external/boringssl: Sync to 14308731e5446a73ac2258688a9688b524483cb6.
This includes the following changes:
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/ee7aa02744a78bf4630913b1c83d0fe36aa45efc..14308731e5446a73ac2258688a9688b524483cb6
Test: BoringSSL CTS Presubmits.
Change-Id: I73bf80fa018c2a65ca9842f1c2f95d64586bdffc
diff --git a/src/ssl/handshake_server.cc b/src/ssl/handshake_server.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee5358c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/ssl/handshake_server.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,1711 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/cipher.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+
+
+static int ssl3_process_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_select_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_select_parameters(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_send_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_send_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+int ssl3_accept(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ assert(ssl->handshake_func == ssl3_accept);
+ assert(ssl->server);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ int state = hs->state;
+
+ switch (hs->state) {
+ case SSL_ST_INIT:
+ ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+ ret = ssl3_process_client_hello(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
+ ret = ssl3_select_certificate(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (hs->state != SSL_ST_TLS13) {
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
+ ret = ssl3_select_parameters(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ssl->method->received_flight(ssl);
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
+ } else {
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ if (hs->server_params_len > 0) {
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_hello_done(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
+ if (hs->cert_request) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE:
+ ret = ssl->method->read_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
+ if (hs->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
+ if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_channel_id(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+ ret = ssl3_get_finished(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ssl->method->received_flight(ssl);
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ hs->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ } else {
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
+ }
+
+ /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then record the handshake
+ * hashes in |hs->new_session| in case we need them to verify a
+ * ChannelID signature on a resumption of this session in the future. */
+ if (ssl->session == NULL && ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+ ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_finished(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+ } else {
+ hs->next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
+ ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = hs->next_state;
+ if (hs->state != SSL_ST_OK) {
+ ssl->method->expect_flight(ssl);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_TLS13: {
+ int early_return = 0;
+ ret = tls13_handshake(hs, &early_return);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (early_return) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ ssl->method->release_current_message(ssl, 1 /* free_buffer */);
+
+ /* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can discard it
+ * now. */
+ if (hs->new_session != NULL &&
+ ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ hs->new_session->certs = NULL;
+ ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_clear(hs->new_session);
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session);
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session);
+ ssl->s3->established_session = ssl->session;
+ } else {
+ ssl->s3->established_session = hs->new_session;
+ ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = 0;
+ hs->new_session = NULL;
+ }
+
+ ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1;
+ ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+ ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (hs->state != state) {
+ ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
+ }
+ }
+
+end:
+ ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
+ uint16_t id) {
+ CBS cipher_suites;
+ CBS_init(&cipher_suites, client_hello->cipher_suites,
+ client_hello->cipher_suites_len);
+
+ while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
+ uint16_t got_id;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &got_id)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (got_id == id) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int negotiate_version(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+ const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ assert(!ssl->s3->have_version);
+ CBS supported_versions, versions;
+ if (ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &supported_versions,
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)) {
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&supported_versions, &versions) ||
+ CBS_len(&supported_versions) != 0 ||
+ CBS_len(&versions) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Convert the ClientHello version to an equivalent supported_versions
+ * extension. */
+ static const uint8_t kTLSVersions[] = {
+ 0x03, 0x03, /* TLS 1.2 */
+ 0x03, 0x02, /* TLS 1.1 */
+ 0x03, 0x01, /* TLS 1 */
+ 0x03, 0x00, /* SSL 3 */
+ };
+
+ static const uint8_t kDTLSVersions[] = {
+ 0xfe, 0xfd, /* DTLS 1.2 */
+ 0xfe, 0xff, /* DTLS 1.0 */
+ };
+
+ size_t versions_len = 0;
+ if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+ if (client_hello->version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ versions_len = 4;
+ } else if (client_hello->version <= DTLS1_VERSION) {
+ versions_len = 2;
+ }
+ CBS_init(&versions, kDTLSVersions + sizeof(kDTLSVersions) - versions_len,
+ versions_len);
+ } else {
+ if (client_hello->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ versions_len = 8;
+ } else if (client_hello->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
