ aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup,
+ NULL /* open */,
+ aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal_scatter,
+ aead_chacha20_poly1305_open_gather,
+ NULL, /* get_iv */
+};
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305(void) {
+ return &aead_chacha20_poly1305;
+}