+ versions_len = 6;
+ } else if (client_hello->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
+ versions_len = 4;
+ } else if (client_hello->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
+ versions_len = 2;
+ }
+ CBS_init(&versions, kTLSVersions + sizeof(kTLSVersions) - versions_len,
+ versions_len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_negotiate_version(hs, out_alert, &ssl->version, &versions)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* At this point, the connection's version is known and |ssl->version| is
+ * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */
+ ssl->s3->have_version = 1;
+
+ /* Handle FALLBACK_SCSV. */
+ if (ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(client_hello,
+ SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff) &&
+ ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < hs->max_version) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ *out_alert = SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *
+ ssl_parse_client_cipher_list(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
+ CBS cipher_suites;
+ CBS_init(&cipher_suites, client_hello->cipher_suites,
+ client_hello->cipher_suites_len);
+
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
+ uint16_t cipher_suite;
+
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &cipher_suite)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
+ if (c != NULL && !sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return sk;
+
+err:
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers determines the key exchange and
+ * authentication cipher suite masks compatible with the server configuration
+ * and current ClientHello parameters of |hs|. It sets |*out_mask_k| to the key
+ * exchange mask and |*out_mask_a| to the authentication mask. */
+static void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+ uint32_t *out_mask_k,
+ uint32_t *out_mask_a) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ uint32_t mask_k = 0;
+ uint32_t mask_a = 0;
+
+ if (ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
+ mask_a |= ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key(hs->local_pubkey);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(hs->local_pubkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check for a shared group to consider ECDHE ciphers. */
+ uint16_t unused;
+ if (tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &unused)) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE;
+ }
+
+ /* PSK requires a server callback. */
+ if (ssl->psk_server_callback != NULL) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+ }
+
+ *out_mask_k = mask_k;
+ *out_mask_a = mask_a;
+}
+
+static const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
+ const struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *server_pref) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
+ /* in_group_flags will either be NULL, or will point to an array of bytes
+ * which indicate equal-preference groups in the |prio| stack. See the
+ * comment about |in_group_flags| in the |ssl_cipher_preference_list_st|
+ * struct. */
+ const uint8_t *in_group_flags;
+ /* group_min contains the minimal index so far found in a group, or -1 if no
+ * such value exists yet. */
+ int group_min = -1;
+
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *client_pref =
+ ssl_parse_client_cipher_list(client_hello);
+ if (client_pref == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
+ prio = server_pref->ciphers;
+ in_group_flags = server_pref->in_group_flags;
+ allow = client_pref;
+ } else {
+ prio = client_pref;
+ in_group_flags = NULL;
+ allow = server_pref->ciphers;
+ }
+
+ uint32_t mask_k, mask_a;
+ ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(hs, &mask_k, &mask_a);
+
+ const SSL_CIPHER *ret = NULL;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, i);
+
+ size_t cipher_index;
+ if (/* Check if the cipher is supported for the current version. */
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(c) <= ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) &&
+ ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) <= SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(c) &&
+ /* Check the cipher is supported for the server configuration. */
+ (c->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) &&
+ (c->algorithm_auth & mask_a) &&
+ /* Check the cipher is in the |allow| list. */
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, &cipher_index, c)) {
+ if (in_group_flags != NULL && in_group_flags[i] == 1) {
+ /* This element of |prio| is in a group. Update the minimum index found
+ * so far and continue looking. */
+ if (group_min == -1 || (size_t)group_min > cipher_index) {
+ group_min = cipher_index;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (group_min != -1 && (size_t)group_min < cipher_index) {
+ cipher_index = group_min;
+ }
+ ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, cipher_index);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (in_group_flags != NULL && in_group_flags[i] == 0 && group_min != -1) {
+ /* We are about to leave a group, but we found a match in it, so that's
+ * our answer. */
+ ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, group_min);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(client_pref);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_process_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
+ if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, ssl->init_msg,
+ ssl->init_num)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Run the early callback. */
+ if (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL) {
+ switch (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&client_hello)) {
+ case ssl_select_cert_retry:
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_select_cert_error:
+ /* Connection rejected. */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+
+ default:
+ /* fallthrough */;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Freeze the version range after the early callback. */
+ if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &hs->min_version, &hs->max_version)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!negotiate_version(hs, &alert, &client_hello)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ hs->client_version = client_hello.version;
+ if (client_hello.random_len != SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->client_random, client_hello.random,
+ client_hello.random_len);
+
+ /* Only null compression is supported. TLS 1.3 further requires the peer
+ * advertise no other compression. */
+ if (OPENSSL_memchr(client_hello.compression_methods, 0,
+ client_hello.compression_methods_len) == NULL ||
+ (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+ client_hello.compression_methods_len != 1)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_LIST);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS extensions. */
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &client_hello)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_select_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ /* Call |cert_cb| to update server certificates if required. */
+ if (ssl->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
+ int rv = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (rv < 0) {
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_on_certificate_selected(hs)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ /* Jump to the TLS 1.3 state machine. */
+ hs->state = SSL_ST_TLS13;
+ hs->do_tls13_handshake = tls13_server_handshake;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
+ if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, ssl->init_msg,
+ ssl->init_num)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Negotiate the cipher suite. This must be done after |cert_cb| so the
+ * certificate is finalized. */
+ hs->new_cipher =
+ ssl3_choose_cipher(hs, &client_hello, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(ssl));
+ if (hs->new_cipher == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_select_parameters(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
+ if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, ssl->init_msg,
+ ssl->init_num)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Determine whether we are doing session resumption. */
+ int tickets_supported = 0, renew_ticket = 0;
+ /* TODO(davidben): Switch |ssl_get_prev_session| to take a |bssl::UniquePtr|
+ * output and simplify this. */
+ SSL_SESSION *session_raw = nullptr;
+ auto session_ret = ssl_get_prev_session(ssl, &session_raw, &tickets_supported,
+ &renew_ticket, &client_hello);
+ bssl::UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session(session_raw);
+ switch (session_ret) {
+ case ssl_session_success:
+ break;
+ case ssl_session_error:
+ return -1;
+ case ssl_session_retry:
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION;
+ return -1;
+ case ssl_session_ticket_retry:
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_TICKET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (session) {
+ if (session->extended_master_secret && !hs->extended_master_secret) {
+ /* A ClientHello without EMS that attempts to resume a session with EMS
+ * is fatal to the connection. */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_session_is_resumable(hs, session.get()) ||
+ /* If the client offers the EMS extension, but the previous session
+ * didn't use it, then negotiate a new session. */
+ hs->extended_master_secret != session->extended_master_secret) {
+ session.reset();
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (session) {
+ /* Use the old session. */
+ hs->ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
+ ssl->session = session.release();
+ ssl->s3->session_reused = 1;
+ } else {
+ hs->ticket_expected = tickets_supported;
+ ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 1 /* server */)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Clear the session ID if we want the session to be single-use. */
+ if (!(ssl->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) {
+ hs->new_session->session_id_length = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb != NULL &&
+ ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb(&client_hello) == 0) {
+ /* Connection rejected for DOS reasons. */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->session == NULL) {
+ hs->new_session->cipher = hs->new_cipher;
+
+ /* On new sessions, stash the SNI value in the session. */
+ if (hs->hostname != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(hs->new_session->tlsext_hostname);
+ hs->new_session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(hs->hostname);
+ if (hs->new_session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Determine whether to request a client certificate. */
+ hs->cert_request = !!(ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER);
+ /* Only request a certificate if Channel ID isn't negotiated. */
+ if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) &&
+ ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+ hs->cert_request = 0;
+ }
+ /* CertificateRequest may only be sent in certificate-based ciphers. */
+ if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+ hs->cert_request = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!hs->cert_request) {
+ /* OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are requested. This is
+ * classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. */
+ hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* HTTP/2 negotiation depends on the cipher suite, so ALPN negotiation was
+ * deferred. Complete it now. */
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!ssl_negotiate_alpn(hs, &alert, &client_hello)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Now that all parameters are known, initialize the handshake hash and hash
+ * the ClientHello. */
+ if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_init_hash(&hs->transcript, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl),
+ hs->new_cipher->algorithm_prf) ||
+ !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Release the handshake buffer if client authentication isn't required. */
+ if (!hs->cert_request) {
+ SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ /* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order to avoid a
+ * known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */
+ if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
+ (hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kECDHE) == 0) {
+ ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't support
+ * ChannelID then we didn't record the original handshake hashes in the
+ * session and so cannot resume with ChannelIDs. */
+ if (ssl->session != NULL &&
+ ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
+ ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+ }
+
+ struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
+ ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
+ ssl->s3->server_random[0] = now.tv_sec >> 24;
+ ssl->s3->server_random[1] = now.tv_sec >> 16;
+ ssl->s3->server_random[2] = now.tv_sec >> 8;
+ ssl->s3->server_random[3] = now.tv_sec;
+ if (!RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->server_random + 4, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - 4)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO(davidben): Implement the TLS 1.1 and 1.2 downgrade sentinels once TLS
+ * 1.3 is finalized and we are not implementing a draft version. */
+
+ const SSL_SESSION *session = hs->new_session;
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ session = ssl->session;
+ }
+
+ CBB cbb, body, session_id;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&body, ssl->version) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &session_id) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, session->session_id,
+ session->session_id_length) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&body, ssl_cipher_get_value(hs->new_cipher)) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0 /* no compression */) ||
+ !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &body) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ bssl::ScopedCBB cbb;
+
+ if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+ if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (hs->certificate_status_expected) {
+ CBB body, ocsp_response;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&body, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &ocsp_response) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&ocsp_response,
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(ssl->cert->ocsp_response),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(ssl->cert->ocsp_response)) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Assemble ServerKeyExchange parameters if needed. */
+ uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(hs->new_cipher) ||
+ ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && ssl->psk_identity_hint)) {
+
+ /* Pre-allocate enough room to comfortably fit an ECDHE public key. Prepend
+ * the client and server randoms for the signing transcript. */
+ CBB child;
+ if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2 + 128) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* PSK ciphers begin with an identity hint. */
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+ size_t len =
+ (ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) ? 0 : strlen(ssl->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)ssl->psk_identity_hint,
+ len)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+ /* Determine the group to use. */
+ uint16_t group_id;
+ if (!tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ hs->new_session->group_id = group_id;
+
+ /* Set up ECDH, generate a key, and emit the public half. */
+ if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&hs->ecdh_ctx, group_id) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), group_id) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child) ||
+ !SSL_ECDH_CTX_offer(&hs->ecdh_ctx, &child)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert(alg_k & SSL_kPSK);
+ }
+
+ if (!CBB_finish(cbb.get(), &hs->server_params, &hs->server_params_len)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ CBB cbb, body, child;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
+ SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
+ /* |hs->server_params| contains a prefix for signing. */
+ hs->server_params_len < 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&body, hs->server_params + 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ hs->server_params_len - 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Add a signature. */
+ if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+ if (!ssl_has_private_key(ssl)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Determine the signature algorithm. */
+ uint16_t signature_algorithm;
+ if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Add space for the signature. */
+ const size_t max_sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey);
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+ !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ size_t sig_len;
+ switch (ssl_private_key_sign(hs, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len,
+ signature_algorithm, hs->server_params,
+ hs->server_params_len)) {
+ case ssl_private_key_success:
+ if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ break;
+ case ssl_private_key_failure:
+ goto err;
+ case ssl_private_key_retry:
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(hs->server_params);
+ hs->server_params = NULL;
+ hs->server_params_len = 0;
+
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_send_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ CBB cbb, body;
+
+ if (hs->cert_request) {
+ CBB cert_types, sigalgs_cbb;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &cert_types) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&cert_types, SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN) ||
+ (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_VERSION &&
+ !CBB_add_u8(&cert_types, TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN)) ||
+ (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION &&
+ (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &sigalgs_cbb) ||
+ !tls12_add_verify_sigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs_cbb))) ||
+ !ssl_add_client_CA_list(ssl, &body) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ assert(hs->cert_request);
+
+ int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
+ if (msg_ret <= 0) {
+ return msg_ret;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+ if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION &&
+ ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+ /* In SSL 3.0, the Certificate message is omitted to signal no
+ * certificate. */
+ if (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are received. This is
+ * classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. */
+ hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+ ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ CBS certificate_msg;
+ CBS_init(&certificate_msg, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
+
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(hs->peer_pubkey);
+ hs->peer_pubkey = NULL;
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ hs->new_session->certs = ssl_parse_cert_chain(
+ &alert, &hs->peer_pubkey,
+ ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs ? hs->new_session->peer_sha256
+ : NULL,
+ &certificate_msg, ssl->ctx->pool);
+ if (hs->new_session->certs == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_len(&certificate_msg) != 0 ||
+ !ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0) {
+ /* No client certificate so the handshake buffer may be discarded. */
+ SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
+
+ /* In SSL 3.0, sending no certificate is signaled by omitting the
+ * Certificate message. */
+ if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) {
+ /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are received. This is
+ * classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. */
+ hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* The hash will have been filled in. */
+ if (ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
+ hs->new_session->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain(hs->new_session, ssl)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ CBS client_key_exchange;
+ uint8_t *premaster_secret = NULL;
+ size_t premaster_secret_len = 0;
+ uint8_t *decrypt_buf = NULL;
+
+ if (hs->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A) {
+ int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ CBS_init(&client_key_exchange, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
+ uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ /* If using a PSK key exchange, parse the PSK identity. */
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+ CBS psk_identity;
+
+ /* If using PSK, the ClientKeyExchange contains a psk_identity. If PSK,
+ * then this is the only field in the message. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &psk_identity) ||
+ ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_len(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
+ CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity, &hs->new_session->psk_identity)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |premaster_secret| and
+ * |premaster_secret_len|. */
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ CBS encrypted_premaster_secret;
+ if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange,
+ &encrypted_premaster_secret) ||
+ CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ encrypted_premaster_secret = client_key_exchange;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate a buffer large enough for an RSA decryption. */
+ const size_t rsa_size = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey);
+ decrypt_buf = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+ if (decrypt_buf == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of the
+ * timing-sensitive code below. */
+ size_t decrypt_len;
+ switch (ssl_private_key_decrypt(hs, decrypt_buf, &decrypt_len, rsa_size,
+ CBS_data(&encrypted_premaster_secret),
+ CBS_len(&encrypted_premaster_secret))) {
+ case ssl_private_key_success:
+ break;
+ case ssl_private_key_failure:
+ goto err;
+ case ssl_private_key_retry:
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (decrypt_len != rsa_size) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare a random premaster, to be used on invalid padding. See RFC 5246,
+ * section 7.4.7.1. */
+ premaster_secret_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ premaster_secret = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len);
+ if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys are
+ * publicly invalid. */
+ if (decrypt_len < 11 + premaster_secret_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
+ size_t padding_len = decrypt_len - premaster_secret_len;
+ uint8_t good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[0], 0) &
+ constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[1], 2);
+ for (size_t i = 2; i < padding_len - 1; i++) {
+ good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(decrypt_buf[i]);
+ }
+ good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len - 1]);
+
+ /* The premaster secret must begin with |client_version|. This too must be
+ * checked in constant time (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/). */
+ good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len],
+ (unsigned)(hs->client_version >> 8));
+ good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len + 1],
+ (unsigned)(hs->client_version & 0xff));
+
+ /* Select, in constant time, either the decrypted premaster or the random
+ * premaster based on |good|. */
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < premaster_secret_len; i++) {
+ premaster_secret[i] = constant_time_select_8(
+ good, decrypt_buf[padding_len + i], premaster_secret[i]);
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
+ decrypt_buf = NULL;
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+ /* Parse the ClientKeyExchange. */
+ CBS peer_key;
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &peer_key) ||
+ CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the premaster. */
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_finish(&hs->ecdh_ctx, &premaster_secret,
+ &premaster_secret_len, &alert, CBS_data(&peer_key),
+ CBS_len(&peer_key))) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* The key exchange state may now be discarded. */
+ SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&hs->ecdh_ctx);
+ } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* For a PSK cipher suite, the actual pre-master secret is combined with the
+ * pre-shared key. */
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+ if (ssl->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Look up the key for the identity. */
+ uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+ unsigned psk_len = ssl->psk_server_callback(
+ ssl, hs->new_session->psk_identity, psk, sizeof(psk));
+ if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ } else if (psk_len == 0) {
+ /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ /* In plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as the
+ * pre-shared key. */
+ premaster_secret_len = psk_len;
+ premaster_secret = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len);
+ if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memset(premaster_secret, 0, premaster_secret_len);
+ }
+
+ CBB new_premaster, child;
+ uint8_t *new_data;
+ size_t new_len;
+ CBB_zero(&new_premaster);
+ if (!CBB_init(&new_premaster, 2 + psk_len + 2 + premaster_secret_len) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
+ !CBB_finish(&new_premaster, &new_data, &new_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ CBB_cleanup(&new_premaster);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
+ premaster_secret = new_data;
+ premaster_secret_len = new_len;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the master secret */
+ hs->new_session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(
+ hs, hs->new_session->master_key, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
+ if (hs->new_session->master_key_length == 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hs->new_session->extended_master_secret = hs->extended_master_secret;
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ if (premaster_secret != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ CBS certificate_verify, signature;
+
+ /* Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a
+ * CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a client certificate.
+ * */
+ if (hs->peer_pubkey == NULL) {
+ SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
+ if (msg_ret <= 0) {
+ return msg_ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ CBS_init(&certificate_verify, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
+
+ /* Determine the digest type if needbe. */
+ uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0;
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&certificate_verify, &signature_algorithm)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &alert, signature_algorithm)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm;
+ } else if (!tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm(&signature_algorithm,
+ hs->peer_pubkey)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse and verify the signature. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_verify, &signature) ||
+ CBS_len(&certificate_verify) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ int sig_ok;
+ /* The SSL3 construction for CertificateVerify does not decompose into a
+ * single final digest and signature, and must be special-cased. */
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t digest_len;
+ if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_ssl3_cert_verify_hash(&hs->transcript, digest,
+ &digest_len, hs->new_session,
+ signature_algorithm)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(hs->peer_pubkey, NULL);
+ sig_ok = pctx != NULL &&
+ EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) &&
+ EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature),
+ digest, digest_len);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ } else {
+ sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify(
+ ssl, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), signature_algorithm,
+ hs->peer_pubkey, (const uint8_t *)hs->transcript.buffer->data,
+ hs->transcript.buffer->length);
+ }
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+ sig_ok = 1;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+#endif
+ if (!sig_ok) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the current
+ * message.*/
+ SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
+ if (!ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
+ * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
+static int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) ||
+ !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ CBS next_protocol, selected_protocol, padding;
+ CBS_init(&next_protocol, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &selected_protocol) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &padding) ||
+ CBS_len(&next_protocol) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_stow(&selected_protocol, &ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated,
+ &ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */
+static int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
+ if (msg_ret <= 0) {
+ return msg_ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) ||
+ !tls1_verify_channel_id(hs) ||
+ !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_send_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ if (hs->ticket_expected) {
+ const SSL_SESSION *session;
+ SSL_SESSION *session_copy = NULL;
+ if (ssl->session == NULL) {
+ /* Fix the timeout to measure from the ticket issuance time. */
+ ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, hs->new_session);
+ session = hs->new_session;
+ } else {
+ /* We are renewing an existing session. Duplicate the session to adjust
+ * the timeout. */
+ session_copy = SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session, SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH);
+ if (session_copy == NULL) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session_copy);
+ session = session_copy;
+ }
+
+ CBB cbb, body, ticket;
+ int ok = ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
+ SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) &&
+ CBB_add_u32(&body, session->timeout) &&
+ CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &ticket) &&
+ ssl_encrypt_ticket(ssl, &ticket, session) &&
+ ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(session_copy);
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ if (!ok) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl) ||
+ !tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return ssl3_send_finished(hs);
+}